TESE DE DOUTORAMENTO

THE EXTENDER TAGS *AND THE LIKE* AND *OR SOMETHING* IN LATE MODERN ENGLISH: A FORMAL AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

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ABSTRACT

Extender tags can be defined as a class of expressions of the type *and stuff* and *or something* that are added to the end of phrases, sometimes in clause-final position, in order to extend otherwise complete utterances (Overstreet 1999; Carroll 2008). Such expressions, as exemplified below by *or something*, have been broadly studied in present-day English from very diverse perspectives.

> "*They say Mr Wakem has got a mortgage* ***or something*** *on the land, Tom," said Maggie.* (Eliot, George. 1860. *The Mill on the Floss:* 12 (Vol. 2))

What is lacking, however, is a thorough historical analysis that covers the study of the form, behaviour and evolution of these tags in previous stages of the language. In this context, the aim of the present dissertation is to offer a corpus-based analysis of extender tags in the late Modern English period, a time span of two centuries covering from 1700 to 1900, as represented by the forms *and the like* and *or something*. For this purpose, two datasets belonging to the *Chadwyck-Healey Collection of Literature* have been selected: the *Eighteenth Century Fiction* and the *Nineteenth Century Fiction*.

Extender tags are divided into two types depending on the conjunction that introduces them: adjunctive forms feature the conjunction *and*, as is the case of *and the like*, while those extenders that are introduced by *or* are disjunctive, such as *or something*. These two forms have been selected for the present piece of research, as representative of each of the two aforementioned categories. The main focus of the dissertation is, consequently, a thorough analysis of the formal features of these tags as well as of the functions they perform during the late Modern English period, including also a brief discussion of their historical development from the point of view of grammaticalization.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of the present dissertation is to explore the behaviour in the late Modern English period of extender tags, a group of forms of the type *and so on, and the like, or something*, etc. Overstreet (2014: 106) defines extenders in the following way:

> Wide range of expressions with similar positional and compositional features. In their most frequent realization, they are phrase- and clause-final, consist of *and/or* plus a vague nominal/proform, with an optional comparative phrase (*like that*). Those beginning with *and* are described as adjunctive [extender tags] while those beginning with *or* are disjunctive [extender tags]. These forms are typically optional and attach to otherwise grammatically complete utterances.

An example is given in (1.1) below.

(1.1) *What are you doing tonight, you know, do you wanna go out* ***or something*** *cos I'm in London. I'm in a hotel.* (Palacios Martínez 2011: 2453)

Extender tags, as illustrated by *or something* in (1.1) above, have been the focus of a wide array of investigations over the last four decades, and have thus become a very prominent area of study. Nevertheless, despite the growing interest in these forms, such research has been conducted almost exclusively on present-day English, while a thorough historical approach concerning their form, behaviour or development in previous stages of the language is still lacking.[1] In this context, the present dissertation represents a timely contribution which will help to complement and broaden our knowledge of these forms in earlier English. Furthermore, the historical perspective is key when approaching the evolution of extender tags, as

[1] As discussed in Section 2.5, a historical perspective is adopted in a few publications on extender tags in Middle and early Modern English, namely Carroll (2007; 2008) and Ortega Barrera (2012).

"grammaticalization is quintessentially a diachronic process" (Levey 2012: 263). Although some attempts have been made in order to assess the grammatical evolution of extender tags using apparent time methods, the results have not been completely satisfactory, so that historical research to verify such changes is still pending (Levey 2012: 278). The choice of the late Modern English period for the present dissertation has a twofold motivation: on the one hand, no research, to my knowledge, has been carried out concerning extender tags at this stage; on the other hand, late Modern English is the time span situated between those periods for which some research on extenders is available (i.e. Middle and early Modern English) and Contemporary English. Therefore, the findings of the present piece of work can serve as a bridge between the already existing information for earlier stages and that available for present-day English in the extensive literature on extender tags.

The specific purpose of the present dissertation is to give a detailed and thorough description of the formal and functional features of two extender tags that have been selected for the analysis as representatives of the whole category of forms, namely *or something* and *and the like*. This choice of forms has been motivated by the desire to include in the analysis one specimen for each of the two types of extenders, i.e. one disjunctive extender tag and one adjunctive extender tag. It has also been taken into account that these two extenders are amongst the most frequently occurring ones. Therefore, for my purposes, *or something* has been chosen, as it is the most common disjunctive extender tag, both in the period under analysis and in present-day English (cf. Section 3.2). In turn, as a representative of the adjunctive set of forms, I have selected the extender tag *and the like*. Although the adjunctive form *et cetera* is probably somewhat more recurrent, it does not have the versatility of *and the like* concerning its use and functions (cf. Section 3.2). In addition, despite its high frequency of occurrence in my late Modern English sources, *and the like* does not seem to be very common in present-day English. This suggests that it may have followed a different developmental path from that

of *or something*, which offers the chance to observe different patterns of evolution for each of the extender tags under investigation.

It has broadly been claimed, and has been proved by Palacios Martínez (2011: 2459), that extender tags are a feature that is more frequently found in speech than in writing. Although they are attested in any kind of context, from the most formal registers to the informal talk amongst friends and relatives, the strong persistence of extender tags in the spoken language has led the vast majority of researchers to look for them in corpora containing oral discourse (cf. Section 2.4.1). The impossibility to access spoken records from earlier stages of the language probably explains the little attention devoted to these forms from a historical perspective. In an attempt to overcome this obstacle, I have resorted to two literary collections containing novels from the *Chadwyck-Healey Collection of Literature*, namely the *Eighteenth Century Fiction* (ECF) and the *Nineteenth Century Fiction* (NCF), which together cover the time span that corresponds with the late Modern English period (1700-1903). First of all, novels have been chosen because they contain dialogues, which are a reflection of the actual speech of the time; and, secondly, because, as opposed to poetry and drama, "the novel dwells on the ordinary man in the society […], the language or language style prevalent in the society at the time of its production will be reflected in the novel" (Ewata & Mahmud 2014: 4). Therefore, the novel is a genre with a high degree of speech-likeness. At the same time, the ECF and the NCF provide a huge collection of material from which to extract the largest amount of data possible.

The dissertation is divided into two main parts. The first (cf. Chapter 2) offers an exhaustive review of the literature on extender tags that has been published over the last four decades, including the varied terminology and definitions suggested for these forms (cf. Section 2.1), the form of extender tags (cf. Section 2.2), the functions that they have been claimed to perform (cf. Section 2.3), textual, sociolinguistic, dialectal and other features of extenders (cf. Section 2.4) and their status in earlier English (cf. Section 2.5). The final section in Chapter 2 (cf. Section 2.6) discusses the

grammaticalization of extenders. The remainder of the volume is devoted to the empirical part of the dissertation, which closely mirrors the structure used for the review of the literature in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 includes the description of the materials and the methodology used for the analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5. The discussion of the form *or something* is the focus of Chapter 4, which pays attention to its formal (cf. Section 4.2) and textual features (cf. Section 4.3), as well as to the functions that the extender covers in the late Modern English period (cf. Section 4.4). In turn, the analysis of *and the like* replicates in Chapter 5 that of *or something*, describing its formal features (cf. Section 5.2), the textual ones (cf. Section 5.3) and the functions that the extender performs (cf. Section 5.4). The extender tag *or something* is examined first, because it is the one that most resembles the present-day English state of affairs concerning the characteristics that extender tags have been shown to display, as discussed in Chapter 2. Such similarity enables an easier and more transparent comparison between the different features of the extender in late Modern English and in present-day English. The analysis of *and the like*, in turn, is addressed afterwards and its features are described in connection to those of the extender tag *or something*. Finally, the dissertation closes with a brief chapter on the grammaticalization of the two forms under analysis (cf. Chapter 6) and some concluding remarks (cf. Chapter 7).

Before proceeding any further, it is important to note that, although I deal with figures, frequencies and percentages in the present dissertation, as these are essential tools to observe the evolution of the extender tags under consideration, the picture of the late Modern English state of affairs is drawn here without testing the statistical significance of such data. A more thorough quantitative analysis has been disregarded on the grounds that extender tags are a rather low-frequency phenomenon, in such a way that many of the features examined in Chapters 4 and 5 are attested in only a handful of tokens. Such occurrences are very interesting from a qualitative point of view and should, therefore, be accounted for, although they are less salient from a strictly quantitative perspective. The focus of the present dissertation is,

therefore, on the comprehensive and detailed description of the extender tags *or something* and *and the like* concerning their formal and functional features, while illustrating, at the same time, the evolution that such features undergo in the late Modern English period.

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2. EXTENDER TAGS IN THE LITERATURE

2.1 TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITION

Over the last 40 years or so, a wide variety of labels have been used to refer to extender tags by different researchers. This section offers a brief account of such labels.

The three standard reference grammars of the English language, namely Quirk et al. (1985), Biber et al. (1999) and Huddleston & Pullum et al. (2002), use terminology directly related to coordination to refer to the forms at issue in this dissertation. Quirk et al. (1985) call them 'abbreviations for coordination' and define them as "abbreviatory devices which are added to a coordinated list, to indicate that the list has not been exhaustively given" (1985: 983). In turn, Biber et al. (1999) describe the function of extender tags as items which indicate "that the expression preceding the conjunction is not to be taken as precise or exhaustive" (1999: 116) and include them under the label 'coordination tags'. Finally, Huddleston & Pullum et al. (2002) refer to these expressions as 'idiomatic coordinates' (2002: 1540).

To my knowledge, the first researchers to approach the topic of extender tags were Ball & Ariel (1978), in an article devoted to the characterization of *or something*. They call these forms '*and/or* tags' and define them on the basis of their function, which they claim is "to suggest, without specifying, other conjuncts or disjuncts similar in some relevant respect to the preceding" (1978: 36). Shortly after, in 1980, Dines provides a variationist approach to extender tags in Australian English and proposes the term 'set-marking tags' to label this class of expressions whose function is, in her own words, "to cue the listener to interpret the preceding element as an illustrative example of some more general case" (Dines 1980: 22). Fifteen years later, Stubbe & Holmes (1995) adopt this same terminology in

a sociolinguistic analysis of pragmatic devices in New Zealand English, as also do Winter & Norrby (2000; 2002) in their cross-linguistic approach to these forms in Australian English and Swedish. In an examination of teenage talk, Stenström et al. (2002: 98-99) simplify the term and refer to this set of expressions as 'set markers', quoting and using Dines' definition in their study. Finally, Youssef (1993) also follows the investigation presented by Dines (1980) in her research on the creole use of *an ting*, though she claims that the tag functions both as a generalizer and as a solidarity marker.

In her 1985 article, entitled "What happens at the end of utterances? – The use of utterance-final tags introduced by 'and' and 'or'", Aijmer analyses these expressions under the label 'utterance-final tags introduced by *and* or *or*', which she reduces for the sake of simplicity to 'terminal tags', 'terminating tags' and '*and*/*or* tags'. Aijmer reuses Dines' (1980) definition to describe this set of expressions and alludes also to their vague nature, categorizing them as vagueness markers or hedges. Twenty years later, Aijmer discusses extender tags in a book chapter devoted to discourse particles (2002) and calls them 'referent-final tags', still holding to their vague reference. In a more recent article (Aijmer 2004), she includes the forms under analysis here in a group of pragmatic markers without making explicit reference to them. Lastly, an article by Simpson about formulaic language in academic speech in American English also considers extender tags as expressions of vagueness (Simpson 2004: 47), though this author uses an alternative label to refer to them, namely 'vagueness markers' or 'generalizers'.

Somewhere in between the set-marking approach initiated by Dines (1980) and the vagueness one proposed by Aijmer (1985), among others, we can set Channell's (1994) treatment of extender tags. Channell places these forms in a frame of vague language, and, consequently, calls them 'vague category identifiers'. However, the function that she attributes to these forms resembles that proposed by Dines (1980): "[t]he exemplar + tag construction is understood as an instruction to access a category, whose characteristics are defined for the hearer by the exemplar provided, taken in conjunction with relevant pragmatic information" (Channell 1994: 131). Channell's

categorization also differs from the rest in that her term 'vague category identifier' does not only include the tag introduced by the conjunctions *and* or *or*, but also the exemplar or exemplars that precede the conjunction. In an analysis that follows Channell's approach to vague language, Koester (2007) further explains Channell's categorization of these forms with the help of the following example:

(2.1) *Because she's missing the servers and things like that*. (Koester 2007: 47)

As Koester explains, the 'vague category identifier' in example (2.1) contains two components, the exemplar *the servers* and what she calls the 'vague tag' (also following Channell 1994: 143), in this case *and things like that* (Koester 2007: 48). Cheng & Warren had already made use of the term 'vague tag' to make reference to extender tags in their 2001 analysis of vague language as used contrastively by native and non-native speakers of English. Very similar to this is the term used by De Cock (2004) in her investigation on preferred sequences of words by native and non-native speakers, 'vagueness tags'. Also following Channell's approach and terminology, Jucker et al. (2003) carry out an interactional study of vague language. Similarly, in 2002, Drave also examines vague language by means of a contrastive analysis using Cantonese and native English speakers, where he identifies extender tags as 'vague category markers', a label that is also used by O'Keeffe (2004) and Evison et al. (2007) in parallel researches on these forms within the frame of vague language. Coterill (2007) also follows Channell's approach in her analysis of the use of vague language in the British Courtroom, and also uses the label 'vague category markers' to refer to expressions of this kind.

In her 1990 article defending the relevance of three-partedness in English list-construction, Jefferson coins the term 'generalized list completers' to refer to extender tags. The function she attributes to them is to be the third item in a list in order to "point out that the list is 'relevantly incomplete'" (1990: 68), i.e. that there are many more elements that could be named apart from those already provided, but there is no need to specify them. Lerner (1994) expands the research carried out by Jefferson (1990) and

adopts the same term to refer to extender tags, although the function that he seems to attribute to these constructions comes closer to that stated by Dines (1980). He explains that the presence of these forms in a list extends the acknowledgement of its members to the acknowledgement of the whole class of items to which the members belong (Lerner 1994: 29). Sánchez-Ayala (2003) also adopts this term in his contrastive analysis of lists in English and Spanish.

In a sociolinguistic analysis of Montréal French, Dubois (1992) refers to the expressions at issue in this dissertation as 'extension particles', and provides the following definition for them: "a word or formula […] that occupies a characteristic position in the sentence and has a typical intonational pattern" (1992: 179). She also explains that their function, similarly to that proposed by Dines (1980), is to "cue the listener to evoke some larger set" (Dubois 1992: 198).

In 1999, Overstreet published a book devoted entirely to extender tags, building on a couple of previous articles by Overstreet & Yule (1997a; 1997b), in which they coined the term 'general extenders' to refer to these forms. She explains her choice of this term in the following way: "'general' because they are nonspecific, and 'extenders' because they extend otherwise grammatically complete utterances" (Overstreet 1999: 3). She uses this label to refer to the whole range of existing forms, but makes a further distinction between 'general' and 'specific' extenders depending on their specificity. 'Specific extenders' are those "further specified instances […] [where] the interpretation of the category implicated by the general extender [is constrained] by naming the category […], or by identifying either characteristic properties of its members […] or their common function" (Overstreet 1999: 52). Example (2.2) below illustrates a 'general extender', in contrast to (2.3), which includes a 'specific extender':

(2.2) *Homer: It's, like, they're all stupid* ***and stuff.*** (*Simpsons Comics* 1994: 2, quoted from Overstreet 1999: 22)

(2.3) *Maya: My nose runs and my eyeballs ooze* ***an' things like that that aren't real attractive.*** (Overstreet 1999: 52)

The author proposes a multifunctional analysis of these expressions, encompassing both referential as well as interpersonal functions,[2] something that had not been done by any of the previous researchers. Cheshire (2007) adopts Overstreet's multifunctional approach as well as the label 'general extender' in her research on the grammaticalization of these forms in British English, defining them "as a class of expressions that typically occur in clause-final position and have the basic form of conjunction (*and* or *or*) plus noun phrase" (Cheshire 2007: 156), a definition that would be used some years later by Denis in his analysis of the innovators of *and stuff* in York English (2011). In turn, Tagliamonte & Denis also adopt this label in order to refer to the forms under consideration, but define them as "features of English that are typically used 'to evoke some larger set'" (2010: 335), thus including part of Dubois' (1992) definition discussed above. They carry out a sociolinguistic as well as a functional analysis of these forms and give an account of their process of grammaticalization in Canadian English, comparable to that done by Cheshire (2007) for British English. An article by Pichler & Levey (2011) offers a similar synchronic analysis of the grammaticalization of the tags as those proposed by Cheshire (2007) and by Tagliamonte & Denis (2010), also following Overstreet's (1999) approach and terminology.

The fact that the label 'general extender' is more neutral than previously existing ones (many of which point to the function that is attributed to these forms, as is the case of 'set-marking tag', for example) has made it the preferred one by the majority of subsequent researchers. As a consequence, 'general extender' has become almost the universal term to refer to these expressions. In addition to those already mentioned, consider, for instance, Palacios Martínez's (2011) research on the use of these forms by adolescents, Ortega Barrera's (2012) examination of the functions of these tags in recipes in earlier English, Secova's (2014) study of the forms, functions

[2] The different functions that extender tags have been claimed to perform, as well as the classification proposed for such functions into referential and interpersonal, as suggested by Overstreet (1999), are dealt with in detail in Section 2.3 below.

and grammaticalization of extenders in French, Buysse's (2014) analysis of English learners' use of these forms using Overstreet's (1999) terminology and definition, and Grzybek & Verdonik's (2014) approach to these forms from the perspective of phraseology.

The term 'general extender' has become so popular that it has come to be used even by those researchers who, following Channell (1994), include these forms in the frame of vague language, despite the fact that Overstreet (1999) does not adhere to it. Terraschke & Holmes (2007), in their contrastive analysis of these forms in New Zealand English and German, as well as Terraschke's (2009; 2010) subsequent articles on the same topic, propose the following definition: "forms which serve referentially as expressions of vagueness, and interpersonally to build rapport, and which conform to a specifiable structural pattern" (Terraschke & Holmes 2007: 201). In a number of articles on the use of extenders in Persian, Parvaresh & Tavangar (2010), Parvaresh et al. (2010), Parvaresh et al. (2012) and Parvaresh & Dabghi (2013) follow Overstreet (1999), but ultimately include Terraschke & Holmes' (2007) definition. Other researchers adhering to the frame of vague language using the label 'general extender' are Cucchi (2007), who explores the use of extenders in EU Parliamentary debates, Ruzaite (2010) in her contrastive study of these forms in Lithuanian and English, Fernández & Yuldashev (2011), in their analysis of this set of expressions in instant messaging interactions, as well as Fernández (2015) on the use of these tags in Peninsular Spanish. Fernández (2015) rephrases Overstreet's (1999) definition of extenders in the following way: "routinized chunks of language used for shared pragmatic functions whose interpretation is heavily grounded in local discourse" (Fernández 2015: 4). Even Overstreet decides to embrace this approach and defends that extenders are part of vague language in her 2011 article on vagueness and the hedging function of vague language. In her 2014 article on the grammaticalization of extenders, Overstreet offers a renewed definition of the forms at issue here: "category label for a wide range of expressions with similar positional and compositional features. In their most frequent realization, they are phrase- and clause-final, consist of *and/or*

plus a vague nominal/proform, with an optional comparative phrase (*like that*) […]. These forms are typically optional and attach to otherwise grammatically complete utterances." (Overstreet 2014: 106).

In a piece of research on the use of extender tags and other expressions in the speech of people with Alzheimer's disease, Maclagan et al. (2008) simplify Overstreet's (1999) label and refer to these forms plainly as 'extenders'.

A more recent contribution to the range of labels referring to the expressions at issue is that proposed by Carroll (2008). She maintains that the distinction suggested by Overstreet (1999) between 'general' and 'specific' extenders is not such a clear one, but should be rather seen as a cline (Carroll 2007: 43). She thus coins the term 'extender tag' to encompass both types of extenders under the same label. She further specifies that "the term 'tags' in 'extender tags' should be understood more broadly, as a sequence which follows either a clause or a phrase" (Carroll 2008: 12), refuting, at the same time, the general belief that 'tags' occur clause-finally, as Overstreet also acknowledged later on (Overstreet 2014: 106). The definition Carroll proposes is the following: "[e]xtender tags are phrases such as *and so forth*, which have also been called 'set-marking tags', 'vague category identifiers', 'list extenders', 'general extenders' and 'list completers'" (Carroll 2008: 7). In her research, Carroll recognizes extender tags to be multifunctional, as had been proposed by Overstreet (1999).

In the present dissertation I follow the analysis carried out by Overstreet in her 1999 book *Whales, Candlelight and* stuff *like that* because, in my opinion, her multifunctional approach is the one that best describes the behaviour of extenders. Nevertheless, I adopt the term coined by Carroll (2008), 'extender tags', in order to refer to these forms instead of Overstreet's 'general extenders', despite its widespread use, because the former label is more transparent and neutral, avoiding the conflict between 'general' and 'specific' forms and encompassing all under the same label.

I therefore define extender tags as a class of "expressions of the type *and the like* and *or something* that are added to the end of phrases, sometimes

in clause-final position, in order to extend otherwise complete utterances" (Pérez-González 2017: 19). These tags can be of two types, adjunctive, if they are introduced by the conjunction *and*, and disjunctive, if they follow the conjunction *or*. In some rare examples the conjunction is not present, but we can gather from the context if it is an adjunctive or a disjunctive form. For instance, in (2.4) the conjunction *or* is elided, while *that kind of shit* in (2.5) is an adjunctive extender tag:

(2.4) *I show myself about eighty feet out,* ***something like that***. (Overstreet 1999: 11)

(2.5) *Although Ryan is often surrounded by explosions and gunfire, Ford says he never puts himself in any real danger. "I don't do stunts," he says. "I do running, jumping, falling down. I hit people, I get hit by people,* ***that kind of shit***. *Stunts are done by stuntmen."* (*Entertainment Weekly* Summer 1994, quoted from Overstreet 1999: 53)

2.2 FORM OF THE TAG

In this section I deal with those aspects related to the formal features of extender tags, as have been analysed in the literature on the topic. First of all, an inventory of these forms for present-day English is provided (cf. Section 2.2.1). Then, special attention is devoted to the extender tag template (cf. Section 2.2.2). Finally, other formal characteristics of extender tags are discussed in Section 2.2.3.

2.2.1 INVENTORY

Table 2.1, Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 provide an inventory of present-day English expressions taken from the different analyses that have been carried out on extender tags or that have included some of these forms and that are reviewed in the previous section. It must be noted, however, that scholars working on the topic have only included within their inventories the forms which are more general in meaning. More complex and further specified

extenders, as exemplified by *and things like that that aren't real attractive* in (2.3) above, are not considered here. The forms are divided into three separate categories: those introduced by the conjunction *and* (cf. Table 2.1), those introduced by *or* (cf. Table 2.2) and those with no overt connector introducing them (cf. Table 2.3). In Tables 2.1 to 2.3 everything in parentheses is optional, while we must select one word from those in braces. For example, in the case of *or* {*stuff / things*} (*like that*), the possible options would be: *or stuff, or things, or stuff like that* and *or things like that*. Moreover, those forms marked with an asterisk are only attested in the speech of non-native speakers of English.

AND
and (*a lot of*) *places* (*like that*)
and all {*kinds of* / *the other*} *things*
and all (*that* / *this*) (*lot*) (*and what not ever*)
and all (*of*) (*those* / *that*)
and all over the place
and all sorts (*of people* / *things* / *other shit*)
and (*all*) *the rest* (*of it*)
and (*all*) *that* / *those* (*lot* / *sort* / *kind* / *bit*)
and (*all*) (*these* / *those* / *the*) *things* (*like that*)
and all this / *that* (*bit* / *sort* / *kind* / *type of*) {*business* / *crap* / *thing* / *jazz* / *nonsense* / *shit* / *stuff* / *bullshit* / *rubbish* / *situation*}
and (*all*) *this, that and the other* (*thing*)
and all this other {*contextual stuff* / *shit*}
and all those {*kind of stuff** / *sort of things*}
*and and and**
and blah blah blah
and anything important like that
and {*business* / *crap* / *things* / *junk* / *shit* / *stuff*} *of this* / *that* {*kind* / *sort* / *ilk* / *nature*}
and everybody
and everything (*like that*) / (*else*)
and everywhere
and kind of funky stuff like that
and (*other*) {*stuff* / *junk* / *crap* / *shit* / *things*} (*like that* / *this*)
and people (*like that* / *this*)
*and so**
and so forth (*and so on*)
and so on (*and so forth*) (*and so on*)
and such (*places*) / (*and such*)
and suchlike
*and such things**
and that there
and that / *this* {*kind* / *sort* / *type*} *of* {*thing* / *stuff*}

and that (*sort* / *type* / *kind* / *lot* / *shit*)
and the like
and the rest (*of it*)
and the whole {*kit and caboodle* / *nine yards* / *bit* / *thing*}
and them
and thing(*s*) (*like that* / *this*)
and things of that kind
and this and that
and {*this* / *really sick* / *some smaller* / *the wole*} *stuff**
*and tralala**
and whatever
and what have you
and whatnot
and whatsie
*and whatsoever**
and you name it
*and etcetera etcetera**
et cetera (*et cetera*)

Table 2.1 Inventory of present-day English adjunctive extender tags

OR
or (*all*) *that* (*there* / *sort of stuff*)
or all sorts
or anybody (*like that*)
or anyone (*like that*)
or anything (*like that*) (*else*)
or anything of that {*kind* / *sort*}
or anywhere (*like that*)
or a whole range of things
*or everything**
or like that
or nothing (*like that*)
*or other things**
or owt (*like that*)
or so
or so forth
*or some other stuff**
or somebody (*like that*)
or someone (*like that*)
or someplace (*like that*)
or something (*or other*) (*like that* / *this*)
or something of that / *this* {*kind* / *sort* / *nature*}
or something to that effect
or somewhere (*like that*)
or sommat
or {*stuff* / *things*} (*like that*)
*or that kind of stuff**
*or the like**
or these {*kind* / *sort*} *of things**

or the odd thing
*or this**
or what
or whatever (*it is*) / (*it is called*) * / (*you want to call it*)* / (*you call it*) / (*they are*)
or what have you
or whatnot
or wherever
or whoever

Table 2.2 Inventory of present-day English disjunctive extender tags

No overt connector
(*all*) (*that* / *this*) {*kind* / *sort* / *type*} *of* {*thing* / *stuff*}
all that
all of that sort of stuff
all the rest of it
(*all*) *stuff like that*
anything (*like that*)
blah blah blah
kind of places
(*people* / *stuff*) *like that*
something (*like that* / *this*)
somewhere (*like that*)
sommat (*like that*)
(*sort of*) *thing*(*s*) (*like that*)
the whole bit
this that and the other
things {*of that sort* / *like that*}
type thing
whatever
what have you

Table 2.3 Inventory of present-day English extender tags with no overt connector

2.2.2. EXTENDER TAG PARADIGM

This section is devoted to an overview of the different attempts at proposing a paradigm that encompasses the totality of forms that extender tags can present. It is subdivided into those that have approached the subject from a classic syntactic point of view, treating the extender tag as a construction (cf. Section 2.2.2.1), and those who have analysed extender tags from the perspective of phraseology (cf. Section 2.2.2.2).

2.2.2.1 THE CLASIC VIEW

The main problem when trying to account for the form of extender tags is that almost every element in the construction is optional, as we can see from the many combinations and the amount of brackets that indicate optionality presented in Tables 2.1 to 2.3 (cf. Section 2.2.1). The optionality of the conjunction, shown in Table 2.3 and illustrated by (2.4) and (2.5) in Section 2.1, should also be considered. All in all, encapsulating the totality of existing extender tags under a single paradigm is really challenging, and different researchers have struggled with this issue, or decided to simplify or even overlook this feature.

In one of the earliest articles on the topic of extender tags, Ball & Ariel (1978: 36) explain that these forms are introduced by a conjunction and can also contain the modifier *like that*, which can be elided. Channell (1994: 131) agrees with this characterization, as do also Winter & Norrby (2000), who define extenders as "generally introduced by a connector (*and/or*)" (Winter & Norrby 2000: 3). This definition is, however, too simple, as it does not account for the material that follows the conjunction or for any modifier other than *like that*.

Dines (1980), in turn, tries to reduce the totality of extender tags to a few patterns. Thus, adjunctive extenders are classified as belonging to one of the following six patterns:

(i) *and stuff/things like that*
(ii) *and that*
(iii) *like that*
(iv) *and stuff/things*
(v) *and all this/that*
(vi) *and everything*

Disjunctive extender tags, on the other hand, are reduced to just one pattern, namely *or something/anything (like that)* (Dines 1980: 18). A quick look at Tables 2.1 to 2.3 suffices to realize that there are numerous forms that do not correspond to any of these patterns.

In subsequent research, Aijmer (1985) proposes three paradigms for the formation of extender tags:

(i) (*and*) *all that/this kind/sort of thing/stuff*

(ii) (*and*) *things/stuff like that/this*
of that/this kind/sort

(iii) (*or*) *something/anything like that/this*
of that/this kind/sort

(Aijmer 1985: 372)

The patterns proposed here, like those suggested by Dines, do not cover the wide range of possible forms that extender tags can display.

Some years later, Dubois (1992) deviates from the lexical patterns just mentioned and goes back to the basic characterization of forms following a conjunction for her analysis of Montréal French. She further specifies what comes after the connector, explaining that extenders "commonly contain quantifiers (*tout* 'all', *quelque* 'some'), generics (*chose* 'thing', *affaire* 'thing', 'affair'), and/or comparative elements (*comme ça* 'like that', *de meme* 'that are the same')" (1992: 189). She also includes in her categorization of extenders some "characteristic fixed expressions (*et cetera, patati patata*)" (1992: 189) that do not follow the previously mentioned structure (1992: 185). Secova (2014) builds on this description and formulates the following pattern in her analysis of these forms, also in French: <*et/ou*> + quantifier/generic noun + <comparative>[3] (Secova 2014: 7).

From Dubois' (1992) description of extenders arises Tagliamonte & Denis' (2010) general paradigm for the formation of such expressions in English, later adopted also by Denis (2011). Like Dubois (1992), these authors explain that extender tags typically contain four different types of elements: connector (*and, or*), quantifier (*all, every, some, any, the odd, the whole, no*), generic (*thing(s), stuff, people, one, where, shit, crap, baloney*) and comparative (*like that, sort of, kind of, type of, of that kind, of that sort, of that type, around there, to that effect*) (Tagliamonte & Denis 2010: 337; Denis

[3] Angle brackets indicate here optionality.

2011: 62). Furthermore, they suggest that these elements can be combined in five different ways (an example of each is given in brackets):

(i) connector + generic + comparative (e.g. *and stuff like that*)

(ii) quantifier + generic + comparative (e.g. *something like that*)

(iii) connector + quantifier + generic + comparative (e.g. *and everything like that*)

(iv) connector + generic (e.g. *and things*)

(v) connector + quantifier + generic (e.g. *or something*)

(Tagliamonte & Denis 2010: 337)

Taking this pattern as a point of departure, Pichler & Levey (2011: 449) propose the following structure for the formation of extender tags: "(connector) (modifier) (generic noun/pro-form) (similative) (deictic)", where every element is optional. The pattern is essentially the same as the one given by Tagliamonte & Denis (2010), but here the comparative part is divided into the similative (the preposition *like*) and the deictic. Moreover, Pichler & Levey (2011) also encompass anything occurring before the generic noun phrase under the label 'modifier'.

Elaborate as Tagliamonte & Denis' (2010) and Pinchler & Levey's (2011) patterns of formation for extender tags may be, they still do not cover the whole range of possibilities, as they leave out more complex creations not included in Tables 2.1 to 2.3 (as discussed in Section 2.2.1), and also such common adverbial extenders as *and so on*, *and so forth* or *etcetera*, which Pichler & Levey (2011: 448) consider as more structurally fixed.

Overstreet (1999), in turn, decides on a much less elaborate proposal and simply explains that extender tags "have the basic form of conjunction plus noun phrase" (1999: 3). By not specifying the structure of this noun phrase, she encompasses the vast majority of forms under this simple pattern, on which most researchers after her have relied when describing extender tags.[4] Palacios Martínez (2011) adds that extenders can "be complemented or

[4] Among the researchers using Overstreet's (1999) categorization for the formation of extender tags we find O'Keeffe (2004); Cheshire (2007); Koester (2007); Palacios Martínez (2011); and Buysse (2014).

modified by some other forms, such as *like this/that*, *(of) that sort/kind, this/that nonsense, this/that business, this bit, the rest of it,* etc." (2011: 2455), a feature that is also incorporated by Overstreet in her 2014 article, where she states that extender tags "consist of *and/or* plus a vague nominal/proform, with an optional comparative phrase (*like that*)" (2014: 106). Again, this paradigm fails to incorporate adverbial forms such as *and so on, and so forth* or *etcetera*, as noted by some researchers (cf. O'Keeffe 2004: 11; Palacios Martínez 2011: 2454), and it does not reflect the optionality of the conjunction either. Fernández & Yuldashev (2011) overcome this shortcoming by stating that extender tags are "a result of the combination of a conjunction and a noun phrase or an adverbial phrase […] where [the] conjunction does not [always] necessarily surface lexically" (2011: 2611).

Finally, Terraschke & Holmes' (2007) proposal builds on Overstreet's (1999), but further specifies what appears in the noun phrase: "conjunction (premodifier) vague noun (postmodifier)" (2007: 201). Later, Terraschke (2009) offers a modification of this pattern: "conjunction + (premodifier) vague expression (postmodifier)" (2009: 145), which would encompass not only extenders with a nominal proform, but also the aforementioned adverbial forms *and so on*, *and so forth* and *etcetera*.

The structure of extender tags in languages other than English seems to be relatively similar. As we have already seen, the paradigm proposed by Dubois (1992) for French was adopted for English without any necessary changes. Cortés Rodríguez (2006a) mentions that, in Spanish, extender tags are usually introduced by a conjunction and contain some vague word (Cortés Rodríguez 2006a: 88), a description that matches Overstreet's (1999) closely. Very similar too is the structure of Persian extender tags, the only difference being that they tend to include the comment clause *I don't know* and a preposition before the noun phrase, yielding the following structure: "conjunction + (*I don't know*) + (preposition) + noun phrase" (Parvaresh et al. 2010: 23). The preposition is directly translated into English by the less proficient speakers, yielding non-native-like forms like *and of such things* (included in Table 2.1).

2.2.2.2 PHRASEOLOGY

The approaches to the form of extender tags presented in the previous section are framed in construction grammar, and the researchers representing them deal with real examples taken from a corpus, using a corpus linguistics approach. Stefanowitsch & Gries' (2003) collostructional theory takes both construction grammar and corpus linguistics as a starting point. Their aim is to investigate the strong ties that bound certain lexemes to a given construction. They define a construction as "any linguistic expression, no matter how concrete or abstract, that is directly associated with a particular meaning or function, and whose form or meaning cannot be compositionally derived" (2003: 212). The association of a given lexeme to any given construction constitutes a collostruction (2003: 215). These authors also state that high frequencies of occurrence, which is on what corpus linguistics relies, do not disambiguate relevant results from accidental ones, and therefore more precise methods are needed (2003: 214). From this collostructional theory derives the notion of phraseologism, which Gries (2008: 6) defines as "the co-occurrence of a form or a lemma of a lexical item and one or more additional linguistic elements of various kinds which functions as one semantic unit in a clause or sentence and whose frequency of co-occurrence is larger than expected on the basis of chance".

Only a couple of investigations study extender tags from the perspective of phraseology, which Carroll (2008: 18) explains serves as a good way to account not just for the short semi-fixed extender tags, but also for more specific creative forms that function in the same way as the shorter variants and have sometimes been excluded from analysis. She illustrates this distinction between short more general forms by means of the extender *and things* and offers a more specific longer variant of this tag, *and other excellent things that grew in that garden* (2008: 18).[5]

[5] The notion of general versus specific extenders has been discussed in Section 2.1, as explained by Overstreet (1999). Carroll (2007: 43) defends that there is no clear-cut difference

However, Carroll defends that the whole class of extender tags cannot be considered a phraseologism because, following Gries' (2008) definition, there is no one single lexical item that is common to all extender tags, not even the conjunction (2008: 21). This explains why she prefers to treat them as a collostruct, "a whole class of syntactically similar items not linked to an individual lexeme" (2008: 9) and this would be the "syntactic frame upon which individual extender tags can be built" (2008: 21). In this context, each individual extender tag, or each form of extender tag (characterized by its head) would be a phraseologism. Grzybek & Verdonik (2014: 114), on the other hand, consider that extender tags are a type of pragmatic phraseologism; the whole class may not be tied to a single lexical item, but they are all linked by their common function, thus being a phraseologism "of a pragmatic rather than of a semantic kind" (2014: 118). Consequently, these two different approaches to the form of extender tags from a phraseological point of view ultimately derive in a terminological mismatch between both works (cf. Carroll 2008; Grzybek & Verdonik 2014).

Like Overstreet (1999), Carroll (2008) defines the form of extender tags as consisting of "a coordinating conjunction (*and* or *or*) followed by a noun phrase which typically includes a semantically empty head (*thing*) and/or a modifier which extends the denotation of the noun (*other*)" (2008: 8). She then moves on to examine some phraseological characteristics of extender tags, following Stubbs' (2001, quoted from Carroll 2008: 22-23) behaviour patterns: collocation (i.e. their attraction to other words or phrases), semantic preference (i.e. their attraction not just to a word, but to the whole semantic field), colligation (i.e. their attraction to a particular category or grammatical frame) and discourse prosody (i.e. the pragmatics or connotations of the extender in question). In respect to these, Carroll finds out that, in terms of collocation, the extender tag *and diverse* is most often than not followed by the word *other*. As regards colligation, the word *other* occurs in extender tags of varying length and specificity. Such extenders could be categorized under

between both types, and that the specificity of the tag should rather be seen as a cline from the more general to the more specific.

the following grammatical structure: conjunction (+ indefinite quantifier) (+ adjectives) (+ *other*) (+ adjectives) (+ noun), where every element is optional except the conjunction (and even there, the speaker has to choose between *and* and *or*). This pattern does not include, however, the possibility of the noun being post-modified. Concerning semantic preference, Carroll finds that the extender *and all* tends to collocate with the semantic fields of family and household (*children, sister(s), brother(s)*, etc). Finally, as regards discourse prosody, she finds that the extender *and such* has a negative connotation of disapproval (Carroll 2008: 24-29). Carroll's findings illustrate some of the characteristics of extender tags from the point of view of phraseology, which can lead to further research on the topic.

In a 2014 article, Grzybek & Verdonik analyse extender tags in Slovene from a phraseological point of view, with the aim to verify that these forms have spread following a diversification process (a method that is more precise than just analysing frequencies). In order to comprehend the diversification process, it is important to understand Zipf's law, which is based on "the least effort principle" (Zhang & Liu 2017: 249), whereby speakers tend to use the minimum amount of words. This leads words, therefore, to be polysemic, by what is called the unification force. On the other hand, listeners find less difficulties when each word has just one single meaning, the so-called diversification force. Reaching a balance between these two opposing forces results in Zipf's law, by which language evolves. To account for this, Altman (1991, quoted from Zhang & Liu 2017: 250) proposes the right truncated modified Zipf-Alekseev model, which is used to "model the ranking law of diversified entities" (2017: 250). In order to check if a phraseological unit, extender tags in this case, is in fact the result of a diversification process, Grzybek & Verdonik (2014) divide the different forms that they have found into basic groups of similar items,[6] which results in 14 different groups of extenders, subsequently ordered from the most frequent to the least frequent ones. Their working hypothesis is that if extender tags adhere to the law of

[6] Considering individual extender tags would lead to confusing results, because many of them occur just once in their data.

diversification, their frequencies should be lawfully connected and follow the Zipf-Alekseev predicted ones. After applying the Zipf-Alekseev function with its normalizing constant, Grzybek & Verdonik confirm that extender tags do conform to the model. This means that extenders are a specific subcategory of language that has arisen as a result of a diversification process, which implies that they are regularly distributed (2014: 122-127).

2.2.3 OTHER FORMAL FEATURES

In this section, some other formal features of extender tags are presented, including their formal distribution, their position within the clause in which they appear and their scope.

As seen in Section 2.2.1 above, extender tags can be subdivided into adjunctives (those introduced by the conjunction *and*) and disjunctives (those introduced by the conjunction *or*). A strong tendency is identified in all the varieties of English analysed in the literature on the topic for adjunctive forms to outnumber disjunctive ones (cf. Section 2.4.3.1). There are, however, a couple of exceptions to this rule. For instance, Overstreet (1999) finds more disjunctives in her corpus made up of conversations between relatives and friends. Similarly, Fernández & Yuldashev (2011) also witness a prevalence of disjunctive forms among the native speakers of their corpus based on instant message interactions. Both studies focus on American English, and in both cases it is informal talk among close relatives or friends what is analysed. Cheshire (2007) explains that the preference that Overstreet's (1999) speakers display for the use of disjunctive forms is due to the fact that her data come from informal chat, an environment which favours disjunctives. Conversely, the topic-focused talk of interviews, which conforms the basic data on which other studies rely, favours adjunctives (Cheshire 2007: 161). This explanation can also be applied to the findings of Fernández & Yuldashev (2011).

Besides being more common than their disjunctive counterparts, adjunctive extenders also show a greater variability of form. It is evident from

Tables 2.1 and 2.2, presented in Section 2.2.1 above, that the inventory of adjunctive forms is larger than that of disjunctive ones. However, the individual frequencies of some disjunctive forms (as is the case of *or something*) can be higher than that of many of the adjunctive ones, some of which are very infrequent. It is because of this that in those studies where the most frequent extenders are selected for the analysis, as is the case of Aijmer (2002), it may seem that disjunctive forms are more numerous than adjunctive ones. Nevertheless, closer examination of the London-Lund and the COLT corpora, which are the data used by Aijmer (2002), proves that adjunctive forms prevail over disjunctive ones in both of them.

Concerning the variation between longer and shorter variants of extender tags, between *and things like that* and *or something like that*, for example, and *and things* and *or something*, respectively, studies on extender tags agree that shorter variants are "generally preferred to the expanded form[s]" (Aijmer 1985: 373). Furthermore, these short forms, more specifically the ones that are most frequent, as *and things, and stuff* or *or something*, are so recurrent that are said to have become more formulaic or "automatic" (Aijmer 2002: 223).

As regards position, extender tags have been mostly analysed to "typically occur in clause-final position" (Overstreet 1999: 3), to be "sentence-final" (Tagliamonte 2010: 258) or to happen at the end of utterances (Aijmer 1985: 366). Although there seems to be general agreement in this respect, extender tags can also appear before the end of the sentence or clause, as (2.6) illustrates.

(2.6) *Apologies if any of you have tried to send mail* ***and stuff*** *to the list or listserv over the part hour or so.* (Palacios Martínez 2011: 2459)

It has been claimed that tags need not always be clause-final, that they can either follow a clause or a phrase (Carroll 2008: 12). If we take this into account, (2.6) would meet this requirement. Furthermore, Sánchez-Ayala (2003) claims that although tags are more frequent at the end of a list of

items, they can also be found in medial position, but provides no illustrative example (Sánchez-Ayala 2003: 339).[7]

In more recent research, Overstreet changes her clause-final restriction to explain that extender tags are ""right-hand" markers used in a fixed position, immediately following the phrases, clauses and utterances with which they occur" (Overstreet 2014: 108), thus embracing examples such as (2.6) above. She also concedes that there are some cases when extender tags can be attached to a subject (Overstreet 2012: 4). Overstreet (2014) explains that the general tendency of extender tags towards clause-final position is due to the characterization of English as an SVO language (2014: 108).

Finally, extender tags "do not seem to be constrained by strict grammatical agreement requirements" (Overstreet 1999: 10), either on syntactic or on semantic grounds. There seems to be general consensus about this on the part of those scholars who have looked into this feature of extender tags.[8] This means that there can be a grammatical mismatch between the head of the extender tag and its scope, that is, the exemplar or exemplars that precede it. Let us consider a couple of examples:

(2.7) *Yeah. Most of 'em are evergreens around there I guess. Pine trees* ***and stuff****.* (Overstreet 1999: 10)

(2.8) *[S]ort of experts and psychics and wise men* ***and things like that****.* (Palacios Martínez 2011: 2464)

In (2.7), a non-count noun, *stuff*, is used in order to refer back to a plural count one, *pine trees*. In (2.8), in turn, we witness semantic mismatch: both the head of the extender (*things*) and its three scope noun phrases (*experts, psychics and wise men*) are plural count, but the word *things*, which is normally used for semantically inanimate referents, is used with human

[7] Extender tags in medial position have also been attested by Carroll (2008) in earlier English, as is discussed in Section 2.5 below.

[8] Cf., for instance, Ball & Ariel (1978: 38); Dines (1980: 26); Aijmer (1985: 376); Cheshire (2007: 168); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 342); Terraschke (2010: 455); Palacios Martínez (2011: 2462-2463); Pichler & Levey (2011: 456-461); and Overstreet (2014: 113).

referents here. Grammatical mismatch has been attested in higher rates among the most frequently occurring extenders, as is the case of *or something*, *and stuff* or *and things*, for example. Moreover, this tendency is increasing over time in present-day English, as Palacios Martínez (2011: 2463) has proved, suggesting that these forms are undergoing a process of decategorialization in their way to grammaticalize.

Furthermore, extender tags are not limited to follow nominal scopes as the ones presented in (2.7) and (2.8) above, but can accompany other types of syntactic structure. Consequently, given that extenders usually have a nominal proform, any type of scope that is not a noun phrase is automatically in a situation of grammatical mismatch with the tag. Attested extender tag scope types include nominal scopes, as in (2.9); a verb phrase as scope of the tag, as in (2.10); an embedded clause as exemplar, as in (2.11); prepositional scopes, as is the case of (2.12); adjectival ones, as in (2.13); and adverbial scopes, as in (2.14). In many cases, the scope of the tag may be ambiguous, but in speech intonation helps in disambiguation (Channell 1994: 132).

(2.9) *You could get a, you know hamburger* ***or whatever****.* (Tagliamonte & Denis 2010: 338)

(2.10) *Sara: My kitty is quiet. It's not like he sits in the window and yowls* ***or anything****.* (Overstreet 1999: 53)

(2.11) *You'd think there was a general election coming up* ***or something****.* (Channell 1994: 135)

(2.12) *Like at work or on a construction site* ***or something like that****.* (Channell 1994: 135)

(2.13) *Am I psychotic* ***or what****?* (Overstreet 1999: 94)

(2.14) *... one of this things that grow logarithmically or exponentially* ***or something****.* (Channell 1994: 136)

2.3 FUNCTIONS OF EXTENDER TAGS

Although many of the earliest works on extender tags consider them as performing just one single function, Overstreet (1999) and many other

scholars after her have proved that these forms are essentially multifunctional. Although extenders sometimes display one single function, on other occasions they realize several functions at the same time. This section is devoted precisely to the multifarious functions of extender tags. It is divided into four sections. Section 2.3.1 deals with a couple of functions that I consider to be general traits common to all extender tags, associated to all uses of these forms, and which therefore deserve to be addressed separately. Then, in Section 2.3.2, the referential functions of extender tags are discussed, i.e. those belonging to the ideational sphere, referring to the content and "the speaker's experience of the real world, including the inner world of his own consciousness" (Halliday 1970: 143). On the other hand, the focus of Section 2.4.3 is on the expressive or interpersonal functions, which serve to "maintain social relations: for the expression of social roles […], social groups are delimited, and the individual is identified and reinforced, since by enabling him to interact with others language also serves in the expression and development of his own personality" (Halliday 1970: 143). Expressive functions are further divided into two groups: those that refer to the speaker's attitude towards the message, the subjective functions (cf. Section 2.3.3.1), and the intersubjective functions, which deal with the speaker's relation with his/her interlocutor(s) (cf. Section 2.3.3.2). Finally, Section 2.3.4 focuses on some other functions of extender tags that have been discussed in some studies but which have received little attention.

2.3.1 FUNCTIONS COMMON TO ALL EXTENDER TAGS

As mentioned above, this section is devoted to a couple of functions which, I argue, play a major role in all uses of extender tags, independently of other functions which may be at work at the same time. They concern the expression of shared knowledge and of vagueness, an interpersonal and an ideational function, respectively, in Halliday's (1970) terms.

2.3.1.1 CONVEYING SHARED KNOWLEDGE

The assumption of shared knowledge, a function that Overstreet (1999: 65) labels "intersubjectivity",[9] is a notion that is closely linked to the sphere of the interpersonal relationships between the participants taking part in a conversation. It means that the speaker appeals to the interlocutor's understanding and presupposes the correct interpretation of what (s)he is saying by resorting to a common knowledge shared by both of them. In the case of extender tags, which are forms whose meaning is non-compositional, the correct identification of the intention that the speaker has in mind when producing these forms relies purely on the interlocutor. There is, therefore, an implicit presupposition that (s)he will be able to decode the message based on an assumption of shared knowledge. This notion demands that the speaker or writer and the listener or reader share the same personal worlds. However, as the word itself indicates, the personal worlds of the participants in a communicative exchange are rarely identical; two individuals are not assumed to share identical concepts. In this respect, so-called intersubjectivity (or the assumption of shared knowledge) has been defined as "the acceptance that, although their subjective experiences and knowledge necessarily separate their individual conceptual worlds, people can function as if they share a co-conception of the world" (Overstreet & Yule 1997a: 95). Consequently, the conveyance of shared knowledge (or intersubjectivity) is essentially an expressive or interpersonal function, more precisely an intersubjective one (cf. also Section 2.3.3.2).

The notion of shared knowledge has been widely present in connection with another function of extender tags, categorization. Categorization has been the first and mainly the only function attributed to extender tags in the earliest works devoted to these forms, where the focus was more on their referential aspects than on their interpersonal implications. As will be

[9] Although the term "intersubjectivity" is the mainstream way of referring to this function across the literature on the topic, I prefer to avoid it when possible because of the terminological overlap with the label 'intersubjective functions' (cf. Section 2.3.3.2).

explained in Section 2.3.2.1, categorization implies that the elements presented before the tag belong to the same category, and the tag itself implies that more items of the same category can be added to the enumeration. Nevertheless, there is no need to do so, because the interlocutor can complete this information, on the basis of, as I have already pointed out, an assumption of shared knowledge. Many have been the researchers who have linked the function of categorization to the notion of shared knowledge.[10] Category implication and correct category identification rely on the existence of so-called shared knowledge, that, as we have seen, does not mean that the personal worlds of the interlocutors are exactly the same, but, rather, that they "behave as if the external world is sufficiently the same for them as it is for others" (Overstreet 1999: 67). This is how the presupposition of shared knowledge is understood in relation to categorization, as "how humans manage to create comparability of categories, or even sufficient overlap, given the assumption of non-identical worlds" (Overstreet 1999: 66).

Overstreet (1999) identifies two main types of shared knowledge: broad, cultural or general knowledge, i.e. that which is potentially shared by many people, and the kind of knowledge that is only shared by a small group of people who have a closer relationship among themselves (1999: 69). General knowledge, as referred to by Overstreet (1999), has been identified by Dubois (1992) as "common experience". In (2.15) below, for instance, the analyst can infer the kind of elements that belong to the category intended by *or anything like that* based on the common knowledge of the different ways of keeping in touch in our present-day society. On the other hand, it is impossible for an outsider to interpret examples such as (2.16) successfully without the particular knowledge of the participants involved in the conversation.

[10] The following researchers have addressed the notion of shared knowledge in relation to categorization: Dines (1980: 29); Dubois (1992: 181-182); Overstreet & Yule (1997a: 95); O'Keeffe (2004: 17); Cortés Rodríguez (2006a: 93-94); Coterill (2007: 106); Evison et al. (2007: 154); Koester (2007: 48-49); and Pichler & Levey (2011: 451).

(2.15) *Maya: I really think as soon as she moves to Connecticut I won't know her anymore. I'm sure she's not gonna call me or you know write me* ***or anything like that****.* (Overstreet 1999: 69)

(2.16) *Mary: Y'know, she wants whales, candlelight,* ***and stuff like that****.* (Overstreet 1999: 70)

Evison et al. (2007) propose a different categorization of the types of shared knowledge. They consider instances like (2.16) above as 'local' knowledge which would be "interpretable by a specific group of participants […] who share relatively exclusive social and cultural frames of knowledge" (2007: 149). They also subdivide Overstreet's (1999) general knowledge into 'global', that which would be "interpretable by most mature, experienced human beings throughout the world" (2007: 149), which is illustrated in (2.15), and 'societal', which is "interpretable by all members of a speech community or socio-political entity who share a common culture and history" (2007: 149). Fernández & Yuldashev (2011) follow Evison et al.'s (2007) classification, but refer to 'societal' knowledge as "culture bound" (2011: 2617). Example (2.17) illustrates this kind of knowledge. Note that here, unlike (2.15) above, the meaning of *and stuff* would not be understandable by most people, but only by those that are familiar with American Thanksgiving typical dishes.

(2.17) *Hey, Zack, so you are going to Tim's on Thanksgiving day?*

[…]

He just tried to entice me by saying he's going to have a huge turkey, gravy ***and stuff****.*

(Fernández & Yuldashev 2011: 2617)

Societal and, especially, local knowledge which is only shared by the participants in the interaction are sometimes very difficult to interpret on the part of an outsider, as can be the case of the analyst. Channell's (1994) research, which tests how a group of students interpret cases of extender tags on the basis of some written examples, proves that these forms are not interpreted in the same way by everybody. In Channell's (1994) tests, the participants were presented with some sentences containing extender tags, and were asked to write down alternatives as they thought fit to complete the

enumeration shortened by the extender tag. The results showed that there was very little coincidence in the options that the participants offered, which means that they interpreted extender tags in different ways and created different categories for them. This fact shows that "what is intersubjectively understood by the use of a[n] [extender tag] is not easily isolated from the participants or its context of occurrence" (Overstreet 1999: 71).

Nevertheless, and regardless of the nature of the shared knowledge required for a felicitous interpretation of extender tags, the underlying function of these forms would be the same, namely, that "the speaker conveys to the hearer an assumption of shared knowledge, and [(s)]he invites the hearer to supply whatever unstated understandings are required to make sense of the utterance" (Overstreet 1999: 72-73). This appeal to the interlocutor can also be seen as an attempt to bring him/her closer, to create rapport between both speaker and interlocutor, as an appeal to solidarity which is also ultimately linked to positive politeness. Secova (2014) even suggests that "since extenders may be used to engender solidarity rather than invoke existing knowledge, they are inherently associated with positive politeness" (2014: 10). Studies by Youssef (1993) and Norrby & Winter (2002) also put forward that the goal of intersubjectivity[11] is to bring speaker and hearer together (Youssef 1993: 296) and to show affiliation or inclusion into a group, involving the speaker's self-presentation (Norrby & Winter 2002: 5-7). Youssef even defines the extender tag *and ting* as a "marker of solidarity". Some authors have linked extender tags to this notion of solidarity and positive politeness,[12] but many more have contemplated the assumption of

[11] Intersubjectivity is understood here as the conveyance of shared knowledge, as proposed by Overstreet (1999).

[12] Cf. Youssef (1993: 303); Winter & Norrby (2000: 5); Cortés Rodríguez (2006b: 112); Cheshire (2007: 181); Terraschke & Holmes (2007: 202); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 343); Terraschke (2010: 459); and Grzybek & Verdonik (2014: 117).

shared knowledge as embracing the categorizing function as well as seeing it linked to solidarity and politeness concerns as well.[13]

In some cases, shared knowledge is co-constructed in the course of an interaction by the participants involved in it, as is the case in (2.18), where Julie offers the category label *conservative* to include the type of people who work in a grocery store, which Crystal accepts as a correct interpretation.

(2.18) *Crystal: an' this one girl you would not even know it. She looks like she works in a grocery store* ***or something****. Y'know. Just totally normal an'*
Julie: conservative
Crystal: Yeah, yeah.

(Overstreet 1999: 72)

In some other cases, the interlocutor just shows his/her understanding of the utterance via different backchannels, as can be seen from example (2.19), where interlocutor G shows understanding and acceptance of what speaker I states:

(2.19) *I: … so it's not to do with building it's to do with who owns the bit of ground under the building it was very much property law* ***that kind of thing****.*
G: mm

(Cheepen & Monaghan 1990: 121, quoted from Overstreet 1999: 77)

In both these scenarios, the interlocutors accept and show understanding, giving supporting feedback that there exists shared knowledge between both interlocutors, whether or not they do actually share that knowledge. It is the assumption on the part of the speaker that such shared knowledge exists, and not its actual existence, what is marked by the extender, and this assumption of shared knowledge is not usually challenged by the interlocutor (Overstreet 1999: 74).

[13] Consider in this connection, Aijmer (1985: 377; 2002: 248); Overstreet & Yule (1997b: 224-225); Norrby & Winter (2002: 5); Stenström et al. (2002: 100-101); Jucker et al. (2003: 1748-1749); De Cock (2004: 236); Fernández & Yuldashev (2011: 2612); Palacios Martínez (2011: 2455); Ortega Barrera (2012: 228); Parvaresh et al. (2012: 268-269); Secova (2014: 9-10); and Fernández (2015: 8-9).

Considering this, extender tags can be classified as markers of intersubjectivity or shared knowledge. Further evidence in favour of this statement is the fact that they usually co-occur with another typical marker of intersubjectivity,[14] namely the discourse marker *you know.* This co-occurrence is illustrated in our earlier instances (2.15), (2.16) and (2.18). *You know* has been described to mark "the general consensual truths which speakers assume their hearers share through their co-membership in the same culture, society, or group. […] [S]peaker and hearer are assumed to be included in the set of those who share a general truth" (Schiffrin 1987: 274-275). In this sense, *you know* has an interactive function, creating rapport with the interlocutor by marking the assumption of shared knowledge between speaker and hearer, which makes their social relation closer, in the same way that extender tags have been claimed to do. The frequent co-occurrence of extenders with the discourse marker *you know* simply strengthens the role of the former as intersubjectivity markers.

In the light of all this information, it does not matter if the extender tag is performing a referential function (cf. Section 2.3.2 below), as is the case of categorization, or any expressive or interpersonal one (cf. Section 2.3.3 below). Every use of an extender tag has an implicit appeal for shared knowledge or intersubjectivity, for the hearer or reader to decipher and understand the intention and meaning behind its use on the part of the speaker or writer, based on a presupposed co-conception of the world between both. This is the reason why I do not consider this assumption of shared knowledge as a mere function that extender tags may display or not, but as a trait common to them all. Consequently, I do not include this function within the analysis of the extenders *or something* (Chapter 4) and *and the like* (Chapter 5). Although the vast majority of scholars working in this field have considered this function in their research, only a few have claimed that it is the primary function of extenders in discourse (cf. Overstreet & Yule 1997a: 95; 1997b: 254; De Cock 2004: 236), and none, to my knowledge, has

[14] Cf. footnote 11, page 33.

considered that it is common to all and every single use of these forms. However, Pichler & Levey (2011) do consider that those extenders performing the function of categorization "are inherently intersubjective" because of the assumption of shared knowledge and that, as they grammaticalize, their "intersubjective and other pragmatic/procedural meanings increasingly come to the fore" (2011: 450).[15] By this they mean that the function of implying shared knowledge (an intersubjective function, cf. Section 2.3.3.2) is inherently attached to the function of categorization and, therefore, already present before extenders acquire other expressive or interpersonal functions. Consequently, they do not consider this function when testing the grammaticalization status of extender tags.

2.3.1.2 EXPRESSING VAGUENESS

In Overstreet's (1999) work on extender tags, the notion of vagueness is completely rejected, as she understands that by being vague, extender tags are projected as making "no contribution to communication" (1999: 21). In fact, extenders have been presented as being "lexically empty" (Dines 1980: 19) or being "purely performance 'fillers', introduced to give both speaker, and hearer, additional time for processing" (Channell 1994: 120). Overstreet takes as further evidence the work of Dines (1980), who claims that extenders may be stigmatized "because they are assumed to reflect vague and inexplicit speech" (1980: 19). Overstreet claims that there is a general feeling that "vagueness in reference indicates vagueness in thinking, and hence stupidity" (Overstreet 1999: 22), and she wants to move away from this negative value of vagueness and present an alternative perspective. As Overstreet & Yule (1997b: 250) put it, the "referentially inexplicit nature of these forms may be viewed as having positive value. Instead of representing failure on the part of speakers to achieve some referential function, these forms may actually be conventional indicators of how certain interpersonal functions are

[15] Note that "intersubjective" here refers to the whole repertoire of intersubjective functions (cf. Section 2.3.3.2), and not only to the conveyance of shared knowledge.

accomplished". Both Dines (1980: 21-22) and Channell (1994: 3) also reject the negative value commonly attached to extender tags, claiming that they do realize functions in discourse and that the presence of an extender tag "in speech does not indicate that the sentence upon which it depends is incomplete or imprecise" (Dubois 1992: 182).

Channell (1994) is the first researcher that presents extender tags as being part of vague language. She wants to avoid the association of vagueness with a "bad" use of language, and thus states that "vagueness in language is neither all 'bad' nor all 'good'. What matters is that vague language is used appropriately" (1994: 3). As a matter of fact, Channell claims that vague language is a recurrent phenomenon both in spoken and written English (1994: 4) and provides a working definition for it, arguing that "an expression is vague if:

a) it can be contrasted with another word or expression which appears to render the same proposition;
b) it is 'purposely and unabashedly vague';
c) its meaning arises from the 'intrinsic uncertainty' referred to by Peirce." [16]

(Channell 1994: 20)

Channell also makes a list of what she considers vague language (1994: 18):

[16] Peirce formulates the notion of vagueness in the following way:

> A proposition is vague where there are possible states of things concerning which it is intrinsically uncertain whether, had they been contemplated by the speaker, he would have regarded them as excluded or allowed by the proposition. By intrinsically uncertain we mean not uncertain in consequence of any ignorance of the interpreter, but because the speaker's habits of language were indeterminate; so that one day he would regard the proposition as excluding, another as admitting, those states of things. Yet this must be understood to have reference to what might be deduced from a perfect knowledge of his state of mind; for it is precisely because these questions never did, or did not frequently, present themselves that his habit remained indeterminate.
>
> (Peirce 1902: 748, quoted from Channell 1994: 7)

(i) Vague additives: by means of this label she distinguishes forms that serve to approximate quantities (numbers and approximators, round numbers and non-numerical vague quantifiers) and vague category identifiers (i.e. extender tags).

(ii) Vagueness by choice of vague words, i.e. placeholder words like *thingy* or *whatsisname*.

(iii) Vagueness by implicature, where an apparently precise sentence has a vague reading.

Drave (2002) modifies this classification slightly: he subdivides the category of vague additives into number approximators, non-numerical vague quantifiers and vague category markers, maintains the category of placeholders and leaves out vagueness by implicature (2002: 26). Therefore, Drave (2002) considers that vague language can perform any of the following functions:

(i) Filling lexical gaps
(ii) Filling knowledge gaps
(iii) Emphasizing (and de-emphasizing) certain information
(iv) Deliberately withholding specific information
(v) Conveying tentativeness
(vi) Conveying an evaluation of, or expectation about, a proposition
(vii) Maintaining an atmosphere of friendliness, informality or deference.

(Drave 2002: 26-27)

Channell's approach in her 1994 book on vagueness is the one that has received the most attention among researchers who also work on extender tags.[17] However, while she just focuses on the function of categorization when studying these forms, most other researchers claim that vagueness is principally linked to the affective sphere.

There are, grosso modo, two approaches to vagueness. On the one hand, "linguistic vagueness", based on the philosophical tradition, which relies

[17] See, among others, Stenström et al. (2002: 86-88); Cucchi (2007: 1); Koester (2007: 41-45); Parvaresh et al. (2010: 19); Fernández & Yuldashev (2011: 2612); Parvaresh et al. (2012: 261); Parvaresh & Dabghi (2013: 76); and Fernández (2015: 12).

purely on meaning and the imposition of clear referential boundaries to words, where vagueness is understood as the fuzziness of these boundaries; a proposition cannot, therefore, be understood neither as true nor false.[18] On the other hand, "pragma-linguistic vagueness", where vague language is considered as "an important communicative strategy" (Ruzaité 2010: 33) and vagueness is then studied "as discourse variables within interactive language use" (Overstreet 2011: 295). The first type (i.e. linguistic vagueness) could be considered as vagueness in a semantic way, intrinsic to sentence meaning. By contrast, in the second type (i.e. pragma-linguistic vagueness) vagueness is considered as part of utterance meaning (Overstreet 2011: 297), and is the one that is the main focus of most research on extender tags.

It is worth noting that vagueness is inherent to vague language. Thus, the items belonging to this category are to be interpreted as inherently imprecise; they will not achieve specificity through negotiation by the participants, the precise meaning of vague items cannot be retrieved and neither can vague language be paraphrased in a non-vague manner (cf. Cheng & Warren 2001: 82; 2003: 394; Drave 2002: 25). Furthermore, as Channell points out in her definition of vagueness quoted above, vague language is used purposefully for strategic communicative reasons (Jucker et al. 2003: 1739), such as the ones contained in the list provided by Drave (2002: 26-27). These communicative concerns are very closely related to the Gricean Cooperative Principle: "[m]ake your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice 1975: 45). In other words, a speaker should make his/her contribution "sincere, clear, relevant and sufficient for the current state of talk" (Cheng & Warren 2001: 84), thus observing the four Gricean maxims: the maxims of quality, quantity, relevance and manner. A way to avoid flouting these maxims is by means of the use of hedges and disclaimers

[18] A common example illustrating this is the 'heap paradox', whereby no clear boundaries exist as to what constitutes a heap or a non-heap. If we have a heap of grain, we could remove one grain and still have a heap, and do so until only one grain remains or even none, and still call it a heap. Therefore, the predicate *heap* is considered as vague (Overstreet 2011: 294).

(Mura 1983: 110, quoted from Cheng & Warren 2001: 84), both closely related to vague lexis (Cheng & Warren 2001: 84). Drave (2002) even suggests that "it may be convenient to think of [vague language] as a sub-category of hedging" (2002: 26), while Overstreet (2011) proposes that hedging is "one common motivation for the use of vague language" and that "vague language is one of the main devices used when hedging occurs in discourse" (2011: 295). Through the use of hedges, the speaker tries to make his/her contribution appropriate and to communicate to the interlocutors that (s)he is aware of the potential pragmatic interpretations of his/her utterances and trusts that they will be able to assign the intended interpretation to his/her contribution (Cheng & Warren 2001: 84-85; Overstreet 2011: 294). This reliance on the interlocutor to understand the meaning intended by the proposition is also related to the assumption of shared knowledge explained in Section 2.3.1.1 above, because it exploits the common ground between both interlocutors.[19] Overstreet (2011) even suggests that "vagueness in language use can then be viewed as the outcome of a basic operating principle that may be stated simply as "you know what I mean"" (2011: 293). But it is not only an appeal to shared knowledge what vague language promotes; it is also a good means to achieve politeness and solidarity. The fact that the interlocutors rely on each other and their common ground in order to decipher their uses of vague language creates a "pseudo-intimacy" even between strangers that is even more pronounced when reflecting in-group membership by speakers that are more closely related (O'Keeffe 2004: 19; Evison et al. 2007: 138).

Jucker et al. (2003: 1765) present the motivations for the use of vague language from the perspective of relevance theory, and they claim that there are four basic reasons that can motivate speakers to resort to vague utterances:

(i) the speaker's lack of certain information;

[19] The connection between vagueness and the assumption of shared knowledge is reported by Cheng & Warren (2001: 85; 2003: 395); Drave (2002: 27); Jucker et al. (2003: 1742); O'Keeffe (2004: 2); Cotterill (2007: 100); Evison et al. (2007: 138); and Overstreet (2011: 293).

(ii) the appreciation on the part of the speaker that the processing cost on his/her part to retrieve that information, even though it may be available, is not worth the effort and it is more beneficial in terms of fluency to leave it out than to be precise;

(iii) the third scenario is similar to the previous one, but concerning the interlocutor, the vague expression yields the same information (textual and procedural) than its precise counterpart, but requires less processing effort for the interlocutor, so it may be preferred;

(iv) the last and most important consideration concerns those cases where vague language conveys a meaning that is different from a precise expression and more relevant for the purposes at hand.

It is this last scenario that Jucker et al. (2003) focus on mostly, those cases where a vague expression serves to guide the interlocutors towards the best interpretation of the utterance at issue because it instructs them to access its conversational implicatures (2003: 1765-1766).

As we have seen then, vague language is both purposeful and desirable in language, as it tackles many situations that may be viewed as potentially risking a breach in conversation. Nevertheless, there are cases where vague language is not tolerated, as is the adversarial trial context. As Cotterill (2007: 103) puts it, "there are additional pressures on witnesses to 'be responsive' in the power asymmetry of the courtroom". By being vague in his/her answers, the witness shows inconsistency, which suggests "that [he/she] is at best unreliable and at worst deceptive" (2007: 107). This potential for deception attributed to vague language can be added to the aforementioned motivations for its use, although it may be more restricted to cases like the interrogatory scene than to everyday life. Lawyers, as trained specialists and skilled communicators, can sometimes exploit this trait and produce confusing questions in order to fool the witness and obtain vague responses that they can then mark as deceptive (2007: 103).

The general trend adopted by the researchers that have worked on extender tags[20] is to consider vagueness as a trait rather than a function, with some exceptions. One of these is Carroll (2008), who seems to acknowledge vagueness as a function, identified as the marking of a category that is not mentioned, following Channell's (1994) treatment of extenders. She offers the Middle English example in (2.20) to explain that such cases, where the category (here *fondying*, 'evil temptations') is named before the exemplars, would not involve vagueness and that "vagueness, or the filling of a lexical gap, is in any case an incomplete description of the functions of extender tags" (2008: 15-16). She suggests, therefore, that vagueness cannot be considered the only function of extenders (as is the case in Channell's (1994) research).

(2.20) *When þat I fele any fondying, as ire or wraþ … **or oþer siche**.*
'When that I feel any evil-temptation, as ire or wrath … **or other such**'.
(Carroll 2008: 15)

Another exception is Secova (2014), who includes vagueness in the list of functions that she attributes to extender tags. Nevertheless, in the description of this function it seems that vagueness is treated more like a trait of extender tags than a function in itself. She claims that "utterances devoid of at least some degree of vagueness may appear too specific, categorial and blunt, and would thus place significant constraints on the interpretation of the message expressed", suggesting too that "the absence [of extender tags] in speech could possibly result in sociopragmatic failure" (2013: 11). Thus, Secova describes the role of vagueness as 'procedural', and highlights its importance in those cases where the pragmatic functions of extenders override their referential functions. In this sense, vagueness can be a trait common to all extender tags, and also play some role in those instances that have become devoid of referential meaning, and is thus assumed as an expressive function conveying only procedural cues for the unfolding of the

[20] Apart from those already mentioned in this section, the following researchers maintain that extender tags add an element of vagueness to the sentence where they occur: Ball & Ariel (1978: 42); Aijmer (1985: 377; 2002: 213); De Cock (2004: 235-236); Simpson (2004: 47); Terraschke & Holmes (2007: 201); and Palacios Martínez (2011: 2455).

message. This is the perspective that I adopt for my analysis. In other words, I consider that all the uses of extender tags are intrinsically vague and that vagueness is inherent to the use of these forms.

2.3.2 REFERENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF EXTENDER TAGS

The referential sphere of language, in connection to what are also called ideational functions, is speaker-based, focused on the representational function of language (Overstreet 1999: 17). This type of referential meaning is associated with a truth-conditional way of connecting the language to a world of reference (Overstreet 2014: 114). In this section I discuss the referential functions of extender tags, namely categorization (cf. Section 2.3.2.1) and list completion (cf. Section 2.3.2.2).

2.3.2.1 CATEGORIZATION

Categorization has been defined as "the means by which we identify objects in the world and reduce the perceived complexity of our environment; it is the means by which we divide the world into manageable chunks" (Overstreet 1999: 33). It is the way in which we as humans interpret the vast world that surrounds us, we simplify it by imposing divisions and by making meaningful groupings that we assume correlate with the real world, although our human categories may not fit so well into the world as we believe (Overstreet 1999: 33).

There are two main approaches to categorization, namely a classical view and a more contemporary one. Within the classical view, the idea that the categories that we make as humans correlate perfectly with the world around us is generally accepted. Regarding this, the limits of categories are well-defined, so every member of the category must share certain features, and those that do not possess all those features would not be members of the category in question. In the classical view categories are thus "well-defined, context-independent, stable and based on perception" (Overstreet 1999: 34). On the other hand, the contemporary view refutes all the maxims belonging

to the classical one. It is argued here that there need not be a property common to all the members of a category, which are bound by "family resemblances" instead. Thus, a member of the category may share some properties with another, and this may share some properties with another member of the category, but it may be the case that this third member and the first one mentioned do not share any property between them (Overstreet 1999: 35). Therefore, there can be no single feature or property that all the members of the category must share; rather, categories possess graded structure, which means that "some instances are better examples of a category that others" (Barsalou 1983: 211). At the centre of the category is then a prototype and instances become more typical when they share a higher number of properties with the category prototype. By contrast, those members that share less properties with the prototype define the edges of the category, including the presence of unclear cases which are not easily circumscribed to the category or to its complement (i.e. the non-members of the category). Finally, the degree of similarity to the category concept of the non-members of the category also varies, from items that are more similar to the category to those that are clearly different (Barsalou 1983: 211-212). To illustrate this point, let us take the category 'furniture'. Prototypical examples of this category would be a chair or a table, while on the edge of the category, as an unclear case, Barsalou (1983) provides the example of a radio[21] and as non-members of the category 'furniture' it would be easier to rule out a dog than a carpet. Categories then "have neither clear boundaries nor necessary and sufficient conditions […] to capture the entire class of items (i.e., the members)" that would belong into them (Overstreet 1999: 36-37), so their interpretation is therefore constrained by the context. More recent research has also proved that categories are not stable, but rather vary across individuals and time. As regards time, taking again the aforementioned example of the radio, it may well be the case that a radio could clearly be considered as a member of the category 'furniture' 60 years ago, but not

[21] It may be the case that if we think of the typical 1960's radio, it could clearly be considered as furniture.

anymore, as it would rather belong into the category of appliances or even mobile applications. Categories also vary across individuals, so that what some people may consider to belong to a certain category, others may not. For example, in our western culture we do not consider ants to be food, whereas these insects would be clearly included into this category by people from Thailand. Also, the concept of similarity has been put to the test, as it is a "subjective judgement and depends on the weight assigned to a particular feature" (Overstreet 1999: 37).

There are two types of categories: common categories and ad hoc categories in Barsalou's (1983) terms.[22] Common categories are those that can be named with a lexical item; for example, the aforementioned examples of table and chair would belong to the category 'furniture'. In turn, as Barsalou puts it, ""ad hoc" categories are spontaneously created for use in specialized contexts" (1983: 211) and cannot be replaced by one single lexical item; for example, a child and a photo album could belong to the category 'things to save from a house on fire'. One important difference between common and ad hoc categories is that the former tend to follow correlational structure, i.e. their members tend to share common properties; for example, a chair and a table are both inanimate objects, they can be both made of wood, metal or some other material, they are used to furnish homes and are more similar among themselves than they are to a member of the category animal, for example. On the other hand, ad hoc categories seem to violate correlational structure, because they include items which appear to have no similarities between them, as is the case of a child and a photo album in the example presented above of the category 'things to save from a house on fire'. This is so because the members of such categories need to be grouped together in a category that is instrumental to achieving some goal in a certain moment; in this case, the goal is to make a list of all the things that have to be saved from a house in the event of it catching fire (Barsalou 1983: 215).

[22] Overstreet (1999: 42) calls them lexicalized and non-lexicalized categories, respectively.

Barsalou (1983) investigates the similarities and differences between these two types of categories and concludes that both common and ad hoc categories possess graded structure, since in both types some examples are more central to the category than others and some of them even display unclear category membership. However, the category representations in memory of the two types of categories differ, in that common categories are well-established, they have strong concept-to-instance associations, strong instance-to-concept associations and the category concepts are well-established in memory because they have been strengthened by repeated use. Ad hoc categories, on the contrary, as groupings of entities made for a goal at a given point in time, lack strong concept-to-instance associations, which means that the retrieval of their members is slower and they are harder to remember. They also lack strong instance-to-concept associations, which makes the access to the category concept more difficult, and they are also poorly established in memory, their members being as difficult to be remembered as random groups of entities with no category concept that encompasses them. Nevertheless, Barsalou (1983: 224) has also proved that, when provided with the relevant context, these weakly associating categories become activated and the relation of their instances with the category concept is more transparent and easier to remember. Barsalou (1983: 224-226) also suggests that constant repetition may lead ad hoc categories to become well-established and lose ad hoc status.

Extender tags, in combination with previously named exemplars, have been largely explained as an indication for the identification of a set, since "they cue the listener to interpret the preceding element as an illustrative example of some more general case" (Dines 1980: 22). To prove that these forms perform this categorization function, Channell (1994) designed a test to assess how her respondents understood extender tags. She presented them some sentences containing extenders and asked them to substitute the combination of the exemplars and the tag for at least two other elements. She obtained three types of responses: some respondents resorted to naming other items that belonged to the same category as the exemplars, others identified

the category, either by describing or by naming it, and others provided non-compliant responses, since they did not follow the instructions given. All in all, Channell (1994) concludes that in the vast majority of cases (87%) "the tag was an instruction to think of a category consisting of items similar to the exemplar" (1994: 125).

All the researchers who have studied the functions of extender tags agree that categorization is the most universal function that has been attributed to these forms, their core or primary function.[23] Let us consider examples (2.21) and (2.22):

(2.21) = (2.7) *Yeah. Most of 'em are evergreens around there I guess. Pine trees* ***and stuff.*** (Overstreet 1999: 45)

(2.22) *Neither shall you covet your neighbor's house, or field, or male or female slave, or ox, or donkey,* ***or anything that belongs to your neighbor.*** (*Deuteronomy* 5: 6-21, quoted from Overstreet 1999: 52)

In example (2.21) the extender tag *and stuff* is used in combination with the exemplar *pine trees* to make reference to the category of evergreens, which has been already mentioned in the previous sentence in the token. In example (2.22) the exemplars *your neighbor's house, field, male or female slave, ox* and *donkey* are part of the category 'your neighbour's valuable belongings' or 'valuable things (that belong to your neighbour)', which is even specified within the extender tag itself, *or anything that belongs to your neighbor.*

[23] Cf. Ball & Ariel (1978: 38); Dines (1980: 22); Aijmer (1985: 373; 2002: 218-219); Macaulay (1991: 170); Dubois (1992: 181); Ward & Birner (1993: 208-210); Youssef (1993: 293); Channell (1994: 122); Lermer (1994: 29); Erman (1995: 141); Stubbe & Holmes (1995: 70); Overstreet & Yule (1997a; 1997b); Overstreet (1999; 2005: 1851; 2014: 116); Winter & Norrby (2000: 2); Cheng & Warren (2001: 88); Drave (2002: 34); Norrby & Winter (2002: 4); Jucker et al. (2003: 1748-1749); O'Keeffe (2004: 5-6); Cortés Rodríguez (2006a: 94); Cheshire (2007: 157-158); Cucchi (2007: 6-8); Evison et al. (2007: 138-139); Koester (2007: 47-49); Terraschke & Holmes (2007: 205); Carroll (2008: 8); Maclagan et al. (2008: 176); Ruzaité (2010: 34); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 338); Terraschke (2010: 450); Fernández & Yuldashev (2011: 2612); Palacios Martínez (2011: 2466); Pichler & Levey (2011: 453); Ortega Barrera (2012: 233); Parvaresh et al. (2012: 268); Buysse (2014: 9); Secova (2014: 16); and Fernández (2015: 5-6).

Aijmer (1985) points out that adjunctive and disjunctive extender tags differ in relation to categorization in two ways: first, in the semantic truth-functional fact that adjunctive extender tags require "that the conjoined elements ('conjuncts') are true", while in the case of disjunctive extender tags "it is enough that one of the elements ('disjuncts') is true" (1985: 373); and, secondly, and connected to the previous idea, that adjunctive extenders have an additive function, since they instruct the interlocutor "to pick out all the members of the set on the basis of the member (or members) which has been produced as an example" (1985: 374). Disjunctive extenders, in turn, have alternate function and signal to the interlocutor "to pick out one (some) member of the same set as the preceding member" (1985: 374). On the other hand, and contrary to Aijmer's (1985) description, Ward & Birner (1993) suggest that it is not necessary for the interlocutor to be able to infer all the members that can constitute the set (both in the case of adjunctive and in that of disjunctive extender tags), but rather that it suffices that "the variable is to be instantiated by at least one other member" of the category (1993: 208).

Going back to examples (2.21) and (2.22) above, they correspond to a common or lexicalized category and an ad hoc or non-lexicalized category, respectively. Even though Barsalou (1983) presents ad hoc categories as instrumental to achieving some goal, usually labelled as "things to do X" (consider our earlier example of 'things to save from a house on fire'), Overstreet & Yule (1997a) claim that these need not always "be expressed in terms of a purpose or goal" (1997a: 86); they just may be cases in which "no lexicalized referring expression is known (or even exists)" (1997a: 88), as in example (2.22) featuring the category 'valuable things (that belong to your neighbour)'. It is worth noting that in examples like (2.21), that present a common (also called natural) category (i.e. evergreens), it is easy for the reader to infer other members of the same category just on the basis of general knowledge, such as a cypress, a honeysuckle or a sequoia. On the other hand, in examples like (2.22), the name of the category (i.e. 'valuable things that belong to your neighbour') is not enough for the reader to infer what other things could be named, so that it is necessary to have some knowledge of the

context in order to be able to produce some further items belonging to that category. In this case we would have to go more than 2,000 years back in time and think of the type of valuable things that people used to own then (nowadays, in our culture, it is not possible to have slaves), and even if we were to extrapolate this example to the present day, there would be considerable variation depending on culture. In view of this, Overstreet & Yule (1997a) propose that common or lexicalized and ad hoc or non-lexicalized categories are the two ends of a continuum that depicts "the degree to which the categories are: (a) conventionally and linguistically established and (b) constrained by contextual factors" (1997a: 87).

It is also worth noting that studies on categorization have focused only on first-order entities, i.e. physical objects and observable things. Nonetheless, extender tags can be also found to have as their scope second-order entities (i.e. actions or events that are located in time), as shown in example (2.23), and third-order entities (i.e. abstract references, such as propositions), as example (2.24) illustrates. In (2.23) we can see that the exemplars (*swings* and *does somersaults*) are verb phrases, while in (2.24) the exemplars are clauses (*where my new address-* and *where to send ch- send money to me*).

(2.23) *She's sort of a child who swings and does somersaults* ***and things like that***. (Overstreet & Yule 1997a: 89)

(2.24) *He doesn't even know where my new address- where to send ch- send money to me y'know* ***or anything***. (Overstreet & Yule 1997a: 89)

As Overstreet & Yule (1997a) point out, although first-order entities are observable and more objectively categorized, with second and third-order entities "there is a shift […] to the more subjective, or private properties", which implies that the more subjective the categorization is, the more "context dependent and tied to speaker's assumptions of shared knowledge" their interpretation is as well (1997a: 90).

Although categorization studies have focused mainly on common categories, it has been observed that extender tags are used to refer to ad hoc

categories far more frequently than to common categories.[24] After all, what is the point of using an extender tag to imply a common or lexicalized category when the category label is available for such purpose? Overstreet (1999: 44-45) proposes four reasons whereby speakers may prefer to use extender tags in combination with some exemplars instead of the corresponding category names:

(i) the speaker cannot recall or does not know the name of the category;

(ii) the speaker acknowledges that his/her interlocutor may not be familiar with the category name;

(iii) for iconicity reasons, in order to emphasize the high number of elements that belong into the category, as example (2.25) illustrates, where Jean, instead of using the label 'housework', names the chores she has been doing in combination with the extender to suggest that even more could be added and to imply therefore that she performed many tasks;

(2.25) *Julie: You takin' a nap?*
*Jean: No:::=I've been (.) vacuumin' 'n (1.0) washin': (1.0) clo::thes 'n dustin': **'n all that stuff**.*[25]
Julie: Umhm.

(Overstreet 1999: 45)

(iv) a speaker may prefer to give an exemplar followed by an extender tag in order to highlight one specific member of the category in question. Overstreet (1999) illustrates this by means of the token *I'm going to get some milk **and stuff***, where the speaker chooses to highlight the milk from all the groceries that (s)he may buy, while at the same time (s)he alludes to the category.

[24] This feature has been observed by Overstreet & Yule (1997a: 88; 1997b: 253); Overstreet (1999: 43); Cortés Rodríguez (2006a: 104); and Parvaresh et al. (2012: 268).

[25] The lengthening of words (indicated by the accumulation of subsequent colons) and the pauses (indicated by the time they last in parenthesis) help to the iconicity of the sentence too, conveying the meaning that she has been doing a lot of things.

In the process of categorization, category implication on the part of the speaker is as important as category inference on the part of his/her interlocutor(s). It has been argued that "successful category identification using a tag necessitates giving a prototypical example of the intended category" (Channell 1994: 126).[26] This dependence on a prototype for felicitous category inference is refuted by Overstreet (1999: 48) on the grounds that, as has been mentioned above, categories differ across individuals and across time, so what may appear to be a prototypical example in the speaker's mind may not necessarily be interpreted in the same way by everybody. On the other hand, as has already been pointed out, studies on categorization have focused on common or lexicalized categories and, although Barsalou (1983) explained that ad hoc categories possess graded structure, the existence of clear prototypes is not so strong as with common categories, because their typicality gradients are not so fixed and accessible in the speakers' memories (1983: 218).

Another usual claim is that "the tag invokes a set of elements with a rough family resemblance to the prototype in the preceding phrase" (Aijmer 2002: 219). The notion of similarity has also been questioned by Overstreet (1999: 49), because as happens with prototypes, it varies across individuals and across time, and, at the same time, depends on which features are given more salience.[27] Overstreet & Yule (1997a) illustrate this with the following example: given the exemplars *horse, zebra* and *skunk*, we may consider that *horse* and *zebra* are more similar. Nevertheless, if the feature 'striped' is given sufficient weight, then we will have to categorize *zebra* and *skunk* together instead. From this, we conjecture that what is important for the determination of categorization is not similarity per se, but rather contextual salience (Overstreet & Yule 1997a: 90).

Finally, it is also worth noting that, as I have already explained above, studies on categorization have focused only on common categories of first-

[26] This notion has also been suggested by Aijmer (2002: 219).

[27] Similarity being a fuzzy concept that depends on which features are more salient had already been suggested by Ball & Ariel (1978: 39).

order entities or perceivable objects, whereas in ad hoc categories and second and third-order entities, categorization becomes more subjective and less based on observable qualities, so that category inference based on prototypicality and similarity to the exemplars given becomes even more difficult. As we have seen, general extenders are very rarely used to imply common categories, so these category inference mechanisms are not well suited for them. Extenders have been argued to represent locally contingent categorization, because their interpretation is "massively constrained […] by contextual factors" (Overstreet & Yule 1997a: 88).

It is clear then that successful category inference is not only determined by the given exemplar(s), but also by the context, an idea that has been assumed by many researchers.[28] Three types of contextual constraints have to be taken into account: "linguistic context, presumed situation, and pragmatic knowledge" (Channell 1994: 131), or what Overstreet (1999) calls linguistic context, broader context and background knowledge (1999: 51-59). In what follows I consider each of these types individually.

The linguistic context is the co-text, the discourse that surrounds the exemplar + extender tag construction. Let us consider again examples (2.21) and (2.22) above. In the first one, there is an explicit mention of the category intended (i.e. *evergreens*) in the discourse previous to the extender tag, which guides its interpretation. In example (2.22), by contrast, the inference of the category is constrained by the relative clause that is included within the extender tag (i.e. *that belongs to your neighbor*), which identifies which types of elements are to be interpreted as belonging to the category. On other occasions, apart from defining a category on the basis of what it contains, there is an additional explicit contrast to what it does not contain that facilitates its inference. Consider in this connection example (2.26) below, where Harrison Ford explains that he does *running, jumping, falling down,* that he *hits people*, *gets hit by people* and other things. Here the category is

[28] Cf., among others, Dubois (1992: 182); Channell (1994: 131); Overstreet & Yule (1997a: 88); Overstreet (1999: 51); O'Keeffe (2004: 6); Cortés Rodríguez (2006a: 93-94); Evison et al. (2007: 140); and Fernández & Yuldashev (2011: 2613).

further constrained by the contrast offered in the mention of what he does not do, namely that he does not do *stunts*.:

(2.26) = (2.5) *Although Ryan is often surrounded by explosions and gunfire, Ford says he never puts himself in any real danger. "I don't do stunts," he says. "I do running, jumping, falling down. I hit people, I get hit by people,* ***that kind of shit****. Stunts are done by stuntmen."* (*Entertainment Weekly* Summer 1994, quoted from Overstreet 1999: 53)

On some other occasions, when extenders are observed within interaction, their interpretation is constrained by explicit negotiation between the interlocutors, as we can see in example (2.27), where the operator asks Nicole if her husband has been *drinking* ***or anything***, to which Nicole answers in the negative rejecting the category of behaviours affected by narcotic substances and explaining instead that *he's crazy*, which the operator accepts as a good interpretation of the category intended.

(2.27) *Nicole: Well, my ex-husband – or my husband – just broke in … and he's ranting and raving.*
Operator: Has he been driking ***or anything****?*
Nicole: No, but he's crazy.
Operator: Did he hit you?
Nicole: No.

(*Newsweek* 4 July 1994, quoted from Overstreet 1999: 55)

The second type of context, which Overstreet (1999) calls the broader context (1999: 55-57), is defined by the physical setting or the presumed situation where the extender is found. Overstreet & Yule (1997a) offer the following example to illustrate this, reproduced here as (2.28):

(2.28)  *Money orders, stamps,* ***etc****…* *Lotto* 

(Overstreet & Yule 1997a: 93)

This example is taken from a sign in a grocery store that indicates that at the right window the customers can buy *lotto*, whereas at the left window they can place *money orders*, buy *stamps* and other (not specified) items. In order

to understand what goes into the category hinted by the extender tag *etc.* in combination with the exemplars presented (*money orders* and *stamps*), one should be familiar with the type of location where the sign is placed; otherwise it is impossible to retrieve any other member of the intended category. Overstreet (1999: 56) suggests newspapers as a possible member of the category of things that could be bought in the left window. It is also worth noting that the linguistic context plays some role in this example as well, because the category of things that could be sold in the left window is contrasted by what is sold in the right one, the category including everything except *lotto*.

Finally, as regards contextual constrains, we have background knowledge, which refers to shared knowledge between the interlocutors. This notion has already been explained in Section 2.3.1.1 and in connection to categorization here as well. As has already been argued, the speaker assumes that his/her interlocutor(s) will be able to infer the intended category and supply whatever information is not included by resorting to the common or background knowledge that they share. The type of shared knowledge ranges in a continuum from global or universal knowledge, that can be shared by any mature human being, to "shared knowledge more specific to the two participants (i.e. their common experience)" (Dubois 1992: 182), i.e. from knowledge that is shared by most to knowledge that is shared by just a few. As seen in Section 2.3.1.1, Evison et al. (2007) and Fernández & Yuldashev (2011) further distribute the types of knowledge as global general knowledge, societal knowledge (central to the society where it is found or "culture-bound") and local knowledge, which is "locally constrained or group-bound" (Fernández & Yuldashev 2011: 2616-2617). Categorization seen from the type of knowledge that its inference implies depends much on the situation or context of occurrence. For example, in both O'Keeffe (2004) and Evison et al. (2007), the most commonly used reference domain in their corpus taken from an Irish call-in radio show is the societal one, referring mostly to general Irish matters of concern. By contrast, in their analysis of CANCAD (the Cambridge and Nottingham Corpus of Academic English) the most frequent reference

domain is the local one, where the shared knowledge between the participants is placed at the immediate classroom context (Evison et al. 2007: 149-154). On the other hand, in Fernández & Yuldashev's (2011) investigation, they find out that non-native speakers of the language immersed and living in an English-speaking country do not feel as confident as native speakers when using extender tags to imply categorization at the societal level. They therefore lag behind native speakers in this reference domain, whereas they do use extenders to imply both global and local knowledge in the same way as native speakers do (2011: 2622-2623).

Although categorization has been defined as the basic function that extender tags have in discourse, it is likely that in many cases not even the speaker him/herself is able to name any more items that belong to the category intended. In such cases, what categorization implies is the potential existence of other category members (even when none is recalled). At the same time, there are cases where category implication is not present. In fact, extenders in such cases are not used for any referential function at all. Let us consider (2.29) and (2.30):

(2.29) *[W]hen he died* ***and that****.* (Macaulay 1991: 171)

(2.30) *Iver: Did you have older brothers and sisters* ***and stuff****?*
Gary: I have an older brother and a younger sister. Like we're all two years apart. So like my brother he's gonna be twenty six, and I'll be twenty-four in August. (Overstreet 1999: 102)

It is very difficult to interpret any of these examples as implying any category. In the case of (2.29), if the person in question died, it is not possible that he could have done anything else, so there is no possible category of actions here. In (2.30), in turn, the exemplars exhaust all the possibilities of the category siblings that could have been deduced, *brothers* and *sisters*, and nothing else, so the extender tag cannot be fulfilling a categorization function in this example. The functions that the extender tags perform in examples of this kind will be addressed in the section devoted to the expressive functions of extender tags (cf. Section 2.3.3 below).

2.3.2.2 LIST COMPLETION

Jefferson (1990) was the first researcher to claim that extender tags may perform a specific function within list constructions, to signal the end of an incomplete list. She claims that lists in English usually "occur as three-part units" (1990: 63) and that speakers tend to resort to three-partedness when producing lists. This is so because "three-partedness appears to have programmatic relevance for the construction of lists. That is, roughly, lists not only can and do occur in three parts, but *should* so occur" (1990: 66). In an attempt to achieve three-partedness, speakers can fill the third slot of a list with an extender tag when no more nameable items come to mind. Sánchez-Ayala (2003) even suggests that extenders have lexicalized from their role as a means "to hold and delay the verbalization of more items" (2003: 339) into markers of list completion, because on most occasions the listing process is abandoned after the production of the tag (except for some rare examples where the list continues and the extender tag thus appears in medial position) (cf. Section 2.2.3 above). In addition to speaker's retrieval problems, another motivation for ending the list by means of an extender tag, is to "abbreviate a list of more than three items down to three" (Carroll 2008: 11). Jefferson (1990) explains that lists ending in an extender tag are ""relevantly incomplete"; i.e., not only do the named items not exhaust the possible array of nameables, but a third item would not do such work; i.e., there are "many more" relevant nameables which will not, and need not, be specified" (1990: 68). Lerner (1994) links this observation to the function of categorization explained in Section 2.3.2.1, stating that "the generalized list completer transforms the list from being merely a collection of items to a reference to the class" (1994: 24). Moreover, "the sort of object being referenced is transformed from the items themselves into the class to which the first two items belong. (One might think of the generalized list completer as a *generalizing* list completer)" (1994: 29). On the other hand, lists of three named items are "relatively complete" according to Jefferson, which means that no more items can nor need be named, because the ones present exhaust

"the array of nameables for the purposes to which this particular listing is being put" (1990: 68).

Although Jefferson (1990) limits the length of lists to three items, Lerner (1994) explains that, despite the fact that three-part lists are the most common, lists need not be limited to three items, but "three seems to be the minimum number of parts needed to demonstrate that one is doing listing" (1994: 23). This premise is accepted by the majority of researchers that have acknowledged this list completion function for extender tags,[29] so that only structures of three or more items are considered listings; i.e. for our current purposes, in the case of lists containing an extender tag, two or more items plus an extender tag. Cortés Rodríguez (2006a) proposes list completion and achieving three-partedness as two separate functions that extender tags may perform. In his data list completion is true of almost every case, as extender tags in his corpus do usually occur at the end of the list (except for some rare exceptions where the listing continues after the tag) (2006a: 95). On the other hand, three-partedness is a function that is only true of those listings of the type two items plus extender tag, which represents 64.5% of the cases in Cortés Rodríguez's (2006a) data. Therefore, it can be said that when an extender tag is used to close a list, in the vast majority of cases it is also used to achieve three-partedness (2006a: 99).

The question remains why, if three items suffice to show that one is doing listing, examples can be found where more than three items are given, when those additions can be deemed irrelevant or superfluous. Overstreet (1999: 28) suggests that these cases show iconicity between the form (naming several items) and content (implying that many more instances exist) as was the case of example (2.25) above, reproduced here as (2.31). Overstreet (2005) also suggests that this is true as well of examples where reduplicated extender tags or combinations of two different extenders appear (2005: 1853),

[29] See Channell (1994: 134); Lerner (1994: 24); Overstreet (1999: 23); Aijmer (2002: 236); Sánchez-Ayala (2003: 337); Cortés Rodríguez (2006a: 95); Carroll (2007: 38; 2008: 8); Palacios Martínez (2011: 2454); Parvaresh et al. (2012: 267); Parvaresh & Dabghi (2013: 80); and Buysse (2014: 9).

as in example (2.32), because they lengthen the list and thus imply that many more items could be included within it. Cucchi (2007) also finds iconicity to be a function in her corpus, and in "stressing that much more could be said" (2007: 10), adverbs like *much more* or *so many* and adjectives like *numerous* or *various* are frequently found in the sentence as well.

(2.31) = (2.25) *Julie: You takin' a nap?*

Jean: No:::=I've been (.) vacuumin' 'n (1.0) washin': (1.0) clo::thes 'n dustin': ***'n all that stuff****.*

Julie: Umhm.

(Overstreet 1999: 45)

(2.32) *As fate would have it, over the weekend I fractured a rib, am bandaged up and under strong nauseating pain medication,* ***etcetera etcetera****.* (Overstreet 2005: 1853)

Nevertheless, research that considers extender tags as list completers[30] also shows that the most common pattern is for extender tags to be placed after just one item. In the light of the information presented above, the form one item plus extender tag is not to be considered a case of listing. The only researcher that has reckoned this pattern as implying listing is Ortega Barrera (2012), who claims that the mere presence of the tags "trigger[s] the conception of a cognitive list in the reader's mind" (2012: 233). She supports her decision of including such patterns as conveying listing by stating that "if we consider that each [extender tag] formulates a list in a cognitive process in which the reader creates their own particular list according to their knowledge on the topic presented, these examples must be also considered" (2012: 229). Nevertheless, in my analysis I only characterize as lists those sequences where at least two items are present before the extender tag (as has traditionally been done). In my view, Ortega Barrera's conceptualization of list completion is better constrained within the categorization paradigm explained above (cf. Section 2.3.2.1), where extender

[30] See, for instance, Channell (1994: 134); Overstreet (1999: 26); Aijmer (2002: 237); Parvaresh et al.(2012: 267); Parvaresh & Dabghi (2013: 80); and Buysse (2014: 9).

tags also exhibit the feature of evoking in the interlocutor's mind other similar examples to the one(s) presented.

Given that the frequency of occurrence of the paradigm increases as the number of items within it decreases, the pattern one item plus extender tag being, therefore, by far the most common one, the function of extender tags as list completers can only be seen as one among other concurrent functions, and not as the only or the main function that these forms realize.

2.3.3 EXPRESSIVE FUNCTIONS OF EXTENDER TAGS

In contrast to the referential functions just discussed in the preceding section, which connect language externally to a world of reference and are thus more objective, the expressive or interpersonal functions of extender tags are inherently subjective, because their interpretation is conditioned in terms of speaker's attitude within the speech situation, either toward the message itself or toward his/her interlocutor(s) (Overstreet 2014: 114-115).

Although many researchers have given more weight to the referential functions of extender tags (as reflected in the various labels used to refer to them, such as *set-marking tags* or *list completers*, among others), Overstreet (1999: 11) defends that extender tags are rather used predominantly with an interactive function, "to indicate assumptions of shared knowledge and experience, or to mark an attitude toward the message expressed, or toward the hearer".

This section is devoted then to the interpersonal or expressive functions of extender tags, which are "tied to the social relationships of the participants" in the frame of their "interactive exchange of talk" (Overstreet 1999: 18). This section is divided into two subsections, focusing, respectively, on the subjective component of expressive functions (cf. Section 2.3.3.1), i.e. those where the speaker's attitude toward the message is conveyed, and on the intersubjective functions (cf. Section 2.3.3.2), i.e. those concerned with the speaker's attitude toward his/her interlocutor(s).

2.3.3.1 SUBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS

Within the subjective functions of extender tags, those that are concerned with the speaker and his/her stance on the message produced, I include a couple of functions, namely intensifying and disclaiming (cf. Section 2.3.3.1.1), and the adherence to the Gricean maxims of quantity and quality (cf. Section 2.3.3.1.2).

2.3.3.1.1 INTENSIFYING AND DISCLAIMING FUNCTIONS

Certain forms of extender tags can fulfil the function of marking the speaker's attitude toward the message that (s)he is producing (Overstreet 1999: 79), either by providing an intensifying meaning of by acting as disclaimers.[31]

The emphatic reading of extender tags does not apply to the whole repertoire of forms, but is instead limited to a very reduced set of extenders. I divide these into two groups because of crucial differences in use: on the one hand, *and everything* (which can sometimes be substituted by *and all,* although it is less frequent) and *or anything* (*or nothing* also appears in some instances); and, on the other, *or what*.

Many researchers agree that *and everything/and all* and *or anything/or nothing* interact with intensity (Aijmer 2002: 241). They are used to mark the information provided as unexpected (Overstreet 1999: 80) and therefore assign the feature [+ remarkable] to the elements they have as scope (Aijmer 1985: 383). The obvious difference between these forms lies in the fact that *and everything* and *and all* occur in affirmative clauses, while *or anything* and *or nothing* appear in negative propositions (Overstreet 1999: 80), as evinced in examples (2.33) and (2.34), respectively:

[31] Among the researchers that have analysed the intensifying function of extender tags we find the following: Aijmer (1985: 382-385; 2002: 240-243); Ward & Birner (1993: 212); Overstreet (1999: 79-96; 2002: 218-219); Overstreet & Yule (2002: 786-789); Cortés Rodríguez (2006b: 117-118); Palacios Martínez (2011: 2466-2467); Secova (2014: 13-14); and Buysse (2014: 14).

(2.33) *As for Thorson, he said, "We just knew he was up for it because of how good he was. He's going to be a Rhodes scholar* ***and everything****!"* (Associated Press Newswire 1989, quoted from Ward & Birner 1993: 213)

(2.34) *So she quite put him off and now he never rings up* ***or anything****.* (Aijmer 1985: 384)

These extender tags mark the information that precedes them as surprising, having the meaning "something is true although it may be hard to believe" (Aijmer 1985: 384). This is further emphasized in some tokens by exclamation marks, as is the case in (2.33) above. While the adjunctive forms mark the maximum extreme, the disjunctive ones mark the minimum extreme. In Overstreet's words (1999: 83), "under such an analysis, the maximum might represent the *most*, and the minimum might represent the *least* that would be expected in a given situation." If we take (2.33) into consideration in this respect, we can say that on a scale of academic ability, for the speaker in question, being "a Rhodes scholar" is the maximum extreme on that scale. In (2.34), in turn, ringing up is the least that the speaker expects that is necessary to keep in touch with someone. The fact that either the maximum or the minimum extremes are being represented is surprising for the speakers, and that is the reason why they emphasize such instances, while, at the same time, implicitly inviting "the addressee to have the same evaluation ('special' or 'remarkable') of the information provided" (Overstreet 2014: 118-119). In some cases, the interlocutor responds to these intensifiers by showing surprise, thus demonstrating that their emphatic intention has been received as such, as is the case of (2.35).

(2.35) = (2.34) *Crystal: He doesn't even know where my new address – where to – send money to me y'know* ***or anything****.*
Julie: Oh, wow.

(Overstreet 1999: 80)

When used as intensifiers, the short forms of extender tags are the norm, with no similative *like that* or any other type of extension, just the bare forms *and everything*, *and all*, *or anything* and *or nothing*. In speech they tend to be pronounced with marks of phonological prominence, as loudness,

vowel lengthening, and rising pitch[32] (Overstreet 1999: 96), which is sometimes translated in the written tokens by means of the exclamation marks (as in example (2.33) above). Ward & Birner (1993) claim that it is the rising pitch with which some instances of these extenders are pronounced that conveys their role as intensifiers (1993: 212-213). For them, only those instances pronounced with some mark of phonological prominence would be intensifiers, while those that are pronounced with a neutral tone would not. Overstreet & Yule (2002), on the other hand, think that extenders "even when written, evoke a scale of some type and mark the accompanying information as being at a high or extreme point on that scale, according to the speaker/writer" (2002: 788), so that all instances containing extender tags of this kind would be intensifiers. Aijmer (2002: 242-243) agrees with Ward & Birner (1993) in that when unstressed, these extenders lack an intensifying effect and that only stressed productions of such forms function as intensifiers, although they can be pronounced with either a rising or a falling tone. Moreover, not all uses of *and all* can be understood as intensifiers. In Aijmer's (2002) corpus, for instance, not a single instance of this extender performs such function. Therefore, it may be the case that other considerations, such as phonological prominence, for example, should be taken into account, besides extender tag form, when accounting for the intensifying function.

The function of the extender tag *or what* as an intensifier has been discussed by Overstreet (1999: 93-96). This extender has a limited range of occurrence, happening at the end of interrogative clauses, and it can perform two actions: seeking agreement with an evaluation or urging an answer from the interlocutor. As was already the case with the other forms analysed in this section, *or what* tends to be pronounced with phonological prominence and only the short form *or what*, with no extension, appears.

[32] Phonological prominence accompanying extender tags has been observed by Ward & Birner (1993: 212-213); Overstreet (1999: 96); Aijmer (2002: 242); Overstreet & Yule (2002: 788); and Cortés Rodríguez (2006b: 118).

When used for the sake of seeking agreement, as illustrated in (2.36) below, *or what* is "appended to a yes/no question that contains an evaluative assessment of some kind" (1999: 93). It does not intend that the interlocutor responds yes or no (as would be the norm for yes/no questions), but for him/her to agree with the view presented by the speaker, in this case, for Jean to agree with Julie that the picture presented is indeed the best one, and she does agree, as confirmed by her response.

(2.36) *Julie: Is that the best picture* ***or what****?*
Jean: Sssh! It's absolutely priceless.

(Overstreet 1999: 93)

Although the usual evaluation is about an object, a concept or a third person, in some cases the assessment is about the speaker or the interlocutor themselves, and in cases like (2.37), where the evaluation is a negative one, the extender *or what*, instead of just seeking agreement, which becomes an obvious face-threating act, is used to mark the speaker's conception of such an assessment as surprising and emphasizing his/her surprise about the information provided. As Overstreet (1999: 95) explains, *haole* is the term for 'newcomer' in Hawaiian, and is used to refer to 'white people'. In example (2.37) the speaker is reproaching her interlocutor for wanting to name the baby with characteristic 'white' names, rather than with a traditional Hawaiian name, and she accuses her of being *too haolified* and of wanting *to be haole*, which she considers to be a bad thing, and marks her surprise by emphasizing it by means of the extender tag *or what*.

(2.37) *"When the baby comes, I let you bathe him and change his diaper like that. But no name him – you too haolified with your names Lovey. Who you think you? Sometimes you act too haoleish to me. You crazy – you like be haole* ***or what****?"* (Yamanaka 1996: 45, quoted from Overstreet 1999: 95)

When used to prompt an answer, *or what* is attached to direct or indirect questions, as illustrated in (2.38) and (2.39), respectively, and it seeks

for an answer from the interlocutor from among the options given in the scope of the tag,[33] a goal that is achieved in both (2.38) and (2.39).

(2.38) *Grandmother: Did you want it strong or weak* ***or what****?*
Grandson: Strong.

(Overstreet 1999: 95)

(2.39) *Shirley: You never told me if you won or lost* ***or what****.*
Randy: I won.

(Overstreet 1999: 96)

One important difference between *or what* and the intensifier extender tags *and everything, and all, or anything* and *or nothing* lies in the fact that the latter, apart from the intensifying function, can also perform the function of categorization that is considered the basic referential function of extender tags (cf. Section 2.3.2.1). *Or what*, by contrast, when functioning as an intensifier never conveys that any other element can be added to the list in question, as we can observe from both (2.38) and (2.39), where the options provided within the scope of the tag exhaust the array of possible choices in each case. Similarly, when used to solicit agreement, as in (2.36), this form never implies that other unspecified options are possible either. In this sense, the extender tag *or what* is devoid of any referential meaning, which explains why it seems to be a less prototypical extender tag in comparison to other forms, and has come to be used with a strict expressive meaning.

In addition to the intensifying function of extender tags just described, another way of marking the speaker's attitude toward the message being produced is by means of disclaiming undesired interpretations of the proposition. The use of extender tags as disclaimers is limited to a couple of formulaic constructions: *not X* ***or anything****, but Y* and *X* ***and everything****, but Y*. The extender *and all (that)* can appear in the second paradigm as well, but there are no documented examples with *or nothing* performing this function.

[33] The prompting use of *or what* has also been attested in German (Overstreet 2005: 1857-1858) and Persian (Parvaresh et al. 2012: 273-274; and Parvaresh & Dabghi 2013: 82-83). By contrast, this extender is not used to solicit agreement in neither of these languages.

Disclaimers are a kind of alignment talk whose use is triggered "by a speaker's/writer's anticipated need to offer a clarification of behaviour or events that should not be interpreted in terms of normal expectations" (Overstreet & Yule 2002: 786). However, unlike other forms of alignment talk, which are used to solve an already presented problematic action, "disclaimers are normally employed prior to potentially problematic actions, and function prospectively to avert anticipated trouble" (Overstreet & Yule 2001: 48). By the use of a disclaimer, the speaker

> (i) claims status as a competent member of society who is aware of social rules and the potential risk involved in violating these rules, (ii) asserts her intention to perform a potentially problematic action, and (iii) asks her interlocutor(s) to disassociate her identity from the potentially problematic action she is about to perform. (Overstreet & Yule 2001: 49)

Disclaiming can be explained as a metapragmatic function that shows the speaker's awareness of the undesired interpretation that his/her behaviour or actions can imply and the desire to disavow any virtual offense. Although this function may seem to be more closely related to politeness issues, it really relates more to the self of the speaker and the potential negative retypification of his/her individual self-image than to his relation to others (Overstreet & Yule 2001: 49-50). By using disclaimers in this metapragmatic way, the speaker is provided with "a means of influencing the interpretation of the pragmatic impact of what she is writing" (Parvaresh & Tavangar 2010: 137) in an attempt to control "the social evaluation of the self" (Overstreet 2014: 118). In this way it is a clarification or response-controlling method, and disclaimer constructions (*not X* ***or anything****, but Y* and *X* ***and everything****, but Y*) are examples of "response-controlling *but*-prefaces [that] […] allow speakers to comment on the interpretation of their own intentions" (Overstreet & Yule 2002: 790).

The function of extender tags as disclaimers was first approached by Overstreet (1999: 88-93) and explored later on by other researchers as well.[34] Overstreet & Yule (2001) explain the formula *not X* ***or anything****, but Y*, as exemplified in (2.40), in the following way:

> I hereby seek to clarify in advance my intention not to violate either a specific social rule (=*not X*) or any other relevant social rules that we have in common (=*or anything*), acknowledging that (=*but*) this utterance (=*Y*) or behavior described therein may constitute a problematic action. (Overstreet & Yule 2001: 51)

(2.40) *P: I mean, I I mean I I y'know it's it's a problem I mean they asked me oh something about do you give blood. I said well I'm not allowed to give blood. Why not? Well I had malaria and I can never give blood. How did you get malaria? Well I was in the jungles in Zambia. Y'know, and and it's not that I'm boasting* ***or anything*** *but I=*
S: You're not.
P: =have done certain things in my life and they asked about it.
(Overstreet & Yule 2001: 52)

In example (2.40) above, *P* does not want to be retypified as being the kind of person who boasts about his experiences, so he disclaims it by means of the formulaic construction *not X* ***or anything****, but Y*. The construction *X* ***and everything****, but Y*, shown in (2.41) below, is very similar. There, the speaker explains that she is indifferent to a guy she has been dating, but acknowledges that he is *cute* and *powerful*, which would be desirable qualities in a partner, and thus, being indifferent to him would not be considered the normal behaviour. However, she excuses her attitude to act contrary to expectation by adding the clarification in the second part of the disclaimer: that he is a *former cocaine addict* and he *fucks whores*.

(2.41) *I kept thinking I had to try and look indifferent, which was weird, because on some level I* am *indifferent to him. I mean, he's cute and he's powerful* ***and all that****, but you have to take his reputation into*

[34] See, for instance, Overstreet & Yule (2001; 2002); Overstreet (2005: 1859; 2014: 118); Cortés Rodríguez (2006b: 118-120); Parvaresh & Tavangar (2010); Secova (2014: 14); and Buysse (2014: 14).

> *account. He's a former* cocaine *addict and he fucks* whores. (Overstreet & Yule 2002: 792)[35]

Overstreet & Yule (2002) explain the meaning of this formula as follows:

> I acknowledge *X* to be the case and would like to emphasize that certain expectations may arise on the basis of *X* (*and everything/and all that*), yet (*but*) I present *Y* as justification for thinking contrary to those expectations. (Overstreet & Yule 2002: 790)

As Cortés Rodríguez (2006b) explains, in disclaiming constructions, the intensifying function is retained in the first part (the one that contains the extender tag), because the stronger the force of the first argument, the one emphasized by the extender, the stronger the force of the second as well, which is the one that determines the stance of the speaker (2006b: 119). Secova (2014) also agrees with this view and states that these constructions "emphasize the speaker's previous discourse and justify its result with respect to the presumed expectations of the listener" (2013: 14).

It is very common for both these formulas (*not X* ***or anything****, but Y* and *X* ***and everything****, but Y*) to be accompanied by the comment clause *I mean* (present in both (2.40) and (2.41) above), which reinforces the clarification intention of the disclaimer. It is also common to find the discourse marker *you know* accompanying these constructions, as is the case in (2.40), a clear indicator of assumed shared knowledge (cf. Section 2.3.1.1), which is very strong in this function, as the speaker seeks the interlocutor's understanding of his intentions in a more explicit way than with any other function. In some instances, the interlocutor offers feedback that no negative retypification will occur, as happens in (2.40), where *S* interrupts *P*'s argumentation by assuring him that he is not boasting.

Both disclaiming expressions *not X* ***or anything****, but Y* and *X* ***and everything****, but Y* are considered by Overstreet (1999) and Overstreet & Yule (2001; 2002) as formulaic constructions, which means that they are both fixed and that specific pragmatic force or effect has been conventionally associated

[35] Lack of italics indicates emphasis.

to them (Overstreet & Yule 2002: 789). Formulaic constructions have been defined as "standardized links between what people actually say and what sort of communicative functions their utterances serve to perform" (2002: 789). In the case of disclaimers, there is a link between the two formulas under discussion here and the metapragmatic function of avoiding potentially problematic actions by explaining beforehand that they should not be understood as such.[36] The claim that these constructions are formulaic is strengthened by the fact that in some cases the second part of the formula is omitted, as illustrated in (2.42) below, where the *but Y* part has been left out, as the formulaic nature of the expression makes it transparent enough for the interlocutor to infer it anyway. Furthermore, there are some cases of co-constructed formulaic expressions between the speaker and his/her interlocutor, as shown in (2.43), which further strengthen the idea that these constructions are indeed formulaic.

(2.42) *L: So but like later on, I'm gonna get together with you an' find out like how much of your stuff you wanna get rid of, an' how much of it you wanna sell to me, heh!*
G: Okay.
L: Like are you – I me- Are you like planning to do that?
I mean, I don't wanna step on your toes ***or anything****.*
G: Whatcha mean?
L: Wu- uh
G: You mean like when I leave here in August?
L: Yeah
G: No, no. You can have like the stuff like the bed…

(Overstreet & Yule 2001: 55)

[36] The function of extender tags as disclaimers has also been documented in other languages: in German by Overstreet (2005: 1859), in Spanish by Cortés Rodríguez (2006b: 119-120), in Persian by Parvaresh & Tavangar (2010) and in French by Secova (2014: 14). They are also attested in the use of English as a second language as spoken by Dutch learners (cf. Buysse 2014: 14).

(2.43) *K: … I was sitting in my living room and without meaning to I was looking out into the garden and I was looking straight into Lawson's house that's the one up in Middle Close on the corner and I saw him get undressed in his living room there's no reason why you shouldn't get undressed in your living room if you want to*
C: yeh
K: and I thought my God
C: yeh
K: if I can see him
C: he can see you
K: and I don't always just get undressed in my living room
C: (laugh)
K: you know I mean OK I'm sure he's not
C: peeping
K: peeping ***or anything***
C: but he
K: but it just
C: you accidentally saw him
K: that's right.

(Overstreet & Yule 2001: 57)

2.3.3.1.2 GRICEAN MAXIMS OF QUALITY AND QUANTITY

Grice (1975: 45) postulates that, in any communicative situation, the interlocutors involved make an effort in order to produce understandable messages, by adhering to what he calls the Cooperative Principle: "make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (1975: 45).[37] In order to comply with this principle, he proposes four maxims that should be observed: the maxim of quantity, which accounts for the amount of information that should be given; the maxim of quality, which is

[37] Grice's (1975) Cooperative Principle has already been addressed in connection to the communicative implicatures of vagueness in Section 2.3.1.2 above.

summarized as "try to make your contribution one that is true"; the maxim of relation, which states that the information provided should be "relevant"; and the maxim of manner, which does not refer to the message itself (as the previous maxims), but to the way in which it is produced, and commands the speaker to "be perspicuous" (1975: 45-46). Grice claims that speakers tend to follow these maxims naturally because they reflect the way in which people have learned to behave since childhood. Nevertheless, they may fail to fulfil the maxims. Such failure can result either in deception, if a maxim is violated and therefore the Cooperative Principle is not observed, or in a conversational implicature, when a maxim is flouted while still observing the Cooperative Principle (1975: 48-49).

Channell (1994) and Cheng & Warren (2001) have pointed out the relation between vague language (where, as we have seen in Section 2.3.1.2, extender tags are included) and Grice's Cooperative Principle, because vague language provides a means to "enable speakers to follow the maxims" (Channell 1994: 33). Even when a hearer may consider a contribution as not appropriate, the presence of vague language "will lead her/him to look upon the contribution as trying to be appropriate, so adherence to the Cooperative Principle is maintained" (Cheng & Warren 2001: 84). This way, vague language is very useful when a maxim is flouted and a conversational implicature is produced (Channell 1994: 33). Overstreet (1999) was the first one to explicitly link extender tags to the Cooperative Principle. More specifically, she has claimed that adjunctive extender tags serve as hedges on the maxim of quantity, while disjunctive extender tags perform the function of quality hedges. In what follows, I focus on these two maxims and on how extender tags are useful resources for speakers to adhere to them.

The maxim of quality, "try to make your contribution one that is true", includes the following submaxims:

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

(Grice 1975: 46)

In order to comply with the second submaxim, not saying something for which evidence is not at hand, something that the speaker is not really sure is true or correct, disjunctive extender tags are convenient devices, since they function as hedges on the accuracy of the statement. Although not always explicitly relating this to Grice's quality maxim, the majority of researchers agree on the fact that extender tags function as accuracy hedges.[38] If we observe example (2.44) below, the speaker is not sure about what has actually happened, and so a couple of options are offered (*he was sacked for something else* or *he was made redundant*), followed by the extender tag *or something*, which implies that it may be the case that neither of those options are correct and another option is possible instead. The lack of accuracy and commitment to what is being stated is further strengthened by the presence of the epistemic adverb *perhaps* and the pragmatic marker *I don't know*. It is very frequent for expressions like these to appear in collocation with disjunctive extenders when they are used to hedge the accuracy of what is being said (Overstreet 1999: 115).

(2.44) […] *and he was perhaps sacked for something else, but I don`t know, or made redundant* ***or something***. (Erman 1995: 141)

When extender tags are used as hedges on the accuracy of the statement, the speaker asserts something that (s)he considers as potentially inaccurate (which would imply defying the maxim of quality), but (s)he uses these devices to indicate "in some conventional way a lack of commitment to the necessary truth of the content of the utterance, or part of the utterance – thus maintaining cooperation" (Overstreet 1999: 112). Buysse (2014) establishes a distinction among these accuracy hedges, between speculation

[38] Ball & Ariel (1978: 41); Aijmer (1985: 378; 2002: 244-245; 2004: 182) Macaulay (1991: 171); Erman (1995: 144); Overstreet (1999: 111-124; 2005: 1855-1856; 2011: 306-307; 2014: 121-122); Cheng & Warren (2001: 88-93); Stenström et al. (2002: 101); Cortés Rodríguez (2006a: 98-99; 2006b: 120-126); Cotterill (2007: 113); Terraschke & Holmes (2007: 204-206); Terraschke (2010: 458-460); Palacios Martínez (2011: 2466); Pichler & Levey (2011: 450); Ortega Barrera (2012: 231); Parvaresh et al. (2012: 270-271); Parvaresh & Dabghi (2013: 81); Buysse (2014: 17-24); Secova (2014: 13); and Fernández (2015: 7-8).

and approximate recollections. Example (2.44) above would illustrate a case of speculation, because the speaker does not know the facts for sure and offers a couple of hypotheses of what they may be, while in (2.45) below the speaker is recalling a time when he saw Al Pacino in a Broadway theatre, but he is not certain of the purpose of his being there, although he seems to remember that he was doing *a stage play*, and he marks his uncertainty by means of the extender tag *or something*.

(2.45) *– [Y]eah there was this group of people outside a theatre apparently he was doing a stage play* ***or something****.*
– mm
– and so oh what are those people looking at we went over and it was Al Pacino. I was amazed took photos of Al it was great.
(Buysse 2014: 18)

Although some examples are easy to classify into one or the other of these categories (thanks mostly to accompanying expressions, as is the case of *perhaps* and *I don't know* in (2.44) and of *apparently* in (2.45)), the difference between these two types of hedges may not always be so clear-cut for the researcher. Sometimes we cannot be sure if what is being offered in the scope of the tag is something that the speaker is recalling and does not remember well or whether some hypothesis is being suggested without actual knowledge of the facts. For example, in (2.46) Jim is not really sure about his roommate's job; he knows that he *works with computers*, but we cannot know for sure if Jim seems to recall that he is on *engineering* or whether this is a hypothesis that he makes based on the fact that he *works with computers*.

(2.46) *Jim:* […] *He's in the comp- He's in u·m engineering* ***or something like that****. He works with computers.* (Overstreet 1999: 109)

A further type of accuracy hedges are approximators, which "mark an utterance, or part of an utterance, not just as potentially inaccurate, but as an approximation" (Overstreet 1999: 115), an attempt to best depict the reality despite lacking the exact facts. Overstreet distinguishes five subcategories of approximators: (i) approximators with amounts or numeral approximators, (ii) lexical approximators, (iii) approximators of reported

speech, (iv) approximators marking analogies and (v) jokes as approximations.

Approximation with amounts seems to be most basic and recognizable way of approximation, first acknowledged in relation to extender tags by Aijmer (1985: 385). In this case, a disjunctive extender tag follows a number or quantity, as in (2.47), or a date, as in (2.48), and marks that it is not precise, but should rather be considered as an estimate approaching the actual number. The exact figure or quantity may be avoided either because it is not remembered at the time of speaking or because strict accuracy is not relevant. In any case, "remaining vague about a certain quantity [helps] maintain fluency while remaining less committed towards the correctness of the number stated" (Jucker et al. 2003: 1761).

(2.47) *[Y]eah it was (er) .. (eh) rather recently I think and it was also a young author who was only thirty years old* ***or something***. (Buysse 2014: 21)

(2.48) *Nigeria introduced universal primary education in fifty-six* ***or so***. (Channell 1994: 60)[39]

In the same way that extender tags can be attached to quantities and mark them as inaccurate, there are instances where they attach to lexical items to indicate that the word used may not be accurate because it is badly pronounced or spelled, as *hammeroids* in example (2.49), or because the speaker is not sure whether it is the appropriate word choice, as in (2.50). It is very usual for learners of English as a second language to use disjunctive extender tags with this function of marking lexical imprecision, as is the case in (2.50). It is also common when the speaker does not remember or is not sure about the name of someone (s)he wants to refer to, as shown in (2.51).

(2.49) *Butt-head: Why is he, like, walkin' funny?*
Beavis: Maybe he has HAMMEROIDS ***or something'***.
(Marvel Comics 1994, quoted from Overstreet 1999: 111)

[39] It is worth noting that although Channell (1994) does not consider any function for extender tags other than categorization, she characterizes the form *or so* as a numeral approximator (1994: 59-62).

(2.50) *Arman: The actor went to a very large building. I don't know the exact word.*
Afshin: Palace?
Arman: Palace?! No! Edifice I think! Yep. Edifice ***or something like that****.*
Afshin: Haven't heard about it.

(Parvaresh et al. 2012: 271)

(2.51) […] *what's his name? A guy that is … Rybczinski* ***or something like*** *that.* (Fernández 2015: 7)

When reproducing another person's words in the way of direct or indirect reported speech, it is very difficult to remember every word verbatim, so speakers tend to use disjunctive extender tags to imply that the quote should be taken as an approximation and not as the actual words, as it may not be an exactly accurate word-for-word recollection. (2.52) and (2.53) are illustrative of this function of extender tags as marking a section of reported speech as an approximation.

(2.52) *Donna: He was saying how I – I'll say "He::::y, nobody::::'s listening to me::::::"* ***or something*** *an' I said I don't*
Blake: You do: do that.

(Overstreet 1999: 118)

(2.53) *Darren: people say 'watch out' you know 'you might get mugged'* ***or something****.* (Cheshire 2007: 180)

Cheshire (2007: 176) does not consider instances of disjunctive extender tags following reported speech as being hedged on accuracy. Rather, she considers them as cases of categorization. For instance, taking (2.53) as a case in point, *watch out* and *you might get mugged* are just examples of the category 'things that people say to each other to advise them to take care in the street'. Nevertheless, this would not apply to examples like (2.52) above, in which Donna marks the quote as possibly inaccurate because what she is trying to depict is not the word-for-word quotation, but the whiny voice with which it is being uttered in order to imitate her. It is very difficult to picture a category of things that could have been said in this context instead of what is actually presented; consequently, it should be rather understood as an

approximation to the actual quote, and not as a case of categorization. However, categorization and hedging a stretch of reported speech are not mutually exclusive functions. In fact, there are cases like (2.53) where both functions are present: in addition to including both quotes in a category of possible 'things that could have been said', these are marked as possibly not accurate verbatim. By contrast, in other cases, like (2.52), only one of these functions is observed, namely hedging a section of reported speech as an approximate recollection.

Another area where the use of an approximator is very convenient is that of analogies. When a speaker wants to describe some experience or situation to an interlocutor, (s)he may sometimes compare it to another situation or experience that (s)he thinks his/her interlocutor will be familiar with. Consider (2.54) and (2.55) in this respect.

(2.54) *It was wonderful. It was like a drive through Jurassic Park* ***or something***. (*Honolulu Advertiser* 14Dec. 1997, quoted from Overstreet 1999: 119)

(2.55) *– [W]ould you like to be in front of the camera or behind the camera*
– front is fine
– in front okay
– like the female Gary Lineker ***or something***.

(Buysse 2014: 23)

Overstreet (1999: 119) provides example (2.54) from an advertisement of a new freeway going through an undeveloped valley in Hawai'i, and the motorist compares his experience driving through it as *a drive through Jurassic Park*, a setting from a movie probably known by the majority of adult people in western culture. The presence of the extender tag *or something* marks this as inaccurate, as the comparison is with some setting that does not even exist, but helps the reader to get a rough idea of the situation described. In (2.55), on the other hand, the speaker is talking about what she would like to become in the future, and makes the analogy of becoming the female version of Gary Lineker, who is a famous BBC sports presenter, to help the interviewer to get an idea of the kind of role she would like to assume. It is worth noting that analogies are "prefaced by the pragmatic marker *like*,

and that *or something* additionally emphasises that the analogy is not foolproof" (Buysse 2014: 23).

The fifth and last type of approximators distinguished by Overstreet (1999) is that of jokes marked as approximations. In such cases "a purposeful exaggeration, or an analogy, which should not be taken too literally" (Overstreet 1999: 120) is presented. It does not reflect the reality, as it is created for humorous effect, so the extender tag functions as a hedge on its accuracy. In (2.56) below, from an article on Martha Stewart, the speaker presents a joke, i.e. while the paint was drying, Martha Stewart had time to build a house, and the ensuing extender tag *or something* marks it as a purposeful exaggeration that is not to be taken as accurate, because it was just made for humorous effect. In (2.57), in turn, the name that the speaker suggests for his great-uncle's foot regime, *Royal Warwickshire foot and mouth*, comes from the acoustic consonance with the previous item (*regime of foot)* and the name of the cattle disease (*foot and mouth*), which are combined in a way that intends to be humorous. The combination is accompanied by the extender tag *or something*, which indicates that it should not to be taken verbatim, but as an approximation, in this case, a joke.

(2.56) *In one of her shows, she took fresh eggs from the hens she raised and made a meal to rival the Last Supper. Ten minutes later she painted a colored diamond on her porch (exhausting just to watch). While the paint was drying, I think she built a house* ***or something****.* (*Honolulu Advertiser* 5 Jan. 1997, quoted from Overstreet 1999; 121)

(2.57) *A: and listed up you see and went out in some ghastly regiment of foot, Royal Warwickshire foot and mouth* ***or something****, and flogged all 'round Africa*
b: hold on in time for Omdurman.
A: I I I don't know which battles he was in I can't remember now.
(Aijmer 2002: 247)

The use of disjunctive extender tags as quality hedges is largely dominated by the extender tag *or something*, as we can see from examples (2.44) to (2.57) above, where only one isolated instance of another extender is found in (2.48), namely *or so*. Another extender tag that is also common in

this function is *or whatever*, which has the added connotation of dismissing the information that is being marked as inaccurate. In (2.58), for instance, Sara is not certain if the new show she is referring to is a *detective show* or a *horror show* or a *soap opera*, but she characterizes this information as unimportant by means of the use of the extender tag *or whatever*, marking it at the same time as potentially inaccurate. In (2.59), in turn, the speaker is looking for a word to refer to criminals, but only finds *gangsters*, which (s)he marks as a lexical approximation at the same time as (s)he downgrades the importance of not having found a better word.

(2.58) *Sara:* […] *There was some stupid ass like new detective show or*
Roger: Uh huh
Sara: like horror show, or soap opera, ***or whatever***
Roger: huh huh huh huh huh
Sara; that's set in fuckin' Waikiki. […]

(Overstreet 1999: 123)

(2.59) *– [Y]es because (er) all the city (em) the city centre is really empty at night*
– (mhm)
– so all the cr- all the.. gangsters ***or whatever***
– (mhm)
– they all come to the centre and they just rob everyone who walks on the street so.

(Buysse 2014: 29)

As regards Grice's quantity maxim, it contains two submaxims:

> 1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
> 2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
>
> (Grice 1975: 45)

Overstreet (1999) points out that both submaxims are "like two forces pulling the speaker in opposite directions" (1999: 126), i.e. on the one hand, being informative enough and, on the other, not saying too much. Grice suggests that although being over informative can be seen as a waste of time, rather than a transgression of the Cooperative Principle, producing too much information can be misleading for the interlocutors, as they may think that

there is a point in including so much information, conflicting at the same time with the maxim of relevance (Grice 1975: 46). Adjunctive extender tags, with their intrinsic meaning 'there is more', are "perfectly suited to the role of hedges on the Maxim of Quantity" (Overstreet 1999: 127), because they "allow the speaker to limit what could be expressed more exhaustively and hedge on expectations of informativeness in interaction" (Overstreet 2014: 120). They naturally imply that "more information could be given but it is not necessary because you already know what I mean". In this sense, they are intrinsically linked to the assumption of shared knowledge discussed in Section 2.3.1.1. Cortés Rodríguez (2006b: 112) suggests that this happens the other way around. Instead of using extenders in order to avoid being over informative, he claims that it is because the speaker knows that his/her interlocutor can decipher the information that is not being provided that (s)he opts to apply the quantity maxim. Research claiming the function of extenders as hedges on the maxim of quantity is not as extensive as that proving their function as accuracy hedges, because although many researchers refer to the notion that extenders imply 'there is more', very few go on to elaborate further on this issue.[40]

As I have already pointed out, the speaker's choice to adhere to the maxim of quantity and therefore not state all the information, abbreviating it by means of a extender tag that implies 'there is more', is tied to the assumption of shared knowledge, relying on the interlocutor being able to understand the unstated information. Because of this, extender tags frequently co-occur with *you know,* as in (2.60). On some occasions, the interlocutor responds indicating that the information provided is indeed sufficient, as is the case of (2.61).

[40] In this connection, see Aijmer (1985: 378); Macaulay (1985: 115); Ward & Birner (1993: 212); Overstreet (1999: 125-140; 2005: 1853-1854; 2011: 307; 2014: 119-120); Drave (2002: 36); Cortés Rodríguez (2006a: 97; 2006b: 112-114); Cucchi (2007: 8); Terraschke & Holmes (2007; 205); Ortega Barrera (2012: 227); Parvaresh et al. (2012: 271-272); Parvaresh & Dabghi (2013: 81-82); Buysse (2014: 9); and Fernández (2015: 7).

(2.60) *If she's gonna go through labor and delivery and she's gonna have a baby* ***and all this stuff*** *you know I'd like to be able to be there.* (Overstreet 1999: 127)

(2.61) *Donna: There's garlic salt an' onion powder* ***an' things like that –*** *Blake: Okay.*

(Overstreet 1999: 131)

In (2.60) the speaker presupposes that his/her interlocutor can figure out what other things are involved in the process of having a baby, so there is no need to list them all. Similarly, in (2.61) Donna does not feel it necessary to state all the spices in her herb cabinet, as Blake can infer which other things can be in there. In other words, the maxim of quality is satisfied in both cases.

As we have seen in relation to *or whatever* above, extender tags used as quantity hedges can also downgrade the information that is left out. This can be done by including pejorative language within the extender tag itself, as evinced in (2.62), with the use of *and all that David Copperfield kind of crap*, and in (2.63) which features *and all that sort of shit*.

(2.62) *If you really want to hear about it, the first thing you'll probably want to know is where I was born, and what my lousy childhood was like, and how my parents were occupied and all that before they had me,* ***and all that David Copperfield kind of crap,...*** (Salinger 1945: 3, quoted from Overstreet 1999: 135)

(2.63) *I haven't learned my Highway Code* ***and all that sort of shit.*** (Palacios Martínez 2011: 2453)

The narrator in (2.62) acknowledges that the readers know how the typical narrative depicting the life of somebody begins, by presenting his/her background story. Therefore, he deems it is unnecessary to state all the details, and, at the same time, as the character in the *Catcher in the Rye* is characterized by proudly and purposely being the opposite of common, he downgrades what is typical behaviour by adding the pejorative noun *crap* within the extender tag. The case of (2.63) is very similar: the speaker downgrades the highway code (and any other item that could be implied by the extender) by means of the extender tag *and all that sort of shit*.

In other cases, what is downgraded is reported speech, as in (2.64) below, where the speaker marks two sections of indirect reported speech, *she's in a hospital* and *God knows best*, as incomplete. More has in fact been said, but it is not worth reproducing it in its totality since it is deemed irrelevant. Therefore, its importance is downgraded by using the pejorative noun *shit* within the extender tag.

(2.64) *They just tell me she's in a hospital and that God knows best* ***and all that shit****.* (Tagliamonte & Denis 2010: 339)

The extender tag *and blah blah blah* has been reported by Overstreet (1999) to be very recurrent with this downgrading connotation, as illustrated in (2.65) below.

(2.65) *They don't wanna give me a paycheck today if I were to take a vacation next week they're like 'Wull, we'd hafta like – we'd hafta like mail it to you*⁝⁝ ***an' blah blah blah****.' An' I'm like 'Hhhh! Nevermind.'* (Overstreet 1999: 138)

The speaker in (2.65) does not want to continue with the quotation and marks that there is more, but it is not consequential for the interlocutor to know any more than the already stated information. Furthermore, the unstated information is downgraded by means of the mocking *blah blah blah*.

Although Overstreet does not include instances of reported speech that are not downgraded in her analysis of extenders as quantity hedges, it is important to note that apart from this pejorative connotation, these examples illustrate speaker's compliance with the maxim of quantity. Speakers avoid being over informative, be it because they do not consider it necessary to offer more information or because they blatantly downgrade its importance. Tokens like (2.66) and (2.67) illustrate the function of extenders to imply that the quote was larger than what is being reproduced, but further information would imply flouting the maxim of quantity, without downgrading the unstated information, as our earlier examples do.

(2.66) *Caroline: they ask really stupid questions like 'can you bring one to school'* ***and things like that***
Berth: they can be a bit patronising
Caroline: these are the sort of things that they think of sometimes.
(Cheshire 2007: 176)

(2.67) *A: Yeah. I know but I mean like my mum was saying that you know … sometimes you're just too pissed to stop and you just com carry on* ***and stuff****.*
B: Yeah.
(Palacios Martínez 2011: 2466)

In (2.66), Caroline offers the quote as just one illustration of other patronizing questions that teachers ask their students, but she considers that quoting one of these questions is sufficiently illustrative and there is no need to include more. Her interlocutor, Berth, is able to understand, which she confirms by not challenging Caroline or showing incomprehension in her response. In (2.67), in turn, speaker A reproduces part of what his/her mother has told him/her and marks with the extender tag that more has been said, but there is no need to quote it in full. Once more, the interlocutor can get the gist of what A is saying with the information already provided, and therefore responds *yeah*. In this sense, by not including verbatim full quotations every time, the speakers are showing their intention to adhere to the maxim of quantity, finding a balance between saying enough and not saying too much.

The role of extender tags as hedges on the maxims of quality and quantity just presented has been challenged by some scholars. Thus, for instance, Cheshire (2007: 180) and Palacios Martínez (2011: 2466) have claimed that extender tags after reported speech only perform the textual function of marking the end of a section of reported speech. In my view, however, the implications explained above in relation to the functions of extenders both as accuracy as well as quantity hedges cannot be overlooked. Furthermore, the fact that not every section of reported speech is closed by means of an extender tag means that when they are used in this position, additional connotations can be assumed: either the quote is not reproduced in

its totality or it is not reproduced verbatim, and in both cases, extenders are used as hedges.

Terraschke & Holmes (2007) consider that extender tags can function as hedges on quantity and quality, but they include this function within the referential domain instead of the expressive one, although they acknowledge that these functions are also linked "to the interlocutor's shared knowledge, thus serving affective functions too" (2007: 206). In the introduction to this section (cf. Section 2.3.3), it was explained that the difference between the referential and the expressive functions lies in the fact that the former tie the expression itself to a world of reference and their interpretation is basically objective, while the latter are related to the stance of the speaker within the speech situation, concerning either the message or his/her interlocutor. In the case of quantity and quality hedges, the speaker shows his/her concern about the message and about complying with the Cooperative Principle in order to maintain fluency and adequacy within interaction. Because of this, as Overstreet (2014) points out, these functions are "inherently speaker-based […] and hence fundamentally subjective in orientation" (2014: 122).

Finally, I have found evidence in the literature on extender tags that suggests that the prototypical differentiation between adjunctive extender tags functioning as hedges on quantity and disjunctive extender tags functioning as accuracy hedges may not be so clear-cut as it may appear at first sight. Secova (2014), in her analysis of the French adjunctive extender *et tout*, explains that this form "is well suited for use in quoted speech, where speakers seek to reproduce someone's words in an authentic manner, even when they are unable to reproduce them verbatim" (2013: 13). This means that she considers that it is used as a hedge on quality. Other instances of adjunctive extender tags functioning as hedges on the accuracy of the statement are given in (2.68) and (2.69) below.

(2.68) *I don't know, he just said there are people there. I think he means people who are regarded by others as sort of experts and psychics and wise men* ***and things like that****. How they work, don't ask me. It's like*

they have feelers which intuit thing about other people there's no, I mean how they do it goodness only knows. (Stenström et al. 2002: 101)

(2.69) *Melanie: no my dad's a senior lecturer um at Upfield University*
AW: right and what does he lecture in?
Melanie: um oh compu- computing and computer science ***and things*** *I can't exactly remember he's a doctor of, something or other, I can't, I always forget.*

(Cheshire 2007: 181)

Stenström et al. (2002) consider that (2.68) illustrates a situation where the speaker is not sure of what she is saying and, by using the extender tag *and things like that*, avoids being completely explicit. She thus marks the potential inaccuracy of her statement and adheres to the maxim of quantity. Something similar applies in (2.69): it is clear that Melanie does not remember her father's field of expertise. She makes it pretty clear by repeating that she does not remember and by hedging the accuracy of her statement, *computing and computer science*, by means of the extender tag *and things*, thus implying that what she is offering is an approximation to the actual information. In view of examples like (2.68) and (2.69), cases where adjunctive extender tags are used in order to adhere to the maxim of quality can indeed be found.

2.3.3.2 INTERSUBJECTIVE FUNCTION OF EXTENDER TAGS: POLITENESS

In this section I discuss a second type of expressive functions, namely those where the speaker's attitude toward his/her interlocutor(s) is conveyed within the frame of their interactive exchange of talk. The only function that is included here is the use of extender tags as politeness strategies.

Politeness strategies are mechanisms designed to deal with face concerns. Face is defined as "the public self-image that every member [of a society] wants to claim for himself" (Brown & Levinson 2009: 311). There is an implicit acknowledgement between all members of a society of the

existence of face and their will for it to be respected. Based on this need to preserve face, the two dimensions to face are defined as follows:

> negative face: the want of every 'competent adult member' that his actions be unimpeded by others;
> positive face: the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others.
>
> (Brown & Levinson 2009: 312)

In everyday interaction, there are some situations where the speaker is in danger of threatening the addressee's face. These are called 'face threatening acts (FTA)'. When confronted with a FTA, the speaker may try to mitigate it by means of some kind of redressive action, in this case, some politeness strategy. As there are two dimensions to face, there are also two types of politeness:

> Positive politeness is orientated toward the positive face […]; it 'anoints' the face of the addressee by indicating that in some respects, [the speaker] wants [the hearer's] wants (e.g., by treating him as a member of an in-group, a friend, a person whose wants and personality traits are known and liked). […]
> Negative politeness, on the other hand, […] is essentially avoidance based, and realizations of negative-politeness strategies consist in assurances that the speaker recognizes and respects the addressee's negative-face wants and will not (or will only minimally) interfere with the addressee's freedom of action. […] Face-threatening acts are redressed with […] softening mechanisms that give the addressee an 'out', a face-saving line of escape, permitting him to feel that his response is not coerced.
>
> (Brown & Levinson 2009: 317)

Different mechanisms serve as politeness strategies in language. One of these is the use of extender tags, which can be employed both as positive politeness strategies (by asserting common ground and in-group membership) and as negative politeness strategies (by being used as hedges in some face-threatening situations, providing the addressee with options from which to choose and thus minimizing the risk of imposition). Overstreet (1999) establishes a distinction between adjunctive extender tags, which function as

positive politeness strategies, and disjunctive extender tags, which serve as strategies for negative politeness (1999: 97), and although the vast majority of examples fit into this dichotomy, there is evidence that it should not be taken as a strict rule. As a matter of fact, Winter & Norrby (2000) explain that the same extender tag can simultaneously "work both as a means of positive and of negative politeness" (2000: 5), a notion that is also supported by Koester (2007), who provides examples of the same adjunctive form (*and things*) functioning either as a positive or a negative politeness strategy (2007: 50). On the other hand, Cheshire (2007) claims that "both adjunctives and disjunctives could be interpreted as having negative politeness functions" (Cheshire 2007: 182). Therefore, although it is prototypical of disjunctive extender tags to perform as hedges on negative politeness, adjunctives can sometimes "also be used to save face" (Fernández 2015: 11).

The use of extender tags as positive politeness strategies has been widely suggested in the literature on the topic.[41] One of the strategies of positive politeness available is to assert common ground with the interlocutor, which is directly related to the assumption of shared knowledge, which has been reported to be inherent to extender tags (cf. Section 2.3.1.1). In connection to this notion, when a speaker uses an extender tag, (s)he relies on the interlocutor to retrieve the intended meaning by implying that 'there is more but I don't need to tell you because you already know what I mean'. This way, the function of conveying shared knowledge (intrinsic to extender tag use) has been identified as strategy of positive politeness (i.e. asserting

[41] Cf. Aijmer (1985: 378; 2002: 240; 2004: 182); Macaulay (1991: 171); Youssef (1993: 295); Stubbe & Holmes (1995: 83); Overstreet & Yule (1997b); Overstreet (1999: 99-104; 2005: 1852-1853; 2011: 307; 2014: 120-121); Winter & Norrby (2000: 4-5); Cheng & Warren (2001: 95-96); Norrby & Winter (2002: 4-7); Jucker et al. (2003: 1749); De Cock (2004: 236); Cortés Rodríguez (2006b: 112-114); Cheshire (2007: 181-182); Cotterill (2007: 100); Evison et al. (2007: 138); Koester (2007: 50); Terraschke & Holmes (2007: 207-208); Maclagan et al. (2008: 182-183); Ruzaité (2010: 34); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 343-344); Fernández & Yuldashev (2011: 2623); Palacios Martínez (2011: 2466-2467); Ortega Barrera (2012: 228); Parvaresh et al. (2012: 269-270); Parvaresh & Dabghi (2013: 80-81); Buysse (2014: 9); Secova (2014: 10); and Fernández (2015: 8-9).

common ground), which has led some researchers (cf. Overstreet 1999: 99; Overstreet & Yule 1997b: 255) to suggest that extenders are therefore "inherently associated with positive politeness" (Secova 2014: 10). Consequently, as positive politeness can thus be considered to be implicit in extender tag use (a feature that has already been addressed in Section 2.3.1.1), in what follows I focus only on those cases where the extender "may not intimate additional instances; instead, it may simply be used for the purpose of marking invited solidarity as interactive partner, much like the form *you know*" (Overstreet 1999: 99); in other words, those cases where their only function is as positive politeness strategies. This implies, therefore, the loss of the basic function of extender tags, namely categorization (cf. Section 2.3.2.1). It has been claimed that the evolution of extenders tags in terms of grammaticalization implies a process of semantic-pragmatic change whereby the referential functions of extender tags (e.g. categorization) are gradually replaced by expressive ones.[42] Therefore, not all extender tags are expected to function exclusively as positive politeness devices. Aijmer (2002: 224-228) explains that it is the short semi-fixed forms, those that are most frequent in language, that she claims have become automatized, that are chosen when politeness is implied. Overstreet & Yule (1997b) and Overstreet (1999) have found that it is the form *and stuff* the one that appears to be the most advanced in working as a mechanism for engendering solidarity in American English, while it seems that the forms *and that* and *and things* are the most frequent ones in British English for this purpose.

Those cases where the use of the extender tag is meant solely as an appeal for solidarity, for the interlocutor's understanding, do not imply any additional items. An example is given in (2.70) below, where the patient is comparing the appearance of AIDS in their community to some biblical passage, but when confronted by the counsellor, who exposes her as not an expert on the Bible, she seeks solidarity by means of the extender tag *and ting*, which clearly does not intimate any additional items to the scope

[42] The process of grammaticalization of extender tags is discussed in detail in Section 2.6.2.

people.[43] Rather, the extender tag is used here as a means of getting closer to the interlocutor and of appealing for his solidarity and understanding.

(2.70) *P: You know, what I hear? … One thing about it like it getting so bad in the daytime it makin hot an you feelin cold. … The Bible really say that, you know. Sickness will come. That true boy. It comin an everybody deadin an it have no cure for it in fact.*
C: Whereabouts does the Bible say that?
P: I heard – well, they say it … we only have six years to live.
C: You only have six years to live?
P: No. The people all people ***an ting****.*

(Youssef 1993: 300)

In (2.71), already analysed in Section 2.3.2.1, it is impossible to infer any additional items that could be suggested by the extender tag *and that*, *he died* and nothing else. Macaulay (1991: 171) suggests that, in such cases, the extender functions more like a hedge, "as a kind of punctuation feature, almost the oral equivalent of a comma or a full stop, depending on intonation" (Macaulay 1985: 115, quoted from Overstreet 1999: 102).

(2.71) = (2.29) *[W]hen he died* ***and that****.* (Macaulay 1991: 171)

Some researchers (cf. Cheshire 2007: 186; Pichler & Levey 2011: 453) agree that becoming a kind of punctor is the endpoint of grammaticalization for extender tags. Cheshire (2007) presents (2.72) as an example of how extender tags can become punctors, where the reiterative use of *and everything* does not intimate any additional items, so it has lost "all of its original meaning and function" (2007: 186).

(2.72) *AW: and is there anyone you really admire? I mean you must have lots of sort of sporting heroes do you?*
Will: er I admire my best friend
AW: oh right
Will: cos erm he's had a lot of problems ***and everything*** *with his family* ***and everything*** *so and he's still coping* ***and everything****.*
AW: you've been a good mate to him then

(Cheshire 2007: 186)

[43] The repetition of *people* further implies that there are no more items in this enumeration.

On the contrary, Overstreet considers such instances as cases where extenders have developed a new pragmatic meaning, as a positive politeness strategy, functioning merely as markers of solidarity, much like the form *you know*. When this use is fully integrated extenders will not "need to be attached to propositional information" (1999: 104). Therefore, examples like those in (2.73) below, where we can see in Karen's second and fourth interventions the extender *and stuff* appearing on its own, with no scope attached to it, will be commonplace.

(2.73) *Karen: So anyway, no I sta – I sa – I got out of here by a quarter till yesterday* ***an' stuff****. I didn't see that last patient.*

Donna: You mean quarter to four.

Karen: Yeah, ***an' stuff*** *– after I took care – after I took care of the body, so. I just figured I dind't wanna leave that hanging till the evening shift.*

Donna: Now we knew him, didn't we?

Karen: Yeah

Donna: 'Cause I 'member with his name.

Karen: Yeah ***an' stuff****. He was –*

Donna: He dind't look familiar, but I mean in his condition, hhh.

Karen: No. HE was a nice – he was a nice – patient.

(Overstreet 1999: 104)

Since extender tags display a similar meaning and function to the form *you know*, the co-occurrence of extenders functioning as markers of solidarity with this discourse marker further strengthens the solidarity reading. This combination is also very frequent, as we can see from example (2.70) above, and, in a much more exaggerated way, in (2.74) below. Anyway, it has been claimed that that the more integrated this function is, the less co-occurrence is expected and needed with other forms of solidarity. Some researchers (cf. Cheshire 2007: 186; Tagliamonte & Denis 2010: 345; and Palacios Martínez 2011: 2463) even consider this lack of co-occurrence as a sign that the extender is further along in the process of grammaticalization.

(2.74) *But y'know* ***'n stuff****, as he got a little bit older* ***'n stuff****, y' know doctor told me and Justin was fine and has no problem. But as he's gotten*

> *older you can see he's he's flattening out y'know,* ***an' stuff****, an' he's uh, his muscles are developing* ***'n 'stuff****, and I even run my hand across his chest y'know and I can tell it's flatter. Y'know, so he's, yeah.* (Overstreet 1999: 103-104)

As I have already explained above, extender tags used as solidarity markers show the appeal of the speaker towards his/her interlocutor's understanding, his/her attempt to create rapport with the addressee. This appeal for solidarity is on some occasions attended by the interlocutor, who responds providing supporting feedback, as illustrated in (2.72) in AW's last turn, when he reassures Will saying that he has been a good mate to his friend.

When used as positive politeness strategies, extenders "may help create and maintain a bond between conversational partners" (Jucker et al. 2003: 1749), so they ultimately create a "self-connection among the participants in the conversation as a marker of group and identity" (Palacios Martínez 2011: 2467). This reading of extenders functioning as positive politeness markers of in-group membership has been supported by some researchers,[44] who claim that the use of these forms in some cases reflects the speaker's belonging to one group (including his/her interlocutor or trying to be differentiated from him/her). This is the case of the Creole form *an ting* in example (2.70) above. Youssef (1993: 294-295) explains that Creole is a language of solidarity, used by speakers when they want to relate to one another, to mark an in-group membership that bonds them together. Therefore, the form *an ting* is a double marker of solidarity, because when speakers resort to this Creole form (even when speaking in Standard English), they are marking in-group membership, while at the same time also expressing solidarity because of the implication of shared knowledge of the tag. This feature also becomes evident in other studies where extenders are classified as markers of in-group membership for young speakers, who are claimed to use some forms more often than adults as a mark of youth speech,

[44] See Youssef (1993: 294-295); Stubbe & Holmes (1995: 83); Winter & Norrby (2000: 6-7); Norrby & Winter (2002: 6-7); Evison et al. (2007: 138); and Palacios Martínez (2011: 1467).

or in those cases where some extenders are used to differentiate boys from girls, as discussed by Winter & Norrby (2000: 6-7) and Norrby & Winter (2001: 6-7), with boys using *and that* and girls *and stuff* to differentiate between them and mark in-group membership.

This use of extenders as markers of solidarity is also a common function among Alzheimer's patients (cf. Maclagan et al. 2008). Speakers with Alzheimer's disease appear to be competent users of extenders tags, but as the disease progresses, they are no longer able to retrieve the meanings behind the use of these forms, and they use them rather as an appeal to the interlocutor's solidarity and an apology for not being able to remember in more detail (2008: 183).

The use of extender tags as markers of negative politeness has also been studied and supported by many researchers.[45] Aijmer (1985) was the first one to suggest that a disjunctive extender tag could be used as "a 'softener' mitigating the force of the speech act", because when signalling "that the listener can choose an alternative to the one proposed, he imposes his communicative intention on the listener with less force" (1985: 385b). This agrees with Brown & Levinson's (2009) proposal for politeness strategies that includes to "minimize the size of imposition on [the hearer]" (2009: 322). When used as a negative politeness strategy, extenders appear in contexts where some imposition on the hearer is expected, such as requests, offers, invitations or proposals (Overstreet 1999: 107). Because of the intrinsic meaning of disjunctive extender tags that 'there are alternatives', they are perfectly suited to be used as hedges on negative politeness. By implying that other options exist, the imposition towards the interlocutor is weakened and therefore the face threat is mitigated. For instance, in (2.75) below, the

[45] Cf. Aijmer (1985: 385; 2002: 246-247); Channell (1994: 190); Overstreet (1999: 104-110; 2005: 1856-1857; 2011: 307; 2014: 122); Winter & Norrby (2000: 5); Cheng & Warren (2001: 95-98); Norrby & Winter (2002: 5); O'Keeffe (2004: 17); Cortés Rodríguez (2006b: 115-117); Cheshire (2007: 182); Cotterill (2007: 100); Koester (2007: 50); Terraschke & Holmes (2007: 209-210); Ruzaitè (2010: 34); Parvaresh et al. (2012: 272-273); Parvaresh & Dabghi (2013: 82); Secova (2014: 11); and Fernández (2015: 10-11).

student is requesting his/her tutor to have a meeting in order to solve any question that might arise after having their essays back. This request may seem an imposition to the tutor if not hedged by some negative politeness strategy. The extender tag *or something* here suggests a weaker commitment on the part of the student to the scope *meet*, implying that other alternatives are also possible (e.g. having personal tutorials, answering doubts through email, etc.) and would also be welcome. However, the extender tag is not the only negative politeness strategy in this example, which also features other signs of tentativeness, such as introducing the question with the modal verb *could*, which is repeated twice, and using *sort of*, which further weakens the strength of the request, i.e. to *meet*.

(2.75) *Could we, when you give us our essays back – and give us titles – could we sort of meet* ***or something*** *– because I mean – there might be things we want to ask.* (Channell 1994: 190)

Parvaresh et al. (2012) provide example (2.76) as an instance of the use of extenders for negative politeness. Maryam wants her sister to put on her hijab, but does not want to tell her so bluntly in order not to impose on her and threaten her negative face, so she hedges the proposition by means of the polite phrasing (*I thought you might like*) and of the extender tag *jâ čizi* (the Persian equivalent to the English *or something*). In this case, the extender tag acts as a tentative hedge, because although other possibilities are potentially available, actually they do not exist; the speaker is just trying to suggest that Mina should wear hijab (and not any other piece of attire). Even in cases where no other option exists, the presence of the extender tag and its intrinsic implication of alternative possibilities makes the request, offer, invitation or proposal less specific, "thereby increasing the likelihood of receiving a preferred response (i.e., acceptance)" (Overstreet 1999: 108). This is so in (2.76), where Mina agrees immediately to wear her hijab.

(2.76) *Maryam: Daddy's guests that are coming over tonight are extremely religious!*
Mina: What does it have to do with me?!
Maryam: I thought you might like to wear hijab ***jâ čizi.*** *I thought*
Mina: Got it! Consider it done!
Maryam: Merci!

(Parvaresh et al. 2012: 272)

In turn, (2.77) below also illustrates a case where the extender tag does not really imply a possibility other than the one presented. Speaker H2 wants to make surveys among small kids (and not a different thing), but by the use of the extender *or something* (s)he leaves speaker H1 the possibility of rejection open. As we have seen in the previous example, the use of the extender actually encourages a preferred response in (2.77) as well, despite the timing problem with the kids' vacation.

(2.77) *H2: Well then. Oh, one thing I wanted to tell you, but okay, if not some other day when you have more time,*
H1: Tell me.
H2: It's just that I wanted to … do surveys ***or something like that*** *with small kids,*
H1: Yes.
H2: To … and then I thought since you teach small kids, but…
H1: Oh, well, the thing is that we are about to go on vacation.
H2: Right.
H1: You would have to come on Wednesday.

(Fernández 2015: 10-11)

Overstreet (1999) also suggests that it is not only the face of the interlocutor that is threatened in offers, invitations, proposals or requests; rather, the speaker's face is also at risk, since in making such propositions, (s)he is in a position of being rejected. Therefore, the use of the extender as a negative politeness strategy is also directed at saving the speaker's own face (1999: 107).

Cheshire (2007) provides an example, given below as (2.78), of an adjunctive extender functioning as a negative politeness strategy, used "to

mitigate the fact that the speaker knows more than the interviewer" (2007: 182):

(2.78) *Debbie: I like this one called 'House Party Three'*
AW: oh I don't know that
Debbie: it's American about all these American singers ***and things***.
(Cheshire 2007: 182)

Similarly, in (2.79), from Koester (2007), the adjunctive form *and things* is used to save face. Here, Angus is asking Paul about his business dealings with other companies. Since this can be interpreted as an unwanted invasion of his privacy, he hedges his inquiry by means of the extender to soften it and mitigate the potential face threat. The fact that the question is a sensible matter is also reflected in Paul's non-committed response (*I think we did*), which suggests that even though he probably knows whether there is such deal or not, he does not wish to discuss the matter.

(2.79) *Angus: Yes. Ah. I heard you did a deal with (??) didn't you. To take a lot of board in* ***and things***
Paul: Yeah. I think we did. Yeah.
(Koester 2007: 50)

2.3.4 OTHER FUNCTIONS OF EXTENDER TAGS

In addition to the functions identified in the previous sections, including those that are common to all extender tags (cf. Section 2.3.1), the referential functions (cf. Section 2.3.2) and the expressive ones (cf. Section 2.3.3), extender tags have also been shown to realize some further minor functions, which are briefly discussed in this section.

Dubois (1992) suggests that extenders "are inherently discourse connectors", because she claims that their use "signals the end of a sentence" (1992: 182). As we have already observed (cf. Section 2.2.3), extenders do not always appear at the end of the sentence, so this textual closing function would not apply to all uses of the forms at issue. Cortés Rodríguez (2006a) also postulates that extenders perform this closing function in almost every occurrence, but explains that extenders can appear at the end of a sentence

or not. What the extender tag closes is the sequence it follows, regardless of whether the sentence where it occurs ends there as well or not (2006a: 95-96). Other researchers[46] have reinterpreted this function as the finalization of a speaker's turn; extenders would thus signal that the speaker is prepared to yield the turn to his/her interlocutor(s). Cheshire (2007) provides some illustrative examples of this function, like (2.80) below, where the interviewer takes the extender *and stuff* as the end of Mick's turn and begins talking immediately after its production, even overlapping him.

(2.80) *AW: have you got a favourite film?*
Mick: don't really watch films
AW: not unless one springs to mind
Mick: I likes watching sport ***and stuff*** *[so*
AW: [do you well we'll talk about that then

(Cheshire 2007: 181)

This textual closing function has already been mentioned (cf. Section 2.3.3.1.2) in connection to Cheshire's (2007: 180) and Palacios Martínez's (2011: 2466) claim that extenders are used to mark the end of a section of reported speech.

Finally, extender tags have been suggested to have a fumbling function,[47] "used whenever the speaker requires time to express what he has to say" (Aijmer 1985: 382). In such instances, the production of extenders would then have no other motivation than to "give both speaker, and hearer, additional time for processing" (Channell 1994: 120). Sánchez-Ayala (2003) defends that extenders have their origin in enumeration, where they are used merely as delay devices, "to hold and delay the verbalization of more items" (2003: 339). However, more often than not, the process of listing is

[46] See, among others, Winter & Norrby (2000: 6); Aijmer (2002: 240); Cheshire (2007: 181); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 343-344); Pichler & Levey (2011: 444); and Fernández (2015: 9).
[47] This function has been mentioned in the following works: Aijmer (1985: 382); Channell (1994: 120-121); Drave (2002: 35); Sánchez-Ayala (2003: 339); Cortés Rodríguez (2006a: 100-101); Buysse (2014: 13); and Secova (2014: 13).

discontinued after the inclusion of the extender tag, which accounts for their common occurrence at the end of lists.

As we have already seen in the previous sections on the functions of extender tags, there is much more to their functions than being just performance fillers, as is pointed out by Channell (1994: 120-121). Nevertheless, there may be cases where they are also used for such a purpose, as demonstrated by Secova (2014: 13) and Buysse (2014: 13): speakers use longer variants of the extender tags when they are not sure what to say next and need to gain reflection time, while, at the same time, this resource makes them sound more fluent than if they hold the floor with pauses or other delay devices (such as *uhhh, mmmm* or *erm*).

2.4 OTHER FEATURES OF EXTENDER TAGS

Besides the formal and functional features of extender tags presented in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 above, some other features of the tags have been addressed in the literature on the topic and are discussed in this section. These include textual features of the tags (cf. Section 2.4.1), sociolinguistic features (2.4.2), and the use of extender tags across different English varieties as well as in other languages (2.4.3).

2.4.1 TEXTUAL FEATURES

Within the textual features considered for extender tags, discourse types and stylistic variation are addressed in this section.

Researchers that have worked on extender tags agree in that these forms are "pervasive features of conversation" (Aijmer 1985: 366). For this reason, it has widely been assumed that they are more frequent in spoken contexts than in written ones (Overstreet 1999: 6), although they are present in written records as well. In order to prove this assumption, Palacios Martínez (2011) conducted a couple of tests comparing the written and spoken parts of the ICE-GB and BNC corpora. In both cases, he found clear evidence that the frequency of extender tags is "much higher in speech than in writing"

(2011: 2459), thus confirming what had been taken for granted in previous studies. Consequently, therefore, almost all researchers working on extender tags have relied on spoken material as a source of data, including recordings of oral speech and elicited interviews or conversations. Some exceptions can, however, be found. One of these is Channell (1994), who, in addition to conversations and elicited interviews, also includes as her source of data attested written material and invented examples. Similarly, Ruzaite (2010) focuses on the occurrence of extender tags in the Parallel Corpus of the Lithuanian Language (PCLL), which includes 70,000 parallel sentences translated from English into Lithuanian, and compares these translated tokens with the options offered by a bilingual dictionary for the translation of these tags. It is not therefore surprising that, using written records as her working material, Ruzaite has to focus on the extenders *et cetera*, *etc.* and *and so on*, which are more typical of formal than of informal discourse (as will be explained later in this section). Finally, Fernández & Yuldashev (2011) rely on a corpus of synchronous computer-mediated contexts, that is, instant messaging interactions between native and non-native speakers of English, compiled from major universities in the United States. Given the high degree of speech-likeness of this type of interactions, the results these scholars obtained are very similar to those presented by other researchers for oral speech (2011: 2621).

On the other hand, register is a feature that has not been thoroughly analysed in the literature on extender tags. Overstreet & Yule (1997b) compare two self-recorded corpora of informal and formal spoken interaction, and find out that extender tags are more frequent in informal conversations, where a wider variety of forms are used as compared to formal interaction (1997b: 252). Stubbe & Holmes (1995) point out that "the overall frequency of pragmatic devices tends to increase in an inverse relationship with the formality of the speech style" (1995: 77) and they agree both with Overstreet & Yule (1997b) and with Tagliamonte & Denis (2010) in that certain extender tags are favoured in informal speech, while others are more recurrent in formal speech. The most significant cases are the forms *and so on*, *or so* and

et cetera for formal speech, and *and stuff*, *and everything*, *or something*, *or whatever* and *or anything* for informal speech (Stubbe & Holmes 1995: 79; Overstreet & Yule 1997b: 252; Tagliamonte & Denis 2010: 341). Cucchi's (2007) research on the use of extender tags in a corpus of Parliamentary debates (a very formal setting) is consistent with this idea, as the most frequent forms in her analysis are *and so on* and *etc.*, used by both native and non-native speakers of English. In a study of academic speech, Simpson (2004) also finds out that the forms *and so on* and *and so forth* are pervasive in the speech of professors, which could be classified as formal speech; by contrast, the forms *or something like that*, *and stuff like that* and *and things like that* are very common in the speech of students, which could broadly be characterized as informal speech. Moreover, Koester (2007) analyses the use of vague language in North American and UK offices including both task-oriented talk and conversations that take place in the office but that are not work-oriented (gossip, etc.), and finds out that there is a stronger presence of vague language forms (extender tags, among them) in work-oriented talk than in small-talk (which could be considered more informal). This finding seems to contradict the previous statement that extender tags are more frequent in informal than in formal interactions. She maintains that this difference may be due to the classification of conversations into formal and informal without taking into account the nature of the speech interaction, and further explains that small-talk and gossip in her corpus are "not usually concerned with the transfer of information, and the discoursive roles tend to be equal" while "discourse which is information-focused and 'unequal' tends to contain more [vague language]" (2007: 54). Coterill (2007: 100) investigates the use of vague language in the courtroom, a formal setting where precision and explicitness is obligatory and vague language is not well tolerated, so much so that she claims that it can be indicative of deception in some cases. However, the forms analysed in Coterill's (2007: 112) research can be classified amongst the informal types (*and everything, something like that*, among others), despite the formal setting of the courtroom. Finally, Cheng & Warren (2001) further claim that "the use of vague language is a linguistic

realization of informality which is one factor in maintaining the friendliness and cooperative tone generally associated with conversations" (Cheng & Warren 2001: 87. The preference for informal contexts of interaction is also asserted by Overstreet & Yule (1997a; 1997b), Overstreet (1999), Terraschke & Holmes (2007), Terraschke (2009; 2010), Parvaresh et al. (2010; 2012), and Parvaresh & Dabghi (2013), among others.

2.4.2 SOCIOLINGUISTIC FEATURES

The sociolinguistic features analysed in connection with extender tags and addressed in this section include such variables as age, social class, gender and education level.

Over the years, extender tags have been a linguistic construction "associated with youth" (Dubois 1992: 185), as it has been proved in several studies that they are more commonly used by young speakers than by older generations.[48] There is, however, an exception to this rule, extenders in the *Bergen Corpus of London Teenage Language*, or COLT, are more frequent among adults. This is the source of data for Stenström et al. (2002), Cheshire (2007) and Palacios Martínez (2011). In their analysis of teenage talk, Stenström et al. (2002) find that vague language, extender tags included, is more frequent in the speech of adults than in that of teenagers. They hypothesize, though, that this effect may be the consequence of their search of vague language based on Channell's (1994) findings. Channell proposes a list of vague items that have been found in her data, based solely on adult production. Stenström et al. suggest that teenagers may have a different way of expressing vagueness. Furthermore, they also point out that COLT being a corpus of teenage language, adult figures only appear interacting as their parents or teachers, explaining and helping with their lessons, a situation which may favour the use of vague language rather than of precise words (Stenström et al. 2002: 91-92). Also making use of COLT, Cheshire (2007)

[48] This idea finds support in Dubois (1992: 185); Stubbe & Holmes (1995: 72); Winter & Norrby (2000: 6); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 359); and Pichler & Levey (2011: 454).

focuses her research solely on extender tags, and finds a similar tendency: adults use these constructions more frequently than adolescents (2007: 161). In turn, Palacios Martínez (2011) compares the language of teenagers in COLT with a sample of adult speech from other British English corpora. His findings are similar to those of Stenström et al. (2002) and Cheshire (2007): he finds a higher rate of extender tags in the language of adults than in that of teenagers. Moreover, adults make also use of a wider and more varied repertoire of these forms than their younger peers. On the other hand, teenagers use some forms much more frequently, as is the case of *and everything*, *and that* and *and stuff* (Palacios Martínez 2011: 2459-2460).

It has been questioned by some researchers whether the higher frequency of extender tags in young speech (except the case of COLT, discussed above) is in fact an age grading factor (i.e. that there is a preference for the use of extender tags during adolescence that declines in adulthood) or rather an effect of grammaticalization (Tagliamonte & Denis 2010: 350; Pichler & Levey 2011: 463). What seems to be clear is that the most frequently occurring forms of extender tags are widely attested in the language of young people. Nevertheless, Palacios Martínez (2011: 2465) also finds out that it is in the language of teenagers where clearer signs of grammaticalization can be observed. Furthermore, research carried out by Denis (2011: 64) on the innovators of the extender tag *and stuff* in York English also proves that the majority of the people spotted to have been responsible for the introduction and rise in frequency of this form were in their early twenties. This is also confirmed in Palacios Martínez (2011: 2460), who has found the form *and stuff* to be increasingly more frequent among teenagers.

Concerning social class, Dines (1980) states that extender tags are more frequent in working-class speech, suggesting that they "may be stigmatized for middle-class speakers" (1980: 19). Both in her research and in an unpublished doctoral thesis carried out by Brotherton in 1976 at the University of Melbourne, the overall use of extender tags in working-class speech is higher than in middle-class speech (Dines 1980: 20). This is also consistent with Stubbe & Holmes' data (1995: 83) and Macaulay's (1991: 170)

account of the use of these forms in the variety of Scottish English spoken in Ayr. On the other hand, Cheshire (2007) claims to find "no general pattern of social class variation in the overall use of these forms". However, despite similar frequencies in extender tag use across social classes, she has identified certain extender forms that are more strongly associated either to working-class or to middle-class speakers. Cheshire (2007: 164) acknowledges a preference among working-class speakers for *and that*, in contrast to middle-class *and stuff* and *and things*. Such preference is, nevertheless, so marginal that Stenström et al. (2002: 106) do not consider that there is a "sociolect" associated to the use of these forms. Furthermore, there is no class differentiation either among the innovators of *and stuff* in York English, as attested by Denis (2011: 64). In his data, the group of people that have been found responsible for the introduction of the extender tag form *and stuff* is formed by an equal number of working-class speakers and of middle-class ones.

In what concerns gender, "no consistent patterns of gender variation" (Cheshire 2007: 162) have been found in connection to extender tags.[49] Yet a few minor differences are attested with women using extender tags slightly more often than men.[50] By contrast, in Pinchler & Levey's research (2011: 454), men use tags in a marginally higher rate than women. Nevertheless, the attested minor difference in the frequency of use of extender tags between men and women, as described above, is not significant enough to consider that there is a pattern of variation that depends on gender, so that extender tags are therefore not associated to any "genderlect" (Stenström et al. 2002: 106).

Last of all, education is a factor that has not been thoroughly analysed yet. For English, the only researchers that have approached it, though only in passing, are Tagliamonte & Denis (2010), who have found out that the

[49] Cf. also Dubois (1992: 185); Stubbe & Holmes (1995: 72); Winter & Norrby (2000: 6-7); Norrby & Winter (2002: 4); Stenström et al. (2002: 102); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 259); and Secova (2014: 20).

[50] This has been claimed by Winter & Norrby (2000: 6-7); Norrby & Winter (2002: 3); Stenström et al. (2002: 102); and Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 341).

factor of education "plays a minor role, but only for the forms *thing* and *or whatever*, and not at all for the forms *stuff* and *or something*" (2010: 359).

2.4.3 EXTENDER TAGS ACROSS SPACE

In this section, the occurrence of extender tags in different varieties of English is addressed (cf. Section 2.4.3.1), as well as their particularities in different languages (cf. Section 2.4.3.2).

2.4.3.1 EXTENDER TAGS ACROSS VARIETIES OF ENGLISH

Extender tags have been approached using corpora from different varieties of English. Many researchers have studied the occurrence of these expressions in American English,[51] while others have focused on British English,[52] on Australian English[53] or on New Zealand English.[54] A couple of scholars, however, have mixed sources for their respective analyses: Evison et al. (2007) include in their investigation examples from British, American and Irish English, while Koester (2007) uses both American and British sources. Other varieties of English studied include Scottish English (Macaulay 1991), Irish English (O'Keeffe 2004), Canadian English (Tagliamonte & Denis 2010; Denis 2015) and Trinidad Creole English (Youssef 1993). Moreover, a couple of works have taken into consideration regional variation within a specific variety of English. This is the case of Cheshire (2007), who has analysed the occurrence of extender tags in three different English towns: Milton Keynes

[51] Cf. Ball & Ariel (1978); Ward & Birner (1993); Overstreet & Yule (1997a; 1997b; 2001; 2002); Overstreet (1999; 2005); Jucker et al. (2003); Sánchez-Ayala (2003); Simpson (2004); and Fernández & Yuldashev (2011).

[52] Cf. Aijmer (1985; 2002); Channell (1994); Erman (1995); Stenström et al. (2002); De Cock (2004); Cheshire (2007); Cotterill (2007); Cucchi (2007); Denis (2011); Palacios Martínez (2011); Pichler & Levey (2011); and Buysse (2014).

[53] See Dines (1980); Winter & Norrby (2000); and Norrby & Winter (2002).

[54] Cf. Stubbe & Holmes (1995); Terraschke & Holmes (2007); Maclagan et al. (2008); and Terraschke (2009; 2010).

and Reading, in the South of the country, and Hull, in the Northeast. Stenström et al. (2002), in their part, have included in their analysis five different school boroughs within the city of London (Hackney, Tower Hamlets, Candem, Barnet and Hertfordshire) in order to uncover class differentiation in the use of these forms.

Given the different focus of each of these works, it is difficult to establish comparisons between the different varieties of English. Nevertheless, extender tags seem to behave in a similar way and seem to perform the same type of functions across varieties. The only apparent difference seems to concern the different forms of extender tags which are more frequent. In all the varieties of English analysed in the works mentioned in the previous paragraph, the most common disjunctive extender tag by far is *or something*. However, as regards adjunctive extender tags, American English shows a preference for the form *and stuff* (Overstreet 1999: 7), which is also the tag that has proved to be further evolved in terms of grammaticalization (Overstreet & Yule 1997b: 256),[55] while in British English the forms *and that* and *and things* are more common (cf. Aijmer 2002: 221; Cheshire 2007: 164; and Pichler & Levey 2011: 453). In turn, Canadian English shows a stronger tendency to use the form *and stuff* (Tagliamonte & Denis 2010: 347), while *and things* seems to be losing ground, a change that, apparently, is also taking place in British English, but which seems to have started later and be evolving at a slower rate (Denis 2011: 63). It has already been pointed out (cf. Section 2.4.2) that *and stuff* is rising in British English especially among the younger generation. This preference for the form *and stuff* is also attested in Australian English (Norrby & Winter 2002: 3) and New Zealand English (Terraschke & Holmes 2007: 202).

2.4.3.2 EXTENDER TAGS ACROSS LANGUAGES

Some authors have chosen to examine the occurrence of extender tags in other languages, including French (Dubois 1992; Secova 2014), Swedish (Winter &

[55] The process of grammaticalization of extender tags is explained in Section 2.6.2.

Norrby 2000; Norrby & Winter 2002), German (Overstreet 2005; Terraschke & Holmes 2007; Terraschke 2009; 2010), Spanish (Sánchez-Ayala 2003; Cortés Rodríguez 2006a; 2006b; and Fernández 2015), Persian (Parvaresh & Tavangar 2010; Parvaresh et al. 2010; 2012; Parvaresh & Dabghi 2013), Lithuanian (Ruzaite 2010) and Slovene (Grzybek & Verdonik 2014), among others. As is the case with the different varieties of English included in Section 2.4.3.1 above, these works suggest the existence of a great similarity in the meanings, uses and functions of extender tags across languages.

In a very brief article on the translation equivalents for extender tags into Lithuanian, Ruzaite (2010) finds that although this language makes use of these forms in a similar way to English, translators decide on many occasions to omit the extender tag in the target text when making a translation, because they consider these forms as low informative. This deliberate omission ultimately changes "the communicative effect and informative content of the translated proposition" (2010: 37). In turn, Grzybek & Verdonik (2014) analyse extender tags in Slovene from a phraseological systematic point of view and recognize the similarities as regards the form and functions of these tags in Slovene and English (2014: 127). Similarly, Winter & Norrby (2000) and Norrby & Winter (2002) compare the behaviour of these forms in Swedish and Australian English and conclude that both languages are similar in what concerns their sociolinguistic features (Norrby & Winter 2002: 4) as well as in their functions (Winter & Norrby 2000: 8). Moreover, in Dubois' (1992) and Secova's (2014) analyses of extender tags in French, they find that these forms have similar characteristics to their English counterparts in terms of form, position in the sentence and function. Specifically, Dubois focuses on the sociodemographic peculiarities of extenders and concludes that they are very similar to English (cf. Section 2.4.2 above): she finds that extenders are more common among younger speakers (1992: 185) and claims to detect no differentiation across social classes concerning the frequency of use of these forms. However, she uncovers the form *choses comme ça* ('things like that') to be preferred by middle-class speakers, while *affaires de meme* ('things that are the same') is

widely more frequent in working-class speech (Dubois 1992: 190). In addition, Secova (2014: 20-24) also points out that less educated people show preference for the form *et tout*, which is disfavoured, as well as other short forms, by more educated speakers, who, conversely, show a preference for longer variants of extender tags. The form *et tout*, moreover, shows the clearest indications of grammaticalization, especially amongst younger speakers (2014: 25).

The information available for German is somewhat more complete and allows a better comparison with the English language. Overstreet (2005) carried out a research on the use of extender tags in German that is parallel to her work on American English (1997a; 1997b; 1999; 2001; 2002). Terraschke & Holmes (2007) and Terraschke (2009; 2010) also compare German with New Zealand English following Overstreet's (1999) analysis. The main difference between English and German seems to lie on the preference for disjunctive forms in German (Overstreet 2005: 1848; Terraschke 2009: 150), which seems to account for the greater variability of disjunctive forms in German as opposed to English, which shows greater variability of form for adjunctive extender tags (Terraschke 2009: 151). Moreover, the paradigm of the extender tag seems to be more complex in German than in English (Terraschke 2009: 151). Additionally, many extender tags have no translation equivalents between English and German (Overstreet 2005: 1861). On the other hand, the functions that extenders perform seem to be the same in both English and German (Overstreet 2005: 1861; Terraschke & Holmes 2007: 210), although Overstreet notes that German speakers do not use extenders so frequently as intensifiers as English speakers do (Overstreet 2005: 1858), and that intensifying is not the main function of any extender tag in German, in contrast to some forms in English (cf. Section 2.3.3.1.1).

As regards Spanish, there is substantial research on extender tags as well, which gives a broad picture of the state of affairs concerning these forms. Sánchez-Ayala (2003) compares list constructions in both English and Spanish, a context where he frequently encounters extender tags with the

function of signaling the end of a list. Concerning lists, he concludes that "the similarity of the construction in both languages is both formal and functional" (Sánchez-Ayala 2003: 345). In Cortés Rodríguez (2006a; 2006b) and Fernández (2015) the analysis focuses on extender tags. These authors find that the construction of extender tags is very similar in Spanish and English, both formally and functionally, and even though Cortés Rodríguez's categorization of the functions of extender tags is slightly different to that proposed by Overstreet (1999), the functions that he describes can easily be matched to those already identified by her (1999). The main difference between Spanish and English concerning extenders is a formal one: whereas in English extender tags are divided into adjunctive and disjunctive forms, in Spanish adjunctive extender tags are further subdivided into affirmative adjunctive tags, where the extender suggests that more options can be added to those already mentioned, introduced by the conjunction *y* ('and'), as illustrated in (2.81), and negative adjunctives, where the extender cancels any further possibility; they are introduced by the conjunction *ni* ('nor'), as shown in (2.82) (Cortés Rodríguez 2006a: 89-90; Fernández 2015: 4):

(2.81) *[E]s muy amplio, no sé, para disfrutar por allí, correr, pasear hacer footing* ***y muchas cosas***. (Cortés Rodríguez 2006a: 90)
'It is very spacious, I don't know, to have fun over there, run, walk, jog **and a lot of things**.'

(2.82) *[A] mí no me molestan ni los inmigrantes africanos, ni los gitanos,* ***ni nadie***. (Cortés Rodríguez 2006a: 90)
'I have no problems with the African immigrants, nor the gypsies, **nor anybody**.'

As we can see from example (2.82), negative adjunctive extender tags in Spanish would translate as a disjunctive in English. However, as compared to disjunctive extenders in English, they appear exclusively in negative sequences and every item in their scope is introduced by the conjunction *ni* ('nor'). They do not offer an alternative, as English disjunctive extenders would, but cancel out every possibility, including those already present in the scope. In other words, disjunctive extender tags suggest that one option should be chosen among those offered and those implied by the extender,

while adjunctives, on the contrary, include all the mentioned options and the implied ones. However, in the case of negative adjunctives, all these options are cancelled, both those which are mentioned and those which are implied by the extender.

In addition to the languages discussed so far in this section, Persian is very well documented too. Being a language that shows greater grammatical and formal distance from English, we would expect to find substantial differences regarding extender tags and their forms and uses. Surprisingly enough, the construction in Persian is very similar to the English one, consisting of semi-fixed expressions which account for the same type of functions that are present in other languages as well. As seen in Section 2.2.2.1, the construction of extender tags in English allows for the main NP to be pre-modified as well as post-modified. However, this is not the case in Persian, where no modification of the noun phrase is attested (Parvaresh et al. 2010: 23). We have also seen in Section 2.1 that the conjunction in English can be omitted in some cases. In Persian, by contrast, the adjunctive conjunction cannot be dropped, although it can be reduced, whereas the disjunctive conjunction has been attested to be omitted in some instances (Parvaresh et al. 2010: 25-26). Contrary to English, which is a SVO language (cf. Section 2.2.3), Persian SOV word order allows extender tags greater flexibility as regards position, and they can appear indistinctively in clause-final as well as clause-internal positions (Parvaresh et al. 2010: 28). Concerning the functions of these tags in Persian, the main functions that are attested in English are present in Persian as well, except for the intensifying function of the extender *or what*, which is on some occasions used to solicit agreement from the interlocutor (Parvaresh et al. 2012: 273). On the other hand, there are a couple of further functions that have been identified in Persian but not in English; the first one is that of expressing outrage and frustration (Parvaresh et al. 2012: 274-275) and the second is that of suspending information and arousing a sense of curiosity by means of the use of a lengthened form of an extender tag (Parvaresh et al. 2012: 276). These functions are exemplified in (2.83) and (2.84), respectively.

(2.83) *Nader: mige ke mædârekæm kâfi nist, mituni je zæng beheš bezæni dobâre?*

Nasser: e:::?! tæqælob ***jā hærči!***

'Nader: Says that I don't have enough documents, can you call him again?

Nasser: Re:::ally?! Manipulation **jā hærči**!'

(Parvaresh et al. 2012: 275)

(2.84) *Maziyar: væli âxæreš dʒâleb næbud.*

Saeed: čerâ?

Maziyar: police ***væ inâ:::***

Saeed: oh! næ! begu dige! gereftæn?! hæme râ? ((esme jek šæxs)) či kâr //kærd?

'Maziyar: But the ending wasn't interesting.

Saeed: =Why?

Maziyar: police **væ inâ:::**

Saeed: Oh! No! Tell me! Arrested you?! All?! What did ((name of person)) do?'

(Parvaresh et al. 2012: 276)

In a brief article, Parvaresh & Tavangar (2010) compare the English formulaic expression *and everything, but* with its Persian counterpart, and conclude that their meaning and function are the same in both languages. The only relevant difference concerns the existence in Persian of three variants of the construction: a couple of synonyms for *but* are used in some instances instead of the usual cognate for it. However, this does not translate into a change of meaning or function, the only difference being that one of the variants is used in more formal or literary contexts than the other two (Parvaresh & Tavangar 2010: 141-143).

2.4.4 EXTENDER TAGS IN LEARNER LANGUAGE

Extender tag use by non-native speakers of English who have learned it as a foreign language is the focus of the present section. This issue has received much scholarly attention over the last couple of decades, taking as a case in point speakers from very different countries and with different mother

tongues: Cantonese (Cheng & Warren 2001; Drave 2002), Swedish (Aijmer 2004), French (De Cock 2004), German (Terraschke & Holmes 2007; Terraschke 2009; 2010), Persian (Parvaresh et al. 2012; Parvaresh & Dabghi 2013) and Dutch (Buysse 2014). In addition, Fernández & Yuldashev (2011) include in their analysis speakers of English as a foreign language from varied origins (Arabic, Chinese, German, Korean, Spanish, Polish, Russian, Turkish and Uzbek).

Despite the fact that, as we have seen in Section 2.4.3.2, extender tags are present in all these languages, and that their functions and meanings are mainly the same in all of them, pragmatic expressions of this type are not thoroughly explored in English as a foreign language syllabi, which are focused on more typically core grammatical and lexical issues. This lack of attention to the explanation of the mechanisms for correct extender tag use in English leads learners to underuse them or to use them incorrectly in some situations, considering also, as Overstreet (2012) points out, that "pragmatic expressions may be harder to acquire than grammatical structures in an L2" (Overstreet 2012: 4). Furthermore, Overstreet (2019) also claims that extender tags and other pragmatic markers, which can be "essentially invisible (or unheard) for language learners, even in their first language, will probably not be acquired simply through exposure to English in use and there may need to be some form of explicit instruction" (2019: 4). This explains the growing number of researchers who propose to include expressions of this type in the English language syllabus, in order to explore the different contexts where they are used (Fernández 2015).

In what follows, I describe the use that speakers of English as a foreign language make of extender tags. It has been proved that these forms are present in the speech of non-native speakers, in some cases less frequently than in native speakers' discourse and in others to a similar extent. In addition, a tendency towards a more prolific use of adjunctive extender tags that mirrors that of English (as seen in Section 2.2.3) has been observed

among non-native speakers of varied origins,[56] with the only exception of those of Dutch (Buysse 2014) and German (Terraschke 2009) origin. At least for German, it has been shown that disjunctive extender tags outnumber adjunctives (cf. Overstreet 2005; Terraschke 2009), which most likely influences these speakers' output when they speak English.

On the other hand, we can also find a number of peculiarities that diverge from the native norm. First of all, the type of extender tags that learners of English are mostly exposed to in the classroom are those forms that are more formal, used in academic English and typical of writing, so they tend to overuse these forms even in more informal contexts, which makes them sound "rather bookish and pedantic to a native speaker" (De Cock 2004: 236).[57] Nonetheless, this is only frequently the case for those students that have not been at an English speaking country and have only learned the language at school or university. By contrast, learners who have been immersed in an English speaking country don not show this preference for formal extender tags (as *and so on* or *et cetera*).

A non-native speaker tendency regarding form is L1 transfer of extender tags into English, sometimes by direct translation, yielding forms that are not attested in English as spoken by native speakers. This is the case of *and and and*, which is a direct translation both of German *und und und* (Overstreet 2012: 7) and of Persian *væ væ væ* (Parvaresh et al. 2012: 265). Forms like *and whatever* may be confused with the disjunctive form *or whatever*, while others reflect grammatical errors caused by the lack of proficiency in the language, as is the case of *and all those kind of stuff* (Buysse 2014: 7). All the non-native-like forms recorded in the literature on the topic are included in Tables 1 and 2 in Section 2.2.1, marked by an asterisk.

[56] This preference for adjunctive forms has been observed in Parvaresh et al. (2010); Fernández & Yuldashev (2011); Gryzbek & Verdonik (2014); and Fernández (2015).

[57] This trait has been identified in the following works: De Cock (2004: 236); Parvaresh et al. (2012: 265); and Buysse (2014: 6).

In some other cases, non-native speakers show a preference for some forms that are attested in native speaker's discourse, but with a higher frequency and with different connotations, as is the case of *and blah blah blah*. This extender is very infrequent in English, and has a clear connotation of marking the preceding discourse as having little value or importance (Overstreet 1999: 137; cf. also Section 2.3.3.1.2). This downgrading factor is not present in the speech of Persian speakers of English, for whom *and blah blah blah* is the most common extender tag among the advanced level students (Parvaresh et al. 2012: 265) and the second most common for intermediate learners (Parvaresh & Dabghi 2013: 78). The use that such speakers make of this form is completely neutral, devoid of any negative connotation. The Persian preference for this form in English is surprising, because the most common Persian extender tag is *væ inâ,* which would be the equivalent of English *and stuff*, a form that is very rarely used by advanced learners of English (Parvaresh et al. 2012: 265) and totally non-existing in the speech of intermediate level students of English (Parvaresh & Dabghi 2013: 78).

Similarly, another important case of L1 transfer is the high frequency of *or so* among German learners of English, for whom this is the most frequent disjunctive extender tag, even more frequent than *or something* (Terraschke 2010: 457). In English, the extender tag *or so* is limited to numerical approximation (cf. Channell 1994: 59-60), while the form *or something* covers a wider range of functions. Due to its similarity to the German form *oder so*, for which *or so* is a direct word-for-word translation, German learners of English use this extender tag to cover the whole range of functions that the form *oder so* performs in German, which would be comparable to *or something* in English. This suggests that German speakers of English as a foreign language have failed to acquire the restrictions existing for the extender *or so* in English (Terraschke 2010: 467). This peculiarity is also attested in the speech of Dutch learners of English, and the explanation is the same: they attribute the functions of the Dutch form *of zo* to the English lexical

equivalent *or so*, because of their formal similarity and of the lack of awareness of the English norm (Buysse 2014: 28).

Another case of inappropriate use of forms of extender tags in English concerns *or anything*; in comparison with the form *or something*. While the latter is used in assertive contexts, the form *or anything*, which shows the same functions, is used in non-assertive contexts. Non-native speakers of English tend to use the form *or something* in both assertive and non-assertive contexts in the majority of cases (Buysse 2014: 24) or even do not use the form *or anything* at all (De Cock 2004: 237).

In general terms, speakers' proficiency broadly determines their use of the English language. Failure in the choice or use of extender tags, as explained above, is of course influenced by the speakers' command of English. This has been observed among non-native speakers of Persian origin when placing extender tags within the clause. It has been pointed out that, since Persian is a SOV language (contrary to English SVO word order), extender tags can be placed indistinctively in medial as well as in final position (cf. Section 2.4.3.2). Interestingly, Persian advanced students of English show a tendency towards clause-final position when they speak English (Parvaresh et al. 2012), while intermediate students use extenders in clause-internal positions to a greater extent because of L1 influence (Parvaresh & Dabghi 2013). An exception concerns the use of the form *or so* by German speakers of English, discussed above, which has been attested in the speech of both the least as well as the most proficient learners (Terraschke 2010: 466-467). In this particular case, it seems that the influence of the speakers' first language has a stronger impact on their use of this tag than their proficiency in English. Moreover, the fact that this kind of linguistic failure does not yield in miscommunication with native speakers of English does not discourage non-natives from using this form, as they would in their mother tongue.

As regards the functions of extender tags, then, the proficiency of non-native speakers is also a very important factor. Clear proof of this is the case of Persian learners of English. As we have already discussed in Section 2.4.3.2, Persian shows some functions for extender tags that are not attested

in any other language, so that Persian intermediate learners of English transfer these functions to their English production (Parvaresh & Dabghi 2013: 83-84). By contrast, more advanced learners only show a few tokens performing these functions that do not exist in the English language when they speak English (Parvaresh et al. 2012: 275). In other words, the more proficient Persian learners are in the English language, the more aware they are of the rules and functions attributed to extender tags and the more they adhere to them.

Another important factor that determines the proficiency of learners of English in the use of extender tags, given the scarce and limited presence of these forms in the classroom, is whether these learners have lived for some time in an English speaking country or not. In Terraschke & Holmes' (2007: 211-213) corpus, their non-native speakers of English of German origin who have been living in New Zealand for different periods were found to use extender tags with referential (cf. Section 2.3.2) as well as with affective functions (cf. Section 2.3.3), in the same way as native speakers. Nevertheless, other studies suggest that non-native speakers "seem relatively unmotivated by affective concerns" (Drave 2002: 37). Aijmer (2004) also notices that Swedish learners of English do not use these forms "for face-saving or to signal politeness", as is the norm for native speakers (2004: 188), a feature that is also attested among Dutch learners of English (Buysse 2014: 30). In turn, Parvaresh et al. (2012) and Parvaresh & Dabghi (2013) observe that more advanced learners of English (some of them having spent some time abroad at English-speaking countries) make some use of extenders as markers of both positive and negative politeness, even though such occurrences are very rare (Parvaresh et al. 2012: 270; 273), while this use is completely non-existent among intermediate learners of English in their data (Parvaresh & Dabghi 2013: 80, 82). Therefore, the use of extender tags as mechanisms for both positive and negative politeness seems to be an issue for learners of English as a second language. As Fernández & Yuldashev (2011) point out, "this layer of functionality may present additional challenges for non-native language users […] because of unfamiliarity with this particular

way of expressing politeness" (2011: 2623). However, as mentioned above, both speakers' proficiency and immersion in an English-speaking country have proved to be decisive factors for the use of extender tags as politeness devices on the part of speakers of English as a second language. Consequently, less proficient non-native speakers are less concerned with affective functions that foster interpersonal relationships and signal politeness. By contrast, they tend to use extender tags primarily as a means to overcome communication problems, to signal that what they are saying may not be accurate or that they may not be using the correct word to express themselves, or even to fill in time in order to have some more time to think on what to say next.

Even within the range of referential functions (cf. Section 2.3.2), non-native speakers show slight differences in use to native speakers. Fernández & Yuldashev (2011) point out that when used for categorization purposes (cf. Section 2.3.2.1), extender tags can refer back to three types of categories: local, societal and global. While native speakers of English tend to use these forms to imply local, societal and global categorization (in that order), societal categorization is the least frequent type in the speech of non-native speakers (even though those considered in their study are settled and living in the USA). These authors argue that "non-native users of the language may not share the same socio-cultural and conceptual schemes that would allow them to make more frequent use of *societal* [extender tags]" (Fernández & Yuldashev 2011: 2622). Nevertheless, regardless of the differences explained above, non-native speakers of English of different origins have been found to encounter no communication problems when speaking to native speakers, who seem to understand the intention behind the use of extender tags irrespective of whether the form chosen is more or less appropriate (Overstreet 2012: 8).

2.5 EXTENDER TAGS IN EARLIER ENGLISH

The vast majority of the research conducted on extender tags has as its focus present-day data. Only Carroll (2007; 2008) and Ortega Barrera (2012) approach extenders from a historical perspective and use for their work Middle and early Modern English material. However, Carroll (2008) includes an illustrative example from Old English that attests that extender tags were already available in that period. This illustration dates from sometime between the years 850 and 950 and is reproduced in (2.85) below.

(2.85) *[Ð]a gesinhiwan mon sceal manian,* ***& eac gehwelcne mon.***
Then married-couples one ought to-exhort, **and also every man.**[58]
(Carroll 2008: 8)

There are, therefore, crucial gaps in the study of extenders from a historical point of view: the oldest stage of the English language is still unexplored, Middle and early Modern English have received some attention, but a thorough analysis of all forms of extender tags and their functions is still lacking, and the late Modern English period is, to my knowledge, still unexplored as well. Furthermore, the research carried out by the aforementioned authors does not approach extender tags as thoroughly and from as many perspectives as done in the numerous works devoted to present-day English. Nevertheless, in this section, I briefly present the state of affairs in Middle and early Modern English so that it serves as a point of departure for the analysis in chapters 4 and 5 in order to see whether the forms and uses of extender tags in earlier English differ or not from the ones available today.

As has been already pointed out in Section 2.4.1, extender tags are commonly found in conversation, so that most research on the use of these forms resorts to corpora containing oral discourse. For earlier stages of the language, this option is not available, which implies that researchers have to rely on the most speech-like material available. For this purpose, Carroll

[58] Carroll (2008: 8) provides a word-for-word gloss for this Old English example, for the sake of clarity.

(2007; 2008) searches for extender tags in a corpus of correspondence, claiming that letters are the best alternative to spoken data. In her 2007 article, she focuses on lists, and limits the search for extenders to those appearing in such structures. Ortega Barrera (2012) follows Carroll's (2007) approach and focuses on lists as well, as a perfect locus for extender tags, but she makes use of a corpus of medical recipes. As already explained in Section 2.3.2.2, one of the commonly claimed functions of extender tags is to complete or close a list when no more items come to mind, or when the speaker feels there is no need to list them all, as the hearer will be able to infer the missing information. By means of the choice of medical recipes for her research, Ortega Barrera explores a text type where lists are very likely to appear, but ignores the feature of speech-likeness which is core to extender tags. Regarding the formality of these sources, the letters in Carroll's (2008; 2009) form part of a corpus of personal correspondence which contain both informal and more formal letters. Recipes, on the other hand, in Ortega Barrera's (2012) analysis, can be considered formal writing.

Similarly to the inventory of extender tags provided for present-day English in Section 2.2.1, Table 2.4 below includes all the extender tag forms that have been documented in Carroll (2007; 2008) and Ortega Barrera (2012) for Middle and early Modern English. As already explained for Tables 2.1 to 2.3 (cf. Section 2.2.1), the brackets in Table 2.4 indicate optionality, so that *and so forth* (*of other* ((*thynges*)) includes the forms *and so forth, and so forth of other* and *and so forth of other thynges*.

This catalogue is not exhaustive, as Carroll (2007) only provides a list of the most common short forms that she identifies in her data (Carroll 2007: 48), while Ortega Barrera only includes a list of illustrative examples (Ortega Barrera 2012: 228-231). The rest of the forms are taken from the examples that they quote in their articles.

AND
and (*alle* / *all*) (*these* / *ðo*) (*other*) *thyng*(*es*)
and all-kynne thyng
and (*many* / *some*) *other*(*s*) (*such*)
and (*many*) *other things*
and (*much*) *other stuff*
and other (*notefull*) (*thinges* / *things*) (*hereafter folowying*)
and so (*the like* / *every such*)
and so forth (*of other* (*thynges*))
and such (*lyke* / *like*) / (*othere* / *other*(*s*)) (*thing*(*es*))
and the like
and more
and of other
&c
OR
or any (*such*) (*thing*) (*other*) (*time*)
or more
or (*any*) *other* (*thing*)
or others
or such (*like*)
or the like
or otherwise
&c

Table 2.4 Inventory of Middle and early Modern English extender tags

Ortega Barrera (2012: 231) claims that, in her corpus, disjunctive forms are more common than adjunctives. However, as we can see from Table 2.4, adjunctive extender tags show more variability of form than disjunctives, which usually points to a higher frequency of such forms (a tendency observed for present-day English, as seen in Section 2.2.3). The higher frequencies of disjunctives in Ortega Barrera's work (2012) may be due to the type of source she uses, as it is very common for medical recipes to include lists that illustrate different alternatives to those mentioned (which favours the use of disjunctive extender tags). On the other hand, although Carroll (2007; 2008) does not deal with the frequencies of the different extender tags attested in her data, she claims that *&c* is the most common adjunctive form, which she found to function as a disjunctive as well in some examples (Carroll 2007: 49), as (2.86) below illustrates.

(2.86) *[O]n Saturday or Sonday* ***&c.*** (Carroll 2007: 47)

In addition, as shown in Table 2.4, neither Carroll (2007; 2008) nor Ortega Barrera (2012) include any instances of extender tags that are not introduced by the coordinators *and* or *or*. Further research would be necessary in order to ascertain whether extender tags with no overt connector are characteristic of present-day English (cf. Table 2.3 in Section 2.2.1) or, on the contrary, can also be attested in earlier English.

The dichotomy between longer and shorter variants of extender tags is not addressed in Ortega Barrera (2012). Carroll (2008), in turn, claims that "there is a tendency for shorter tags, and general ones, to occur more frequently than longer or more specific ones" (Carroll 2008: 14). However, by this, she does not mean that she has attested more extenders in their short form that longer ones, but, rather, that the individual frequency of any short general tag (as, for example, *or such like*) is higher than that of any longer more specific one. In fact, various illustrations of the latter are found in the examples she provides, as *and oþer feele things That growed on þat gardyn* in (2.87) below. Consequently, whether shorter forms are more frequent than their longer counterparts (as has been attested in present-day research; cf. Section 2.2.3), or vice versa, has not been investigated for earlier stages of English.[59]

(2.87) *[Y]mpes and herbes* ***and oþer feele things That growed on þat gardyn***.
'[S]hoots and herbs and other excellent things that grew in that garden.'
(Carroll 2008: 18)

As regards position, Carroll (2008) disproves the claim that extender tags occur clause-finally (as suggested by Overstreet (1999) among others, cf. Section 2.2.3) and alleges that these forms "are a sequence which follows either a clause or a phrase" (Carroll 2008: 12). Thus, it is more accurate to describe extender tags as commonly occurring at the end of the phrase, which, in many cases, also corresponds to clause-final position. Such description has been adopted, in fact, by scholars who have carried out subsequent research

[59] This feature, concerning the late Modern English period, is addressed in the subsequent analysis of the forms *or something* and *and the like* (cf. Section 4.2.1.1 and Section 5.2.1.2, respectively).

on the position of extender tags. Therefore, although Carroll acknowledges that it is true that the most common position for these forms is at the end of the clause, extender tags are also attested to occur at the end of a phrase which is not placed clause-finally, as is the case of (2.88) below.

(2.88) *Iob, Iosep,* ***and mony oÞere suche*** *weren riche of pite.*

'Job, Joseph, **and many other such** were rich in pity.' (Carroll 2008: 15)

Moreover, there is evidence that, apart from phrase-final position, extender tags can also occur elsewhere (Carroll 2008: 14). Although examples of this kind are extremely rare, some cases have been attested where extenders occur in medial position, as is the case of (2.89), where the extender tag *or any other of your name* is placed not at the end of the list, as would be expected, but within it.

(2.89) *[Y]ou, my cousin your son,* ***or any other of your name****, or servant* (Carroll 2007: 47)

Carroll (2007: 47-48) claims that other examples of the type shown in (2.89) may have been missed in the analysis by mistakenly supposing that the list was ended by the extender tag and not looking further into the subsequent text. Whether a tendency exists to place the extender tag at the end of the clause or whether examples of this kind are still possible in later stages of the language is an issue which requires further examination.[60]

Concerning the possibility of a grammatical mismatch between the extender tag and its scope, which is pretty common in present-day English, as explained in Section 2.2.3, Carroll (2007: 49) observes that only the extender tags *and other* and *or other* are found in her corpora. She does not trace any extender that contains the plural *others*. This means that some grammatical mismatch in terms of number is expected, as the singular form *other* must have been used in order to refer to singular as well as plural scopes (although she does not offer any illustrations of this). Furthermore, it is worth noting that Carroll's research only includes lists composed of noun phrases, which explains why examples of the type shown in (2.10) to (2.14) in Section

[60] Position is a factor that is analysed in connection to the extenders tags *and the like* (cf. Section 4.2.3) and *or something* (cf. Section 5.2.3) in late Modern English.

2.2.3 are out of the scope of her analysis. This does not imply, however, that they did not occur in the Middle and early Modern English periods.

As regards the functions of extender tags, the analysis conducted by Carroll (2007; 2008) and Ortega Barrera (2012) for earlier English is not exhaustive. They both agree that these expressions realize the function of categorization (Carroll 2008: 15; Ortega Barrera 2012: 233), which has been stated as the basic function of these forms. They also agree in that they are used as list completers in order to abbreviate a list of items (Carroll 2008: 16; Ortega Barrera 2012: 233). Ortega Barrera (2012: 233) goes further and searches for politeness strategies in her tokens, but fails to find them. It may be the case that her corpus of recipes is not the best context for the identification of politeness strategies, as the writer of a recipe is not expected to enter in any type of relationship or attachment with its readers, which may be relevant to politeness issues.

In turn, Carroll (2007: 49; 2008: 17) identifies a function that has not been suggested for present-day extender tags. In her data, the extender tags *et cetera* and *and so forth* are sometimes used "to abbreviate formal set phrases, such as *captatio benevolentiae*, and extracts or quotations" (2007: 49) in contexts that are presumed to be "so familiar to the reader that they need not be quoted in full" (2008: 30). In (2.90), for instance, the writer assumes that the readers will be able to complete the religious formula which starts as *in nomine patris* and decides therefore not to make it explicit, abbreviating it by means of the extender tag *et cetera*.

(2.90) *A charme for to stawnchym blood… 'In nomine patris* ***et cetera****… I conjure the, blood…*

'A charme for stanching blood … In nomine patris **et cetera**… I conjure thee, blood…'

(Carroll 2008: 31)

The form *et cetera* has also been found by Ortega Barrera (2012) to function in medical recipes as a means to indicate to the reader that a given recipe follows in the next page. Such cases appear at the end of a page, "to signal that we can find the rest of the information on the following page" (Ortega Barrera 2012: 230).

2.6 GRAMMATICALIZATION OF EXTENDER TAGS

This section is devoted to describing how grammaticalization has affected or is affecting the evolution of extender tags, as analysed by various researchers. First of all, I introduce the topic by means of an overview on the main approaches to the notion of grammaticalization and related processes of language change (cf. Section 2.6.1). Then I discuss how the grammaticalization of extender tags has been described in earlier work on the topic (cf. Section 2.6.2).

2.6.1 GRAMMATICALIZATION AND RELATED PROCESSES OF LINGUISTIC CHANGE

It was Meillet who in 1912 first coined the term "grammaticalization", and defined the process as "[t]he passage of an autonomous word into the role of grammatical element […], the attribution of grammatical character to a formerly autonomous word" (Meillet 1912: 131, quoted from Traugott 2003a: 624). Since then the phenomenon of grammaticalization has been approached by many different researchers from varied perspectives. In what follows, I only discuss those that I consider most relevant, because they bear some connection to the analysis of the grammaticalization of extender tags. I use the term 'grammaticalization' because it is the most widely spread one, despite the fact that other terms, such as 'grammaticization', are also found in the literature on the topic.

Lehmann (2015)[61] characterizes grammaticalization as "a process which may not only change a lexical into a grammatical item, but may also shift an item from a less grammatical to a more grammatical status" (2015: 13). He discusses that, in the different phases of grammaticalization and due to different processes, items move from discourse to syntax to morphology to morphophonemics. He understands grammaticalization as the degree of autonomy of a sign, as its reduction until it comes to the morphophonemics

[61] This corresponds to the third edition of Lehmann's *Thoughts on grammaticalization*, first published in 1982.

level and may even disappear (2015: 15). Lehmann establishes six criteria to attest the level of integrity of a sign and thus its grammaticalization status. These criteria focus on the weight, cohesion and variability of the sign in both the paradigmatic (which correlates with the selection of a given sign) and the syntagmatic (which refers to the sign's combination with other elements in its environment) axes, which leaves us with the six parameters shown in Table 2.5 below.

parameter	weak grammaticalization	– process →	strong grammaticalization
integrity	bundle of semantic features; possibly polysyllabic	– *attrition* →	few semantic features; oligo- or monosegmental
paradigmaticity	item participates loosely in semantic field	– *paradigmaticization* →	small, tightly integrated paradigm
paradigmatic variability	free choice of items according to communicative intentions	– *obligatorification* →	choice systematically constrained, use largely obligatory
scope	item relates to constituent of arbitrary complexity	– *condensation* →	item modifies word or stem
bondedness	item is independently juxtaposed	– *coalescence* →	item is affix or even phonological feature of carrier
syntagmatic variability	item can be shifted around freely	– *fixation* →	item occupies fixed slot

Table 2.5 Parameters and processes of grammaticalization (taken from Lehmann 1985: 309)

In what follows, I describe briefly each of these six parameters (Lehmann 2015: 134-170):

- Integrity refers to the paradigmatic weight of a sign, its semantic and phonological substance, which is grammaticalized through a process called attrition. The gradual loss of phonological substance is called phonological attrition and can be illustrated by means of the verbal form *going to*, which yielded the contraction *gonna*. On the other hand,

the loss of semantic complexity or bleaching of a sign is called desemanticization. This process is observed, for example, in the loss of the original meaning of volition of the verb *will* in its grammaticalization as an auxiliary verb indicating futurity or intention.

- Paradigmaticity is the formal and semantic integration or cohesion of a certain paradigm and the sings that belong to it. This distinguishes between major paradigms, like those of nouns or verbs, which are larger and normally open class paradigms, and minor paradigms, like those of pronouns, adpositions or conjunctions, which are smaller and closed class, and to which no more elements can be added if it is not through a process of paradigmaticization. This process levels out the differences which exist between the original members of the major paradigm, leaving a more homogeneous and reduced paradigm. This process is attested, for instance, in the use of such nouns as *front, back, top*, etc. as periphrastic prepositions, as in *in front of*, *as far back as*, and *on top of*.
- Paradigmatic variability is the freedom of choice of a sign from among the members of a paradigm, or zero, therefore leaving the category unspecified. This distinction produces two types of paradigmatic variability: intraparadigmatic variability (i.e. the selection of alternatives in opposition within the same paradigm) and transparadigmatic variability (i.e. the freedom of either specifying the category through one of the members of the paradigm or leaving it unspecified). When obligatorification comes into play, it is not easy to distinguish between intraparadigmatic and transparadigmatic variability because leaving the paradigm unspecified is not an option anymore and the choice between the members of the paradigm is also restricted. The increase in obligatoriness depends much on the context; the more we enlarge the context, the more a sign becomes obligatory, which also implies that the more grammaticalized it gets, the more ubiquitous it becomes. Lehmann illustrates this phenomenon by

means of the infinitive sequences introduced by *for…to*, where, originally, the complement of *for* is both the subject of the subordinate clause and the object of the main clause, who benefits from the action, as shown in (2.91). This benefaction reading is lost and such structural sequence begins to be used outside its original context, as illustrated by (2.92) below.

(2.91) *I brought a book for him to read*. (Lehmann 2015: 150)

(2.92) *For George to marry an unbaptized girl is highly unlikely*. (Lehmann 2015: 150)

- Structural scope is the syntagmatic weight of a sign, or the size of a construction at its constituent level. Lehmann (2015: 151) explains that "the structural scope of a sign decreases with increased grammaticalization through a process called condensation"; which can go from clause level to verb or noun phrase level and ends at the stem level. This process is attested in the shift that verbs like *have* or *be* underwent from main verbs to auxiliaries. The scope of such verbs is, therefore, reduced from the clause level to verb phrase level. A clear distinction should be established between structural and semantic scope of a sign. The semantic scope may widen in the course of grammaticalization, but according to Lehmann, this bears no grammatical relation to constituents at the higher levels and thus bears no relation to the process of grammaticalization. He argues that "morphological structure is often not amenable to direct semantic interpretation"; it is an example of "arbitrariness and absence of iconicity" of which "reduction of scope is the one [key] factor" (2015: 154-155).
- Bondedness, or the syntagmatic cohesion of a sign, is the connection that a sign bears to another sign in a syntagmatic relation. The increase in bondedness is identified with coalescence and it is very obvious at the phonological level, where Lehmann distinguishes three phases: cliticization (i.e. subordination of juxtaposed elements), agglutination (i.e. the item becomes an affix of another element) and

fusion or merger (i.e. the item becomes an integral part of another morpheme). Some grammatical relation between the signs is an elementary precondition for coalescence; occasional collocations cannot coalesce, although cliticization may happen due to reiterated co-occurrence (such cases, however, do not proceed to the other two phases of coalescence). As an illustration of the process of coalescence, Lehmann (2015:164) provides the following: "apophony (*sing* PRS vs. *sang* PAST) and metaphony (*tooth* SG vs. *teeth* PL)".

- Syntagmatic variability is the freedom of a sign to be shifted around in its context, which means that the word order is flexible and it becomes fixed with increased grammaticalization through a process called fixation. There are some occasions when the order in which an item becomes fixed differs substantially from that order which was more natural when the item was still a free lexeme. Fixation is exemplified by the grammatical evolution of adverbs to adpositions.

Lehmann also observes that for grammaticalization to take place, a given sign must display all the above parameters. Regardless of the fact that some parameters can lag behind in the process (as grammaticalization takes place over centuries on many occasions), in the end, all of them must be at work.

Hopper (1991) builds on Lehmann's parameters and proposes five principles to identify the process of grammaticalization at an incipient stage, because he argues that Lehmann's parameters are only applicable and fully distinguishable when grammaticalization has already ended or is at an advanced stage. Hopper's principles of grammaticalization can be summarized as follows (Hopper 1991: 22-31):

- Layering. When new layers appear in the grammaticalization process, the old ones do not automatically disappear; rather they often coexist. In some cases, one of the layers may be specialized for particular uses or for a particular register, or simply become a stylistic variant of another layer. This principle is exemplified by the co-existence in English of some verbs which form the past by means of the older vowel

alternation pattern (*sing/sang*) and those with the more modern layer of appending the apical suffix [t] or [d] (*decide/decided*).

- Divergence. In the process of grammaticalization, the grammaticalized form and the lexical form from which it evolved can both still exist in the language. The result is a pair of words with a common etymology, but differing functionality (they may be phonologically identical or very distinct). This is the case, for example, of the indefinite article *a(n)*, derived from the numeral *one*, which remained an autonomous word in English alongside the article. Hopper suggests that divergence can be considered as a special kind of layering that, rather than pertaining to two items within the same grammatical domain (as the two patterns for past tense formation in English exemplified above), involves a lexical and a grammatical item instead.
- Specialization. It is closely related to Lehmann's 'obligatorification'. In the course of grammaticalization, the forms become increasingly obligatory in certain constructions. At an advanced stage of specialization, combinations of forms settle into paradigms, comparable to Lehmann's 'paradigmaticization'. This is illustrated by the French negative particle *pas*. In Old French, *pas* was only one among a number of nouns that were used in order to reinforce negation. Eventually, however, it was *pas* the one that became obligatory, yielding the general negator sequence *ne … pas*.
- Persistence. This principle refers to the fact that the meaning and function of a grammatical word reflects a dominant earlier meaning that was present in the original lexical form from which it evolved. This may be opaque at the final stage of grammaticalization (morphologization), but noticeable at intermediate phases. Persistence is observed in relation to the auxiliary verb *will*, which retains its original meaning of volition in some contexts (e.g. *will you marry me?*).
- Decategorialization. It involves loss of the optional markers of categoriality, loss of discourse autonomy and loss of optionality in morphological trappings on the part of grammaticalized forms (e.g. the

forms are no longer nouns or verbs). This loss of categoriality goes hand in hand with the assumption of discourse functions (from the propositional sphere to the textual one). *Considering*, for example, lost its verbal status when it decategorialized into a preposition.

Hopper's five principles, as also happened with Lehmann's parameters, are not exclusively present in grammaticalization processes, but are common to linguistic change in general. However, they serve to show the degree of grammaticalization of a given sign and are useful to spot this change at an incipient stage and not only when the process is advanced.

Bybee (2003) establishes a strong connection between grammaticalization and frequency. She claims that "frequent repetition plays an important role in the […] changes that take place in grammaticalization" (2003: 604). It is not the case that grammaticalized items become high-frequency tokens, but rather that it is because they are high-frequency items that they come into the process of grammaticalization. Bybee claims that some items, through constant repetition, undergo a generalization of meaning, they increase in generality and the contexts where they can appear shift from very specific ones to more general. Such generalization fosters an increase in the types of lexical elements with which each item can co-occur, which ultimately leads to a dramatic increase in frequency of those generalized items, thus triggering other changes that happen in grammaticalization (2003: 603). Among these changes, Bybee (2003: 605-621) discusses the following:

- Bleaching of semantic force in high-frequency items due to habituation. The inherent meaning of the lexical form is lost and replaced by a more general and abstract one as the item is grammaticalized and generalized to additional contexts of occurrence. This process corresponds to Lehmann's (2015) desemanticization, and is illustrated by Bybee by means of Old English *cunnan*, whose original meaning ('know') was lost as it grammaticalized into an auxiliary verb for root possibility. Due to the fact that *cunnan* was already very frequent in Old English, its original meaning was weakened and its use expanded

to new contexts of occurrence. This triggered a further weakening of the meaning 'know', which, at the same time resulted in a further increase in the frequency of use of the verb and, ultimately, in *can* becoming an auxiliary for root possibility, devoid of any trace of its original nuance.

- Phonological reduction and phonological fusion have also been discussed above in relation to Lehmann (2015). Bybee explains that it is those constructions that are further repeated the ones that undergo phonological changes faster. Therefore, it is the increase in frequency of a grammaticalizing construction that triggers this change. Phonological reduction implies that some sounds are not fully articulated in some high-frequency tokens (which explains the loss of phonological substance from OE *cunnan* to present-day English *can*). Phonological fusion, in turn, happens when combinations of words that occur together very frequently come to be stored and processed as one chunk. This is the case of the contraction *don't*, for instance.
- Autonomy of grammaticalizing constructions or items when they become dissociated of their original lexical meanings. Again, due to frequency of use and generalization, items grow increasingly independent of their lexical nuances. Such dissociations can be phonological, semantic and morphosyntactic. This is observed in the French negator *pas*, which is devoid of its original meaning ('step'). However, the noun *pas* (meaning 'step') still exists in French.
- New pragmatic functions are assigned to grammaticalizing tokens thanks to their autonomy and growing opacity of internal structure. These new pragmatic functions originate precisely in the contexts where they are most frequently used. Bybee illustrates this process with the phrase *I don't know*, which is used sometimes in speech (especially in American English) as a softener to politely refuse something or disagree with the interlocutor. In such uses, *I don't know* is extrapolated from its original use to answer a question.
- Entrenchment. As high frequency of occurrence can motivate change, it is also the reason behind the maintenance of conservative structures

despite the pressure of productive patterns. In the history of English, analogical change has happened with the aim to level or regularize the morphophonemic and morphosyntactic alternations present in different paradigms, but high-frequency forms and constructions tend to resist such change (as is the case of irregular past forms in contrast to the productive *-ed* pattern, already discussed above in relation to layering as described by Hopper (1991)).

Heine (2003) defines grammaticalization as "a process whereby expressions for concrete (= source) meanings are used in specific contexts for encoding grammatical (= target) meanings. This process has a number of implications for the structure of the expressions concerned" (2003: 578). He also identifies four interrelated mechanisms of change that, although not confined to grammaticalization exclusively, together constitute the different components of such process. Each of them is concerned with one of the different levels of language: semantics, pragmatics, morphosyntax and phonetics, respectively (Heine 2003: 578-580):

- Desemanticization is concerned with semantics and involves the loss of lexical content, also called bleaching; it means the loss of concrete meanings because of their reinterpretation into more abstract grammatical ones. Desemanticization can also refer to the loss of one (or all) of the grammatical functions of an already grammatical form. This process has already been discussed above in connection to Lehmann (2015) and Bybee (2003).
- Extension is related to the pragmatic side of language and implies the use of expressions in new contexts where they could not be used previously. Extension can be paralleled to Lehmann's (2015) obligatorification process.
- Decategorialization, already identified by Hopper (1991), refers to loss in morphosyntactic substance. The forms under grammaticalization lose their previous categorial status. Decategorialization can even imply loss of autonomy of a sign (cliticization, affixation).

- Erosion means loss in phonetic substance, which is also called phonetic reduction, due mainly to the increase in frequency of use of the form undergoing grammaticalization and its widespread context generalization. Such loss in phonetic substance is discussed by both Lehmann (2015) and Bybee (2003).

Heine (2003) illustrates these mechanisms with the grammaticalization process of *will* as a future tense marker. First, the original volitional meaning of the verb was bleached, which triggered its extension to more varied contexts of occurrence. Then *will* decategorialized and lost its main verb status. Ultimately, it underwent erosion and yielded the contracted form *'ll*.

Desemanticization, decategorialization and erosion imply a loss in properties in the process of grammaticalization; extension, on the other hand, entails gaining pragmatic substance. These mechanisms of change tend to occur in that order in the process of grammaticalization, desemanticization occurs first, as it has been observed that "in the early stages of grammaticalization there may be a shift from less to more grammatical meaning although there are as yet no noticeable pragmatic, morphosyntactic, or phonetic changes associated with that shift" (Heine 2003: 580). The changes that take place in desemanticization have been described under three different models (Heine 2003: 591-592):

1. The "bleaching model", the most prominent one, involves loss of most of the semantic content of the form undergoing desemanticization (a), but one component of meaning remains (b): ab > b. This is the case, for example, of the indefinite article *a(n)*, derived from *one*, mentioned earlier on in this section.
2. The "loss-and-gain model" emphasizes the fact that apart from the loss of semantic content, there is also a gain in some cases, and some forms acquire a new meaning (c) in the process: ab > bc. Such model is illustrated by the loss of the sense of physical motion of *go to*, while retaining its tense domain, and ultimately acquiring the sense of futurity in the construction *(be) going to*.

3. The "implicature model" suggests that the original meanings can be lost altogether, giving rise to new meanings that have no component in common with the original ones: ab > bc > cd. This model is displayed by the evolution of the French negative particle *ne*, to which the noun *pas* was associated in order to strengthen its meaning, giving rise to the form *ne … pas*. Ultimately, the form *pas* has been attested to occur independently as a negative marker.

These models of semantic change are not mutually exclusive; rather, one is contained in the next one. Nevertheless, it has been the "bleaching model" that has proved to be the most basic one and "the *sine qua non* for grammaticalization to happen" (Heine 2003: 592).

Those forms that undergo grammaticalization through the aforementioned mechanisms follow what Heine calls a "three-stage model" or "overlap model", which he explains as follows (Heine 2003: 579) and is sketched as A > A,B > B:

i. There is a linguistic expression A that is recruited for grammaticalization.
ii. This expression acquires a second use pattern, B, with the effect that there is ambiguity between A and B.
iii. Finally, A is lost, that is, there is now only B.

Heine prefers to describe the process of grammaticalization as a chain rather than by means of the more common terms 'path' or 'cline', because he claims that the changes that take place exhibit a chain-like or overlapping structure that is reflected in the second stage of grammaticalization mentioned above. As he explains, "the development of grammatical forms does not lead straight from the source meaning (or form) A to the target meaning (or form) B but invariably involves an intermediate stage where A and B coexist side by side, thereby creating a situation of ambiguity" (Heine 2003: 589-590).

Traugott, in turn, defines grammaticalization as "the process whereby lexical material in highly constrained pragmatic and morphosyntactic contexts is assigned grammatical function, and once grammatical, is assigned increasingly grammatical, operator-like function" (2003a: 645). This process

involves "a set of related functional, pragmatic, semantic, morphosyntactic and phonological changes" (Traugott 2010a: 97), as already postulated by Heine (2003). For her, context is a very important factor in the process of grammaticalization as the locus for change. She is also a firm defender of pragmatics being a variable to be taken into account inside grammar. She distinguishes two main approaches to grammaticalization as has been analysed by other researchers over the last decades, one that understands grammaticalization as an increase in dependency or reduction, and another that sees it as expansion. The first one is considered the traditional approach to grammaticalization, where the "basic insight is that a lexical item or construction (in the sense of a string or phrase) becomes a grammatical item over time" (2010a: 97), where the focus is on "reduction of structure and form, and on increase in dependency" (2010a: 97). The second construal, on the other hand, admits three types of context-expansion: "i) host-class expansion, ii) syntactic expansion, and iii) semantic-pragmatic expansion" (2010a: 98). The main difference between these two approaches to grammaticalization is that in the first one, pragmatics is outside core grammar, whereas in the second one, it forms part of grammar (2010a: 98). For Traugott, it is very important "to look beyond morphosyntax to the relation between syntax and discourse pragmatics, between cognition and communication" (1995: 16).

This inclusion of pragmatics in the process of grammaticalization has allowed the development of constructions like discourse markers to be included in the domain of grammaticalization, despite their increase in scope and disjunction, which goes against those theories of grammaticalization that conceive it just as implying reduction of properties. For Traugott, the signs of early grammaticalization are (Traugott 2003a: 644):

i. structural decategorialization;
ii. shift from membership in a relatively open set to membership in a relatively closed one (i.e., from lexical category to syntactic operator category) in the context of a specific construction;
iii. bonding (erasure of morphological boundaries) within a construction;
iv. semantic and pragmatic shift from more to less referential meaning via invited inferencing.

Therefore, Traugott (2010a) defends that not only semantic, but also pragmatic factors, among others, are at work in grammaticalization (Traugott 2010a: 98-109):

- The role of semantics in grammaticalization has been widely attested, and metaphorizing (or analogy) amply regarded in the early theories of grammaticalization as the predominant mechanism in grammaticalization processes. Another such mechanism is bleaching, "understood as the loss of substantive, contentful, referential, or lexical meaning, but the retention of abstract or schematic meaning" (2010a: 99)[62]. Traugott suggests that while some content meaning is lost, abstract meaning is also gained, involving a strengthening of informativeness in the development of procedural meanings central to grammaticalization.
- The role of pragmatics in grammaticalization is the area where Traugott has contributed the most. She claims that "what appears to be metaphorical change based in analogical thinking is, in fact, the outcome of paying attention to, and using, pragmatic implicatures that arise in the syntagmatic flow of speech" (2010a: 100). She postulates the theory of invited inferencing which evokes "speakers producing or even intending meanings beyond what is said, and hearers inferring such meaning – in other words, it is intended to evoke negotiation of meaning" (2010a: 100-101). This perspective is widely interactional, involving not only the speaker and his/her inner thinking, but also his/her interaction with his/her interlocutor(s). Traugott claims that such process is behind the conventionalization of abstract implicatures of futurity inherent to the verb *will*, which led to its grammaticalization as a future marker.
- Another factor that is especially stressed by Traugott is context, as the locus where pragmatic ambiguity (necessary precondition for grammaticalization) takes place. Such contexts where more than one

[62] This process has already been discussed above in connection to work by Lehmann (2015), Bybee (2003) and Heine (2003).

meaning is possible have come to be called 'bridging contexts', using Heine's terminology. In time, the new meaning that was originally only pragmatically implied within the ambiguous string comes to be used in new contexts where only this meaning, and not the original one, is allowed; these are called 'switch contexts'. Although discussion on context has previously been centred on the local context of the phrase, clause or sentence, Traugott (2010a) claims that certain types of grammaticalization seem to have arisen in larger discourse contexts. The importance of the larger context has been observed, for example, in connection to the polyfunctionality of grammaticalized expressions of the kind of *so* or *albeit*. In order to overcome the pragmatic ambiguity of such forms, it is necessary to go beyond the clausal to the discourse context. The polyfunctionality of such expressions has been regarded either as inherent to the individual expression under analysis or as its accommodation to the disparate discourse functions that it may play within the larger context.

- Strategic interaction between the participants, related to the aforementioned theory of invited inferencing, is a factor that also needs attention in the process of grammaticalization. On some occasions, change takes place in dialogic interaction, as is the case of the Spanish modal particle *bien* when used as a marker of disagreement. Therefore, the switch contexts enabling change in such cases are not "pragmatically ambiguous, but pragmatically dialogic" (2010a: 106).
- Last of all, Traugott posits stance among the pragmatic effects of context in grammaticalization and furthers studies connecting (inter)subjectification and grammaticalization. Subjectivity, in the frame of "expressiveness" is a "synchronic notion [that] has to do with the speaker's attitude towards what is said" (2010a: 107). The acquisition over time of a subjective stance (the reflection in language of the speaker's attitudes) by relatively neutral expressions is known as subjectification. Intersubjectification, in turn, is the encoding of the speaker's attitude toward his/her interlocutor. For Traugott, an

> increase in subjectification, and to a lesser extent in intersubjectification also, is correlated with increased grammaticalization. Therefore, she proposes that the semantics-pragmatics of grammaticalization involves the following shift: propositional (> textual) > expressive meaning (2003a: 633).

In connection to the notion of (inter)subjectivity as proposed by Traugott, it is important to note that "[n]either subjectification nor intersubjectification entails grammaticalization" (Traugott 2010b: 38). Although it can be considered a subtype of semantic reanalysis (Traugott 2010b: 54), this is not enough to consider it a mechanism for grammaticalization (López-Couso 2010: 140). However, Traugott (2010b: 38) explains that "there is a strong correlation between grammaticalization and subjectification, and a weaker one between grammaticalization and intersubjectification". In addition, although "not restricted to grammaticalization, subjectification is more likely to occur in it than in […] semantic change, presumably because grammaticalization by definition involves recruitment of items to mark the speaker's perspective" (Traugott 2010b: 40). Furthermore, it is more common for subjectification to be found in primary grammaticalization (involving the development of lexical material into grammatical item) than in secondary grammaticalization (already grammatical items becoming more grammatical).

As regards intersubjectification, Traugott explains that it is only once meanings come to reflect speaker's attitudes and beliefs (subjectification), that these subjectified meanings can enter the process of encoding speaker's attention towards the addressee (intersubjectification). Traugott emphasizes that "there cannot be intersubjectification without some degree of subjectification. […] Therefore intersubjectification can be considered to be an extension of subjectification rather than as a separate mechanism" (Traugott 2003b: 134). This can be schematized as follows:

non-/less subjective > subjective > intersubjective (Traugott 2010b: 35).

It is important to note, nevertheless, that one meaning can only be (inter)subjectified if it "has a newly coded [inter]subjective meaning" (2010b:

35). Many expressions may have pragmatic (inter)subjective meanings in context, but this (inter)subjectivity has not developed through the process of intersubjectification; rather, it is part of the pragmatic nuance of the expression. Such pragmatic (inter)subjectivity does not reflect speaker's involvement; it is "inherent in language use and relates to the speaker's conceptualization of reality" (López-Couso 2010: 141). Taking this into account, the formulation that would be theoretically more adequate is:

non-/less subjectivized > subjectivized > intersubjectivized (Traugott 2010b: 36)

However, since speakers do not have immediate access to history, they cannot know if (inter)subjective meaning is intrinsic to the form in question, or whether it has developed over time.

It is easy to find examples of subjectification in English (for example, raising constructions from non-raising ones or epistemic modals that arise from verbs of volition), but intersubjectivized meanings are not so easily spotted. Traugott provides the example of some intersubjectified hedges that arise from subjectified discourse markers (*well, perhaps* and *sort of*, only in some of their hedged uses). Even so, we must be careful when speaking of intersubjectification in English, because we may encounter many "addressee oriented uses, but unless a form-meaning pair has come to code intersubjectivity, we are not seeing intersubjectification" (Traugott 2010b: 37). Intersubjectification is more common in languages that possess honorific systems, like Japanese.

As is the case for most developmental paths (as already suggested for grammaticalization), the hypothesis mentioned above, non-/less subjective > subjective > intersubjective can also be layered. Therefore, older non-/less subjective meanings can and usually do co-occur with the new subjectified ones. At the same time, intersubjectification is not the endpoint for all subjectivized items. On many occasions, when they are more contentful, they

stop at the subjectification level and never get to be intersubjectivized (Traugott 2003b: 134).[63]

The aforementioned processes have been attested to bear relation to the evolution of extender tags, as is discussed in the following section (cf. Section 2.6.2).

2.6.2 GRAMMATICALIZATION OF EXTENDER TAGS

The historical evolution of extender tags and their process of grammaticalization is a topic which has not received extensive attention on the part of the different researchers that have worked on extenders. Invaluable insights into the grammaticalization of these forms can nevertheless be found in both works directly focused on this issue and in passing mentions in other works which have thrown some light on the way in which extender tags have evolved.

While grammaticalization is best attested in diachrony, all the research devoted to the grammaticalization of extender tags has been conducted from a synchronic perspective, using only present-day English material.[64] Nevertheless, Overstreet (2014: 110) defends that it is possible to find evidence of grammaticalization in synchronic data thanks to the existence of layering (cf. Section 2.6.1) and to the implication that the older layers (i.e. those less grammaticalized or original uses of these forms) and the new ones (i.e. the novel uses and more advanced in the process) coexist in the same historical period. As Overstreet puts it, "[t]he existence of layering provides us with the opportunity to look at synchronic data for evidence that a particular type of variation in form may be associated with variation in

[63] On the syntactic manifestations that tend to accompany (inter)subjectification, see López-Couso (2010: 148-150).

[64] Cf. Erman (1995); Overstreet & Yule (1997b: 256); Overstreet (1999: 97-140; 2011: 300-301; 2014); Aijmer (2002: 217-218); Cheshire (2007: 156-186); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010); Denis (2011: 63; 2015: 76-150); Palacios Martínez (2011: 2459-2467); Pichler & Levey (2011); and Secova (2014: 12).

function that has occurred over time" (2014: 110). This is possible because the grammaticalization of extender tags is currently under way. Only a few general extenders represent instances of fully grammaticalized constructions. The vast majority of uses of these forms can be said to correspond to different stages in the grammaticalization process, from examples showing the original form and uses of extender tags to others where new functions are being adopted. Some researchers have suggested that the endpoint of grammaticalization for extender tags is becoming a kind of punctor, "almost the oral equivalent of a comma or a full stop, depending on intonation" (Macauley 1985: 115, quoted from Overstreet 1999: 102).[65] However, such claims have been contested and it has been suggested that extenders rather become hedges on politeness. This approach has been widely adopted by those scholars analysing this feature. On the one hand, adjunctive extender tags become markers of intersubjectivity (Overstreet & Yule 1997b: 256), "used to indicate familiarity and social connection […] and to signal an assumption of shared experience and solidarity with the addressee, thereby marking attention to the addressee's self-image in terms of positive politeness" (Overstreet 2014: 121). On the other hand, disjunctive extender tags are used in contexts such as offers, invitations, proposals or requests to "implicate options and express tentativeness" (Overstreet 1999: 107), because "suggesting an alternative possibility represents an attempt to minimize the implicit imposition on the addressee and thus represents a strategy of negative politeness" (Overstreet 2014: 122), what is described as "non-imposition politeness" (2014: 122).

As noted above (cf. Section 2.6.1), Bybee (2003: 203) suggested that it is in those items that show higher rates of occurrence where grammaticalization takes place first, so it is a widespread practice to analyse those extender tags that are more frequent in search of signs of grammaticalization.[66] Another commonly accepted fact is that teenagers use

[65] Cf. also Cheshire (2007: 186); and Pichler & Levey (2011: 453).

[66] All researchers listed in footnote 64 make use of frequently occurring extender tags in their analysis of the grammaticalization of these forms.

extender tags (or at least those that occur at a higher rate) more frequently than adults (cf. Section 2.4.2) and it is thus in the speech of adolescents where clearer and more abundant signs of grammaticalization are expected to appear. In fact, Cheshire (2007) and Palacios Martínez (2011) have decided to use adolescent speech data for their analyses. Palacios Martínez (2011) even conducted a comparative study between young and adult speakers as regards the grammaticalization of the most frequently occurring extender tags in both groups and concludes that "it is in the language of teenagers where [the] indicators of grammaticalization are more clearly observed" (2011: 2465).

In an attempt to solve the problem of relying excessively on synchronic data, Tagliamonte & Denis (2010), Denis (2011), Pichler & Levey (2011) and Denis (2015) use the apparent time method, simulating diachrony by comparing the speech of older and younger speakers. The rationale behind this method is that it has been argued that "individual's grammars tend to stabilize in adolescence", which implies that "the grammar of a fifty-year-old in 2014 is in many respects equivalent to the grammar of a twenty-year-old in 1984" (Denis 2015: 33). Therefore, language variation is, in this respect, strongly correlated to speaker's age. By dividing the available data into different age cohorts, it is argued that we can attest the evolution of a form over decades, taking as benchmark the date of birth of the speakers. So, if we collect data in 2018 from speakers that rate from 15 to 90 years old, we can see the evolution of any form from around the 1940s until the present day. In any case, this method has the implicit risk of yielding results that are due to an age-grading effect rather than to grammaticalization (Tagliamonte & Denis 2010: 350), a problem which should be ruled out provided that the indicators of grammaticalization are at work and the evolution of the form is as expected. Tagliamonte & Denis (2010) and Denis (2011) divide their data into three age cohorts: <30 years old, 30-50 years old and >50 years old. Denis (2015) adds a new group to these three, namely older speakers born around the beginning of the 20th century. Pichler & Levey (2011), in turn, use divisions into three age groups as well: 17-23; 27-48 and 60-81. This kind of

approach provides us with the evolution of extender tags from more or less half of the 20th century until the present day.[67]

The first approach to the grammaticalization of extender tags is Erman's (1995) description of this process for the form *or something*. She defends that *or something* has already been depleted of its original meaning, in the sense that both parts of the disjunction, *or* and *something,* have already become grammatical items on their own. This extender is now becoming still more grammatical, "further depleted of [its] original meanings and functions and [acquiring] new and more general meanings and functions" (1995: 136) as an 'approximation marker', being thus "reanalysed as belonging to a new functional category" (1995: 136-137). Erman (1995: 139-145) proposes the following development for *or something* from the propositional stage (stage I) to the textual (stage II) to, finally, the interpersonal or expressive stage (stage III):

- Stages I + II. Although, for Erman, both the pronoun and the conjunction have entered the textual stage, there are still very obvious traces of the propositional components of the pronoun *something* (*some + thing*) in some examples where its scope is "some concrete thing or object" (1995: 140), as in (2.93):

  (2.93) […] *granny Elsie always used to give me cherry cake and a bottle of pop* ***or something***. (Erman 1995: 140)

- Stage II. The scope of the tag is no longer a noun phrase that agrees with the pronoun *something*, but a larger piece of discourse (a quote, a state, an event or a process), so its interpretation is not so readily at hand as at the previous stage. It operates more at the textual level and its meaning is only implied. Nevertheless, this larger piece of discourse scope "could be rewritten as a noun phrase at a higher level of abstraction", which means that "it belongs to the same constituent category as the item from which the pronoun is derived" (1995: 141) and its interpretation is thus facilitated by this fact. In the case of

[67] Denis' (2015) data, in turn, only go back to the beginning of the 21st century.

(2.94) below, the tag could be rewritten as "or some process of the same or a similar kind", which is the superordinate set of both the underlined verb phrase and the tag. This set or category is, in turn, an abstract noun phrase which would agree with the pronoun *something*.

(2.94) […] *the only occasions that I went upstairs were for instance, if Hart was changing his time of lecture* ***or something.*** (Erman 1995: 141)

- Stages II + III. Erman explains that, in this phase, the two parts of the extender tag, *or* and *something*, are beginning to merge into one. The pronoun, therefore, is starting to decategorialize, its scope items are no longer noun phrases nor can they be rewritten as such and there are cases of adverbial phrases, as shown in example (2.95), where the form *or some time* would be expected to occur rather than *or something* with the adverbial scope (*tomorrow* and *now*).

(2.95) […] *and this one must we do, either tomorrow or now* ***or something.*** (Erman 1995: 142)

Moreover, cases of human noun phrases as scope can also be found, as is the case of (2.96), where the form *or someone/somebody* could have been used instead.

(2.96) […] *it wants almost boys or schoolgirls* ***or something*** *singing it.* (Erman 1995: 145)

Erman also concludes that the feature of humanity "is more decisive for the impression of strangeness than the superordinate feature +ANIM" (1995: 143), as illustrated in (2.97), where no other extender tag form would be more appropriate than *or something*.

(2.97) […] *and there were a number or characters who I think were waiting to sell some sheep or some cattle* ***or something***" (1995: 143)

At this phase there is overlap between stages II and III because, despite the decategorialization of the tag, there is still a choice present in the disjunction, and therefore the function of *or* is retained.

- Stage III. This would represent, for Erman (1995), the last stage in the grammaticalization of the extender tag *or something*, its expressive

stage, where "the meanings of the words as separate items have been obfuscated". In other words, this "means that the conjunction *or* no longer has a disjunctive function, and the pronoun no longer has pronominal function, but that they have merged, and as a linguistic unit they enter a new functional category, namely, that of an approximation marker" (1995: 144). When the extender functions as an approximation marker, its role is to signal to the listener that the speaker does not "find it necessary to commit her/himself to the truth of the proposition of the preceding discourse", implying therefore that "the exactness of some part of the information is not important for the conversation as a whole" (1995: 144). In example (2.98), the speaker implies that (s)he is not sure about the exactness of the frequency mentioned, but there is no choice or disjunction here: there is no other option implied by the extender tag.

(2.98) *[Y]ou get it out of the computer* <u>*every six months*</u> ***or something***"
(Erman 1995: 144)

In order to verify that the evolution described above for *or something* does indeed represent a case of grammaticalization and not any other type of change, Erman (1995: 145-157) applies Hopper's (1991) principles of grammaticalization (cf. Section 2.6.1):

- Layering: *or something* does not substitute other approximation markers available in English, as *around, or so*, etc. Instead, all these forms co-exist.
- Divergence: Erman explains that the constituents of the extender tag *or something* have merged and become one single item at the last stage of grammaticalization. However, all the component parts of the tag (the conjunction *or*, the pronoun *something* and even the two items forming the pronoun, *some* + *thing*) are both autonomous words in the English language.
- Specialization: although other extender tag forms could have undergone the process of grammaticalization that we have witnessed

for *or something*, they did not gain the same general grammatical meaning; it was *or something* that specialized for this function.

- Persistence: at the intermediate stages of the process of grammaticalization, there is obvious evidence of the original meanings of the pronoun in the uses of the tag.
- Decategorialization: as has been explained above, the extender tag undergoes "a shift of category membership, from the categories of conjunction + pronoun to the discourse category of approximation marker" (Erman 1995: 146).

Other research on the grammaticalization of extender tags traces the evolution of the forms at issue in a similar way to the one proposed by Erman (1995), but focusing, instead, on the different changes that take place separately: phonetic reduction, decategorialization, semantic change and pragmatic shift, following the model proposed by Cheshire (2007). These processes had already been hinted at by Overstreet & Yule (1997b), although these authors never discussed the issue of grammaticalization strictly speaking. They claimed that those forms that have developed into markers of solidarity (e.g. *and stuff* in American English) show the following characteristics: they are "reduced to short versions" (1997b: 255), they are not necessarily in agreement with their scopes, they even "cease to be attached to named exemplars" (1997b: 255-256) and they lose their original meaning of categorization devices, while acquiring the new pragmatic function of "marker[s] of intersubjectivity" (1997b: 256). In what follows, I consider, in turn, these indicators of grammaticalization:

Phonetic reduction in the case of extender tags has generally been understood as the gradual replacement of the long forms by the short forms of the extenders (cf. Section 2.2.3). Thus, for instance, the form *and things* would have evolved from *and things like that*, or even longer and more complex forms like *and things like that that aren't real attractive*. This approach has been adopted by the majority of researchers,[68] despite the fact

[68] Cf. Cheshire (2007: 167-168); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 351-352); Overstreet (2011: 301); Palacios Martínez (2011: 2462); Secova (2014: 12); and Denis (2015: 107).

that some acknowledge that this is not a canonical case of phonetic reduction, a process that "usually takes place at the syllabic or phonemic level" (Denis 2015: 107). In this case, it affects "whole morphemes at a time" (Denis 2015: 107), but since this ultimately "implicates loss of lexical material, which in itself involves the loss of phonetic information" (Tagliamonte & Denis 2010: 351), they resolve to use this dichotomy of long versus short forms as a sign of grammaticalization. Pichler & Levey (2011), on the other hand, reject this way of approaching the phonetic reduction of extender tags on the grounds that "the derivation of short variants from longer variants […] is questionable from a historical perspective" (2011: 448). As a matter of fact, short forms are already present in the historical data collected, for example, by Carroll (2007; 2008) (cf. Section 2.5). Nevertheless, they acknowledge that "morphologically lighter forms tend to be more grammaticalized than morphologically heavier forms", so that it is expected to find "an increase in the number of short [extender tag] variants relative to long ones" (2011: 449). As a consequence, they decide to operationalize this factor by coding the extenders for length instead of for the presence or absence of an extension, dividing them between short (1 o 2 lexemes) and long (3+ lexemes) (2011: 449).[69] Overstreet (2014), in turn, analyses the changes implied here as morphosyntactic reanalysis and phonological attrition rather than just as phonetic reduction. In the former process she includes the fact that shorter variants are becoming more frequent that their longer counterparts, while they also become "idiomatic", as their component parts are usually automatized "as a single processing chunk" (2014: 110). On the other hand, under phonological attrition she includes "loss of tone unit boundary" on the part of the short forms of the tag, which results "in a tighter integration of the tag into the utterance" (Aijmer 2002: 218). Another aspect that has also been pointed out by Cheshire (2007) is that some short forms are further reduced in pronunciation, the unstressed conjunctions being reduced to /n/ in the case of *and* or to schwa in the case of *or* (Cheshire 2007: 168).

[69] Secova (2014: 18), following this approach, decides to measure the length of extenders by syllables.

Decategorialization in the grammaticalization of extender tags refers to the "mismatch that develops between the proform and the phrase to which it is attached in terms of both syntactic and semantic properties" (Overstreet 2014: 113). As seen above, this was already discussed by Erman (1995). This way of approaching decategorialization is also based on Overstreet & Yule's (1997b) observation that the relation of extenders to their scopes "do not seem to be constrained by strict grammatical agreement requirements" (1997b: 257), a premise which has been adopted by all researchers after them.[70] The rationale here is that "we might expect the head noun in the construction to always have the same syntactic and semantic properties as a preceding noun to which it relates anaphorically" (Cheshire 2007: 168). Therefore, *and stuff* should always have a plural mass noun scope, *and things* a plural count noun, *or something* a singular count noun, and so on. Overstreet & Yule (1997b) argue that the fact that extenders may present other forms as scopes is a sign of ongoing decategorialization of the tag. The following examples, taken from Denis (2015: 121-122), illustrate how the extender *and stuff* can be found with a range of unexpected scopes: a non-count noun in (2.99), a plural count noun in (2.100) and even non-nominal elements, as verb phrases in (2.101) and complete clauses in (2.102).

(2.99) *Stroud's would have toys and kitchenware* ***and all that stuff*** *at that time*. (Denis 2015: 121)

(2.100) *One Christmas I was tired of Santa Claus pictures* ***and all that stuff***. (Denis 2015: 121)

(2.101) *I still have […] the old agreements dating back to what the hired man had to sign. To provide so much wood and provide so much milk* ***and all this kind of stuff***. (Denis 2015: 121-122)

(2.102) *I was one out of a group of five hundred junior farmers that went to the Royal Winter Fair from Ontario. […] We spent a week as the*

[70] See Overstreet (1999: 10; 2011: 301; 2014: 113-114); Aijmer (2002: 218); Cheshire (2007: 168-174); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 352-354); Palacios Martínez (2011: 2463); Pichler & Levey (2011: 449-450); Secova (2014: 16); and Denis (2015: 121-133).

guests of the Ontario Government and we stayed at the Royal York hotel ***and all this kind of stuff****.* (Denis 2015: 122)

The most common way of approaching the decategorialization of extender tags has been to analyse the scope of each form and verify whether it is the expected nominal form, an unexpected nominal element or some other type of scope (including adjective phrases, adverbial phrases, verb phrases, whole clauses and prepositional phrases).[71] There are, nevertheless, forms for which such a three-way distinction is not possible, "such as *and that* and *or whatever*, which do not contain a generic noun that can be coreferenced with an antecedent NP" (Pichler & Levey 2011: 450). In such cases, the only distinction to be made is whether their scope is nominal and, therefore, a match, or non-nominal, and thus a mismatch. Nevertheless, if the individual variants of extender tags are analysed more in detail, we see that some cases fall outside the patterns just explained. As Erman (1995) pointed out, and was explained above, adjectival, prepositional, verbal and sentential scopes of *or something* can be understood as noun phrases at another level of abstraction. Furthermore, a higher level of strangeness applies when the tag is used to extend human scopes, despite the fact that they are nominal items. Another exception would be the tags *or somewhere* and *or sometime*, whose more usual scopes are prepositional phrases, and not nominal elements, as has been just acknowledged, because temporal and spatial references are usually signalled by means of a prepositional phrase.

Semantic change "is characterized by a bleaching of meaning" (Tagliamonte & Denis 2010: 354), and is even called "semantic bleaching" by Denis (2015: 133). This corresponds with Heine's (2003: 583) desemanticization (cf. Section 2.6.1), which he considered the trigger for grammaticalization, preceding all other mechanisms of change. Given that it has been claimed that "the main function [of extender tags] was to implicate a category" (Cheshire 2007: 157), it has been "assumed that this is the core

[71] This approach is the one followed by Cheshire (2007: 171); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 353-354); Palacios Martínez (2011; 2462-2463); Pichler & Levey (2011: 449); Secova (2014: 16); and Denis (2015: 123-124).

meaning of the forms" (2007: 174), and therefore semantic change, or bleaching, implies the loss of their categorizing function.[72] In cases like (2.103) below, it is obvious that no set of further options is intended by the use of *and stuff*, as it is clear from the context that the students made a video for their teacher and nothing else, just a video. There are, however, many other examples where the analyst has to subjectively code extender tags for the categorization function, especially when contextual evidence is lacking and the intentions of the speaker(s) are obviously unknown to the researcher. The inherent difficulties in objectively coding semantic change may result in significant variation between different analyses.

(2.103) *AS: We threw a baby shower, and then all of a sudden our marks got raised. Yeah, she was going to cry. 'Cause we made like a video*
INT: Yeah, I saw it.
AS: You remember, right?
INT: Yeah.
AS: So ah, we made her a video ***and stuff****, and then she's like, "Guys, I'm going to cry." She's like, "But I won't."*

(Denis 2015: 136)

Pragmatic shift is triggered by semantic change, following the rationale that "grammaticalizing forms will shift from expressing propositional functions to interactional and interpersonal functions. Assuming that the set-marking function is the propositional function/meaning of a[n extender tag], then semantically bleached [extender tags] are likely not vacuous, but rather are serving other (interactional/interpersonal) functions" (Denis 2015: 139). As we have seen in Section 2.3, extender tags are highly multifunctional, and they can serve many functions apart from (or instead of) the propositional ones. Different scholars claim that they perform functions in many domains of language, so

[72] This conception of semantic change has been adopted by all researchers: Aijmer (2002: 217-219); Cheshire (2007: 174-178); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 354-356); Palacios Martínez (2011: 2463); Pichler & Levey (2011: 450-453); Overstreet (2011: 306-307; 2014: 114-118); Secova (2014: 16-17); and Denis (2015: 133-139).

that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to attach one single function, or a main one, to every use of an extender tag. Added to this is the fact that it is also highly improbable that this decision could be physically grounded on the surrounding discourse. It is because of this that Cheshire (2007: 183) decides to carry out a quantitative analysis of pragmatic shift, not on the basis of the expressive functions that the extenders show, but on their co-occurrence with other discourse markers. As she puts it, "the forms that were furthest advanced in terms of phonetic reduction, decategorization and semantic change […] tend to occur more often alone, whereas the forms that are less grammaticalised […] occur more often with another discourse particle" (2007: 185). This implies that having developed new pragmatic functions leads extenders to no longer "need the support of other discourse particles", because they would be "playing a similar pragmatic role as that of these discourse markers" (Palacios Martínez 2011: 2463).[73]

Pichler & Levey (2011) reject this way of approaching the pragmatic shift of extender tags on the grounds that it is "based on the questionable assumptions that co-occurrence patterns are functionally motivated, and that they constitute a straightforward metric of semantic-pragmatic change" (2011: 450). They decide to operationalize both semantic and pragmatic changes together, because they claim that they are not two independent factors, but clearly interrelated ones, as "in the course of semantic-pragmatic change, the set-marking meaning of [extender tags] gradually recedes while their intersubjective and other pragmatic/procedural meanings increasingly come to the fore" (2011: 450). They propose therefore four stages in the semantic-pragmatic shift of extender tags (2011: 452):[74]

[73] This way of approaching the pragmatic shift of extender tags has been adopted by Cheshire (2007: 185-186); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 356-357); Palacios Martínez (2011: 2462-2465); and Denis (2015: 139-142).

[74] Pichler & Levey's (2011: 450-453) approach is replicated by Secova (2014: 16-17) and Overstreet (2014: 114-122), the only difference being that the latter two scholars omit the last stage where extenders become punctors.

(i) stage 0 (set-marking, but contingent on intersubjectivity)[75]

(ii) stage 1 (set-marking + interpersonal/textual)

(iii) stage 2 (interpersonal/textual)

(iv) stage 3 (punctor: devoid of referential and pragmatic meanings)

Pichler & Levey (2011) explain that intersubjectivity is an interpersonal meaning that is intrinsic to categorization, and therefore they do not operationalize it as an interactional function when analysing semantic-pragmatic shift. Denis (2015) proposes that, since interpersonal meanings are thus intrinsic in extender tag use, another way of approaching semantic-pragmatic change would be following the cline: set-extension + interpersonal (/interactional) > interpersonal (/interactional), which resembles Heine's (2003) bleaching model: ab > b (cf. Section 2.6.1) (Denis 2015: 145-146). Nevertheless, Denis (2015) does never apply this methodology to his research.

In my opinion, this way of approaching semantic and pragmatic changes together, although it suffers from a higher degree of subjectivity when assigning functions to the occurrences of extender tag, is more efficient than the one proposed by Cheshire (2007), because it also resembles the models of grammaticalization and (inter)subjectification proposed by Traugott: "propositional (>textual) > expressive meaning" (Traugott 2003a: 633) and "non-/less subjective > subjective > intersubjective" (Traugott 2010b: 35) (cf. Section2.6.1). Overstreet (2014) adopts the latter cline and claims that extenders acquire first uses that imply speaker's attitude towards the message (subjective), such as intensifying and the Gricean maxims, before meanings concerning the speaker's attitude towards the addressee come to the fore, in this case, extenders functioning as politeness devices (2014: 114-122). For the present dissertation, I have decided to follow Pichler & Levey's approach to the grammaticalization of extender tags. I therefore consider phonetic reduction, decategorialization and semantic-pragmatic change as the indicators of grammaticalization of *or something* and *and the like* in late Modern English (cf. Chapter 6).

[75] Note that intersubjectivity here refers to the assumption of shared knowledge (cf. Section 2.3.1.1).

Two opposing conclusions have been reached by those researchers who have studied the grammaticalization of extender tags: while some of them claim that the changes they have observed are indeed signs of ongoing grammaticalization,[76] others state that they have not found traces of such process and defend that those changes are a sign of some other mechanism of language change.[77] Scholars belonging to the first group ground their conclusion on synchronic data, where they interpret the existing variability as a sign of ongoing grammaticalization. However, those works that have used the apparent time method have not found clear sings of evolution or change in the use of extenders tags on the last century. Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 362) find some weak signs of decategorialization, while Denis (2015: 149-150), in turn, identifies semantic bleaching at an incipient stage, although, surprisingly, this change is attested among the long forms instead of the short ones. Pichler & Levey (2011: 461-462), on the other hand, find no evidence of any change in progress. Tagliamonte & Denis (2010) and Denis (2011; 2015) claim to have found the phenomenon of lexical replacement, with the form *and that* being replaced by *and stuff*, both in Canadian English and also in York English. However, they defend that this change bears no relation to the process of grammaticalization, because the form *and stuff* has not been attested to undergo any of the aforementioned changes. In its first occurrences in both Canadian and York English, *and stuff* is already more frequent in its short form, it shows signs of decategorialization and semantic bleaching as well. Therefore, it seems that the extender tag *and stuff* is introduced in these varieties of English bearing the grammatical status of the form it is replacing (i.e. *and that*). Denis (2015: 148-149) further grounds his rejection to include extender tags in a process of grammaticalization in the fact that he could only attest one of the aforementioned mechanisms at work in his data (i.e. semantic bleaching). He claims that if extender tags were

[76] These authors are: Erman 1995; Aijmer (2002: 217-218); Cheshire (2007: 187-188); Palacios Martínez (2011: 2468); Overstreet (2014: 123); and Secova (2014: 25).

[77] These researchers are Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 362); Denis (2011: 63; 2015: 147-150); and Pichler & Levey (2011: 461-464).

undergoing grammaticalization, phonetic reduction, decategorialization and pragmatic shift should also be attested. Furthermore, all those mechanisms also apply to other types of change, unrelated to grammaticalization. Pichler & Levey (2011: 462), on the other hand, defend that to be able to claim whether extender tags are involved in a process of grammaticalization or not, diachrony is necessary. The fact that there is not enough evidence in apparent time because the data are pretty stable does not mean that extender tags are not grammaticalizing. They may be "in fact the product of grammaticalization processes that may have been operative at an earlier stage of the language" (2011: 462). Furthermore, they claim that the variability they have found, with different extenders showing different degrees of grammaticalization in their different realizations is clearly "compatible with a grammaticalization scenario" (2011: 462), as not all changes take place at the same time and not all changes reach completion. For them, whether extender tags are undergoing grammaticalization or not can only be proved by further diachronic research on the topic.

3. MATERIALS AND METHODS

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the focus of the present dissertation is on extender tags in the late Modern English period. The main reasons behind this decision are, on the one hand, the lack of earlier research concerning the history of these forms at this stage of the language (cf. Section 2.5), and, on the other hand, the proximity of this period to contemporary English, for which much work has already been conducted, which opens the possibility of direct comparison and of tracing the evolution of extender tags from around 1700 almost till the present day. Furthermore, the scarce research that has been carried out on extender tags from a historical point of view focuses on the Middle and early Modern English periods, leaving late Modern English unexplored and therefore a niche for further research.

In this chapter I first describe the corpus that I have selected to carry out this research (cf. Section 3.1.1), focusing on the reasons why I think it is the best choice available, despite its limitations (cf. Section 3.1.2). Then I offer a description of the databases that I have created to store the data obtained for the analysis (cf. Section 3.2).

3.1 THE CORPUS

As has already been pointed out in Section 2.4.1, extender tags have been found to be frequent features of oral speech, much more commonly attested in conversation than in written texts. For this reason, researchers working on these forms have usually decided to use corpora containing conversations in order to analyse them. One of the major problems of working on earlier stages of the language concerns the impossibility of having access to oral records of the time. In view of this major drawback, one possible solution is to use written material that shows the highest degree of speech-likeness possible. Carroll (2007; 2008) achieves this by using a corpus of personal

correspondence in her analysis of Middle English and early Modern English (cf. Section 2.5). By contrast, as we have seen, Ortega Barrera (2012) decides to disregard speech-likeness in her choice of material, but chooses instead another likely environment for extender tags to appear, namely lists. This explains her selection of a corpus of medical recipes. In my opinion, although lists may be a good option in order to trace extender tags, the expected variety of forms and functions to be found in this environment is quite limited. A wider range of forms and a richer array of functions and uses is more likely to be found in fictional speech. Therefore, for my analysis of extender tags, I have decided to use two collections of literature comprising novels, which contain a good amount of fictional dialogues.

3.1.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE CORPUS

As I have mentioned above, for my analysis of extender tags I have chosen two datasets containing fiction, which belong to the Chadwyck-Healey collection of literature, namely the *Eighteenth Century Fiction* (ECF) and the *Nineteenth Century Fiction* (NCF). Combined, these collections cover the time span 1700 – 1903, matching the so-called late Modern English period. Both collections consist of British English texts.

It is important to note, however, that such electronic resources as those contained in the Chadwyck-Healy collections of literature, among others, were not "specifically designed for the purposes of linguistic analysis" (López-Couso 2016: 140), and cannot therefore be considered corpora. This implies that they are not structurally tagged and do not offer word counts. Nevertheless, the massive amount of data that such collections contain makes them invaluable for corpus-like use.

The ECF contains 96 complete novels published between 1700 and 1780 from British writers, including such well-known names as Daniel Defoe, Samuel Richardson or Laurence Sterne, as well as less salient but nevertheless important writers as Penelope Aubin or Mary de la Rivière Manley. The NCF, in turn, covers the time span from 1782 to 1903, including

250 novels, also from British and Irish writers, including the most representative names of the period, as Jane Austen, Charles Dickens or the Brontë sisters, alongside works that are less known, which have received little attention and are out of print and, therefore, hard to access.

Both collections of literature include only one edition of each work, usually and preferably the first one, although some later editions have been included in some cases in order to allow for comparison of the many authorial revisions (which may result in repetitions of some tokens), or replacing the first edition, if these revised versions have become the standard. In some cases, prior serializations have also been preferred to later first volume editions. In the rest of cases, the dates of the prior serialization (if it exists) are given in the bibliographical reference of the novel. The works are included in full, with prefaces, dedications, illustrations and all kind of annotation by the author.

These collections of literature are very well suited for my purposes for two main reasons. Firstly, as I have explained above, novels include a considerable proportion of fictional dialogue, which is a good approximation to actual speech of the time. There are also many epistolary novels, which show a high degree of speech-likeness as well. Secondly, the ECF and the NCF are one of the largest collections of literature available in electronic form from the period under analysis, amounting to a total of 52 million words. Given that extender tags are a low-frequency phenomenon, a smaller corpus would yield a more reduced amount of tokens than large databases like the ones used here.

Both the ECF and the NCF have a search engine to make standard searches or complex searches with a command line search. For the latter type, the corpora are structurally tagged, so that the user can look for some word or combination of words in specific parts of the texts. Unfortunately, however, the corpora are not grammatically and/or pragmatically tagged, which implies that I had to look for individual extender tags one by one. Since extender tags are combinations of words rather than one word alone, in order to search for them, they have to be enclosed between double quotes (for

example, *"or something"*, *"and the like"*) and all possible spelling variations have to be looked for as independent searches (for example, *"and suchlike"*, *"and such like"*, *"and suchlikes"* and *"and such likes"*). The screenshots in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 below have been extracted from the NCF, which has the same interface as the ECF. Figure 3.1 illustrates the search window provided by the NCF, while Figure 3.2 shows the results of searching for the combination *"or something"* in the same database.



Figure 3.1 Search window in the NCF



Figure 3.2 Results of searching for "*or something*" in the NCF

3.1.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE CORPUS

As has already been pointed out above, given that the Chadwyck-Healey collections of literature have not been designed for linguistic analysis, they do not offer a word count, which is a crucial disadvantage when conducting quantitative research. These datasets only specify the approximate amount of words in each collection, about 12 million for the ECF and around 40 million for the NCF, but there are no further subdivisions into smaller time frames or for each of the novels. Without a more specific word count, a quantitative analysis tracing the evolution of any linguistic phenomenon is not viable.

It is for this reason that I have decided to do a manual count of the number of words in these collections, subdividing them into 20-year subperiods. In my word count I only took into consideration the text in the novel, leaving out editorial or bibliographical information. Furthermore, I also chose only one edition in the case of those works that have been included twice in the database, with two different editions, as the parts of the texts where the extender tags appeared were identical. This explains the lack of exact match of my final word count with that of the editors of the Chadwyck-Healey collections, which amounts to approximately 52 million words. The distribution of the number of words per 20-year subperiod is given in Table 3.1 below.

1700 – 1719	531,755	1800 – 1819	5,233,912
1720 – 1739	1,762,637	1820 – 1839	5,166,893
1740 – 1759	5,746,598	1840 – 1859	9,734,919
1760 – 1779	2,311,090	1860 – 1879	10,885,524
1780 – 1799	3,658,802	1880 – 1903	5,014,287
TOTAL			50,046,417

Table 3.1 Number of words in the corpus

As we can observe in Table 3.1, the number or words for each subperiod is not homogeneous, which means that, for the results to be comparable, normalized frequencies have to be computed. Therefore, I normalize the frequencies of occurrence of extender tags in every subperiod to a million words, in order to avoid working with very low figures.

3.2 THE DATABASE

As mentioned in Chapter 1, for my research I have decided to analyse a couple of extender tags, one adjunctive form, *and the like*, and one disjunctive form, *or something*. These extenders serve as an illustration of the state of affairs of the two types of extender tags in the late Modern English period, leaving for future research the possibility of widening the array of forms to be analysed.

As regards the choice of forms under consideration for the present dissertation, I conducted a rough search for those extender tags that have been claimed to be more frequent in earlier English (as attested by Carroll 2007; 2008 and Ortega Barrera 2012) and those reported to be more recurrent in present-day English as well.[78] The results of the search are divided into adjunctive (cf. Table 3.2) and disjunctive extender tags (cf. Table 3.3). It must be noted that some extenders are more likely to provide false hits than others. This is the case of, for example, *and that*, which yielded a huge amount of hits (30,923), as these two words can easily be found to co-occur in many non-extender-tag situations. On the other hand, the results obtained for *etc*. can be regarded as instances of extender tag use in every case. Furthermore, the higher amounts that are observed in the NCF do not necessarily entail an increase in frequency of the corresponding extender tag, as it has already been pointed out in Section 3.1.2 above that the amount of data in the NCF

[78] Consider, among others, Dines (1980); Aijmer (1985); Overstreet (1999); Cheshire (2007); Palacios Martínez (2011); Pichler & Levey (2011); and Tagliamonte & Denis (2011).

is much larger (about 40 million words) than in the ECF (around 12 million words).

	ECF	NCF	Total
And stuff	7	21	28
And that	9,290	21,633	30,923
And all	2,644	7,825	10,469
And everything	3	434	437
And things	54	264	318
And so forth	97	506	603
And so on	74	414	488
And other	761	1,798	2,559
And the/such like	472	475	947
Etc.	973	1,627	2,600

Table 3.2 Adjunctive extender tag search in the ECF and NCF

	ECF	NCF	Total
Or something	50	410	460
Or anything	3	287	290
Or so	221	1,132	1,353
Or other	788	1,555	2,343
Or otherwise	62	162	224
Or any	769	1,330	2,099
Or the/such like	35	82	117
Or whatever	42	213	255

Table 3.3 Disjunctive extender tag search in the ECF and NCF

The choice of the disjunctive tag was an easy one. The form *or something* is the most common disjunctive extender tag in all varieties of present-day English (cf. Section 2.4.3.1) and the one that has been attested to present clearer signs of ongoing grammaticalization.[79] Furthermore, disregarding the results for the forms *or so, or other* and *or any* (which are likely to include a considerable amount of non-extender-tag cases), *or something* has proved to be the prevailing disjunctive extender in my late Modern English corpus, as seen in Table 3.3 above. On the other hand, the choice of the adjunctive form *and the like* was not as straightforward. The extenders *and that, and all* and *and other* were discarded for the same reason

[79] See, for example, Aijmer (1985); Erman (1995); Cheshire (2007); Pichler & Levey (2011); and Overstreet (2014).

mentioned above for *or so, or other* and *or any*, namely the assumption that such high frequencies do not correspond to extender tag uses in the majority of cases. As can be observed in Table 3.2, the next most common adjunctive extender is *etc.*, but the variability as regards features and functions of this form is not expected to be as rich as that of other extender tags. Therefore, I decided to look for the next most frequent extender in the period, which resulted to be the form *and the/such like*. Contrary to the case of *or something*, the form *and the/such like* is not reported among the most frequently occurring extenders in present-day English.[80] Moreover, *and the like* is the only extender tag in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 to display similar values in both the ECF and the NCF, which clearly indicates that it must have undergone an important reduction in use over time (considering that the NCF is almost four times larger than the ECF). The hypothesis here is, therefore, that different paths of evolution will be attested for the adjunctive and the disjunctive extenders selected for analysis.

In order to store the data for the selected extender tag forms in the ECF and the NCF, I created a couple of Microsoft Access databases with tabbed forms to ease the introduction and analysis of each of the tokens extracted from the corpus. In what follows I provide a description of the database, illustrated by means of Figure 3.3 below, which provides a screenshot for one of the entries for the extender tag *or something*.

In the first column, the fields are devoted to the token itself and its bibliographical details:

- I have included two fields for the token because Microsoft Access has a 255-character limitation, which is not enough in some cases, as we need as much context as possible to analyse the forms under discussion.
- Another field indicates the Chadwyck-Healey collection from which each token is retrieved (ECF or NCF).

[80] Cf., among others, Dines (1980); Aijmer (1985); Overstreet (1999); Palacios Martínez (2011); and Pichler & Levey (2011).

- The next field comprises the year of publication. For some novels, the ECF and NCF collections of literature provide different years of publication, especially in those cases where the serialization of the text in a magazine or a newspaper precedes the publication of the full novel. In such cases, where there was a considerable difference between these dates (more than one year), the earlier one has been chosen in order to be closer to the actual year of composition of the work.
- The author is then specified in the following field.
- The next line contains the title of the novel where the extender appears.
- Finally, the page (and volume if relevant) is included in the last field of this column.



Figure 3.3 Token of *or something* in the database

The next group of fields in the middle column is concerned with the form of the tag:

- The first one, labelled 'form', indicates if the extender appears in its bare form or whether, on the contrary, it contains some kind of extension.
- In the latter case, the type of extension of the tag is included in the next field. The available choices included here for the different types

of extension of *or something* are: *like* similative, prepositional similative, other similative, adverbial, comparative, adjectival, prepositional complementation, relative clause and verbal complementation. In the case of Figure 3.3 above, the extension is the relative clause *that looked like it*.

- On some occasions, a second extension is present and this is reflected in the field devoted to it. The options contained in this field are the same as those included for the first type of extension above. In addition, the option 'none' has also been included for those examples where no second extension was attested (as the one illustrated in Figure 3.3).
- The specificity of the tag is indicated in the following line. It has already been pointed out (cf. Section 2.1) that extender tags have been divided into general and specific extenders by Overstreet (1999). For my purposes, I have decided not to use those labels. However, I distinguish between those extenders that have general reference, from those that are further specified by the surrounding context (as is the case of the token in Figure 3.3, where the extension of the tag makes it specific).
- The next field is devoted to the position of the tag within the sentence where it appears, whether it is clause-final, phrase-final or occupies medial position, as has already been explained in Section 2.2.3 above.
- Then, different features related to the scope of the extender tag are analysed. First of all, the database contains information on the type of syntactic element the scope is (noun phrase, verb phrase, prepositional phrase, adjective phrase, adverb phrase, embedded clause or whole clause).
- On some occasions, the assumption of a scope to the tag is ambiguous. This has been illustrated by Palacios Martínez by means of (3.1), where it is not clear if the scope of the extender *and everything* is the adjective *faithful*, or if it makes reference to the clauses *to be good* and *to be faithful*. In such cases, ambiguity is reported in this field.

(3.1) *He said he was making a real effort, to be good and to be faithful* ***and everything***. (Palacios Martínez 2011: 2453)

- The next three fields concern only those cases where the scope of the extender is a noun phrase. The first of these fields is devoted to indicating whether the noun is animate or inanimate.
- For animate scopes, the next field includes whether the scope is human or non-human.
- The next field contains information as to whether the extender tag *or something* can be replaced by the form *or somebody* (in those instances with a human scope).
- Last of all, the next line is devoted to specifying whether there is grammatical agreement between the tag and its scope.

In what follows, the different functions that the tag performs in the tokens at issue are addressed.

- The next two fields in the middle column pay attention to the function of the extender as list completer, first indicating the position the extender occupies within the list where it occurs.
- Then, regarding the information about the position that the tag occupies in the list provided in the preceding field, its function as list completer is confirmed or not. As has been explained in Section 2.3.2.2, only those tokens where the tag appears in the third or the following positions are regarded as list completers (as the minimum amount of tokens to consider that one is doing a list is three).
- The next three fields deal with the function of categorization (cf. Section 2.3.2.1). The first one indicates whether the tag is performing such function or not.
- For those cases where the tag performs this categorization function, the next field contains information as to the type of category that is being implied: ad hoc or common.
- Another field is included in order to cover whether there is explicit mention of the category in the token, as is the case of the category *shares* in Figure 3.3 above.

- In the last column, the first field is devoted to indicating if the tag functions as a marker of intersubjectivity (using Overstreet's (1999) terminology), which refers to the assumption of shared knowledge. As has already been claimed in Section 2.3.1.1, extender tags in my corpus have been taken to convey shared knowledge in all of their occurrences.
- Next, a couple of fields are devoted to the function of *or something* as a hedge on the Gricean maxim of quality. The first one merely indicates whether the extender performs this function or not.
- Then, for those extenders that function as quality hedges, this type of hedging is further specified (following Overstreet's (1999) categorization) into: quality hedge, approximator with amounts, lexical approximator, approximator of reported speech, approximator with analogies and approximator with exaggerations and jokes. This categorization distinguishes the general use of the extender as a quality hedge from some special uses as an approximator (tied to those specific contexts) (cf. Section 2.3.3.1.2).
- In the following line, the function of extender tags as politeness devices is included, be it positive politeness, negative politeness or none for those cases where this function does not apply.

The remaining fields include miscellaneous additional information pertinent to the analysis of extender tags.

- The next two fields concern the co-occurrence of extenders with pragmatic markers. The first one is devoted to indicating if such co-occurrence exists.
- For those cases where co-occurrence with some pragmatic marker is attested, the next field is devised to specify this pragmatic marker.
- The next couple of fields concern the grammaticalization of the extender under analysis. The first slot indicates whether it has become a mere performance filler (devoid of any referential or expressive meaning).
- Then the stage of grammaticalization of the tag is specified, following Pichler & Levey's (2011) four-stage account (cf. Section 2.6.2).

- The next slot, labelled 'conversation' was originally devised to indicate whether the extender occurred within a dialogue or in the narrative part of the novel. However, in view of the number of epistolary novels included in the corpus, another option was then added to cover such cases, thus yielding three alternatives: conversation, narrative and letter.
- Finally, an open field was included in order to introduce any comments or observations which may be relevant for the analysis of the token.

The database created for the extender tag *and the like*, illustrated by the screenshot in Figure 3.4 below, covers the same areas as that of *or something*, but shows a number of differences with it that derive from the dissimilarities in the form and functions of the two extender tags.



Figure 3.4 Token of *and such like* in the database

- First of all, an additional field was added in the middle column regarding the form of the tag, labelled 'extender', which indicates the extender tag variant under analysis: *and the like*, *and such like* or *and (poss.) like*.
- Second, the types of extension that the extender tag *and the like* shows are different from those of *or something*. *And the like* has been attested in the data obtained from the ECF and NCF to be extended by the

traditional post-modification pattern with two types of post-modifiers: prepositional phrases and relative clauses. However, the most recurrent type of extension observed in my data features the proform (*like/suchlike*) as an adjective in attributive relation to a noun phrase which becomes the head of the tag (cf. Section 5.2.1.3). Therefore, the options provided in the database for the types of extension of *and the like* are: noun phrase, prepositional phrase and relative clause.

- For those cases that are extended by a noun phrase, such noun phrase can be, in turn, pre- and/or post-modified. Therefore, the field 'extension modification' indicates whether such noun phrase is pre-modified, post-modified, both pre- and post-modified or shows no modification at all.
- The field that was devised to indicate whether the tag can be substituted by *or somebody* has been removed from this database, as it does not apply to the extender *and the like*.
- It has been claimed (cf. Section 2.3.3.1.2) that while disjunctive extenders function as hedges on the Gricean maxim of quality, adjunctive extender tags are quantity hedges instead. Therefore, it is the function of quantity hedging that is tested for *and the like*.
- The different kinds of quantity hedging that have been included in the database have been retrieved from those suggested by Overstreet (1999), comprising the general function of hedge on quantity and specialized uses for downgrading and summarizing reported speech. To these, their use to reduce a known fact or formula, proposed by Carroll (2007), has also been added.

4. *OR SOMETHING* IN LATE MODERN ENGLISH

This chapter is devoted to the analysis of the extender tag *or something* in the late Modern English corpus described in Section 3.2 above. Besides a brief introduction (cf. Section 4.1), I then proceed to examine the formal characteristics of the tag *or something* (cf. Section 4.2), its textual features (cf. Section 4.3) and its functions (cf. Section 4.4), in accordance with the information provided in Chapter 2 above.

4.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

This section is devoted to the description that the OED provides for the extender tag *or something* (cf. Section 4.1.1) and to a general overview of the data obtained from the search of this extender in the corpus (cf. Section 4.1.2).

4.1.1 THE OED ACCOUNT OF *OR SOMETHING*

The OED recognizes the form *or something* as what we understand is an extender tag and defines it as "used to express an indistinct or unknown alternative" (OED, s.v. *something*, n. (and adj.) and adv. A 1f). There are no examples in the OED of any long extender variants (cf. Section 2.2.3), showing any type of extension, just examples of simple bare *or something*. The earliest attestation dates from 1814 and is found in Jane Austen's novel *Mansfield Park*, reproduced here as (4.1):

(4.1) *There are generally delays, a bad passage* ***or something****.* (OED, s.v. *something,* n. (and adj.) and adv. A 1f)

Unfortunately, we do not have any evidence of the existence of the extender tag *or something* previous to the late Modern English period, as neither Carroll (2007; 2008) nor Ortega Barrera (2012) include any examples

of this tag in their analyses, and neither do they list this form as one of the extenders they have come across. Nevertheless, there are plenty of examples in my corpus predating (4.1) above. Examples (4.2) to (4.6) below, featuring bare *or something* realizing the function of an extender tag, all date from the 18th century.

(4.2) *[Y]et it looked so ill, so like an Excuse, or a Sham of Cowardise, or Dissaffection to the Cause and to my Master's Interest,* ***or something*** *I know not what, that I could not bear to think of it, nor never had the heart to see the King's face after it.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1720. *Memoirs of a Cavalier*: 310)

(4.3) *I am half distracted, captain Sandy, said Mrs. Wadman, holding up her cambrick handkerchief to her left eye, as she approach'd the door of my uncle Toby's sentry-box – a mote – or sand –* ***or something*** *– I know not what, has got into this eye of mine – do look into it – it is not in the white* – (Sterne, Lawrence. 1760. *Tristram Shandy*: 110 (Vol. 8))

(4.4) *"I am very sorry," said Cecilia, "that I have so much mistaken your hour of breakfast; but let me not be any restraint upon you, I shall find a book, or a newspaper,* ***or something*** *to fill up the time till Mrs. Delvile honours me with a summons."* (Burney, Fanny. 1782. *Cecilia*: 262 (Vol. 1))

(4.5) *And he took this fair hand, and respectfully imprinted a kiss upon it; the lady being so astonished, or alarmed,* ***or something****, that she had not the presence of mind to withdraw it angrily, as undoubtedly most of my fair readers will think she ought.* (Bage, Robert. 1796. *Hermsprong*: 172 (Vol. 1))

(4.6) *"Nay, my lord, prudence, if I had it, or self,* ***or something*** *I don't know what, whispers me I should be quite in the wrong to be its advocate."* (Bage, Robert. 1796. *Hermsprong*: 82 (Vol. 3))

The OED also provides an instance of the form *or something or other* that is defined as the pronoun *something* senses A 1a: "some unspecified or indeterminate thing" and A 1b: "used as a substitute for a name or part of one, or other particular which is not remembered or is immaterial, etc." (OED, s.v. *something,* n. (and adj.) and adv. A 6a), rather than as an extender tag.

Nevertheless, the example reproduced here as (4.7), shows a clear extender tag use of *or something or other*:

(4.7) *A sort of a Queen or Wife,* ***or something or other*** *to somebody*. (OED, s.v. *something,* n. (and adj.) and adv. A 6a)

This particular example, dated from 1752, predates all the aforementioned tokens from the ECF except (4.2). Nonetheless, the corpus provides another token of *or something or other* given below as (4.8), that predates (4.7).[81]

(4.8) *[K]nowing well enough that such things as these do now always continue, that Men that keep Mistresses often change them, grow wary of them,* ***or something or other****.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1722. *Moll Flanders*: 120)

As we have seen, then, the corpus provides examples of earlier attestations to those given in the entry for *or something* in the OED.[82] It remains to be seen whether a thorough analysis of data prior to that included in the ECF would provide even earlier instances of this extender.

4.1.2 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF *OR SOMETHING* IN THE CORPUS

The corpus yielded a total of 462 tokens of the sequence *or something*, 460 of the form *or something* and two of the spelling variant *or somethin'*. I also searched for alternative spellings (such as *or somethyng, or somethyn', or some thing* and *or some thyng*), but obtained no results. Out of these 462 tokens, 50 were found in the ECF and the remaining 412 in the NCF database. A total of 35 tokens have been excluded from the analysis of the form *or something*, 7 from the ECF and 28 from the NCF. Three of these were repetitions. A couple of novels appear in two different editions in the corpus, so that some tokens are duplicated. Given that both the token and the context are identical in both editions, only one of each of them has been included in

[81] The variant *or something or other* is discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.1.1 below.

[82] It must be noted that only bare forms of *or something* have been considered in this section, because the OED only provides short variants as well. Earlier extended forms of *or something* have been attested in the ECF.

the analysis. The basis for excluding these resulting 32 tokens is that they have not been considered instances of extender tags. In what follows, I examine these instances arranged as belonging to different patterns.

A number of these exclusions follow the pattern *something … or something …,* where *something* is postmodified in all its occurrences and is the head of the phrase. Let us consider (4.9) and (4.10) by way of illustration:

(4.9) *Elfridge never went out on horseback but she brought home something – **something found, or something bought**.* (Hardy, Thomas. 1873. *A Pair of Blue Eyes*: 242-243 (Vol. 1))

(4.10) *… and when Mr. Rawlings made his appearance, it was the signal for an universal rush. Everybody had **something to ask**, **or something to communicate** to him; the majority of the people present being as deeply involved in the business as he was himself.* (Bell, Robert. 1850. *The Ladder of Gold*: 32 (Vol. 3))

As we can see, there is no sense of extension in (4.9) above, i.e. there are no other options that can be added to *something found* and *something bought*. In other words, these two options already exhaust the array of possibilities. Rather, they appear to be a kind of explanation of the kind of things that Elfridge brought home. Similarly, in (4.10), there is no extension reading either; *something to ask* and *something to communicate* are the only options in this disjunction: people would either ask Mr. Rowlings something or tell him something. Therefore, rather than showing as extender tags, what (4.9) and (4.10) display is a disjunction between two indeterminate things, i.e. *something or something*. Furthermore, we cannot remove the post-modification from *or something* (i.e. *to communicate*) without changing the sense of the clause.

Another frequent pattern is *either/whether…* + *or something…* Such tokens have been excluded because *either* and *whether* already indicate that we are dealing with a two-option disjunction; thus, *or something* cannot suggest any additional one. (4.11) illustrates this pattern:

(4.11) *"Something comes and goes here: there is a shape frequenting this house by night, different to any forms that show themselves by day. I have indisputably seen a something, more than once; and to me its*

conventual weeds were a strange sight, saying more than they can do to any other living being. A nun!"

"Monsieur, I, too, have seen it."

"I anticipated that. ***Whether*** *this nun be flesh and blood,* ***or something that remains when blood is dried and flesh wasted****, her business is as much with you as with me, probably."*

(Brontë, Charlotte. 1853. *Villete:* 91 (Vol. 3))

As we can see here, *or something* does not suggest any further options; the options are just two, namely a living nun or a ghost one. In this case, as is also attested in (4.9) above, the pronoun *something* appears more than once in the previous context, probably conditioning its presence later on under the form *or something*.

In the data we also find the construction *somebody/someone or something*. This seems to be a kind of fixed expression and, therefore, I have not considered examples of this type as belonging to the group of extender tags. This pattern is illustrated by (4.12) below.

(4.12) *He stopped, as he had stopped several times before, to calculate rather than to observe. The mist was so thick that he could not see his own extended hand. It was not the first time that it had occurred to him that* ***some one or something*** *was hovering about his course.*

"Who is there?" exclaimed Egremont. But no one answered.

(Disraeli, Benjamin (Earl of Beaconsfield). 1845. *Sybil*: 143 (Vol. 2))

As was already the case with the previously attested patterns, there is no possibility for *or something* here to suggest any additional item to the ones already present. Thus, it cannot be considered a case of extender tag either.

Finally, there is a miscellaneous group of tokens that do not fit into any of the aforementioned patterns. In a couple of tokens the clause introduced by *or something* paraphrases the preceding clause. It does not add any additional items or premises, but just gives an explanation of the previous information. This is the case of (4.13) below, where *or something to be learned in a stage coach* is a way of widening the understanding of its scope, namely *education*.

(4.13) *PREPARATIONS FOR PARTING: A JOURNEY: MORE OF EDUCATION,* ***OR SOMETHING TO BE LEARNED IN A STAGE COACH****.* (Holcroft, Thomas. 1794. *The Adventures of Hugh Trevor*: 166 (Vol. 1))

The corpus also yields a couple of examples where *or something* is the subject of a clause, not attached to the conjunction *or* and, therefore, not an extender tag. Furthermore, the conjunction *or* can be substituted by *or else* in such cases, as shown in (4.14):

(4.14) *"You have eaten nothing, dear, since we left," she said, with a heartbreaking smile. "I am not crazy, Arthur. O no, no, my dear boy! I will not go crazy; but you must eat something, and not be killed too. Susan is not here," said Mrs Vincent, with a ghastly, wistful look round the room; "but we are not going to distrust her at the very first moment, far less her Maker, Arthur. Oh, my dear, I must not speak,* ***or something*** *will happen to me; and nothing must happen to you or me till we have found your sister."* (Oliphant, Margaret. 1863. *Salem Chapel*: 313-314 (Vol. 1))

The examples presented in this section clearly show that *or something* is not being used here as an extender tag. There is no sense of extension or of doubt in any of these tokens, as would be the case with the extender tag *or something*. As an extender, no matter how grammaticalized it is, *or something* will always imply that there are other options that are not being mentioned from which to choose. Such connotation is inherent to the tag, even in those cases where not even the speaker can recall any additional item.

The 427 resulting instances of the extender tag *or something* are distributed through the late Modern English period as illustrated in Figure 4.1 below. As we have already seen in Section 3.1.2, given that the number of words for each subperiod is different, the figure considers the normalized frequencies of occurrence per million words. Both the raw figures and the corresponding normalized frequencies for each 20-year subperiod are given in Table 4.1 below, where we can observe an increase in the occurrence of the form *or something* from the second half of the 19th century onwards.



Figure 4.1 Evolution of *or something* in late Modern English (normalized frequencies)

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Or something	**7.5** (4)	**6.8** (12)	**2.6** (15)	**5.2** (12)	**4.9** (18)	**7.1** (37)	**7.2** (37)	**11.6** (113)	**10.6** (115)	**12.8** (64)	427

Table 4.1 Evolution of *or something* in the ECF and NCF (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)

4.2 FORMAL FEATURES OF *OR SOMETHING*

This section is devoted to the analysis of the formal features of the extender tag *or something* in late Modern English, paying attention to its form (cf. Section 4.2.1), the range of specificity that it can covey (cf. Section 4.2.2), the position that the tag occupies in the clause where it appears (cf. Section 4.2.3), the different elements that it can have as scope (cf. Section 4.2.4) and whether the tag co-occurs with some type of pragmatic marker (cf. Section 4.2.5).

4.2.1 FORM OF THE TAG

As seen in Section 2.2.3, extender tags have been traditionally divided into short or bare forms and long or extended ones. However, besides this division,

little attention has been paid to the examination of the formal manifestations of extender tags. This section focuses on the discussion of the forms which the extender tag *or something* presents in late Modern English, considering the dichotomy bare vs. extended forms (cf. Section 4.2.1.1), as well as the different types of extensions that are attested (cf. Section 4.2.1.2). Section 4.2.1.3, in turn, is concerned with the status of the form *or something or other*, which represents a special variant within the paradigm.

4.2.1.1 BARE AND EXTENDED FORMS OF *OR SOMETHING*

As explained above, extender tags are subdivided into those forms that appear without any type of extension, or bare forms, as is illustrated in (4.15) below, and those where some additional material accompanies the base form of the tag, as is the case of (4.16), which features the variant *or something of that sort*. Furthermore, instances are found where not only one, but two extensions are combined to create the extended form of the tag as exemplified in (4.17).

(4.15) *"You've a grand education, and you'll surely get a place as a teacher* ***or something****; I'm sure you would make a grand teacher."* (Brown, George Douglas. 1901. *The House with the Green Shutters*: 311)

(4.16) *"Here's old Bounderby always boasting that at my age he lived upon two-pence a month,* ***or something of that sort****."* (Dickens, Charles. 1854. *Hard Times*: 208)

(4.17) *Well, well, we must bide our time. Life isn't all beer and skittles, – but beer and skittles,* ***or something better of the same sort****, must form a good part of every Englishman's education.* (Hughes, Thomas. 1857. *Tom Brown's School Days*: 46)

As shown in Figure 4.2, although the presence of double extension is minimal in my data (only 16 instances in all, which represent 3.7% of the cases), almost three quarters of the total of occurrences of this tag have some type of extension (70% in all). The bare form is much less frequent in comparison to the extended forms.



Figure 4.2 Distribution of bare and extended forms of *or something* (percentages)

However, as we can see from Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3, while extended occurrences of the tag remain relatively stable all through the period, an important rise in the use of the bare variant is observed from the second half of the 19th century onwards. Such an increase can be predicted to have been maintained in the following period, judging from what has been reported in the specialized literature as the most widespread tendency nowadays, with bare forms outnumbering their long counterparts.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Bare	-	**1.1** (2)	-	**0.4** (1)	**0.8** (3)	**0.8** (4)	**1.2** (6)	**2.8** (27)	**3.9** (42)	**5.4** (27)	112
Extended	**7.5** (4)	**5.7** (10)	**2.6** (15)	**4.8** (11)	**4.1** (15)	**6.3** (33)	**6** (31)	**8.8** (86)	**6.7** (73)	**7.4** (37)	315

Table 4.2 Evolution of bare vs. extended forms of *or something* (normalized figures and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.3 Evolution of bare vs. extended forms of *or something* (normalized frequencies)

4.2.1.2 TYPES OF EXTENSION OF *OR SOMETHING*

In this section I introduce and illustrate the different types of extension of the extender tag *or something* in my data, both simple and double extensions, paying attention also to their evolution throughout the period analysed. As we can see from Figure 4.2 above, the proportion of double extensions in my late Modern English corpus is very low (3.7%). Furthermore, we can see from Table 4.3 and Figure 4.4 below that such cases are very rare in all the subperiods, with no significant increase or decrease in their use across time. The very low figures obtained for the individual subperiods make it impossible to trace any diachronic changes in the evolution of the different combinations.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Simple Ext	**5.6** (3)	**5.1** (9)	**2.3** (13)	**3.9** (9)	**4.1** (15)	**6.1** (32)	**5.8** (30)	**8.5** (83)	**6.3** (69)	**7.2** (36)	299
Double Ext	**1.9** (1)	**0.6** (1)	**0.3** (2)	**0.9** (2)	-	**0.2** (1)	**0.2** (1)	**0.3** (3)	**0.4** (4)	**0.2** (1)	16

Table 4.3 Simple vs. double extension of *or something* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.4 Evolution of simple and double extension of *or something* (normalized frequencies)

In what follows, I examine the single extension types that *or something* presents in my corpus. Although the specificity of the tag is discussed in further detail in Section 4.2.2 below, I have arranged the different types of extension of *or something* from the more general to the more specific, following Overstreet's (1999) distinction between "'general extenders' (e.g. *and all that stuff*) and what might be called 'specific extenders' (e.g. *and all that stupid bureaucratic stuff*), in which there is more specific lexical material used within the phrase" (1999: 12). I have found nine different types of extensions for the tag *or something* which function, in syntactic terms, as post-modifiers of the pronoun *something*.[83]

The first three types of simple extension fall within the category of similatives, which is subdivided into (i) those similatives that are introduced by a preposition and (ii) non-prepositional similatives. I separate those that are introduced by the preposition *like* in the former group, which constitutes a very common pattern, to which I refer as '*like* similatives', illustrated in (4.18) below, and those that are introduced by any other preposition, as illustrated in (4.19) with the form *or something of that sort*, to which I refer

[83] The patterns of extension of *or something* have been discussed in Pérez-González (2017) in connection with *or something or other* (see Section 4.2.1.3 below).

as 'prepositional similatives'. On the other hand, non-prepositional similatives are referred to as 'other similatives'; the extender tag *or something that way* in (4.20) is an example of this type of similative.

(4.18) *She now finding all was over, and seized with a sudden fit of frenzy,* ***or something like it****, ran to his sword, which he had pulled off, and laid it in the window, and was about to plunge it in her breast.* (Fowler, Eliza Haywood. 1751. *Betsy Thoughtless:* 250)

(4.19) *"Day after day I used to be counting for when he would come to tell me he'd got a place at court,* ***or something of that sort****, for I never could tell what it would be."* (Burney, Fanny. 1782. *Cecilia:* 257 (Vol. 2))

(4.20) *[A]nd they say, it's all on account of something that Miss Clemmey Ormsby told, that Lady Geraldine said about my Lord O'Toole's being no better than a cat's paw,* ***or something that way****, which made his lordship quite mad.* (Edgeworth, Maria. 1809. *Ennui:* 216)

The second type of extension, with still a low degree of specificity, corresponds to adverbial complementation. In every case in my data the form that accompanies *or something* as extension is the adverb *else*, as exemplified in (4.21).

(4.21) *"Humph! I thought so." He looked contemplatively at his horse's mane, as if he had some serious cause of dissatisfaction with it,* ***or something else****.* (Brontë, Anne. 1848. *The Tenant of Wildfell Hall:* 104 (Vol. 1))

A third type of extension entails a comparative form following the extender tag *or something*, as is the case of *more* in (4.22) below.

(4.22) *She lov'd him tenderly, as a Benefactor, a Father,* ***or something more****; that she had been us'd to love without that severe mixture of Fear that mingles in the love we bear to Parents.* (Manley, Mary de la Rivière. 1709. *The New Atalantis:* 60))

The next type of extension following the specificity cline, and thus including more detailed information than the previous types, is represented by an adjective phrase post-modifying the tag. This is illustrated by the adjective *good* in *or something good* in (4.23).

(4.23) *"Moore eats like three men: they are always making sago or tapioca,* ***or something good*** *for him: I never go into the kitchen but there is a*

saucepan on the fire, cooking him some dainty." (Brontë, Charlotte. 1849. *Shirley:* 213 (Vol. 3))

We can also find in the data a further type of prepositional extension, which is not a similative one, but a prepositional phrase that post-modifies the extender tag *or something*, as is the case of *between both* in (4.24) below.

(4.24) *"Your authority, Mr. Jacob, is the best in the world, certainly. Nevertheless, there are many who on such an occasion might suspect you of partiality."*

"Then they would do me great injustice, Miss Torrington. I am a man, or a boy, ***or something between both****: take me for all in all, it is five hundred to one you ne'er shall look upon my like again."*

(Trollope, Frances Milton. 1837. *The Vicar of Wrexhill:* 301 (Vol.1))

Relative clauses can also work as extensions of the extender tag *or something*, functioning, as was the case with the previous types, as post-modifiers of the pronoun *something*. The extender tag *or something that affected his spirits* in (4.25) illustrates this pattern.

(4.25) *Such a contrast between him and your brother! – pray send me some news of the latter – I am quite unhappy about him, he seemed so uncomfortable when he went away, with a cold,* ***or something that affected his spirits****.* (Austen, Jane. 1818. *Northanger Abbey:* 235 (Vol. 2))

Finally, I have also encountered some tokens of a less prototypical type of extension where the extender tag itself is a whole clause with *something* as subject and the extension as its predicate. Consider (4.26) below as an illustration.

(4.26) *[F]or tho' my Father seem'd to threaten I shou'd not see this Wonder of his, I yet hoped his Mind wou'd change, or the old Gentleman wou'd ask for me,* ***or something wou'd happen to bring us together****: which fell out better than I expected.* (Davis, Mary. 1725. *The Rash Resolve:* 136)

This type of extension is different from the ones presented previously, because the extension here, instead of being a post-modifier of the pronoun *something*, forms a clause with it as its subject. If we take a closer look at the scope of the tag, what we find are clauses: *his Mind wou'd change* and *the old Gentleman wou'd ask for me*. It is to be expected, then, that the tag should be

constructed by means of the same syntactic structure. If we make the transformation to explicitly state the whole clauses in the scope of the tag and within the tag itself, the result would be the following: "I yet hoped his Mind wou'd change", "I yet hoped the old Gentleman wou'd ask for me" and "I yet hoped something wou'd happen to bring us together". Despite the difference in syntactic structure displayed by those examples belonging to this pattern in comparison with the previous ones, the predicate in this type of extension adds specificity to the tag (in the same way as the relative clause *that affected his spirits* in (4.25) above); it restricts the array of possible options implied by the extender, similarly to extensions from other patterns. Furthermore, this type of extension is very rare in my data (6 instances out of a total of 299 cases of simple extension) and its occurrence (as we will see in Table 4.4) is very occasional all over the period and almost non-existent towards the second half of the time span examined. It may well be the case that such instances represent remnants of bridging contexts resulting from the grammaticalization process followed by *or something*.

As mentioned previously, the different types of simple extension discussed in the preceding paradigms go from less to more specific. Thus, forms like those of the similative type and adverbial extensions do not add much information to the tag; they only mean "some or other thing similar to that or those already offered". By contrast, the rest of the types add further information that limits the type of elements that can be added to those provided in the scope of the tag. Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of simple extensions in the period under analysis, while Table 4.4 provides their distribution over the different subperiods. As we can see, similatives (in the different shades of red) comprise the great majority of cases of simple extension (67.6%), while all the other forms amount to one third of the total (32.4%). Similative forms have grown in frequency over the time span examined here. As shown in Table 4.4, no instances are attested in the material from the beginning of the 18th century, but they gradually become more frequent in the latter part of the century and, specially, in the course of the 19th century.



Figure 4.5 Distribution of simple extension types of *or something* (percentages)

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Like Sim	-	-	**0,7** (4)	**0,4** (1)	**0,3** (1)	**1,5** (8)	**0,8** (4)	**0,6** (6)	**1,6** (17)	**1,4** (7)	48
Prep. Sim	-	-	-	**1,3** (3)	**1,4** (5)	**1,9** (10)	**3,3** (17)	**4,8** (47)	**3,2** (35)	**3,6** (18)	135
Other Sim	-	-	-	-	-	**1,1** (6)	**0,4** (2)	**0,6** (6)	**0,4** (4)	-	18
Adverbial	-	**0,6** (1)	-	-	-	-	-	**0,6** (6)	**0,3** (3)	-	10
Comparative	**3,8** (2)	**3,4** (6)	**0,5** (3)	**1,3** (3)	**1,6** (6)	**0,4** (2)	**0,8** (4)	**0,7** (7)	**0,3** (3)	**0,6** (3)	39
Adjectival	-	-	**0,2** (1)	-	**0,3** (1)	**0,2** (1)	-	**0,4** (4)	**0,5** (6)	**0,8** (4)	17
Prep. Comp	-	-	**0,2** (1)	**0,4** (1)	-	-	**0,2** (1)	**0,3** (3)	**0**	**0,4** (2)	8
Relative Cl	**1,9** (1)	-	**0,7** (4)	-	**0,5** (2)	**0,6** (3)	**0,4** (2)	**0,3** (3)	**0,1** (1)	**0,4** (2)	18
Verbal Comp	-	**1,1** (2)	-	**0,4** (1)	-	**0,4** (2)	-	**0,1** (1)	-	-	6

Table 4.4. Simple extension types of *or something* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)

Table 4.4 shows that *like* similatives are the earliest type of similative extension to appear, followed by prepositional similatives. Both patterns

experiment an important growth throughout the period, in particular prepositional similatives, which represent the most common type of extension, covering almost half of the occurrences (45.2% of the total). Other similative forms appear later, at the beginning of the 19th century, but their frequency remains very low (6%). Scarce is also the presence of adverbial extension (3.3%), as is that of adjectival (5.7%) and prepositional complementation (2.7%), all these types being of a very low-frequency of occurrence throughout the period. The development of comparatives is particularly noticeable: while they represent the most common form of simple extension at the beginning of the period, they gradually lose ground and come to show a very low-frequency in the last subperiods. Despite their low frequencies, relative clauses (6%) and verbal complementation (2%) go through a similar development, becoming less frequent throughout the late Modern English period. All in all, the evidence provided in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.5 above suggests that *or something* has evolved from more specific types of extension towards a loss in specificity during the 18th and 19th centuries. This is discussed in more detail (taking also into account bare forms and double extensions) in Section 4.2.2 below.

The 16 cases of double extension attested in the corpus are examined below depending on the specificity of each of the extensions. This leaves us with three different patterns: (i) general extension + specific extension, (ii) specific extension + general extension and (iii) the combination of two specific extensions. These three patterns are discussed and exemplified in that order below.

The first pattern of double extension corresponds then to the combination of an extension with general meaning and a specific one. The adverb *else* is the only general extension that I have found in my data preceding a specific one. This pattern is illustrated in (4.27) by *or something else geographical*, where the tag is extended both by the adverb *else* and the adjective *geographical*.

(4.27) *"That is a beautiful mysticism – It is a – "*

"Please do not call it by any name," said Dorothea, putting out her hands entreatingly. "You will say Persian, ***or something else geographical****. It is my life. I have found it and cannot part with it."* (Elliot, George. 1872. *Middlemarch:* 290)

In the second type of double extension, what we find is a specific extension combined with a general one, which, in my corpus, is always one of the similative type explained above. This is illustrated by example (4.28), where the first extension is the comparative form *better* and the second one the prepositional similative *of the same sort*.

(4.28) = (4.17) *Well, well, we must bide our time. Life isn't all beer and skittles, – but beer and skittles,* ***or something better of the same sort****, must form a good part of every Englishman's education.* (Hughes, Thomas. 1857. *Tom Brown's School Days:* 46)

The last attested combination of extensions found in the corpus is the one formed by two specific extenders. This pattern is illustrated in (4.29) below, where the tag *or something* is extended by way of post-modification by the adjective phrase *animate or inanimate* and the relative clause *that he thought would be the better for the air*.

(4.29) *If a gleam of sun shone out of the dark sky, down Mark tumbled into the cabin, and presently up he came again with a woman in his arms, or half-a-dozen children, or a man, or a bed, or a saucepan, or a basket,* ***or something animate or inanimate, that he thought would be the better for the air****.* (Dickens, Charles. 1844. *The Life and Adventures of Martin Chuzzlewit:* 190)

4.2.1.3 THE FORM *OR SOMETHING OR OTHER*

Among the variants of *or something*, the corpus yielded 19 occurrences of the sequence *or something or other*, illustrated in (4.30) below.

(4.30) *All day she had expected Giles to call – to inquire how she had got home,* ***or something or other****; but he had not come.* (Hardy, Thomas. 1887. *The Woodlanders:* 111 (Vol. 3))

This variant amounts to just 4.5% of the total of tokens of the extender tag *or something* in late Modern English. As we can see from Table 4.5, the form is very rare all through the period under examination. It seems that its low-frequency of use continues in the present day; in fact, it is only mentioned by Overstreet (cf. Section 2.2.1), and she claims to have only found one example of it (1999: 7).

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Or something or other	**1.9** (1)	**0.6** (1)	-	**0.4** (1)	**0.3** (1)	**0.4** (2)	**0.4** (2)	**0.8** (8)	**0.2** (2)	**0.2** (1)	19

Table 4.5 *Or something or other* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)

In this section we will see how the sequence *or something or other* holds a special status within the *or something* paradigm, as has been proved by Pérez-González (2017).[84] For this purpose, three hypotheses will be tested:

I. *or other* is an extension of *or something*, similar to those analysed in Section 4.2.1.2;

II. *or other* is an extender tag in its own right which, in combination with *or something,* forms a cluster of extender tags;

III. the whole sequence *or something or other* is a kind of fixed expression which functions as a variant of the form *or something*.

As regards the first hypothesis, in Section 4.2.1.2 we observed that the extensions of *or something* are syntactically attached to the pronoun

[84] The paradigm *or something or other* has been analysed in the following publication by Alba Pérez-González (Departamento de Filoloxía Inglesa e Alemá. Universidad de Santiago de Compostela): (2017) "Looking into extender tags in late Modern English: The case of *or something or other*." In Bemposta, Sofía et al. (eds.), *New trends and methodologies in applied English language research III: Synchronic and diachronic studies on discourse, lexis and grammar processing*, 19-37. Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang CH. ISBN: 978-3-0343-2709-1.

something, post-modifying it.[85] In the case of *or something or other,* on the other hand, both forms, *or something* and *or other*, are in a paratactic relation, joined by the conjunction *or*. In this sense, we can say that the syntax of the form rules out the first hypothesis mentioned above on the grounds that the extensions of *or something* depend on it (being its postmodifiers), while *or other* is at the same syntactic level than *or something* in the sequence *or something or other*.

The second hypothesis suggests that *or other* is an independent extender tag, which, in combination with *or something*, forms a cluster of extender tags, much like *and so on and so forth* in (4.31) below.

(4.31) *Here, one encounters notions such as the "register" (allowing us to determine whether an utterance is to be considered formal or relaxed, whether or not it connotes social prestige, and so on); the modal aspects of the utterance (having to do with speakers' and hearers' attitudes towards what is said); questions of rhetoric (e.g. 'how to get one's point across') and similar issues that have been almost totally neglected by linguistics (as they have been, until recently, by mainstream philosophy ever since the demise of the Sophists);* ***and so on and so forth****.* (Mey 1993: 31, quoted from Overstreet 1999: 129)

In (4.31), both extenders forming the cluster can also function on their own (as illustrated by *and so on* previously in the same example). They are, therefore, two separate extender tag forms that can occur together. One peculiarity that we must bear in mind regarding any cluster of extender tags is that both extenders must share the same scope, which in (4.31) is the aforementioned "notions": *the register, the modal aspects of the utterance, questions of rhetoric* and *similar issues that have been totally neglected by*

[85] The exception to this rule are those forms belonging to the pattern illustrated in example (4.26), which instead of post-modifying the pronoun, form a clause where the pronoun is the subject and the extension its predicate. As already explained above, despite the difference in syntactic structure, this type of extension behaves similarly to the post-modifier types, providing information about the kind of elements that can be added to those mentioned in the scope of the tag.

linguistics. These extenders are combined for reasons of iconicity.[86] Therefore, besides the basic implication inherent to extender tags that other options could be added to those actually provided, the combination of more than one extender indicates that those items that could be added are, moreover, very numerous.

The OED, in the entry for *other* (pron. & noun), provides a couple of examples of *or other* where this form can be said to belong to the category of extender tags. One of them, dating from 1484, is reproduced here as (4.32).

(4.32) *All be he of his parente, his affyn[y]te* ***or other***. (OED, s.v. *other* pron. & n. b 7)

Unfortunately, the examples that the OED provides date from an earlier period than the one that concerns us here, and I have been unable to find examples of bare *or other* in my corpus functioning as an extender tag. The only instances that I could find in my data where *or other* does function as an extender tag is as part of some kind of fixed expressions where this form follows an indefinite pronoun or noun phrase, and functions as an accuracy hedge[87] on the nominal element that precedes it. These fixed expressions can appear under three different patterns:

a) *some/one* + *or other* + *of* […], as in (4.33):

(4.33) *So that in a Word, I could not peep abroad hardly, but I was in Danger to be seen and known too, by* ***some or other of them***. (Defoe, Daniel. 1723. *Colonel Jack:* 343)

b) *no/one/some* + noun + *or other*, instantiated in (4.34) and (4.35):

(4.34) *But I will not believe it. No, his intrigue with the landlady must involve* ***some mystery or other***, *which a distracting interview will elucidate.* (Barret, Eaton Stannard. 1814. *The Heroine, or Adventures of Cherubina:* 15)

(4.35) *That the Laystalls be removed as far as may be out of the City, and common Passages, and that* ***no Nightman or other*** *be suffered to empty*

[86] The notion of iconicity in the use of clusters of extenders tags and other types of lengthening was addressed in Section 2.3.2.2.

[87] Cf. Section 2.3.3.1.2, where accuracy hedges were explained in relation to the Gricean maxim of quality.

a Vault into any Garden near about the City. (Defoe, Daniel. 1722. *A Journal of the Plague Year:* 54)

c) pronoun beginning with *some-* + *or other*, as we can observe in (4.36) to (4.40) below:

(4.36) *"No, no," said the other, "if we stay here a few minutes,* ***somebody or other*** *will pass by; and the horses are almost knocked up already."* (Burney, Frances. 1778. *Evelina:* 21)

(4.37) *"I can't exactly answer for the punctuality of my kettle –* ***somehow or other*** *it's always out of order; but I've a sort of superstitious suspicion that we're late."* (Bell, Robert. 1850. *The Ladder of Gold:* 95)

(4.38) *Almost everybody (every woman, indeed, without exception) has seen,* ***sometime or other****, strange and wonderful things which cannot be explained.* (Besant, Sir Walter. 1884. *Dorothy Forster:* 1)

(4.39) […] *after all, this was a life of trial and tribulation, and I had read* ***somewhere or other*** *that there was much merit in patiente, so I determined to hold fast in my resolution of accepting the offer of the American.* (Borrow, George Harry. 1851. *Lavengro:* 204)

(4.40) *When Fred got into debt, it always seemed to him highly probable that* ***something or other*** *– he did not necessarily conceive what – would come to pass enabling him to pay in due time.* (Eliot, George. 1874. *Middlemarch:* 96)

As I have already explained in the literature review part (cf. Section 2.3.3.1.2), when a disjunctive extender tag is used as a hedge on the Gricean maxim of quality, it has the function of signalling that the speaker is not sure about the accuracy of what (s)he is saying. If we consider (4.40) as an illustration, what *or other* is pointing out here is that the speaker is not sure about the '*something* that would come to pass', which is even made explicit in the subsequent clause: *he did not necessarily conceive what*. In this case, as happens with all examples in (4.33) to (4.40), the extender does not suggest that there are other possible alternatives to its scope (which is the pronoun *something* in the case we are analysing), but rather it is functioning in all cases as a quality hedge, with no trace of a categorizing function. On the other hand, in (4.32) above, *or other* does indeed suggest that there are other

options apart from those provided (*parente* and *affynyte*). In Pérez-González (2017), I suggest that "[i]t may well be the case that, at some point, a shift took pace whereby the extender *or other* ceased to perform the function of suggesting that there are other items that can be added to a list […] to this hedging function, which, as we can see, is limited to a very specific context" (2017: 32). This may have been the product of grammaticalization, that gradually fossilized the use of this extender tag as a mere accuracy hedge, to appear only in the contexts that we have analysed as a), b) and c) above, becoming thus some kind of fixed expression.

However, although *or other* has been considered to be an extender tag in examples (4.33) to (4.40), this does not mean that *or something or other* are indeed two independent extender tags that cluster together, thus confirming the second hypothesis, as there is a crucial difference between the form *or something or other*, as illustrated by (4.41) below, and *and so on and so forth* in (4.31) above.

(4.41) *"I had no notion but he would go a shooting,* ***or something or other****, and not disturb us with his company.* (Austen, Jane. 1813. *Pride and Prejudice:* 292 (Vol. 3))

As I have already pointed out, a cluster of extender tags, as that formed by *and so on* and *and so forth* in (4.31), should share the same scope, which in that case are the "notions" presented before them. In such cases, we could erase any of the two extenders from the cluster and leave the other, and this would not alter the meaning of the sentence or its grammaticality. In the case of *or something or other* in (4.41), by contrast, the extender tags *or something* and *or other* do not share the same scope: whereas the scope of *or something* is *a shooting*, *or other* has the pronoun *something* as its scope, as shown above for (4.40). Therefore, we could make the transformation, "he would go a shooting, *or something*", but not "*he would go a shooting, *or other*", which would not be grammatically correct, because the extender *or other* has not been attested to occur outside the fixed expressions explained above within the period at hand and because its correct scope is the pronoun *something*, and not *a shooting.* Taking this into account, even though *or something* and

or other are two extenders tags, there is no evidence in late Modern English of the latter one functioning as an individual tag in its own right, which could, therefore, form a cluster in combination with *or something*. Rather, the construction *or something or other* is a single extender tag, where the head extender (*or something*) is being hedged by another extender tag (*or other*), the latter being consequently attached to the former and not independent from it.

This explanation leads us directly to the third hypothesis above, that states that *or something or other* is a fixed expression that can be considered a variant of the simple form *or something*. The data extracted from the ECF and NCF do indeed corroborate that we are dealing with a fixed expression, corresponding to pattern c) explained above and that this fixed expression has been used as a variant of the form *or something*. Additional evidence that both variants behave in a similar way at a formal level is provided below:

(a) The form *or something or other* can appear in its bare form, without any extension, as we have already seen in (4.30) and (4.41) above, as well as in (4.42) below:

(4.42) *His father was a captain of the Garde du Corps, and his grandfather a grand falconer,* ***or something or other****, with Louis XV.* (Lever, Charles. 1844. *Tom Burke of "Ours":* 199 (Vol. 1))

(b) On the other hand, the form can also take the same type of extensions as the variant *or something*, as is illustrated here through the comparison of (4.43) and (4.44):

(4.43) *"He shot himself, I think, or was knocked down,* ***or something of that sort****. I remember it perfectly."* (Burney, Fanny. 1782. *Cecilia:* 130 (Vol. 4))

(4.44) *"However, a broiled bone, or a smoked haddock, or an oyster, or a slice of bacon of our own curing, with a toast and a tankard –* ***or something or other of that sort****, to close the orifice of the stomach before going to bed, does not fell under my restriction, nor, I hope, under your lordship's."* (Scott, Sir Walter. 1815. *The Antiquary:* 195-196 (Vol. 2))

(c) Finally, *or something or other* can even take a double extension, although this pattern does only appear once in the corpus, given here as (4.45).

(4.45) […] *[H]is horse was either clapp'd, or spavin'd or greaz'd; - or he was twitter-bon'd, or broken-winded,* ***or something****, in short,* ***or other had befallen him which would let him carry no flesh****.* (Sterne, Lawrence. 1760. *Tristram Shandy:* 43 (Vol. 1))

The type of extension exhibited in (4.45) corresponds to the pattern illustrated above in example (4.29), where the extender tag was post-modified by the combination of two specific extensions. In (4.45), the two extensions, which are combined are, on the one hand, *had befallen him*, which belongs to the infrequent pattern exemplified in (4.26) above, and on the other hand, the relative clause *which would let him carry no flesh*. As regards the first extension, example (4.45) is slightly different from the one in (4.26) above. If we make the transformations to explicitly state the clauses in the scope of the tag and that within the tag, the result would be: "he was clapp'd", "he was spavin'd", "he was greaz'd", "he was twitter-bon'd", "he was broken-winded", "or something or other had befallen him". Here the clauses in the scope of the tag are in the passive voice, while the clause where the extender tag appears is in the active voice. This is so because the verb *befall* is intransitive, and the clause that would match the ones in the scope, "*he was befallen something or other" is clearly ungrammatical. Despite the described mismatch, the structure is similar to that presented in (4.26). Therefore (4.45) would also constitute one of those rare cases which were considered remnants of bridging contexts in the grammaticalization of the tag (cf. Section 4.2.1.2).

In view of the discussion presented in the preceding paragraphs, it has been confirmed that the form *or something or other* is a fixed expression that occurs in 4.5% of the occurrences in my data as a variant of the extender tag *or something*.

4.2.2 SPECIFICITY OF THE TAG

I have already mentioned specificity in the previous section when describing the form of the extender tag *or something* (cf. also Section 2.1). Overstreet (1999) made a distinction between what she called general extenders and specific extenders, the latter being those "further specified instances [where]

the interpretation of the category implicated by the general extender [is constrained] by naming the category […], or by identifying either characteristic properties of its members […] or their common function" (1999: 52). In other words, specific extender tags are those where some more lexical material accompanies the bare form of the tag and gives information about the type of tokens that could be added to the one(s) already present in the scope of the extender tag. Carroll further elaborated on this notion maintaining that the distinction proposed by Overstreet (1999) between 'general' and 'specific' extenders is not such a clear one, but should be rather seen as a cline (Carroll 2007: 43).

Obviously enough, all bare occurrences of the tag *or something* have general reference. As regards expanded forms, examples (4.46) to (4.48) prove Carroll's idea that specificity should be seen as a cline rather than a straight dichotomy. While *or something like it* in (4.46) can be considered to have general reference, almost as much as the bare form, different degrees of specificity apply in the two other examples, although both would be considered specific. The greater the amount of lexical material accompanying the tag and the more contentful this is, the greater specificity it will show.

(4.46) *I made no answer, for my heart was in my throat,* ***or something like it****, and I could not trust myself to speak*. (Brontë, Anne. 1847. *Agnes Grey:* 241)

(4.47) *"She asked some idle question about gruel, or foot-baths,* ***or something equally trivial****. She is always prowling and prying about".* (Sala, George Augustus. 1862. *The Seven Sons of Mammon:* 155-156 (Vol. 2))

(4.48) = (4.29) *If a gleam of sun shone of the dark sky, down Mark tumbled into the cabin, and presently up he came again with a woman in his arms, or half-a-dozen children, or a man, or a bed, or a saucepan, or a basket,* ***or something animate or inanimate, that he thought would be the better for the air****.* (Dickens, Charles. 1844. *The Life and Adventures of Martin Chuzzlewit:* 190)

Nevertheless, for our purposes and for the sake of simplicity, given that we are dealing with a low-frequency phenomenon (especially among the specific forms, as we can see from Figure 4.6 below), I have decided to

maintain Overstreet's dichotomy between general and specific extender tags in my quantitative analysis. As is evident from Figure 4.6, in my late Modern English data, the great majority of tokens of the extender tag *or something* have general reference (81% vs. 19%).



Figure 4.6 Distribution of types of specificity of *or something* (percentages)

If we take a closer look into the evolution of the forms, Table 4.6 and Figure 4.7 show that specific tokens of *or something*, as in (4.47) or (4.48) above, show a very low-frequency but remain stable from beginning to end of the late Modern English period, while those tokens of the extender with general reference become more frequent at the same pace as the extender tag itself increases its frequency (cf. Figure 4.1 above), and are clearly more common than their specific counterparts over most of the time span considered here. Subperiod 1740-59 is the only one when specific variants of *or something* are slightly more frequent than general forms of the extender (1.4 vs. 1.2).

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
General	**5.6** (3)	**4** (7)	**1.2** (7)	**3.5** (8)	**3.3** (12)	**5.2** (27)	**5.8** (30)	**10** (97)	**9.3** (101)	**10.8** (54)	346
Specific	**1.9** (1)	**2.8** (5)	**1.4** (8)	**1.7** (4)	**1.6** (6)	**1.9** (10)	**1.3** (7)	**1.6** (16)	**13** (14)	**2** (10)	81

Table 4.6 Evolution of general and specific reference of *or something* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.7 Evolution of general and specific reference of *or something* (normalized frequencies)

The late Modern English picture just described is in accordance with the present-day English state of affairs, where the tendency is for extender tags to most commonly occur in their short forms and be nonspecific, which explains why the most widespread label to refer to them is "general extenders" (Overstreet 1999: 3). Therefore, a movement towards lack of specificity (as shown by the behaviour of *or something* in my data) seems to be a fitting evolution for this extender.

4.2.3 Position of the tag in the clause

As I have already pointed out in Section 2.2.3, extender tags in present-day English have been typically depicted as occupying clause-final position. Some researchers have even labelled them, according to this feature, "utterance-

final tags" (Aijmer 1985). In the light of the almost unanimous agreement among scholars that extenders tend to be placed at the end of clauses, it is likely that this was the prototypical position for them also in the late Modern period. However, research about extenders in earlier stages of English and in different languages suggests that this claim has to be revisited. Carroll (2008: 12) explains that it is not necessarily at the end of a clause where extenders are positioned, but at the end of a phrase; this phrase can, in turn, be in clause-final position or clause-medially. Furthermore, Carroll (2007) even provides a couple of examples where the tag occupies medial position within a phrase, with the enumeration continuing after the extender tag (cf. Section 2.5).

In my late Modern English data, *or something* can occur in all of the three aforementioned positioning options. It can, although very rarely, occur in medial position within the phrase of which it is a part, as shown in (4.49), where the speaker says that he is *going mad or something*, and decides to offer a further option after the extender tag (i.e. *delirious*). On the other hand, on many occasions it appears in phrase-final position, but the clause does not end with this phrase, as (4.50) illustrates, where the clause continues after the extender tag *or something* by way of the adverbial *here* and the relative clause *who is dead*. Finally, there are also many examples in which the clause ends after the extender tag, as is the case of (4.51) below. In what follows, these three options are treated as extenders in medial, phrase-final and clause-final position, respectively.

(4.49) *"I must be going mad," cried he – "**or something** – delirious perhaps – but leave me, whoever you are – I can't bear that white face, and those eyes – for God's sake go, and send me somebody else, that doesn't look like that!"* (Brontë, Anne. 1848. *The Tenant of Wildfell Hall:* 197 (Vol. 3))

(4.50) *"There was a follower, or an officer, **or something**, here," said Mr. Jarndyce, "who is dead."* (Dickens, Charles. 1836. *Bleak House:* 147)

(4.51) *From the moment I pronounced this determination, indifference on his part was changed into rudeness, **or something worse**.* (Wollstonecraft, Mary. 1798. *The Wrongs of Woman:* 10 (Vol. 2))

In the period analysed, *or something* appears in medial position in only a couple of instances (0.5% of the total), which can be said to represent the exception that confirms the rule that extender tags are typically positioned at the end of the phrase where they belong, irrespective of whether this phrase occurs at the end of the clause or not. As we can see in Figure 4.8 below, in the majority of cases this phrase occurs clause-finally (66.7% of the cases). Note that extenders in clause-final position are obviously also phrase-final, but I make this distinction in order to differentiate those cases where the clause in which they appear ends with the extender tag from those where the clause continues after the extender tag.



Figure 4.8 Distribution of position of *or something* in the clause (percentages)

This split between extenders happening clause-finally and those which do not becomes interesting when analysing the progression of each of the two possible positions over the period at issue here, as reflected in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.9 below. Although at the beginning of the late Modern English period, the frequencies of phrase-final and clause-final appearances of the extender tag *or something* are very similar, we witness an important rise in clause-final occurrences of the tag towards the end of the period. The data suggest that it seems plausible to assume that *or something*, throughout the period under analysis, shows an evolution towards the canonical present-day English clause-final position.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Medial	-	**0.6** (1)	-	-	-	-	-	**0.1** (1)	-	-	2
Phrase-Final	**3.8** (2)	**3.4** (6)	**1** (6)	**2.2** (5)	**3** (11)	**3.2** (17)	**3.1** (16)	**3.1** (30)	**2.8** (31)	**3.2** (16)	140
Clause-Final	**3.8** (2)	**2.8** (5)	**1.6** (9)	**3** (7)	**1.9** (7)	**3.8** (20)	**4.1** (21)	**8.4** (82)	**7.7** (84)	**9.6** (48)	285

Table 4.7 Evolution of position of *or something* in the clause (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.9 Evolution of position of *or something* in the clause (normalized frequencies)

4.2.4 SCOPE OF THE TAG

It has already been pointed out in Section 2.2.3 that extender tags are not obligatorily bound by strict grammatical agreement requirements to their scopes. Although this fact has been widely acknowledged by most researchers working on the topic, it has not been quantitatively analysed to what extent this grammatical mismatch amounts. Palacios Martínez (2011: 2463) does, however, point out that it is within the most frequently occurring forms where this feature is most salient and growing over time. In what follows, I provide

a qualitative as well as a quantitative analysis of this feature for the form *or something* in late Modern English.

First of all, it is important to acknowledge what would constitute grammatical agreement for the extender tag *or something*. Given that the head of the tag is the pronoun *something*, which is composed of the adjective *some* and the noun *thing*, meaning "some indeterminate or unspecified thing", the tag would grammatically agree with a nominal scope that, according to the nature of the noun *thing*, is an inanimate object. This means that the presence of noun phrases referring to animate beings or of any other construction that is not a noun phrase would imply that both scope and extender tag are in a relation of grammatical mismatch. In Figure 4.10 below, we can see that the scope of *or something* in the ECF and the NCF is a noun phrase in 73% of the cases, while the remaining quarter comprises all other scope types that have been attested in the corpus. This means that nominal scopes widely outnumber any of the other options, all of which are illustrated and explained below. A priori, and without examining the nature of those noun phrases, in the light of the information just given, it seems that there is a strong tendency towards grammatical agreement between tag and scope, although other options are also possible.



Figure 4.10 Distribution of scope type for *or something* (percentages)

As already mentioned, the noun phrase is the most common scope for the extender tag *or something*, representing almost three quarters of the total number of occurrences. (4.52) is an illustration of this; it contains two noun phrases, *the grape* and *the ground*, as scope of *or something*.

(4.52) *"It's the grape, or the ground,* ***or something****," Mr. Thomson went on. "All I can say is, oure youngsters will have a bad look-out!"* (Meredith, George. 1859. *The Ordeal of Richard Feverel:* 9 (Vol. 2))

Verb phrases have also been attested as scope of the tag in 11% of the tokens analysed, as is the case of *believes me mad* and *thinks me false* in (4.53).

(4.53) *"Oh Frank!", he cried, "my Julia believes me mad, or thinks me false,* ***or something****, and she will marry another before I can get out to tell her all I have endured was for loving her."* (Reade, Charles. 1863. *Hard Cash:* 97 (Vol. 3))

Much more sporadic are cases where a prepositional phrase is the scope of *or something*. In the period analysed, instances of this kind represent only 1.2% of the total. One such example is (4.54) below, where the extender *or something of the kind* refers back to the prepositional phrases *from the war* and *from hunting*.

(4.54) *'And that is matching oak, under which Coeur de Lion or Edward the Third, I forget which, was met by Sir Guy de Palisere as he came from the war, or from hunting,* ***or something of the kind****.'* (Trollope, Anthony. 1864. *Can You Forgive Her?:* 170 (Vol. 1))

Adjective phrases, in turn, serve as scope of the tag in 3.5% of the cases. Example (4.55) clearly illustrates this pattern, with the adjective phrases *resigned to the will of Heaven* and *benumbed* as scope of the extender.

(4.55) *"I am calmer now; and feel resigned to the will of Heaven; or benumbed;* ***or something****."* (Reade, Charles. 1863. *Hard Cash:* 158 (Vol. 2))

In a very rare 0.5% of the total of occurrences, we find an adverbial phrase as scope of the extender tag. This pattern is exemplified in (4.56), where we observe the adverbs *well* and *fast* just before the tag.

(4.56) *'I never liked any lessons as well as those I did without being obliged, and always, when there is a thing I hate very much in itself, I can get up an interest in it, by resolving that I will do it well, or fast,* ***or something*** *– if I can stick my will to it, it is like a lever, and it is done.'* (Yonge, Charlotte Mary. 1856. *The Daisy Chain:* 279)

The cases described so far are all phrasal scope types. Nevertheless, there are also cases where the extender tag *or something* has clausal scope. I have identified in my corpus two different types of clausal scope for the extender tag *or something*: On the one hand, an embedded clause as scope of the tag, as is the case of (4.57) below, where the embedded clause *that it was very astonishing and very gratifying* is the scope of *or something to that effect*; and, on the other hand, cases where the tag refers back to the whole clause that precedes it. This pattern is illustrated in (4.58), in which the scope of *or something* are the clauses *he will seem to you to be a little out of drawing* and *you won't like his tone of colour*. The embedded clause scope type is considerably common in my data (among those that are not nominal scopes), corresponding to 7.5% of the total of occurrences, while the clause type is far less frequent, representing just 3.3% of the total attestations of *or something*.

(4.57) *We murmured that it was very astonishing and very gratifying;* ***or something to that effect****. I don't think we knew why it was either, but this was what our politeness expressed.* (Dickens, Charles. 1836. *Bleak House:* 73)

(4.58) *"Some day you will look at your friend, and he will seem to you to be a little out of drawing, or you won't like his tone of colour,* ***or something****."* (Wilde, Oscar. 1891. *The Picture of Dorian Gray:* 18)

The task of identifying the scope of each occurrence of *or something* is not an easy one, as it is sometimes rather subjective and mainly based on the researcher's intuitions. In the majority of cases, the options are clear, as is the case, for example, in (4.52) to (4.58) above. However, on other occasions ambiguity is present when analysing a given token and assigning a scope to the tag. Let us consider, by way of illustration, example (4.59) below:

(4.59) *[K]nowing well enough that such things as these do now always continue, that Men that keep Mistresses often change them, grow*

> *weary of them, or Jealous of them,* ***or something or other****.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1722. *Moll Flanders:* 120)

Here, *or something or other* can be said to have as scope the previous verb phrases *change them* and *grow weary of them, or Jealous of them*. However, an alternative reading is also possible: the scope of the tag are the adjective phrases *weary of them* and *Jealous of them*. In speech, intonation usually helps in disambiguation in such cases; by contrast, when dealing with written records, as here, just punctuation (which is not always reliable) and the context can help the analyst guide his or her intuitions. In cases like this, I resorted to these criteria as best I could. For instance, in an example such as (4.59) above, given that the adjective phrases are conjoined by the disjunctive conjunction *or* and are, at the same time, the most immediate items before the tag, I decided that the most likely reading is that they constitute the intended scope of the tag. Disregarding cases of ambiguity such as these, which amount to 1.9% of the total of occurrences, in the rest of examples, the assignment of scope to the tag has been more straightforward.

As can be gathered from the data presented in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.11 below, the dominance of nominal scopes all through the period analysed is irrefutable. Note that the line traced by the evolution of nominal scopes is almost identical to the one shown by the evolution of the tag in Figure 4.1, growing in frequency at the same pace as the extender tag *or something*. Both verb phrases and embedded clauses also become somewhat more frequent over time, especially in the second half of the period, as do also, though in a more modest way, whole clauses as scope. Prepositional phrases and adverbial phrases, in turn, are so scarce and scattered throughout the period under examination that it is not possible to trace their evolution. Last of all, adjective phrases, despite showing a very low-frequency as well, are the only type of scope that seems to have lost some of its strength over the period analysed, being more common at the beginning of the 18th century than later on.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
NP	**7.5** (4)	**4** (7)	**2.3** (13)	**3.9** (9)	**3.5** (13)	**4.8** (25)	**4.8** (25)	**9.1** (89)	**7.4** (81)	**9.2** (46)	312
VP	-	**0.6** (1)	-	-	**0.5** (2)	**0.9** (5)	**1.2** (6)	**1** (10)	**1.3** (14)	**1.8** (9)	47
PrepP	-	**0.6** (1)	**0.2** (1)	**0.4** (1)	-	-	-	-	**0.2** (2)	-	5
AdjP	-	**1.1** (2)	-	**0.4** (1)	**0.3** (1)	**0.2** (1)	-	**0.2** (2)	**0.6** (7)	**0.2** (1)	15
AdvP	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0.2** (1)	**0.1** (1)	-	-	2
Embedded Clause	-	**0.6** (1)	**0.2** (1)	-	**0.5** (2)	**0.8** (4)	**0.8** (4)	**0.8** (8)	**0.5** (6)	**1.2** (6)	32
Whole Clause	-	-	-	**0.4** (1)	-	**0.4** (2)	**0.2** (1)	**0.3** (3)	**0.5** (5)	**0.4** (2)	14

Table 4.8 Evolution of scope of *or something* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.11 Evolution of scope of *or something* (normalized frequencies)

Let us now consider the nature of all those noun phrases that work as scope of *or something* in my late Modern English data. As shown in Figure 4.12, out of the 312 instances of nominal scopes, the overwhelming majority (95.5%), are inanimate, while only 4.5% correspond to animate noun phrases

as scope of *or something*, out of which 2.9% are human and 1.6% are non-human.



Figure 4.12 Distribution of types of nominal scope of *or something* (percentages)

These types are exemplified below. (4.60) shows two inanimate noun phrases as scope of the tag, *a secret passage* and *an old chest*, while (4.61) and (4.62) have animate scopes, in the former referring back to a human referent, *Miss Osborne*, while in the latter an animal, *a lion*, is the scope of the tag.

(4.60) *"Isn't there a secret passage, or an old chest,* ***or something of that kind****, somewhere about the place, Alicia?" asked Robert.* (Braddon, Mary Elizabeth. 1862. *Lady Audley's Secret:* 135 (Vol. 1))

(4.61) *– "He will never marry unless he can marry somebody very great; Miss Osborne perhaps,* ***or something in that stile*** *–".* (Austen, Jane. 1804. *The Watsons:* 319)

(4.62) *"It is time some one undertook to rehumanize you," said I, parting his thick and long-uncut locks; "for I see you are being metamorphosed into a lion,* ***or something of that sort.*** *"* (Brontë, Charlotte. 1847. *Jane Eyre:* 278 (Vol. 3))

It must be noted that noun phrases that denote a profession (baker, teacher, etc.), political or social status (king, maid, etc.), kinship (cousin, nephew, etc.), origin (Indian, American, etc.), religion (Quaker, Muslim, etc.) and those referring to religious or mythical figures (devil, fairy, etc.) were not classified here as human, as they were interpreted as making reference not to the persons themselves, but to their status as any of the categories listed. As Erman (1995: 142) explains, in such cases the focus is not on the individuals; we rather "assign a metonymic reading to them" and refer to some aspect or feature they possess instead. Cases like the one in (4.63) below were thus considered as inanimate.

(4.63) *"Isn't Mr FitzHoward nephew to the Duchess of St. Bungay?"*
"Nephew, or cousin, ***or something****."*
(Trollope, Anthony. 1864. *The Small House at Allington:* 255 (Vol. 2))

The main reason behind the decision of considering the scope of the tag in examples such as (4.63) above as inanimate lies in the fact that in those cases the extender was not replaceable by *or somebody/or someone*, while this replacement was indeed possible in cases such as (4.61).[88] The fact that the pronoun *something* cannot be exchanged here by *somebody/someone* means that it is not making reference to the person. When dealing with human scopes, the extender tag which would meet strict grammatical agreement requirements would be *or somebody/or someone*. This also implies that there is a higher sense of strangeness when we encounter the extender tag *or something* in examples like (4.61) above, with a human scope, than in those that refer back to an animal, as is the case of (4.62), where no other extender could have been used instead of *or something*, even though such cases also show the animacy feature.[89]

[88] Note that in example (4.61), the previous reference to *Miss Osborne* is done by means of the personal indefinite *somebody* (*unless he can marry* ***somebody*** *very great*), while the extender tag selected later on is *or something* rather than *or somebody*.

[89] That the +human feature is more strange for *or something* than the +animate one has already been pointed out by Erman (1995: 142-143).

Table 4.9 and Figure 4.13 show the evolution of the animacy feature of the noun phrases that function as scope of *or something* in the late Modern English period. As we can see, inanimate noun phrases (which represent the large majority of cases, as already seen in Figure 4.12 above) vastly outnumber animate ones, which are, furthermore, almost non-existent until the second half of the period (except for one single example of a human scope in subperiod 1720-39). Although human animate scopes convey a higher sense of strangeness when used in combination with *or something* than non-human ones, the data show that the former are more frequent than the latter nonetheless. However, cases of noun phrases that show the feature +animate as scope of *or something* are very scarce in the period analysed, though they seem to be emerging timidly in the 19th century.

		1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Inanimate		**7.5** (4)	**3.4** (6)	**2.3** (13)	**3.9** (9)	**3.5** (13)	**4.4** (23)	**4.3** (22)	**8.6** (84)	**7.3** (79)	**9** (45)	298
Animate	*Human*	-	**0.6** (1)	-	-	-	**0.4** (2)	**0.2** (1)	**0.4** (4)	-	**0.2** (1)	9
	Non-Human	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0.4** (2)	**0.1** (1)	**0.2** (2)	-	5

Table 4.9 Evolution of animacy of nominal scope of *or something* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.13 Evolution of animacy of nominal scope of *or something* (normalized frequencies)

As already pointed out above, when we speak of strict grammatical agreement between the extender tag *or something* and its scope, this will need to be an inanimate noun phrase, while cases of non-agreement will be those where grammaticality is at stake, i.e. those where the noun phrase serving as scope of the tag is animate rather than inanimate. The rest of the scope types listed and analysed above cannot be categorized in terms of agreement, as they are not noun phrases, so that the dichotomy agreement vs. non-agreement is not therefore applicable to these cases.

As shown in Figure 4.14, in my late Modern English material the extender tag *or something* agrees with its scope in the majority of cases (69.5% of the total of occurrences), while cases of grammatical mismatch are very rare (only 3.3%). Noticeable are those cases that are not under the agreement umbrella, which amount to more than one quarter of the total (27.2%).



Figure 4.14 Distribution of agreement of *or something* with its scope in percentages

It is also evident from Table 4.10 and Figure 4.15 below that cases of agreement prevail over all of the other options, and that cases of non-agreement are very rare all through the period analysed. On the other hand,

those cases where the scope is not a noun phrase, and where therefore agreement is not applicable, show a growth in frequency over the 18th and 19th centuries, becoming quite frequent in the last few decades examined here.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Agreement	**7.5** (4)	**3.4** (6)	**2.3** (13)	**3.9** (9)	**3.5** (13)	**4.4** (23)	**4.3** (22)	**8.6** (84)	**7.3** (79)	**8.8** (44)	297
Non-Agreement	-	**0.6** (1)	-	-	-	**0.4** (2)	**0.6** (3)	**0.5** (5)	**0.2** (2)	**0.2** (1)	14
Not Applicable	-	**2.8** (5)	**0.3** (2)	**1.3** (3)	**1.4** (5)	**2.3** (12)	**2.3** (12)	**2.5** (24)	**3.1** (34)	**3.8** (19)	116

Table 4.10 Evolution of agreement between *or something* and its scope (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.15 Evolution of agreement between *or something* and its scope (normalized frequencies)

All things considered, although we cannot rate those scopes that are not noun phrases according to the parameter of agreement, it can safely be assumed that they do not meet strict grammatical agreement requirements for the simple reason that they are not noun phrases. Despite making the distinction between cases of non-agreement and cases where this notion is not

applicable,[90] if both are considered together, we witness a different tendency in the period analysed, from an almost complete dominance of agreement in the first part of the period, to a clear growth in frequency of cases where agreement is not obligatory when using the extender tag *or something*. Furthermore, we can see that it seems easier to use the tag in combination with non-nominal scopes than in those cases where the extender conflicts with grammaticality (animate noun phrases). Animate scopes are, therefore, much more scarce.

4.2.5 Co-occurrence with pragmatic markers

This section is concerned with the co-occurrence of the extender tag *or something* and pragmatic markers. The term 'pragmatic marker', as suggested by Brinton (1996), is better suited than 'discourse marker' to include a range of "seemingly empty expressions" that "function on a level above the syntax of the individual clause", because the term "*pragmatic* better captures the range of functions filled by these items" (Brinton 1996: 29-30), especially, to convey that "they have both textual and interpersonal functions" (1996: 40). Overstreet & Yule (1997b: 254-256) and Overstreet (1999: 74-76) explain that the frequent co-occurrence of the comment clause *you know* with extender tags supports the idea that they function in a way that signals intersubjectivity. Aijmer (2004) also agrees with this view and further explains that "[w]hen markers cluster is a sign that they have a similar function" (2004: 185). Therefore, such "collocations contribute to the interpersonal function of tags" (Aijmer 2004: 185), reinforcing their intersubjective weight. This agrees with Overstreet's proposal, as the pragmatic marker *you know* does indeed have this intersubjective function of seeking "interactional alignments by establishing shared opinion" (Overstreet 1999: 76). Cheshire (2007), in turn, takes this notion to another

[90] The majority of researchers working on the topic do not make this distinction and lump together all cases that are not in strict grammatical agreement.

level and proposes that if extender tags collocate with such expressions, it is because they need their support in order to disambiguate their meaning and function, and the further they are in the process of grammaticalization and "become more established as fixed expressions with a range of conventional pragmatic functions" (2007: 186), the less need they have to collocate with other pragmatic markers for reinforcement. Tagliamonte & Denis (2010: 356-357) replicate Cheshire's procedure, but find that, in their data, collocations of extenders and other pragmatic markers do not reveal the same trend, as their frequency seems to increase over time. Palacios Martínez (2011) also uses the collocation of extender tags and pragmatic markers to measure the degree of grammaticalization of the tags that he analyses.

In my corpus, *or something* collocates with some pragmatic marker on 48 occasions, representing just 11.2% of the total of tokens. These pragmatic markers can be classified into different categories depending on their meaning. The first one comprises elements that signal doubt on the part of the speaker, including expressions such as *I don't know, I suppose, I think, probably,* etc. This group is the most numerous one in my data, probably because doubt is also the main meaning of *or something*. This is exemplified by *I don't exactly know what* in (4.64) below.

(4.64) *"And that detestable – ahem – and Sir Thomas chose to take offence at him – or my profuse expenditure,* ***or something*** *– I don't exactly know what – and hurried me down to the country, at a moment's notice, where I'm to play the hermit, I suppose, for life."* (Brönte, Anne. 1847. *Agnes Grey:* 326)

Another type of pragmatic marker attested in the ECF and NCF material are expressions denoting approximation, as is the case of *about* in (4.65) below.

(4.65) *In about three years,* ***or something more****, my father had got advanced into the middle of his work.* (Sterne, Lawrence. 1760. *Tristram Shandy:* 71 (Vol. 5))

Next, we find cases where the extender collocates with an expression that is used to present examples or to summarize a list of them, as shown in

(4.66), which features the exemplifying marker[91] *such as* introducing the examples listed as scope of *or somethin' like that*.

(4.66) *"… and he didn't know the name o' the place where you lived in London, though he said he thought it was in one o' them Law Courts, such as Westminster Hall or Doctors Commons,* ***or somethin' like that****."* (Braddon, Mary Elizabeth. 1862. *Lady Audley's Secret:* 242-243 (Vol. 3))

Another widely acknowledged type of pragmatic maker used in combination with extender tags is that denoting intersubjectivity, as is the case of *you know* in (4.67) below.

(4.67) *"[S]he told him directly, she had not the least mind in the world to be off, for she could live with him upon a trifle, and how little so ever he might have, she should be very glad to have it all, you know,* ***or something of the kind****."* (Austen, Jane. 1811. *Sense and Sensibility:* 43 (Vol. 3))

Last of all, I have found a couple of examples that do not fit into any of the previous categories. On the one hand, the clause *I am not willing to say* in (4.68), that would denote the intention of the speaker to leave information unsaid. On the other, (4.69) is an illustration of just the opposite: the speaker giving assurance of what has been stated by means of the adverbial *no doubt.*

(4.68) *… whether the Want of Rivella's Conversation, which he had so long been us'd to contributed, or the Uneasiness of his Circumstances; for his Marriage had not answer'd the fancied End,* ***or something else****, which I am not willing to say, where very much may be said; tho' as Rivella's Friend, I have no Reason to spare Cleander's Lady, because she always speaks of her with Language most unfit for a Gentlewoman, and on all Occasions, has us'd her with the Spite and ill Nature of an enraged jealous Wife.* (Manley, Mary de la Rivière. 1714. *The Adventures of Rivella:* 108)

[91] Exemplifying markers are dealt with in further detail in Section 5.2.5 in connection with the extender tag *and the like*.

(4.69) *"She's an excitable, nervous person: she construed her dream into an apparition,* ***or something of that sort****,* *no doubt,; and has taken a fit with fright."* (Brontë, Charlotte. 1847. *Jane Eyre:* 113 (Vol. 2))

The majority of the pragmatic markers that collocate with the extender tag *or something* in my data, as we can see from Figure 4.16 below, could be classified also as markers of epistemic stance, "used to present speaker comments on the status of information of a proposition. They can mark certainty (or doubt), actuality, precision, or limitation" (Biber et al. 1999: 972). Within this category, besides those markers denoting doubt, approximators and those expressing assurance and obscuring information would also be included (70.8% in all).[92] As regards the frequencies of occurrence of pragmatic markers in combination with the extender tag, those that reinforce the meaning of doubt of *or something* are the most frequent in my data (58.3%), while approximators, exemplifiers, obscuring information and assurance markers are more sporadic. The other major category, representing something less than one quarter of the occurrences (22.9%), is that of signalling intersubjectivity. We have to bear in mind that the co-occurrence of *or something* with any pragmatic marker is very infrequent. Furthermore, extender tags themselves are a low-frequency phenomenon, so that the low percentages shown by pragmatic marker types other than those denoting doubt or intersubjectivity can only attest to their existence.

If we take a closer look at the evolution of these collocations, as reflected in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.17 below, we can see that the situation is not as transparent as Figure 4.16 seemed to suggest once we transform raw numbers into normalized frequencies. The low number of words in the first subperiod triggers the relatively high normalized frequency which corresponds to the isolated instance attested. Disregarding that, we can see that the co-occurrence of the tag with pragmatic markers expressing doubt is the most frequent pattern all through the period under analysis, almost

[92] Some studies suggest, however, that intersubjective nuances and functions are also included within the notion of stance (see, in this respect, Kaltenböck et al. 2020).

converging with intersubjectivity markers at the end of the time span considered.



Figure 4.16 Distribution of pragmatic marker types that collocate with *or something* (percentages)

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Doubt	-	**1.1** (2)	**0.2** (1)	**0.4** (1)	**0.5** (2)	-	**1.3** (7)	**0.8** (8)	**0.5** (5)	**0.4** (2)	28
Approximation	-	**1.7** (3)	-	**0.4** (1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Exemplifying	-	-	-	**0.4** (1)	-	**0.2** (1)	-	-	**0.1** (1)	-	3
Intersubjectivity	-	-	-	-	-	**0.2** (1)	**0.2** (1)	**0.4** (4)	**0.4** (4)	**0.2** (1)	11
Obscuring information	**1.9** (1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Assurance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0.1** (1)	-	-	1

Table 4.11 Evolution of pragmatic marker types that collocate with *or something* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.17 Evolution of pragmatic marker types that collocate with *or something* (normalized frequencies)

It is important to point out that, while pragmatic markers signalling doubt are attested all through the 18th and 19th centuries and less frequent types are scattered all over the corpus, those denoting intersubjectivity only appear from the early 19th century onwards and grow in frequency over time. It seems, therefore, that the rather frequent present-day collocation of intersubjectivity markers of the type *you know* with extender tags has its origin in the 19th century concerning its collocation with *or something*.

4.3 TEXTUAL FEATURES OF *OR SOMETHING*

It was already pointed out in Chapter 2 (cf. Section 2.4.1) that extender tags have been acknowledged to be more frequently found in oral speech that in written records, being "pervasive features of conversation" (Aijmer 1985: 366). This fact has been tested by Palacios Martínez (2011) with positive results, thus confirming that the frequency of use of extender tags is "much higher in speech than in writing" (2011: 2459). Unfortunately, it is impossible to access speech from earlier stages of the language (cf. Section 2.5), which leaves us with the only option of working with the most speech-like material

available. Nevertheless, novels allow us to discriminate between those extender tags that occur within conversations and those that appear in the middle of a narration. It has to be acknowledged, however, that such dialogues are not real conversations but imagined speech made up by the writer and also that the narrative part of the novels in the ECF and NCF is, on some occasions, a first person narration that simulates a speech directed to the reader.

In this section, I briefly analyse this textual feature concerning the extender tag *or something*, establishing a distinction between its occurrence in conversation or in narration. However, I also consider letters as a special case of what can be called "written conversation". Letters, despite not being strictly dialogic interactions, are closer to a conversation between the writer and his/her addressee than to conventional narration. Therefore, the language that is expected to be found in letters is more typical of speech than of writing. In fact, Carroll (2007; 2008) used a corpus of personal correspondence in her analysis of extender tags (cf. Section 2.5), and argued that this setting is one of the best approximations to actual speech for previous stages of the language.

As is reflected in Figure 4.18 below, the great majority of instances of the extender tag *or something* appear in dialogues (63%). They are very infrequent in epistolary contexts (only 3%), while 34% of the cases are found within the narrative sections of the novels included in the corpus. Judging from the data just described, it seems that the extender tag *or something* is more frequently found in conversation during the late Modern English period.

Taking a look at the evolution of the tag throughout the period analysed, as reflected in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.19 below, we witness an interesting diachronic change. During the first half of the 18th century, it was more common for the tag *or something* to appear in the narrative component of the novels, while its frequency in conversation grew as the period progressed, dialogue becoming the most usual context for the occurrence of the tag from the middle of the period onwards. The occurrence of the extender within epistolary sections, in turn, is very infrequent in my late Modern

English data. These findings (i.e. *or something* becoming less frequent in narrative and more commonly used in conversation) are consistent with the present-day English tendency for extender tags to be more common in speech than in written records.



Figure 4.18 Distribution of textual occurrences of *or something* (percentages)

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Conversation	-	**0.6** (1)	**0.3** (2)	**1.3** (3)	**2.7** (10)	**4** (21)	**3.7** (19)	**7.9** (77)	**7.7** (84)	**10.4** (52)	269
Letter	-	-	**0.5** (3)	**0.4** (1)	**0.3** (1)	**0.4** (2)	**0.4** (2)	**0.1** (1)	**0.2** (2)	**0.2** (1)	13
Narrative	**7.5** (4)	**6.2** (11)	**1.7** (10)	**3.5** (8)	**1.9** (7)	**2.7** (14)	**3.1** (16)	**3.6** (35)	**2.7** (29)	**2.2** (11)	145

Table 4.12 Evolution of textual occurrences of *or something* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.19 Evolution of textual occurrences of *or something* (normalized frequencies)

4.4 FUNCTIONS OF *OR SOMETHING*

In this last section I deal with the functions that the extender tag *or something* has proved to perform in the late Modern English period, as represented in the ECF and NCF material. These functions are divided, as has already been done in Chapter 2 (cf. Section 2.3), between referential and expressive functions, depending on whether they are tied to the outer physical world and the speaker's experience of it or, on the contrary, subject to the expression of the speaker's own consciousness and his/her maintenance of social relations.

As pointed out in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1, there are a couple of functions that I consider common to all extender tag uses, and are therefore taken to be features intrinsic to their use instead. These are the assumption of shared knowledge and vagueness (an expressive and a referential function, respectively). Given that each token of *or something* is considered to operate in the sphere of both these functions, they are not discussed in detail in this section together with the analysis of the remainder of functions that the extender tag performs in the late Modern English period. Since conveying

shared knowledge and expressing vagueness have been thoroughly explained and analysed in Sections 2.3.1.1 and 2.3.1.2 respectively, I offer here just a brief summary. On the one hand, given that the use of extender tags substitutes the expression of a precise item, they are generally referred to as vague items, and therefore vagueness is intrinsic to them in this sense. However, their use is intentional, it does not depend on the lack of knowledge on the part of the speaker (as the earliest approaches to vague language suggested). We can thus say that vagueness is part of the nature of extender tags. On the other hand, when a speaker uses an extender tag in discourse, (s)he relies on its felicitous interpretation on the part of his/her interlocutor. The premise is that the recipient of the message will be able to decode it as the speaker has intended, and this depends on an assumption of shared knowledge between both, the assumption that both the speaker and the interlocutor share the same conception of the world, despite their assumed different experience of it.

4.4.1 REFERENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF *OR SOMETHING*

Referential functions of extender tags, which have also been referred to as ideational functions by Overstreet (1999: 17), are those that tie the language to a world of reference in a truth-conditional way. In other words, they are objective functions that do not depend on the subjectivity of the speaker. As referential functions of *or something*, in what follows I discuss categorization (cf. Section 4.4.1.1) and list completion (cf. Section 4.4.1.2).

4.4.1.1 CATEGORIZATION

Categorization has been defined as the basic function of extender tags in discourse (cf. Section 2.3.2.1), and can be summarized as follows: the exemplar(s) in the scope of the tag belong(s) to a category of items to which the extender tag implies that other items could be added. This category is abbreviated, for the sake of briefness or for other convenient reasons, by means of the tag, which indicates that more items belonging to the category

formed by the exemplar(s) given could also have been named, but this is not necessary, as the interlocutor is assumed to understand and know which elements could be added after the illustrations provided. Thanks to the conveyance of shared knowledge, the interlocutor is able to recognize the category that the speaker intended to imply and imagine which other elements could belong to it.

By way of illustration, in (4.70) below, the scope of the extender tag *or something of the sort* corresponds to the noun phrases *light carts* and *chaises*, which can be said to belong to the category of small horse-drawn vehicles typical of 19th-century England. The speaker suggests hiring a carriage, but as there is not one available, they settle for something smaller and more modest that can be at their disposal. The extender tag suggests that other items belonging to the same category could be named, such as a cabriolet, a tilbury or a whitechapel, among others. Nevertheless, there is no need to name them, as the interlocutor is supposed to have already gotten the gist of the message by means of the examples provided, and will be able to infer any other representative members of the category intended.

(4.70) *"Suppose she hires a carriage?"*

"There are none to be had except at the station."

"There are farmers about here; and farmers have light carts, or chaises, ***or something of the sort****."*

(Collins, Wilkie. 1870. *Man and Wife:* 64 (Vol. 2))

Categories can be of two types, common or lexicalized and ad hoc or non-lexicalized (cf. Section 2.3.2.1). Common categories are those that can be named by means of a lexical item, and the elements that belong to them typically show some common properties and similarities between them. Ad hoc categories, on the other hand, are spontaneously created by the speaker to fulfil a need to group a variety of elements together. In contrast to common categories, there are not many superficial similarities among these elements or there may be no similarity at all, but they share some characteristic that is key to the category where they belong. The two types of categories are exemplified in (4.71) and (4.72), respectively.

(4.71) *"He was a cross old fellow, and took no notice of us, but within the last year or two, his nephew, or son,* ***or something****, died, and now he is just dead, and the lawyer wrote to tell Alan he is heir-at-law."* (Yonge, Charlotte Mary. 1856. *The Daisy Chain:* 259)

(4.72) *"Would you wish me to shave my head and black my face, or disfigure myself with a burn, or a scald,* ***or something of that sort****?"* (Dickens, Charles. 1850. *The Personal History of David Copperfield:* 15)

In (4.71) a common or lexicalized category is alluded: the scope of the tag is found in the noun phrases *nephew* and *son*, which belong into the category 'relative' or 'kin'. By contrast, in (4.72) we have the category 'ways to disfigure oneself', illustrated by *a burn* and *a scald*. The category 'relative' or 'kin' in (4.71) is common because it can be expressed in one single lexical item and is easily retrievable by anyone who hears it. The category in (4.72), on the other hand, is an ad hoc one, created at the moment of speaking to point at different ways to disfigure oneself; the retrieval of other items that could belong to this category depends much on the context, both linguistic and situational, and can sometimes be not so transparent for the reader as that in example (4.71). Let us recall (4.70) in this respect. Here the context of the category 'small horse-drawn vehicles' is 19th-century England, so that we would need to have knowledge of the types of carriages that were typical of the time and place in question in order to be able to retrieve more elements belonging to this category. Obviously enough, the speaker assumes that his/her interlocutor will be able to infer the category intended and will also be able to provide whatever unstated information on the grounds of shared knowledge.

As we can observe in Figure 4.20 below, in my late Modern English data the extender tag *or something* performs the function of categorization in almost 79% of its occurrences, and the categories being represented are mostly ad hoc ones (76.8% of the total). If we focus only on those cases functioning as categorizing devices, ad hoc categorization represents an overwhelming 97.3% of the total of categories evoked in the corpus. Common categorization, in turn, is very scarcely found over the period under analysis. On the other hand, as shown in the figure, in 21.1% of cases the extender tag does not perform the function of categorization. These are tokens where no

category can be inferred, and where the extender is performing some other function.



Figure 4.20 Distribution of the categorization function of *or something* (percentages)

Let us consider (4.73) and (4.74) below in connection to this last group of extenders, i.e. those where the function of categorization is not observed:

(4.73) *[S]he came to be inform'd that my Merchant had liv'd there two Years,* ***or something more****.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1724. *Roxanna:* 266)

(4.74) *Diamond could not help thinking of words which he had heard in the church the day before: "Surely it is good to be afflicted,"* ***or something like that****.* (Macdonald, George. 1868. *At the Back of the North Wind:* 254)

In neither of these tokens are we able to assign a category to the exemplar in the scope of the tag. When the narrator in (4.73) says *my Merchant had liv'd there two Years,* ***or something more***, (s)he does not intend a category of different time frames, but merely suggests that it may have been more than two years, or perhaps less. Since (s)he is not sure about the quantity being stated, (s)he hedges it by means of the extender tag. Similarly, in (4.74) there is not a category 'things to be heard at church'. Rather, what the speaker intends by appending the extender tag to the quote is that (s)he is not sure about its accuracy; the wording may not be exact. Tokens like these will be

discussed in greater detail below when dealing with the subjective functions of the tag (cf. Section 4.4.2.1).

From what we can observe in Table 4.13 and Figure 4.21 below, it seems that the extender tag *or something* is used mainly as a categorization device, as tokens which do not perform this function are not very frequent throughout the late Modern English period. Furthermore, from the mid-19th century onwards the difference between the categorizing function and non-categorizing ones becomes more pronounced, with the former type occurring three or four times more often than those of the latter group. All in all, the evolution of the function of categorization concerning the extender tag *or something* points towards stability.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Categorization	**5,6** (3)	**4,5** (8)	**2,1** (12)	**4,3** (10)	**4,4** (16)	**4,8** (25)	**5** (26)	**9,1** (89)	**8,9** (97)	**10,2** (51)	337
No Categorization	**1,9** (1)	**2,3** (4)	**0,5** (3)	**0,9** (2)	**0,5** (2)	**2,3** (12)	**2,1** (11)	**2,5** (24)	**1,6** (18)	**2,6** (13)	90

Table 4.13 Evolution of the categorization function of *or something* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.21 Evolution of the categorization function of *or something* (normalized frequencies)

Focusing now on those tokens that perform the function of categorization, already hinted in Figure 4.20 above, cases of common categorization are very rare. This becomes even more patent from the data in Table 4.14 and Figure 4.22 below, which show that, with the exception of some isolated 19th-century tokens, common categories are non-existent in connection with this tag. The type of category that is implied with the use of the extender tag *or something* in the period under analysis is, in almost all cases, an ad hoc one, similar to those explained above in connection with examples (4.70) and (4.72), created at the moment of speaking in order to group together, under the premise at hand, entities that would not otherwise or in another situation be categorized together.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Common	-	-	-	-	-	**0.2** (1)	**0.2** (1)	**0.3** (3)	**0.4** (4)	-	9
Ad hoc	**5.6** (3)	**4.5** (8)	**2.1** (12)	**4.3** (10)	**4.4** (16)	**4.6** (24)	**4.8** (25)	**8.8** (86)	**85** (93)	**10.2** (51)	328

Table 4.14 Evolution of the type of category evoked by *or something* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.22 Evolution of the type of category evoked by *or something* (normalized frequencies)

It is also worth noting that, among those cases where the extender tag performs the function of categorization, the category is sometimes explicitly stated in the token. Such is the case of (4.75) below, where the category 'accident' is named before its exemplars are presented as the scope of the tag. This is not invariably so in every example, as we can see from (4.76), where the category implied by the exemplar *a canoe* is not overt, but only hinted at; we could name this category 'types of boats without an engine'.

(4.75) *It was so very uncharacteristic of such a robust person as dear Marian to be ill, that I could only suppose she had met with an accident. A horse, or a false step on the stairs,* ***or something of that sort****.* (Collins, Wilkie. 1860. *The Woman in White:* 257 (Vol. 2))

(4.76) *"It must be a new river," said Mark. "This is the New Sea. We're drifting a little."*
"We'll come again in a canoe, ***or something****," said Bevis.*
(Jefferies, Richard. 1882. *Bevis:* 176 (Vol. 2))

As shown in Table 4.15 and Figure 4.23 below, the explicitness of the category being evoked by the combination of the exemplar(s) and the tag *or something* in late Modern English undergoes interesting changes throughout the time span considered here. While in the first part of the period explicit category references are slightly more common than their non-explicit counterparts, in the 19th century non-explicit categories come to prevail .

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Explicit	**1.9** (1)	**2.3** (4)	**1.7** (10)	**3** (7)	**2.5** (9)	**2.1** (11)	**1.2** (6)	**2.5** (24)	**1.7** (19)	**2.6** (13)	104
Non explicit	**3.8** (2)	**2.3** (4)	**0.3** (2)	**1.3** (3)	**1.9** (7)	**2.7** (14)	**3.9** (20)	**6.7** (65)	**7.2** (78)	**7.6** (38)	233

Table 4.15 Evolution of category explicitness of *or something* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.23 Evolution of category explicitness of *or something* (normalized frequencies)

It can be argued that as the extender tag becomes more common and its function as a categorization device more firmly established in the language, there is less need for the category to be explicit or overt. Therefore, the growth of tokens where such categorization is non-explicit over the latter part of the period under analysis can be interpreted as the assimilation of such function into the language.

4.4.1.2 LIST COMPLETION

Extender tags have also been claimed to perform the function of list completion,[93] which means that they are used to indicate that a listing process is abandoned by the speaker. Extenders occur after a list of items, signalling that this is both relevantly complete (no more items will be added), but, at the same time, relevantly incomplete, in the sense that the extender implies that other items could be added to it (cf. the function of categorization just explained in the previous section). The presence of the extender at the

[93] This function in relation to extender tags has been explained in Section 2.3.2.2.

end of a list indicates that not only one, but an indefinite number of other exemplars could be added to the list of items that precedes it, but there is no need to do so, as the interlocutor is able to infer them on the basis of shared knowledge and the recognition of the category to which the named exemplars belong. Therefore the list is ended at that point and closed by the tag itself.

Researchers agree that the minimum number of items that are considered a list are three (cf. Section 2.3.2.2), which means that, if we count the extender as the last item, at least two exemplars plus the extender tag are needed to consider we are doing listing. Those cases, as the one exemplified in (4.77) below, where only one item precedes the extender, would thus not be considered an example of listing.

(4.77) *"Twas a regular boy's dream, a tournament,* ***or something of that nature,*** *where I was victor, the queen – you know who she was – giving me her token – a Daisy Chain.* (Yonge, Charlotte Mary. 1856. *The Daisy Chain:* 61)

The ECF and NCF material provides a wide range of possibilities as regards the number of elements that conform the scope of *or something* in the late Modern English period. From just one item, as has been illustrated in (4.77) above, to two, as in (4.78), or three items as scope, like the actions *cough*, *whistle* and *hum* in (4.79), to the far less common pattern with four items before the tag, as in (4.80), with *a yellow face and a nightcap*, *a pair of crutches*, *a wooden leg* and *a dog with a decanter-stand in his mouth* as scope of *or something of that kind.* Cases where more items than four appear in the scope of the tag are even less frequent, but instances can be found in which up to eleven exemplars appear before the tag, as (4.81) below shows.

(4.78) *"Yes, yes," answered Don Francisco, startled into sudden recollection, "I remember there was a mention of the devil – or his agent –* ***or something****."* (Maturin, Charles Robert. 1820. *Melmoth the Wanderer:* 164 (Vol. 4))

(4.79) *"If you cough in the passage before you open the door, or whistle carelessly, or hum a tune,* ***or something of that sort****, to let them know you're coming, it's always better."* (Dickens, Charles. 1839. *The Life and Adventures of Nicholas Nickleby:* 551))

(4.80) *Her only association with the word [beggar] was a yellow face and a nightcap, or a pair of crutches, or a wooden leg; or a dog with a decanter-stand in his mouth,* ***or something of that kind****; and she started at me with the most delightful wonder.* (Dickens, Charles. 1850. *The Personal History of David Copperfield:* 381)

(4.81) *"He was partner in a house in some large way – spirits, or buttons, or wine, or blacking, or oatmeal, or woollen, or pork, or hooks and eyes, or iron, or treacle, or shoes,* ***or something or other that was wanted for troops, or seamen, or somebody*** *– and the house burst, and we being among the creditors, detainers were lodged on the part of the Crown in a scientific manner, and all the rest of it."* (Dickens, Charles. 1857. *Little Dorrit:* 424)

It has been claimed (Overstreet 1999: 28) that in cases such as (4.81), the large number of elements in the scope of the tag shows iconicity between form and content, emphasizing that the person in question does indeed have many things. Even the form itself of the extender tag here reminds us of iconicity: the longer variant *or something or other* is used and is extended by a relative clause that also contains a list of items extended by yet another extender tag. Furthermore, iconicity is strengthened by the fact that the extender tag indicates that, apart from the large number of exemplars already included, more could be added to the list.

Figure 4.24 depicts the different positions in which the extender tag *or something* has been found to occur in late Modern English.



Figure 4.24 Position of *or something* in lists (percentages)

As we can see, the most usual pattern is for the tag to occur in second position (67.9%), that is, the exemplar plus tag combination, as illustrated by (4.77). This means that *or something* is only used as a list completer in this period in about 32% of the cases, because, as has been pointed out above, the minimum of items needed for a list to be considered as such is three. The ratio of tokens decreases exponentially as the number of items in the scope of the tag increases. This way, those tokens with a larger number of items in the scope of the tag are much less frequent than those with smaller scopes: in 24.9% of the cases *or something* is the third element; in 4.7% and 1.6% of occurrences it occupies the fourth and fifth position on the list, respectively; finally, only in 0.9% of the cases does it occur as the sixth element or more.

Although we have seen that the pattern exemplar + tag, i.e. that in which the tag is not performing the function of list completion, is the most common one in late Modern English, at the very beginning of the period, cases where the tag realizes this function outnumber those in which it does not, as Table 4.16 and Figure 4.25 below indicate. This situation is, however, rather ephemeral, as cases of functions other than list completion are more common than those where *or something* performs this function from the second subperiod on.

This agrees with the evidence from present-day English, when extender tags have proved to accompany a single exemplar in the vast majority of cases (cf. Section 2.3.2.2). The fact that *or something* only functions as a list completer in 32.1% of its occurrences in my data means that this cannot be considered its main function in late Modern English, but one that appears alongside others, in accordance with the multifunctional character of extender tags.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Yes	**5.6** (3)	**2.3** (4)	**0.5** (3)	**1.3** (3)	**2.2** (8)	**1.5** (8)	**2.7** (14)	**4** (39)	**3.7** (40)	**2** (15)	137
No	**1.9** (1)	**4.5** (8)	**2.1** (12)	**3.9** (9)	**2.7** (10)	**5.5** (29)	**4.4** (23)	**7.6** (74)	**6.9** (75)	**10** (49)	290

Table 4.16 Evolution of the list completion function of *or something* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.25 Evolution of the list completion function of *or something* (normalized frequencies)

4.4.2 EXPRESSIVE FUNCTIONS OF *OR SOMETHING*

While Section 4.4.1 was devoted to the objective functions of the extender tag *or something*, the present section discusses those that have a more subjective nature, i.e. those that instead of being tied to the outer world for reference, rely on the subjectivity of the speaker: the expressive functions. The most salient of these functions is the conveyance of shared knowledge, which I argue is an intrinsic trait to the use of extender tags and is therefore present in every occurrence of these forms.

Expressive functions have been claimed "to indicate assumptions of shared knowledge and experience, or to mark an attitude toward the message expressed, or toward the hearer" (Overstreet 1999: 11). Overstreet claims that this is the basic purpose of extender tags, rather than that of fulfilling referential functions. Other researchers,[94] nevertheless, have given more weight to the objective component of these forms. In my analysis, both types of functions are dealt with, unbiased by these considerations, as they are both

[94] Cf., for example, Dines (1980); Jefferson (1990); Dubois (1992); Channell (1994); and Lerner (1994).

present in the use of the tag at issue here and determine how the extender evolved through the late Modern English period. It must be borne in mind that it has been claimed that in the gradual grammaticalization of extender tags there is a shift from the referential to the expressive sphere.

As has already been done in Section 2.3.3, in what follows I subdivide the expressive functions of *or something* into two further subtypes, subjective functions, those that convey the speaker's attitude towards the message expressed (cf. Section 4.4.2.1), and intersubjective functions, which reveal the stance and relationship of the speaker with his/her interlocutor(s) (cf. Section 4.4.2.2).

4.4.2.1 SUBJECTIVE FUNCTION: *OR SOMETHING* AS A QUALITY HEDGE

Of the two subjective functions of extender tags described in Section 2.3.3.1, namely intensifying and disclaiming, on the one hand, and hedging on the Gricean maxim of quality, on the other, only one has been identified in the use of *or something*: the adherence of the tag to the Gricean maxim of quality.

It has already been pointed out in Section 2.3.3.1.2 that disjunctive extender tags are related to Grice's Cooperative Principle as a means to adhere to its second maxim, the maxim of quality. Therefore, these forms have been analysed to function as hedges on such maxim, to indicate that the speaker contemplates the Cooperative Principle and tries to adhere to it, but cannot be as precise as (s)he would be required to by the aforementioned maxim because of lack of information or certainty. Let us remember what the maxim of quality states:

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

(Grice 1975: 46)

There are occasions when, despite the fact that the speaker may not want to stray from the truth, appropriate evidence may not always be at hand, and sometimes (s)he needs to say things in which complete accuracy

cannot be assured. A disjunctive extender tag is consequently used in such cases in order to mark what is being stated as imprecise, to indicate that the maxim of quality is not being flouted, but, rather, that the speaker is trying to observe the Cooperative Principle despite his/her lack of precision. A case in point is (4.82), where the speaker speculates about the religion of somebody by the way she dresses, stating that she must be *a Methodist, or Quaker*, without having the certainty that this is the case. It is equally probable that one of the options presented is true or that neither of them is. This explains the addition of the extender tag *or something of that sort*, first of all as a categorization device, to indicate that there are other possible options from which to choose (even though these are not included, as the interlocutor can figure them out), and, secondly, to indicate the lack of commitment of the speaker towards the truth of the proposition, given that what is being stated is only a conjecture based on his/her own observation.

(4.82) *"I saw she was a Methodist, or Quaker,* ***or something of that sort****, by her dress, but I didn't know she was a preacher".* (Eliot, George. 1859. *Adam Bede:* 101 (Vol. 1))

As has been recurrently explained throughout this dissertation, it is very common for extender tags to perform more than one function at the same time, as they are highly multifunctional. Therefore, instances such as (4.82), where more than one function of *or something* is at work, are very frequent. In the case of (4.82) we can observe categorization, list completion and quality hedging.[95] This multifunctionality is also reflected in my late Modern English data. As Figure 4.26 shows, 75.2% of the occurrences of *or something* function as hedges on the maxim of quality. At the same time, it has been attested in Figure 4.20 above that *or something* also functions as a categorizing device in more than 80% of the cases. Therefore, examples like (4.82) where both functions are at work at the same time are expected to be frequent.

[95] The interaction of functions in one and the same token is analysed in Chapter 6, devoted to the grammaticalization of extender tags.



Figure 4.26 *Or something* as a quality hedge (percentages)

As shown in Figure 4.26, in 24.8% of the cases, *or something* is not used as a quality hedge in the ECF and NCF material. (4.83) below is an illustration of this, a token where we observe only the function of categorization; the speaker is looking for a *lawyer* or a *Master in Chancery* or any other similar option in order to solve some affairs that concern him/her. Here there is no doubt about the accuracy of the statement; the only purpose of the extender is to suggest that any other similar option is also acceptable for the purpose at hand.

(4.83) *"Do you know any raving lawyer, any mad Master in Chancery,* ***or something of the kind****, who meddles in these affairs?"* (Disraeli, Benjamin (Earl of Beaconsfield). 1826. *Vivian Grey:* 155 (Vol. 2))

In what concerns the diachronic evolution of the function of *or something* as a hedge on the maxim of quality, we can observe from Table 4.17 and Figure 4.27 below that it is more common for the extender to perform such function all through the late Modern English period than are those cases that do not adhere to it.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Yes	**5.6** (3)	**6.2** (11)	**2.1** (12)	**4.8** (11)	**3.5** (13)	**5.7** (30)	**6** (31)	**8.4** (82)	**7.8** (85)	**8.6** (43)	321
No	**1.9** (1)	**0.6** (1)	**0.5** (3)	**0.4** (1)	**1.4** (5)	**1.3** (7)	**1.2** (6)	**3.2** (31)	**2.8** (30)	**4.2** (21)	106

Table 4.17 Evolution of *or something* as a quality hedge (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.27 Evolution of *or something* as a quality hedge (normalized frequencies)

When discussing the function of extender tags as hedges on the maxim of quality (cf. Section 2.3.3.1.2), we saw that Buysse (2014) subdivided Overstreet's (1999:112) accuracy hedges, like (4.82) above, into cases of speculation and cases of approximate recollections, depending on whether the speaker's uncertainty derives from the fact that (s)he is making a conjecture about a fact that (s)he does not actually know for sure, or whether (s)he does not remember such fact with strict accuracy. On some occasions, the differentiation between both subtypes is easily made, as in (4.82) above, which represents a case of speculation. On other occasions, by contrast, such distinction is not so straightforward, as shown in (4.84) below. Here, with the context provided in the token, the researcher cannot safely choose between any of the two types of accuracy hedges, as we do not know if the speaker does not remember what was put under his/her leg, or whether (s)he does not know because (s)he never saw it and is speculating about what it could have been. In view of this added difficulty, I will stick to Overstreet's categorization and consider all these as cases of accuracy hedging, where the speaker is not sure about the exactness or rightness of what (s)he is stating, and so decides to hedge it by means of the extender tag *or something*.

(4.84) *However, I must say, that they were very kind to me, and put a great coat* ***or something*** *under my wounded leg, for I was in an agony, and fainted several times.* (Marryat, Frederick. 1832. *Peter Simple:* 302 (Vol. 1))

Although accuracy hedges like the ones exemplified in (4.82) and (4.84) constitute the majority of the cases where *or something* is used as a hedge on the maxim of quality, a further type can be distinguished among these, namely approximators. In Overstreet's words, such cases "mark an utterance, or part of an utterance, not just as potentially inaccurate, but as an approximation" (1999: 115). Similarly to accuracy hedges, approximators mark the lack of accuracy of what is being stated, but, at the same time, indicate that an attempt is being made to approach precision. In relation with *or something,* five types of approximators have been found in my data and are analysed individually below: (i) approximators with amounts, (ii) lexical approximators, (iii) reported speech approximation, (iv) analogy and (v) exaggerations or jokes.

When a disjunctive extender tag is used in order to hedge an amount in terms of its accuracy, be it a time reference, a quantity, a size, weight, age or any other number, we are using an approximator. Approximators with amounts are the most recognizable way of approximation; they indicate that the quantity or amount that is being hedged is just an estimation of the actual number. The speaker may lack complete precision when stating a given amount, or such accuracy may not be as relevant as maintaining fluency. In (4.85) below, for instance, the narrator marks the time frame that is stated, *an hour*, as an approximation, both by means of the extender tag *or something more* and by the adverb *about*. It is very likely that the interval referred to is not an hour exactly, but the precise amount of time is not considered so relevant for the message, so that rounding down is better for the purpose at hand than strict accuracy. It may also be the case that the exact period is not even known.

(4.85) *In about an hour,* ***or something more****, we see, to our infinite Satisfaction, the open Harbour of Harwich, and the Vessel standing directly towards it, and in a few Minutes more, the Ship was in smooth*

Water, to our inexpressible Comfort. (Defoe, Daniel. 1724. *Roxanna:* 155)

Lexical approximators are very similar to approximators with amounts, but instead of accompanying a quantity, *or something* may hedge a lexical item for various reasons, among others the following: the speaker does not know the pronunciation of a word or its correct spelling, (s)he is not sure whether (s)he is using a word or expression appropriately or does not remember it well, or the speaker may have a hard time bringing to mind somebody's or some product's name, and so use the disjunctive extender to indicate that the one produced is an approximation, which may not be the actual name. Example (4.86) below illustrates the second case; the speaker is here in search of an expression that (s)he does not remember or know well, *delirium tremens*, so (s)he produces something that sounds similarly and indicates by means of the tag that it is just an approximation to the actual word. (4.87), in turn, presents a case where the speaker is not sure whether she remembers correctly the name of some person she wants to refer to, so she uses the extender *or something like that* to hedge the name she provides, to indicate her uncertainty. In fact, her interlocutor corrects her mistake and facilitates the correct name in her turn.

(4.86) *'Well, to say it out at once then, he do take a drop too much at times, and then he has the horrors – what is it they call it? delicious beam-ends,* ***or something of that sort****.'* (Trollope, Anthony. 1858. *Doctor Thorne:* 179 (Vol. 3))

(4.87) *"Hawk,* ***or something like that.****"*

"Ay, Hawkes – Dickon Hawkes; that's Pegtop, you know, Maud," said Milly.

(Le Fanu, George Sheridan. 1864. *Uncle Silas:* 270 (Vol. 2))

Another very easily discernible way of approximation is the one that is attached to reported speech. When a speaker wants to reproduce someone else's speech, be it directly or indirectly, quite often (s)he does not remember it sharply word-by-word. Therefore, it is not infrequent to encounter citations and rephrasings followed by a disjunctive extender tag, as *or something that way* in (4.88) below, in order to indicate that the quote should not be taken

verbatim, but that the content is reproduced as nearly as possible to the actual wording. On other occasions, the speaker may not want to reproduce the message in all accuracy, maybe because it is too long or because (s)he does not consider strict word-for-word reproduction necessary for the purpose at hand. In such cases, the disjunctive extender is a valuable tool to reproduce a quote in the way the speaker prefers and to avoid breaking communication by still adhering to Grice's Cooperative Principle.

(4.88) *Mr. Burke come down that day too soon to stop it, and said, 'it was not becoming to trample on the fallen',* ***or something that way****, that put an end to it.* (Edgeworth, Maria. 1812. *The Absentee:* 455 (Vol. 2))

The remaining types of approximators are very sporadic in my data for *or something* in late Modern English. However, despite their low frequency, it is important to point out that they are already present in this period. In the case of analogies, as illustrated in (4.89), a situation is presented to which the speaker compares the actual one; *like a princess marrying a gamekeeper fellow* is taken here as an analogy which represents an unfortunate marriage choice. Analogies are introduced by *like* and the use of the extender tag further indicates that the situation depicted is not a real one, but one created to better explain an idea, comparable to it. As in the previous types of approximators, the situation depicted is an approximation, and not the real truth.

(4.89) *"Sacrifice! If there is any sacrifice, it is in your thinking of marrying a good-for-nothing fellow like me. It's like a princess marrying a gamekeeper fellow,* ***or something like that****; and you talk of sacrifice, and what the wretched idiots of a ridiculous little village think of you!"* (Black, William. 1871. *A Daughter of Heth:* 227 (Vol. 3))

Finally, I have also found in the NCF material one example of an exaggeration or joke hedged by *or something*, reproduced here as (4.90). In this example, *snoring, or choking, or Dutch-clocking* is the exaggerated way in which Bounderby describes the noise that Tom made while sleeping. It is a purposeful exaggeration created for humorous effect, which is marked by the extender tag as an irreal situation, not to be taken literally. In this sense, the use of *or something* here is very similar to the previous type, an analogy

(although made in an exaggerated way) created to depict a situation in a comic way.

(4.90) *"Well!" said the exasperated Bounderby, "while he was snoring, or choking, or Dutch-clocking,* ***or something or other*** *– being asleep – some fellows, somehow, whether previously concealed in the house or not remains to be seen, got to young Tom's safe, forced it, and abstracted the contents."* (Dickens, Charles. 1854. *Hard Times:* 215-216)

As I have already anticipated, accuracy hedging is by far the most common type of hedge on the Gricean maxim of quality found for the extender tag *or something* in late Modern English. It represents almost three fourths of the total number of occurrences, as Figure 4.28 below shows. Among the approximators that belong to the remaining fourth, hedging reported speech is the most salient one, which is found in 15% of the cases, while the rest of quality hedge types present much lower frequencies.



Figure 4.28 Types of quality hedge of *or something* (percentages)

The evolution of each of the types of hedges through the late Modern English period is reflected in Table 4.18 and Figure 4.29 below.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Accuracy hedge	**3.8** (2)	**4** (7)	**1.7** (10)	**3.5** (8)	**3** (11)	**3.4** (18)	**4.3** (22)	**6.1** (59)	**6.1** (67)	**6.4** (32)	236
Approximator with amounts	**1.9** (1)	**2.3** (4)	**0.3** (2)	**0.4** (1)	**0.3** (1)	-	**0.2** (1)	**0.5** (5)	**0.2** (2)	-	17
Lexical approximator	-	-	-	-	-	**0.4** (2)	-	**0.3** (3)	**0.2** (2)	**0.6** (3)	10
Reported speech	-	-	-	**0.9** (2)	**0.3** (1)	**1.7** (9)	**1.3** (7)	**0.9** (9)	**1.1** (12)	**1.6** (8)	48
Analogy	-	-	-	-	-	**0.2** (1)	**0.2** (1)	**0.5** (5)	**0.2** (2)	-	9
Exaggerations and jokes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0.1** (1)	-	-	1

Table 4.18 Evolution of types of quality hedging of *or something* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.29 Evolution of types of quality hedging of *or something* (normalized frequencies)

The predominance of accuracy hedges observed in Figure 4.28 above is patent here again, being the most recurrent type all through late Modern English. Interestingly, in the first part of the period the only two patterns that appear in the corpus are accuracy hedges and approximators with amounts, while the rest of types occur for the first time at a later stage. Of the two earliest types, only accuracy hedges continue to grow in frequency over the time span considered, while approximators with amounts, which are quite frequent in the first two subperiods, show an important decrease in their use across time.

Reported speech approximation evolves in quite the opposite way: it appears timidly in the second half of the 18th century and its frequency shows a slight growth towards the end of the period under analysis here. The remaining types, lexical approximators, analogies and exaggerations or jokes, are not attested until the 19th century, and their numbers are very low, with no signs of a rise in their use.

4.4.2.2 INTERSUBJECTIVE FUNCTION: *OR SOMETHING* AS A NEGATIVE POLITENESS DEVICE

The last section on the functions of the extender tag *or something* is devoted to its intersubjective functions, i.e. those that are related to the relationship that is shown between the speaker and his/her interlocutor(s) or the attitude that (s)she presents towards them. The only intersubjective function that has been found in relation to the tag under analysis is politeness, more specifically, negative politeness. In Section 2.3.3.2 above we saw that the goal of politeness strategies is to deal with face concerns, especially in order to redress so-called face threatening acts, situations where the speaker is in a position of menacing the face of his/her interlocutor(s). Overstreet (1999: 97) made a distinction between the use of disjunctive extender tags as possible strategies for negative politeness and adjunctive tags as positive politeness devices. I keep this dichotomy in my analysis, as I have found *or something* in my data functioning as a negative politeness marker and *and the like* as an instrument for achieving positive politeness (cf. Section 5.4.2.2.1).

The aim of negative politeness is to avoid imposing on the hearer/interlocutor, not coercing his/her decisions and thus interfering in his/her freedom of action. Negative politeness strategies, therefore, soften the force of proposals, offers, invitations, requests and so on, with the aim that they do not appear blunt to the interlocutor(s), which will also ultimately favour the desired response, which is acceptance. This softening is achieved by means of suggesting that other options from which to choose are available, a meaning that, as we have seen, is inherent to extender tags. By implying

the existence of other options apart from the one that is being requested by the speaker, the interlocutor has the feeling that (s)he is not being compelled to take the option presented, which will avoid the imposition and potential threat to his/her face. When presented with options, furthermore, the interlocutor is more prone to acceptance. In a way, the speaker's face is also at risk in such a situation, as the option of rejection is present, so that by avoiding threatening the interlocutor's face, the speaker also avoids a threat to his/her own face, arising from a potential dismissal.

In (4.91) below, for instance, Slyme wants Jonas to say a prayer, but in an attempt not to impose this action on him and avoid threatening his face, he opts to convey much tentativeness in his words, directed at softening his petition. First of all, the request is introduced by the modal verb *will*, with the intrinsic meaning of volition, implying that "you can *engage to say a prayer* if it is your will to do so". A second means of softening the request is the use of the extender tag *or something of that sort*, which implies that other types of redemption are also possible from which Jonas may choose. Finally, we also see the stuttering on the part of Slyme when making his proposal, which also prevents Jonas from perceiving Slyme's request as blunt. Therefore, the extender tag is used in (4.91), along with other devices, as a negative politeness strategy

(4.91) *"Are you guilty?"*

"Yes!" said Jonas.

"Are the proofs as they were told just now?"

"Yes!" said Jonas.

"Will you – will you engage to say a – a Prayer, ***or something of that sort****?" faltered Slyme.*

(Dickens, Charles. 1844. *The Life and Adventures of Martin Chuzzlewit:* 592)

The speaker in (4.92) does not want to be kept inside and thus proposes going outside, *to the stairs or the garden* or any other place out of bounds of the house. Even though his tone is pretty rough and impolite in the first part of his statement, he then decides to use a politeness strategy to hedge his request, presumably in an attempt to encourage acceptance on the part of his

interlocutor. By implying that other options apart from the stairs or the garden would also be acceptable to him, he softens his request and makes it less imposing on his interlocutor.

(4.92) *"I didn't come here to be wedged into a corner of this little beastly hole all the evening," he answered rebelliously; "can't we get out to the stairs or the garden* ***or something****?"* (Somerville, Edith Oenone & Martin Ross. 1894. *The Real Charlotte:* 146 (Vol. 2))

However, there are also times where no other options can be retrieved, as is the case of (4.93):

(4.93) *"I have all sorts of ideas. One might push the printing branch of the business – and have dark rooms for amateurs – and hit on a new hand-camera – and perhaps even start a paper, call it Camera Notes,* ***or something of that kind****."* (Gissing, George. 1897. *The Whirlpool:* 218)

Here, the speaker provides a number of very concrete suggestions for a printing business, one of which is starting a paper and calling it *Camera Notes*. There is not a category of items with other names for the newspaper that the interlocutor may be familiar with. Thus, the only purpose of the extender in this example is to soften the speaker's suggestion, so that this name may not be seen as an imposition, relying on the fact that the intrinsic meaning of the extender gives the idea that other options are possible (even in situations where there is none). By virtually implying that other options are available, the interlocutor is provided with a choice, which softens the speaker's proposal and encourages a preferred response on the part of the interlocutor.

Figure 4.30 below shows that the incidence of politeness in the use of the extender tag *or something* is not particularly high, with only 10.5% of the total of tokens being used for this purpose in the late Modern English period. Nevertheless, Overstreet (2014: 119), following Traugott's (2010b: 35) non-subjective > subjective > intersubjective pathway for language change, points out that extender tags follow that cline and acquire intersubjective meanings over time. Therefore, the politeness function is argued to be the last one that extender tags acquire. The modest percentage that *or something* presents as a negative politeness device in my data suggests that the extender may

already be advancing towards more (inter)subjective-centred uses at this period of the language.



Figure 4.30 Distribution of use of *or something* as a negative politeness device (percentages)

Furthermore, if we take a look at the evolution of the negative politeness function throughout the period under analysis, as reflected in Table 4.19 and Figure 4.31 below, we can see that its first appearances date from the latter part of the 18th century and its frequency consistently grows from that moment until the end of the period, even though in relatively low numbers. Nevertheless, this evolution suggests that the growth that we witness here is likely to continue in the next period towards a situation where cases of this type are more common.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Yes	-	-	-	-	**0.5** (2)	**0.6** (3)	**0.6** (3)	**1.1** (11)	**1.3** (14)	**2.4** (12)	45
No	**7.5** (4)	**6.8** (12)	**2.6** (15)	**5.2** (12)	**4.4** (16)	**6.5** (34)	**6.6** (34)	**10.5** (102)	**9.3** (101)	**10.4** (52)	382

Table 4.19 Evolution of use of *or something* as a negative politeness device (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 4.31 Evolution of use of *or something* as negative politeness device (normalized frequencies)

Although cases where the extender tag *or something* functions as a negative politeness device are not very frequent in the period under analysis, the mere fact that such cases exist points towards an advancing process of grammaticalization of this tag, given that functions and uses of this kind are typical of extenders exhibiting a higher degree of grammaticalization. Furthermore, the lack of instances of negative politeness in the first part of the late Modern English period suggests that it was precisely at this moment that *or something* acquired this function.

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5. *AND THE LIKE* IN LATE MODERN ENGLISH

This chapter is devoted to the analysis of the extender tag *and the like* and its variants *and such like* and *and (poss.) like* in late Modern English as represented in the ECF and NCF. After a brief introduction (cf. Section 5.1), I examine the formal features of the tag (cf. Section 5.2), some textual characteristics (cf. Section 5.3) and its functions (cf. Section 5.4), in a parallel manner to the one provided for the analysis of *or something* in Chapter 4.

5.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

This section includes a summary of the OED account of the extender tag *and the like* and its variants (cf. Section 5.1.1) and also presents a general overview of the data obtained from the corpus (cf. Section 5.1.2).

5.1.1 THE OED ACCOUNT OF *AND THE LIKE* AND VARIANTS

The forms *and the like* and *and such like* are cross-referenced in the OED as two variants of the same extender tag. The dictionary traces the emergence of these forms back to the 15th and 16th centuries. The form *and the like* is included in sense 2.d of the entry for *like*, n.1, and is defined as "used at the end of a list to indicate that further, similar items are included; and so on, and so forth, et cetera" (OED, s.v. *like*, n.1 2d). In turn, the form *and such-like* is defined as "something of that kind; the like. Chiefly in **and such-like, or such-like**" (OED, s.v. *such-like/suchlike* adj. and pron. B.a). The earliest examples of these forms are given here as (5.1) and (5.2), dating from 1556 and a1425, respectively.

(5.1) *There were also a secte called Manichæi, who not onely refused flesh, but also egges, milke & chese,* ***and the lyke****.* (OED, s.v. *like*, n.1 2d)

(5.2) *Bark-duste, psidie, balaustie, mumme* ***and sich like****.* (OED, s.v. *such-like/ suchlike* adj. and pron. B.a)

The OED also includes in the entry for *like* other meanings that are related to this extender use. This is the case of sense 2b of *like*, "something of the same kind as that previously mentioned or implied", which can happen after a conjunction in its extender tag use, or not. Some examples are provided, like (5.3) below, dating from c1475, that could be considered as illustrating the use of *and other like* as an extender tag.

(5.3) *Vngula..bigynneþ gynneþ bi þe nose, and goiþ ouer þe yȝe til þat he haue keuerid al þe yȝe and knottis þat ben in þe yȝe* ***and obere lijk***. (OED, s.v. *like,* n.1 2b)

Also related to the extender tag use of *like* is its occurrence with a possessive form preceding it, reported in sense 3.b "implying only similarity. Now usually in **and their like**: = *and the like* in sense 2d" (OED, s.v. *like,* n.1 3b) or with its periphrastic counterpart with the preposition *of*, in the form *the like of you/him/her/us/them*. These patterns are illustrated in (5.4) and (5.5), respectively, from the years 1549 and 1607.

(5.4) *Ye thus depraue the wryters tofore remembred* ***and theire lyke.*** (OED, s.v. *like,* n.1 3b)

(5.5) *Hee came into the world to saue thee,* ***and the like of thee***. (OED, s.v. *like,* n.1 3b)

Finally, in addition to the nominal and pronominal forms of *like* and *such-like*, some of the senses provided for the adjective entries of these forms have also been linked to their extender tag use by the OED: "resembling something already indicated or implied. ***the like***: such as have been mentioned" (OED, s.v. *like*, adj., adv., prep., and conj., and n.2 A 1e); and "of such a kind; of the like or a similar kind; of the before-mentioned sort of character" (OED, s.v. *such-like/suchlike* adj. and pron. Aa). As we can see from (5.6) and (5.7) below, dated 1557 and 1875, respectively, these forms function as extender tags in a similar way to those in our earlier instances, despite the fact that the proforms *like* and *such-like* are not the head of the extender tag in these examples.[96]

[96] The vast majority of extended forms of *and the like* and *and such like* in my data are of the type shown in (5.6) and (5.7) (cf. Section 5.2.1.2).

(5.6) *Hunger, thyrste, slepe, werines,* ***& such like disposicions****.* (OED, s.v. *such-like/ suchlike* adj. and pron. Aa)

(5.7) *They cause disease and poverty* ***and other like evils****.* (OED, s.v. *like*, adj., adv., prep., and conj., and n.2 A 1e)

5.1.2 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF *AND THE LIKE* IN THE CORPUS

The Chadwyck-Healey collections of literature used in this dissertation (ECF and NCF) yielded 888 tokens of the extender tag *and the like* in the late Modern English period, 560 of the form *and the like*, 316 of the variant *and such like*, and, finally, 12 tokens of the form *and (possessive pronoun) like* (including tokens of *and his like, and her like, and their like* and *and your like*).[97] Out of the total 888 of tokens, 399 were attested in the ECF and the rest, 489, in the NCF. Another 22 tokens of the sequence *and the like/and such like* were excluded from the analysis since they were not considered extender tags.

The rationale for including the forms *and the like* and *and such like* in the discussion lies in the fact that they were identified in the OED as variants of the same extender tag (cf. Section 5.2.1). Furthermore, as will become clear from the analysis in the present chapter, they have proved to behave in a similar manner, both formally and functionally. Moreover, the variant with the personal pronoun (i.e. *and (poss.) like*) was also attested in the OED with extender tag use (cf. Section 5.2.1). In addition, obvious similarities arise from the comparison of this variant and the periphrastic *of* extension of *and the like*, as illustrated in the use of *and their like* and *and the like o' them* in (5.8) and (5.9) below, respectively.

(5.8) *Ah, bon dieu, what a pleasant companion he was, what a brilliant wit, what a rich fund of talk, what a grand manner! – and she had exchanged this for Major Loder, reeking of cigars and brandy-and-*

[97] In the remainder of this chapter, I will refer to the whole paradigm of forms of the extender as "the extender tag *and the like*", for practical reasons. Each of the individual variants will be referred to as "the form/variant *and the like/and such like/and (poss.) like*".

water, and Captain Rook with his horse-jockey jokes and prize-ring slang, ***and their like****.* (Thackeray, William Makepeace. 1848. *Vanity Fair*: 588)

(5.9) *"A man may have a mission to govern, such as Washington and Cromwell* ***and the like o' them****."* (Trollope, Anthony. 1869. *Phineas Finn*: 47 (Vol. 2))

Some other spelling variants have also been included in the analysis, as is the case of *and suchlike, and such-like* and *and the likes*, as well as variants incorporating some determiner, including *and other the like, and other like, and many other like, and other such like* and *and many other such like*. Additional spelling variants with determiners before the tag have been searched for, but the searches yielded no hits. All the aforementioned spelling variants have been subsumed under the variants *and the like* and *and such like* depending on their proform (*like* or *such like*, respectively).

As mentioned above, a total of 22 tokens of the sequence *and the like* and variants have not been included in the analysis of these forms as extender tags. In such cases, as (5.10) below illustrates, what we observe is the literal meaning of the sequence of words *and the like* (i.e. 'and the same'), which happen to be arranged in such order by chance. Therefore, such instances do not correspond to the extender tag use of *and the like*.

(5.10) *There is no doubt that it was a monstrous comfortable circumstance to be sitting in a snug well-furnished room, warmed by a cheerful fire, and full of various pleasant decorations, including four small shoes,* ***and the like amount of silk stockings****, and, – yes, why not? – the feet and legs therein enshrined.* (Dickens, Charles. 1844. *The Life and Adventures of Martin Chuzzlewit:* 215)

There is a very simple way of discerning those cases where *and the like* and *and such like* function as extender tags from those in which they do not. When these forms are extender tags, they can be reduced to the simple or bare form, and the clause is still grammatical, although it, of course, loses some specificity. Let us consider (5.11) and (5.12) in this respect.

(5.11) *After abundance of jolting in carriages, sea-sickness,* ***and such like trifling accidents, incidental to us travellers****, here we are at last, dear Louisa*. (Holcroft, Thomas. 1792. *Anna St. Ives*: 18 (Vol. 2))

(5.12) *"Clearly, at some time in the Long-Ago of human decay the Morlock's food had run short. Possibly they had lived on rats* ***and suchlike vermin****."* (Wells, Herbert George. 1895. *The Time Machine*: 105)

In both (5.11) and (5.12) we can substitute the parts in bold for the bare form *and such like* and the sentence would still retain the same meaning. However, this transformation is not possible in (5.10), where the deletion of *amount of silk stockings* would radically change the sense of the sentence.

The 888 tokens of the extender tag *and the like* attested in my late Modern English data are distributed throughout the period analysed as shown in Table 5.1 below. What we can see here is a dramatic decrease in the use of the tag if we compare the first two subperiods with the next ones. This is due to a very frequent use of the forms under analysis on the part of one individual writer, Daniel Defoe, who is responsible for the production of 24 out of 34 occurrences in the first subperiod, and of 150 out of 196 in the subperiod 1720-39 (75.6% of the total of occurrences of the extender tag *and the like* in these subperiods are his).

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
And the like	**63.9** (34)	**111.2** (196)	**23** (132)	**16** (37)	**7.1** (26)	**2.9** (15)	**14.5** (75)	**16.9** (165)	**12.4** (135)	**14.6** (73)	888

Table 5.1 Evolution of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures)

Although Daniel Defoe is not the only writer who shows a strong tendency to use the extender tag *and the like*, given the low number of words included in the first subperiods (which is reflected in the word count provided in Section 3.1.2), his literary production represents an important part of the total available (in fact, 46.5% of the total of words from 1700 to 1739 belongs to his novels). The strong presence of Defoe's work in this time span and his recurrent use of this extender yield higher than usual values in the first two

subperiods. Figure 5.1 below shows the evolution of the tag including Defoe's writings and without them. If we omit Defoe's use of the extender, the result is a rather stable situation over the late Modern period, with a slight decrease in the presence of this extender towards the turn of the 19th century, but overall with no noticeable change in the frequency of use of the form throughout the period under consideration.



Figure 5.1 Evolution of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

In the subsequent analysis of the extender provided in this chapter, I have decided not to leave out the large number of occurrences that are attested in Defoe's work. It must be borne in mind, however, that higher than expected frequency of occurrence in the two earliest subperiods can be explained by his idiosyncratic writing, rather than implying a consequent diachronic decrease in the use of the tag.

5.2 FORMAL FEATURES OF THE EXTENDER TAG *AND THE LIKE*

This section covers the formal features of the extender tag *and the like* in the late Modern English period, paying special attention to its form (cf. Section 5.2.1), the specificity that it implies (cf. Section 5.2.2), the position that the tag occupies within the sentence in which it appears (cf. Section 5.2.3), the

types of elements that it can take as scope (cf. Section 5.2.4), and, last of all, the co-occurrence of the extender tag with some type of pragmatic marker (cf. Section 5.2.5).

5.2.1 FORM OF THE TAG

The form of the extender tag *and the like* is approached in this section in a slightly different way from the one above for *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.1). Here, we have different variants of the same extender tag, namely the forms *and the like*, *and such like* (with their different spellings and sometimes introduced by the determiners *many* and/or *other*), and the form *and (poss.) like*. I discuss all these different formations and the evolution of their use through the period under consideration (cf. Section 5.2.1.1), before proceeding to the analysis of the dichotomy between bare and extended forms (cf. Section 5.2.1.2) and of the different types of extension that the tag shows in the data (cf. Section 5.2.1.3).

5.2.1.1 EVOLUTION OF THE DIFFERENT VARIANTS OF THE EXTENDER TAG *AND THE LIKE*

As mentioned above, the paradigm of the extender tag *and the like* comprises a variety of different formations, the first of which, and the most common one, is the form *and the like* itself, as illustrated in (5.13) below. In addition, we have the form *and such like*, which can also appear under the spellings *and suchlike* or *and such-like*, as we can see in (5.14). Finally, the NCF also yields tokens of the pattern *and* + possessive pronoun + *like*, exemplified in (5.15) below, and to which I refer as *and (poss.) like*.

(5.13) *Self Interest, in their Judgment, was the sole Mover of human Affairs; and they looked on Virtue, Friendship, Benevolence, Love of Country,* ***and the like****, as Terms invented by the Wise to impose upon the Weak.* (Brooke, Henry. 1765. *The Fool of Quality:* 115 (Vol. 1))

(5.14) *I am sorry to say it's no use asking me about days of the month,* ***and such-like****. Except Sundays, half my time I take no heed of them; being*

a hard-working woman and no scholar. (Collins, Wilkie. 1860. *The Woman in White:* 342 (Vol. 2))

(5.15) *What Confessors were in old times, Quackenboss* ***and his like*** *are in our Protestant Country*. (Thackeray, William Makepeace. 1854. *The Newcomes:* 350 (Vol. 2))

Some other forms belonging to the paradigm of this extender tag have also been found in the material. The first one is the spelling variant *and the likes,* as illustrated in (5.16) below. Also noticeable are the occurrences of the forms *and the like* and *and such like* combined with a determiner placed after the conjunction, yielding sequences such as *and other the like* and *and many such like*, as shown in (5.17) and (5.18), respectively.

(5.16) *"But he would give them written orders on his bankers; they could not think it a ruse," she said eagerly, evidently enamoured of her own idea, since she saw that I entertained it.*

"Sailors don't do nothing about banks ***and the likes of that****, miss."*

(Russell, William Clark. 1878. *The Wreck of the Grosvenor:* 81-82 (Vol. 2))

(5.17) *In years of plenty many thousands of them meet together in the mountains, where they feast and riot for many days; and at country weddings, markets, burials,* ***and other the like public occasions****, they are to be seen, both man and women, perpetually drunk, cursing, blaspheming, and fighting together.* (Scott, (Sir) Walter. 1830. *Guy Mannering:* 65 (Vol. 1))

(5.18) *She did so with great Modesty, and being seated on a Stool near the Door, before which her Sheep were feeding, he began to enquire of her where she was born,* ***and many such like Questions****; and perceived by her Answers, that she had had an Education far above what she appeared to be, and that she disguised her Birth, and did not really, as he supposed, belong to these Peasants with whom she lived.* (Aubin, Penelope. 1739. *Lady Lucy:* 157)

Given that such variants are very rare and occasional throughout the period in question (there are only 14 examples in all), for my analysis, I decided to lump the latter group of forms together with their respective proforms; this way, (5.16) and (5.17) are included within the paradigm of *and the like,* while

(5.18) belongs to the form *and such like*. The distribution of the three resulting group of variants is illustrated in Figure 5.2 below.



Figure 5.2 Distribution of the variants of the extender tag *and the like* in late Modern English (percentages)

As we can see in Figure 5.2, the form *and the like* is by far the most common one, representing more than 63% of the total of occurrences (including those introduced by the determiner), while *and such like* amounts to something more than one third of the total of tokens (36.6%). In turn, the presence of the form *and (poss.) like* is very occasional (1.3% of the total of occurrences of the extender) and, from what we can gather from Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3 below, inexistent until the latter part of the period.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
And the like	**56.4** (30)	**101.6** (179)	**8.5** (49)	**13** (30)	**3** (11)	**1.7** (9)	**8.3** (43)	**9.5** (93)	**7.3** (80)	**7.2** (36)	560
And suchlike	**7.5** (4)	**9.6** (17)	**14.4** (83)	**3** (7)	**4.1** (15)	**1.1** (6)	**6.2** (32)	**7** (68)	**4.9** (53)	**6.2** (31)	316
And (poss.) like	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0.4** (4)	**0.2** (2)	**1.2** (6)	12

Table 5.2 Evolution of the variants of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.3 Evolution of the variants of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)[98]

As seen here, except for subperiods 1740-59 and 1780-99, where *and such like* shows slightly higher rates than *and the like*, the latter variant is the preferred one throughout the late Modern English period. The enormous difference between the frequency of use of the two major variants that is reflected both in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3 in the first two subperiods is due to Defoe's tendency to use the form *and the like* rather than *and such like*. The earliest occurrences of the form *and (poss.) like*, in turn, are first observed towards the middle of the 19th century. However, the frequency of use of this variant is very low in the period that concerns us here. All in all, as already seen in Figure 5.1 above, although we witness an important decrease in the use of the extender at the turn of the century, the situation becomes stable in the 19th century again, with normalized frequencies almost as high as those found throughout the 18th century.

[98] The figure provides a close-up on the data from the subperiod 1740-39 onwards, thus ignoring the complete values of the first two subperiods.

5.2.1.2 BARE AND EXTENDED FORMS OF THE EXTENDER TAG *AND THE LIKE*

As mentioned in Section 2.2.3 above and as we have already witnessed for *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.1.1), extender tags can either occur in their bare form, featuring only the conjunction and the extender tag proform, as we can see in (5.19) below, or they can also be extended, when additional lexical material appears accompanying the tag, usually providing it with greater specificity, as (5.20) illustrates.

(5.19) *However, at last I got some Quilting-Work for Ladies Beds, Petticoats,* ***and the like****; and this I lik'd very well and work'd very hard, and with this I began to live.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1722. *Moll Flanders:* 206-207)

(5.20) *In Allan Water, near by where it falls into the Forth, we found a little sandy islet, overgrown with burdock, butterbur* ***and the like low plants****, that would just cover us if we lay flat.* (Stevenson, Robert Louis. 1886. *Kidnapped:* 261)

Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4 provide the distribution of bare and extended forms of the extender tag *and the like* over the time span under consideration here.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Bare	**52.7** (28)	**92.5** (163)	**13.9** (80)	**12.1** (28)	**4.4** (16)	**2.1** (11)	**8.9** (46)	**12.4** (121)	**10.3** (112)	**11** (55)	660
Extended	**11.3** (6)	**18.7** (33)	**9** (52)	**3.9** (9)	**2.7** (10)	**0.8** (4)	**5.6** (29)	**4.5** (44)	**2.1** (23)	**3.6** (18)	228

Table 5.3 Evolution of bare vs. extended form of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.4 Evolution of bare vs. extended form of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

As seen in Section 4.2.1.1 above, *or something* extended forms vastly outnumbered their bare counterparts all through the late Modern English period, despite the observed increase in use of the latter type towards the end of the period. Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4 above show that for the extender tag *and the like* the situation is a different one: disregarding the two idiosyncratic first subperiods, we see a modest predominance of bare forms over extended ones that remains rather stable over time. In the first two subperiods the figures for the bare form rocket due to Defoe's tendency to use this variant.

A closer look at this extender tag reveals, however, that not all its variants behave in the same way. As we can gather from Figure 5.5 below, the variant *and the like* shows a strong preference for the bare form (52.7% vs. 10.4% for the extended variant), while *and such like* shows a slight preference for the bare form (20.3%) at the expense of the extended one (15.3%). On the other hand, the variant *and (poss.) like* occurs exclusively in its bare form in my data.



Figure 5.5 Distribution of bare and extended forms between the variants of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

The evolution of the different variants throughout the period under analysis is reflected in Table 5.4 and Figure 5.6 below. The data for the variant *and the like* are pretty similar to those provided in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4 above for the tag in general: we see a predominance of the bare forms over the extended ones all through the late Modern English period. As mentioned above, *and the like* is also the variable for which Defoe shows a strong preference, which explains the very high figures in the first two subperiods of this variant at the expense of the other two. In turn, the data for the variant *and such like* reflect an unstable development over time, from a slight preference for extended forms at the beginning of the 18th century to bare forms timidly surpassing extended ones at the end of the 19th century. Finally, the variant *and (poss.) like*, as we have already seen when explaining Figure 5.5 above, occurs solely in its bare form and only at the end of the period analysed.

AND THE LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Bare	**50.8** (27)	**89.1** (157)	**7.5** (43)	**11.2** (26)	**1.6** (6)	**1.5** (8)	**6.2** (32)	**8.2** (80)	**5.8** (63)	**5.2** (26)	468
Extended	**5.6** (3)	**12.5** (22)	**1** (6)	**1.7** (4)	**1.4** (5)	**0.2** (1)	**2.1** (11)	**1.3** (13)	**1.6** (17)	**2** (10)	92

AND SUCHLIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Bare	**1,9** (1)	**3,4** (6)	**6,4** (37)	**0,9** (2)	**2,7** (10)	**0,8** (3)	**2,7** (14)	**3,8** (37)	**4,3** (47)	**4,6** (23)	180
Extended	**5,6** (3)	**6,2** (11)	**8** (46)	**2,2** (5)	**1,4** (5)	**0,8** (3)	**3,5** (18)	**3,2** (31)	**0,5** (6)	**1,6** (8)	136

AND (POSS.) LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Bare	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0,4** (4)	**0,2** (2)	**1,2** (6)	12
Extended	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 5.4 Evolution of bare vs. extended form of the different variants of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)





Figure 5.6 Evolution of bare vs. extended form of the different variants of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

All in all, as was the case with *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.1.1), although in a much more modest manner, with the extender tag *and the like* there is a slight growth in the preference for bare forms throughout the period analysed, although here bare forms are already predominant from the beginning of the period.

5.2.1.3 TYPES OF EXTENSION OF THE EXTENDER TAG *AND THE LIKE*

The array of extension types available for the extender tag *and the like* in its different variants (except the *and (poss.) like* one, which, as seen above, only occurs in its bare form), is much less complex than that of *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.1.2). In what follows, I distinguish two main types of extension: (a) the most prototypical one, where the head of the extender tag *and the like* is a nominal form which the extension post-modifies (similarly to the extensions of *or something*); and (b) a second type of extension where *like* is

an adjective that functions as a modifier of a nominal element that is syntactically the head of the extended form.[99]

Among the patterns of extended forms with *like* as head of the extender tag the most common extension is a prepositional phrase which functions as a post-modifier of *like*. This type is very similar to prepositional similatives with *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.1.2). Illustrations of this pattern are (5.21) and (5.22) below.

(5.21) *"He was aye getting the silly callant Alan awa wi' gigs, and horse,* ***and the like of that****, to Roslin, and Prestonpans, and a' the idle gates he could think of."* (Scott, Sir Walter. 1832. *Redgauntlet:* 9 (Vol. 2))

(5.22) *"One word more, Mr. Clennam," retorted Pancks, "and then enough for to-night. Why should you leave all the gains to the gluttons, knaves, and impostors? Why should you leave all the gains that are to be got, to my proprietor* ***and the like of him****?"* (Dickens, Charles. 1857. *Little Dorrit:* 439)

One isolated example, reproduced here as (5.23), exhibits a relative clause as an extension of *and suchlike*.

(5.23) *"Yes, ma'am, he's gone! He was kindlike to mother when she wer here below, sending her the best ship-coal, and hardly any ashes from it at all; and taties,* ***and suchlike that were very needful to her****."* (Hardy, Thomas. 1886. *The Mayor of Casterbridge:* 307 (Vol. 2))

The most prolific form of extension for the extender tag *and the like* corresponds to a pattern in which we find a nominal element functioning as the head of the extender tag, *Discourses* in the case of (5.24) below, preceded by the adjective *like* (proform of the extender tag), which is in an attributive relation to the noun, pre-modifying it.

(5.24) *'The almighty's Ears are always open to our Complaints; trust him, in his own Time he will deliver us, or take us to eternal Rest.' With these,* ***and such like Discourses*** *he comforted them daily.* (Aubin, Penelope. 1739. *Coun de Vinevil:* 54)

[99] These forms have already been introduced in Section 5.1.1 above.

As in regular noun phrases, the noun that serves as head of the extender tag can be further pre-modified,[100] as is illustrated in (5.25) below, post-modified, as is the case of (5.26), or it can show both pre- and post-modification, as in (5.27), where the head of the tag, the noun *accidents*, is pre-modified by the adjective *trifling* and post-modified by the adjective phrase *incidental to us travellers*. As we already commented in the discussion of *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.1.2), the more information accompanying the extender tag, the greater specificity it gains.

(5.25) *She sat down in the shop, and amused herself with talking to the woman on the new modes of dress,* ***and such like ordinary matters****.* (Haywood, Eliza Fowler. 1751. *Betsy Thoughtless:* 43 (Vol. 1))

(5.26) *But when he heard he was alive in the Enemy's Hands, he was the easier, and applied himself to the recruiting his Troops,* ***and the like Business of the War****; and it was not long before he paid the Imperialists with Interests.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1720. *Memoirs of a Cavalier:* 137-138)

(5.27) = (5.11) *After abundance of jolting in carriages, sea-sickness,* ***and such like trifling accidents, incidental to us travellers****, here we are at last, dear Louisa.* (Holcroft, Thomas. 1792. *Anna St. Ives:* 18 (Vol. 2))

Figure 5.7 shows the vast predominance of noun phrase extension for the extender tag *and the like* in the late Modern English period. Furthermore, as we can see from Table 5.5 and Figure 5.8 below, diachronically, the noun phrase extension is the only type of extension that the tag shows until the latter part of the 18th century. Prepositional phrases as extensions of *and the like* do not occur until the 1780-1800 subperiod and then only sporadically, and the only occurrence of a relative clause extension in my data dates from the last subperiod in the NCF. It may well have been the case that the extended forms where *like* is an adjective that pre-modifies a nominal head of the extender tag of the type shown in (5.24) above, were those from which the bare form originated. It is hard to tell because the situation that we

[100] We have to bear in mind that the nominal head is already pre-modified by the adjective *like*.

witness in the late Modern English period in this respect is one of relative stability, where extended forms are not being replaced by their bare counterparts (cf. Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4 above). However, such replacement could have taken place at an earlier stage of the language, so that late Modern English corresponds to a transitional period where bare forms already outnumber extended ones and begin to acquire new types of extensions (probably imitating other extender tags).[101]



Figure 5.7 Distribution of types of extension of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
NP	**11.3** (6)	**18.7** (33)	**9** (52)	**3.9** (9)	**1.9** (7)	**0.8** (4)	**4.1** (21)	**4.2** (41)	**0.9** (10)	**3** (15)	198
Prep. P	-	-	-	-	**0.8** (3)	-	**1.5** (8)	**0.3** (3)	**1.2** (13)	**0.4** (2)	29
Rel. Cl	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0.2** (1)	1

Table 5.5 Evolution of types of extension of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)

[101] Note that such types of extension have already been attested for *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.1.2). The relative clause extension type is also found in Carroll's (2008) data, shown in example (2.87) (cf. Section 2.5).



Figure 5.8 Evolution of types of extension of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

As regards the nominal extension type, I already mentioned that head nouns can take further modification in addition to the forms *like* or *suchlike*. Figure 5.9 below shows that the tendency is for these nouns to take no additional modification in almost 60% of the cases. In the remaining instances, pre-modification clearly outnumbers post-modification (25.8% vs. 9.6%), and those examples where both pre- and post-modification are present are rather rare (6% of the total instances). Furthermore, we can see from Table 5.6 below that no clear pattern of evolution can be discerned, as occurrences of the different types of modification of nominal extensions of *and the like* are scattered about the various subperiods.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
None	**7.5** (4)	**13.6** (24)	**5.2** (30)	**0.9** (2)	**0.5** (2)	**0.6** (3)	**2.7** (14)	**2.7** (26)	**0.4** (4)	**1.4** (7)	116
Pre-mod.	**1.9** (1)	**2.8** (5)	**2.4** (14)	**1.7** (4)	**0.8** (3)	-	**1.2** (6)	**0.8** (8)	**0.5** (5)	**1** (5)	51
Post-mod.	**1.9** (1)	**2.3** (4)	**1** (6)	**0.9** (2)	-	-	**0.2** (1)	**0.4** (4)	-	**0.2** (1)	19
Both	-	-	**0.3** (2)	**0.4** (1)	**0.5** (2)	**0.2** (1)	-	**0.3** (3)	**0.1** (1)	**0.4** (2)	12

Table 5.6 Evolution of modification of nominal extensions of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.9 Distribution of modification of nominal extensions of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

All in all, it seems that the form of the extender tag *and the like* is rather stable in the period under analysis, bare forms being more common than extended ones all through late Modern English. However, a shift seems to have taken place among the extended forms, as towards the end of the time span analysed here the tag adopts new extension types, more similar to those found with other extender tags.

5.2.2 SPECIFICITY OF THE TAG

As is also the case for the extender tag *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.2), the specificity of the tag *and the like* is determined by the presence or absence of lexical material as part of the extender. The more contentful the extension of the tag is, the greater specificity it will show, as it will give information that will narrow down the choice of the kind of elements that can be added to the ones already present in the scope of the tag.

The dichotomy between general and specific tokens of the tag does not match that between bare and extended forms. Although all bare forms of the tag have general reference, not all extended forms are specific, as we have already seen for *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.2). Thus, for example, we come

across extended instances that are nonspecific, as is the case of (5.28), and others that, as pointed out by Carroll (2008) and explained in Chapter 4 for *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.2), show different degrees of specificity, as we can see by comparing (5.29) and (5.30).

(5.28) *"He has probably brought something from Framley," said Lucy, having cream* ***and such like matters*** *in her mind; for cream* ***and such like matters*** *had come from Framley Court more than once during her sojourn there.* (Trollope, Anthony. 1861. *Framley Parsonage:* 280-281 (Vol. 3))

(5.29) *"Weel I wot I wad be broken if I were to gie sic weight to the folk that come to buy our pepper and brimstone,* ***and such like sweetmeats****."* (Scott, Sir Walter. 1830. *The Antiquary:* 204 (Vol. 1))

(5.30) *"I used to meet him occasionally in the town; and then, as I was too good natured to resent his unmannerly conduct, and he bore no malice against me, – he was never unwilling to talk to me; on the contrary, he would cling to me and follow me anywhere, – but to the club, and the gaming-houses,* ***and such like dangerous places of resort*** *– he was so weary of his own moping, melancholy mind."* (Brontë, Anne. 1848. *The Tenant of Wildfell Hall:* 44 (Vol. 2))

The semantically light noun *matters* in *and such like matters* in (5.28) above does not add specificity to the tag; it conveys so little information that there would not be a difference in meaning if we removed it from the sentence. *Matters* belongs to a group of nouns which are almost semantically empty (in some of their nuances), as is also the case with *things* or *stuff*, which are added in these instances where unspecificity is to be implied. On the other hand, we can see that *and such like sweetmeats* in (5.29) offers more information about the things that could be added to the enumeration (other sweetmeats in this case), but not so much as *and such like dangerous places of resort* in (5.30). In other words, the more contentful the extension of the tag, the higher its level of specificity. Therefore, we can say that in the case of *and the like*, as happened with *or something*, we can establish a cline concerning the specificity of the tag. However, for the sake of simplicity, and

given that we are dealing with very low frequencies,[102] I have decided to keep Overstreet's (1999) dichotomy between general and specific occurrences of the tag.

Figure 5.10 below for *and the* like can be compared to Figure 4.6 in Section 4.2.2 above for *or something*. Both figures are very similar and show that both *or something* and *and the like* seem to behave exactly in the same way concerning specificity in the late Modern English period. Note that they show almost the same distribution of general and specific occurrences (*and the like*: 80.2% vs. 19.8%; *or something*: 81% vs. 19%).



Figure 5.10 Distribution of types of specificity of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

However, if we take a look at the diachronic evolution of the tag, as shown in Table 5.7 and Figure 5.11 below, we can see that this is not the case. Although the extender tag *and the like* shows by far more commonly general specificity (in 80.2% of the total of occurrences), these figures are clearly biased due to Defoe's excessive use of general *and the like* in the first two subperiods.

[102] Note that, as attested in Table 5.3 above, the extender tag *and the like* is more frequently found in its bare form; its extended variants represent merely one quarter of the total of occurrences.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
General	**52.7** (28)	**93.6** (165)	**16** (92)	**12.1** (28)	**5.2** (19)	**2.5** (13)	**10.3** (53)	**13.1** (128)	**11.8** (128)	**11.6** (58)	712
Specific	**11.3** (6)	**17.6** (31)	**7** (40)	**3.9** (9)	**1.9** (7)	**0.4** (2)	**4.3** (22)	**3.8** (37)	**0.6** (7)	**3** (15)	176

Table 5.7 Evolution of general and specific reference of the extender tag *and the like* in normalized frequencies and raw numbers



Figure 5.11 Evolution of general and specific reference of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

While in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.7 we observed that the general reference of *or something* grew in frequency during the period analysed (cf. Section 4.2.2), the distribution of general and specific reference with *and the like* remains stable over the same time span. Once we disregard Defoe's contribution, we can see that general occurrences of the tag outnumber specific ones all through the late Modern English period, but we witness no clear growth nor decrease in this tendency. In other words, there is no movement towards unspecificity, as was the case with *or something*.

If we take a closer look at the data and subdivide the extender into its different variants, as reflected in Figure 5.12, we can see that they behave in a different manner. While all occurrences of *and (poss.) like* and the great

majority of those of *and the like* have general reference, *and such like* shows a higher proportion of specific tokens, despite its preference for general reference as well.



Figure 5.12 Distribution of general and specific reference between variants of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

Furthermore, if we examine the evolution of these variants throughout the late Modern English period, as shown in Table 5.8 and Figure 5.13, we see that the form *and the like* (the one preferred by Defoe) shows a similar development to the one presented in Table 5.7 and Figure 5.11 above for the extender tag *and the like* as a whole, with general nuances outnumbering specific ones all through the period, with an apparent stability in numbers. *And such like*, in turn, shows some fluctuations across time, from a predominance of specific occurrences of the tag at the beginning of the 18th century to a prevalence of general reference over specific reference at the end of the 19th century. Finally, the variant *and (poss.) like* does not appear until the second half of the 19th century and occurs only with general reference (cf. Table 5.8).

AND THE LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
General	**50.8** (27)	**90.2** (159)	**7.7** (44)	**11.2** (26)	**2.5** (9)	**1.7** (9)	**7.2** (37)	**8.7** (85)	**7.1** (77)	**5.6** (28)	501
Specific	**5.7** (3)	**11.3** (20)	**0.9** (5)	**1.7** (4)	**0.5** (2)	-	**1.2** (6)	**0.8** (8)	**0.3** (3)	**1.6** (8)	59

AND SUCH LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
General	**1.9** (1)	**3.4** (6)	**8.3** (48)	**0.9** (2)	**2.7** (10)	**0.8** (4)	**3.1** (16)	**4** (39)	**4.5** (49)	**4.8** (24)	199
Specific	**5.6** (3)	**6.2** (11)	**6.1** (35)	**2.2** (5)	**1.4** (5)	**0.4** (2)	**3.1** (16)	**3** (29)	**0.4** (4)	**1.4** (7)	117

AND (POSS.) LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
General	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0.4** (4)	**0.2** (2)	**1.2** (6)	12
Specific	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 5.8 Evolution of general and specific reference of the variants of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)





Figure 5.13 Evolution of general and specific reference of the variants of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

To sum up, it seems that the behaviour of the extender tag *and the like* in late Modern English is somewhat different from that of *or something* as described in Section 4.2.2. While the latter shows a change towards unspecificity, the tag acquiring more general meaning over time, *and the like* seems to have already reached a point of stability concerning specificity, with general reference being more common than specific occurrences of the extender all through the period under analysis in this dissertation, despite the slight fluctuations observed for the variant *and such like*.

5.2.3 POSITION OF THE TAG IN THE CLAUSE

As mentioned in Section 2.2.3, the most prototypical position for extender tags is at the end of the clause and clause-final position is also the preferred position of the extender tag *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.3). It must be noted, however, that clause-final position does not cover the totality of occurrences of extender tags, which explains why Carroll (2008) maintains that it is not at the end of clauses that extenders occur, but rather at the end of the phrase where they appear. The fact that such phrase-final occurrence occupies in

many cases (at least in present-day English) clause-final position as well is probably the reason for the usual characterization of extender tags as clause-final elements.

In the late Modern English period, the extender *and the like* can occupy three different positions within the clause where it appears: (i) occasionally clause medial position, in the middle of the phrase of which it is a part, as we can see in (5.31) below, where the enumeration continues after the appearance of the tag; (ii) it is more common for the tag to appear in phrase-final position, where the clause does not end after it, as illustrated in (5.32); and (iii) there are cases where, apart from being phrase-final, the extender is also in clause-final position, as the clause does not go on after the extender tag, as in (5.33).

(5.31) *You'll have to hear all about Wantage, the birthplace of Alfred, and Farringdon which held out so long for Charles the First, (the vale was near Oxford, and dreadfully malignant; full of Throgmortons, Puseys, and Pyes,* ***and such like****, and their brawny retainers).* (Hughes, Thomas. 1857. *Tom Brown's School Days:* 17)

(5.32) *No better dining-table could be required than the chest, which he solemnly devoted to that useful service thenceforth. Their blankets, clothes,* ***and the like****, he hung on pegs and nails.* (Dickens, Charles. 1844. *The Life and Adventures of Martin Chuzzlewit:* 287)

(5.33) *"Very well; you makes your way with the big wigs, lords and earls* ***and them like****, and you gets returned for a rotten borough; – you'll excuse me, but that's about it, ain't it? – and then you goes in for government!"* (Trollope, Anthony. 1869. *Phineas Finn:* 47 (Vol. 2))

As shown in Figure 5.14 below, the frequencies of the different positions of the extender tag *and the like* are almost the same as those attested for *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.3). Close to two thirds of the occurrences of this tag correspond to clause-final position (63.8%), while medial positioning is very marginal, only 6 examples (0.7%) in the whole corpus. In turn, phrase-final position is found in 35.5% of the instances.



Figure 5.14 Distribution of position of the extender *and the like* in the clause (percentages)

If we take a closer look at the different variants of this extender tag in Figure 5.15 below, we can see that the percentages for the form *and the like* are very similar to those presented in Figure 5.14 for the tag as a whole, with a clear predominance of clause-final position. By contrast, the variant *and such like* does not present such a drastic difference between phrase-final and clause-final occurrences, even though the latter type is also in this case more common than the former. The form *and (poss.) like*, on the contrary, shows a preference for phrase-final over clause-final position.



Figure 5.15 Distribution of position of the different variants of the extender tag *and the like* in the clause (percentages)

In what follows, I analyse how the extender tag and its different variants have evolved through the late Modern English period concerning the position in which they appear in the clause. As we can observe from Table 5.9 and Figure 5.16 below, the strong tendency that we witnessed in the distribution of position in Figure 5.14 above to clause-final occurrence is mainly due to the extremely high numbers that correspond to the two first subperiods, as a result of Defoe's vast use of this tag, specially at the end of the clause. As becomes evident from the data below, although clause-final position is slightly more common than phrase-final overall, the two major positions basically go hand in hand all through the period under analysis.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Medial	-	**0.6** (1)	**0.2** (1)	-	**0.3** (1)	-	-	**0.2** (2)	**0.1** (1)	-	6
Phrase-Final	**18.9** (10)	**27.8** (49)	**8.7** (50)	**3.9** (9)	**2.7** (10)	**0.9** (5)	**7.5** (39)	**6.1** (59)	**4.2** (46)	**7.6** (38)	315
Clause-Final	**45.1** (24)	**82.8** (146)	**14.1** (81)	**12.1** (28)	**4.1** (15)	**1.9** (10)	**7** (36)	**10.7** (104)	**8.1** (88)	**7** (35)	567

Table 5.9 Evolution of position of the extender tag *and the like* in the clause (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.16 Evolution of position of the extender tag *and the like* in the clause (normalized frequencies)

When focusing on the diachronic evolution of the different variants of the tag *and the like*, we can see that the situation is pretty similar to the one presented above for the tag as a whole. As seen in Table 5.10 and Figure 5.17, both *and the like* and *and such like* show a slight preference for clause-final position. However, apart from the idiosyncratic behaviour of the first two subperiods in the case of *and the like* (Defoe's preferred variant), the frequency of phrase-final occurrences is not too different from that of clause-final position. Furthermore, there seems to be no change in tendency; the situation remains basically the same all through the period analysed, although at some points phrase-final tags outnumber clause-final ones. The variant *and (poss.) like*, in turn, shows a preference for phrase-final positioning, contrary to the other two variants, but it is such a low-frequency form that the results do not warrant definitive conclusions.

AND THE LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Medial	-	-	**0.2** (1)	-	**0.3** (1)	-	-	**0.1** (1)	-	-	3
Phrase-Final	**18.8** (10)	**23.8** (42)	**3.3** (19)	**2.6** (6)	**1.1** (4)	**0.4** (2)	**4.1** (21)	**3** (29)	**2.6** (28)	**3.8** (19)	180
Clause-Final	**37.6** (20)	**77.7** (137)	**5** (29)	**10.4** (24)	**1.6** (6)	**1.3** (7)	**4.3** (22)	**6.5** (63)	**4.6** (52)	**3.4** (17)	377

AND SUCH LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Medial	-	**0.6** (1)	-	-	-	-	-	**0.1** (1)	**0.1** (1)	-	3
Phrase-Final	-	**4** (7)	**5.4** (31)	**1.3** (3)	**1.6** (6)	**0.6** (3)	**3.5** (18)	**2.8** (27)	**1.6** (17)	**2.8** (14)	126
Clause-Final	**7.5** (4)	**5.1** (9)	**9** (52)	**1.7** (4)	**2.5** (9)	**0.6** (3)	**2.7** (14)	**4.1** (40)	**3.2** (35)	**3.4** (17)	187

AND (POSS.) LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Medial	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Phrase-Final	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0.3** (3)	**0.1** (1)	**1** (5)	9
Clause-Final	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0.1** (1)	**0.1** (1)	**0.2** (1)	3

Table 5.10 Evolution of position of the different variants of the extender *and the like* in the clause (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.17 Evolution of position of the different variants of the extender *and the like* in the clause (normalized frequencies)

Summing up, although the general figures seem to point to both *or something* and *and the like* showing the same behaviour concerning the position that they occupy in the clause, closer inspection of the data reveals that this is not indeed the case. While *or something* exhibits an evolution towards clause-final preference, *and the like* is more stable through time, showing a slight preference for clause-final positioning all through the 18th

and 19th centuries, with little variability, disregarding the higher rates of clause-final position in the first two subperiods due to Defoe's contribution.

5.2.4 SCOPE OF THE TAG

The aim of this section is to present the data obtained for the different types of scope of the extender tag *and the like* from a qualitative as well as a quantitative point of view, in a similar fashion to *or something* in Section 4.2.4 above. I have already pointed out that extender tags, in general, have been described as not requiring a strict grammatical agreement relation with their scopes (cf. Section 2.2.3). In the case of *or something,* the data revealed the existence of a variety of scope types, although in the vast majority of cases agreement was found to occur.

As was done for the extender *or something*, in what follows I first delimit what would constitute strict grammatical agreement for the extender tag *and the like* and its scope. Both when *like* is a noun and when it is an adjective pre-modifying a noun phrase (cf. Section 5.2.1.2), the extender would agree with a noun phrase. Contrary to *or something*, where only inanimate nouns showed agreement with the tag, for *and the like* any type of noun phrase will show agreement with the tag, either animate or inanimate, singular or plural, concrete or abstract, etc. In those cases where *like* is an adjective pre-modifying a noun, it is the noun the one which governs agreement with the scope. Figure 5.18 below shows very similar figures to those obtained in the analysis of *or something* (cf. Figure 4.10 above), with almost three quarters of the total of tokens being noun phrases, and the remaining quarter being distributed among all the other possible scope types. In the case of *and the like*, these types are even more varied, including all those identified for *or something* (except adverb phrases) and two additional categories. In the light of the data below, it can safely be maintained that, as was already the case with *or something*, agreement between the extender and its scope is the most common scenario in the late Modern English period, as noun phrases widely outnumber any other kind of scope.



Figure 5.18 Distribution of scope type for the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

Nominal scope, as we have just seen, is the most common of all the types (72.5%) that have been attested in the period at issue here. (5.34) is an illustration of this type, with the noun phrases *tumble-down wood-work* and *rotten rafters* as the scope of *and such like*.

(5.34) *"You know what a queer old place the Castle is, my lady; all tumble-down wood-work, and rotten rafters,* ***and such like****."* (Braddon, Mary Elizabeth. 1862. *Lady Audley's Secret:* 303 (Vol. 2))

Among the rest of the scope types, verb phrase scopes are one of the most common. 9.7% of the total of occurrences are of the type exemplified in (5.35) below, where two verb phrases, *have made their Attendants serve them upon the Knee* and *have given Visitors their Hand to kiss*, appear as the scope of the tag.

(5.35) *I have wonder'd since, that it did not make me Mad; nor do I now think it strange, to hear of those, who have been quite Lunatick with their Pride; that fancy'd themselves Queens, and Empresses, and have made their Attendants serve them upon the Knee; given Visitors their Hand to kiss,* ***and the like****; for certainly, if Pride will not turn the Brain, nothing can.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1724. *Roxana:* 290)

Prepositional phrases as scope of *and the like* are far less common, representing only 1% of the total of occurrences. The prepositional phrases *into his debts*, *after his companions* and *into his amours* in (5.36) below clearly illustrate this type of scope for the extender tag *and the like*.

(5.36) *My Brother had just before, with the approbation of my Uncles, employed a person related to a discharged Bailiff or Steward of Lord M. who had the management of some part of Mr. Lovelace's affairs (from which he was also dismissed by him) to enquire into his debts, after his companions, into his amours,* ***and the like****.* (Richardson, Samuel. 1751. *Clarissa:* 22 (Vol. 1))

Another type of scope that has also proved to be quite uncommon is that of adjective phrases. One of these few cases that belong to the 1% of attested occurrences of this kind is (5.37), where *good tempered* and *agreeable* are the scope of *and the like*.

(5.37) *"Why ay, Miss, as you justly observes, 'tis full early to know what people be; but I hope we shall find her quite the thing; and if so be as she's but good tempered, and agreeable,* ***and the like****, why I warrant we shall pass this here summer as pleasant as any thing can be."* (Smith, Charlotte Turner. 1788. *Emmeline:* 26 (Vol. 1))

As was already the case with *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.4), for the extender tag *and the like* we find both phrasal scope types, which are the ones that have been described in the previous paragraphs, and clausal scope types. To this second class belong embedded clauses, which show the highest frequency rate overall after the noun phrase scope, representing 12.1% of the total of occurrences. As an illustration, consider the two embedded clauses in (5.38), *that I wou'd not let her kill the Girl when she wou'd have done it* and *that it was all my own doing*, which serve as scope of *and the like*.

(5.38) *This put Amy into such a Hurry, that she cry'd; she rav'd; she swore and curs'd like a Mad-thing; then she upbraided me, that I wou'd not let her kill the Girl when she wou'd have done it; and that it was all my own doing,* ***and the like****.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1724. *Roxana:* 368)

Relative clauses as scope of the tag are very uncommon in my data. I have only found two tokens of this kind, which represent 0.2% of the total of

occurrences. Furthermore, this is a type that I have not encountered when analysing *or something*. One of these rare examples is (5.39) below, which shows the relative clauses *that is spiteful or malicious* and *that is disrespectful or undutiful* as scope of *and such like*.

(5.39) *To be sure, the Occasion on which he mentions this, explains it; that I must say nothing, tho' in Anger, that is spiteful or malicious; that is disrespectful or undutiful,* ***and such like****.* (Richardson, Samuel. 1741. *Pamela:* 320 (Vol. 2))

The last of the clausal scope types is illustrated in (5.40), which includes a whole clause or clauses as scope of the tag, as is the case here with the clauses *here lives a Fortune-teller*, *here lives an Astrologer* and *here you may have your Nativity calculated*.

(5.40) *[A]nd this Trade grew so open, and so generally practised, that it became common to have Signs and Inscriptions set up at Doors; here lives a Fortune-teller; here lives an Astrologer; here you may have your Nativity calculated,* ***and the like****.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1722. *A Journal of the Plague Year:* 32)

I have added a further category of scope type for those tokens which contain different parts of speech combined as scope of the tag, which makes their assignment to any of the previous categories impossible. This is the case of (5.41) below, where the scope of the tag is formed by the combination of the noun phrase *the Fight* and the embedded clause *how they escaped*. I have decided to leave cases like this one, which amount to only 0.7% of the total of occurrences, under the label 'ambiguous' rather than arbitrarily assigning them to any of the scope types that they feature. However, some cases of combined scope types have been disambiguated. For instance, when the scope of the ambiguous extender tag contains more tokens belonging to one particular part of speech than to another, the tag is assigned to the more numerous scope type.

(5.41) *They sent about 20 scattering Troopers who pretending themselves to be Imperialists fled from the Battle, were let in one by one, and still as they came in, they staid at the Court of Guard in the Port, entertaining*

the Souldiers with Discourse about the Fight, and how they escaped, ***and the like****.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1720. *Memoirs of a Cavalier:* 128-129)

Unlike in the case of *or something*, with the extender tag *and the like* in a number of instances it was difficult to assign forms ending in *-ing* either to the nominal or to the verbal categories of scope. This is due to the development and reanalysis of deverbal nouns into verbal forms, which was taking place around the period that we are analysing. This explains the occurrence of some hybrid forms in this period, like *the recruiting his Troops* in (5.42).

(5.42) = (5.26) *But when he heard he was alive in the Enemy's Hands, he was the easier, and applied himself to the recruiting his Troops,* ***and the like Business of the War****; and it was not long before he paid the Imperialists with Interests.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1720. *Memoirs of a Cavalier:* 137-138)

Although Aarts (2007) suggests to apply the *Best Fit Principle* in such cases, quantifying if the nominal traits outnumber the verbal ones, or vice versa, and thus assign each item to the corresponding category, there are times where the nominal and verbal characteristics are balanced, and the resulting items are then considered true hybrids (Aarts 2007: 213-229). This would indeed be the case of (5.42) above, where we find the same amount of nominal traits (the definite article preceding the *-ing* form) as of verbal features (governing a direct object). Fanego (2004; 2007) traces the evolution from the early deverbal nouns ending in *–ing* to their acquisition of verbal traits and ultimate yielding gerunds (verbal forms). She explains that given that such change was not abrupt, but gradual, and took place over a long period of time (since Middle English and the beginning of the early Modern English period, deverbal nouns began acquiring verbal traits until their final falling under prescriptive norms from the end of the 18th century onwards), in this transitional period they "could exhibit practically any combination of nominal and verbal properties" (Fanego 2004: 30), which made those forms hybrids. Nevertheless, she also claims that in the course of the 18th century, "this co-occurrence of nominal and verbal features became greatly restricted, […] only determiners, whether possessives or articles, remained compatible with

verbal gerunds" (Fanego 2004: 30), because, as she suggests, "the function of *the* in such instances was no longer to indicate definite reference, but rather to provide the following verbal gerund with an introductory element of some kind" (Fanego 2007: 192), in lack of a suitable complementizer for cases such as these. Therefore, Fanego claims that instances as (5.42) above can already be considered as verbal rather than as truly hybrid. I have considered, then, examples of this kind which show verbal traits, such as direct or indirect objects, as verbal despite the fact that they are introduced by a determiner.

The type presented in (5.43) is somewhat more complex, as it shows a further nominal trait, the *of*-complement *of my precious jewel and virgin innocence*, instead of a plain direct object. However, cases like this are very infrequent in the period that concerns us in this dissertation, and I decided to consider them as verbal with residual nominal traits.

(5.43) *You seem to have no notion of pure refined friendship between man and woman, Mr. Proctor, which makes you write as you do, of his robbing me of my precious jewel and virgin innocence,* ***and such like vulgar stuff as never once entered my head****: and it is quite monstrous that it should enter yours, at an age when, by your own confession, in your indecent letter to me, you are unfit for marriage.* (Moore, John. 1800. *Mordaunt:* 322 (Vol. 3))

Another useful hint to distinguish nominal from verbal *–ing* forms concerns capitalization, as it was frequent in the early part of the late Modern English period (not so much later on) to write nouns with an initial capital letter, as *Bleeding* in (5.44) below. Even so, capitalization depended much on the style of the writer, and cannot be taken as a mandatory feature for nouns in this period.

(5.44) *… I never was so desirous of disobeying them before, to attend the Darling of my Heart: And why? – For fear of this poor Face! – For fear I should get it myself! – But I am living now, very low, and have taken proper Precautions by Bleeding,* ***and the like****, to lessen the Distemper's Fury, if I should have it: And the rest I leave to Providence.* (Richardson, Samuel. 1742. *Pamela:* 256 (Vol. 4))

Furthermore, we also find cases of ambiguity regarding the assignment of a given scope to the tag. When we analysed the extender tag *or something*, examples of this kind represented just 1.9% (cf. Section 4.2.4), while in the case of *and the like* such instances amount to 13.2% of the total of occurrences. These are tokens such as (5.45) below, where it is not clear if *and the like* refers back to the previous and immediate verb phrase *eaten by Cannibals* or to the whole list that precedes it: *perishing*, *starving*, *being devoured by wild Beasts*, *murthered* and *eaten by Cannibals.* In this case, I have decided to consider the whole list of verb phrases as scope of the tag because, although some are linked by commas and others by the adjunctive conjunction, they are all conjoined at the same level of analysis.

(5.45) *[W]hereas my Companions in the Misery, were so sunk by their Fear and Grief, that they abandoned themselves to the Misery of their Condition, and gave over all Thought but of their perishing and starving, being devoured by wild Beasts, murthered, and perhaps eaten by Cannibals,* ***and the like****.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1720. *Captain Singleton:* 16)

The results of the evolution for the extender tag *and the like,* as summarized in Table 5.11 and Figure 5.19 below, are different from the ones obtained for *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.4). In both cases nominal scopes outnumber by far any other type of scope. However, while with *or something* the wider variety of scope types is attested in the second half of the period analysed, in the case of *and the like* all the scopes types different from the nominal one are already found in the 18th century and the variation is reduced as the period progresses. This may be due to the fact that the first subperiods exhibit the highest rates of occurrence of this tag, which therefore show as well the greatest degree of variability of scope types. Accordingly, we witness an incontestable prevalence of the nominal scope over any other type all through the late Modern English period for the extender tag *and the like*.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
NP	**41.4** (22)	**57.9** (102)	**15.3** (88)	**9.9** (23)	**3.5** (13)	**1.9** (10)	**11.6** (60)	**15** (146)	**10.3** (112)	**13.6** (68)	645
VP	**9.4** (5)	**14.7** (26)	**1.6** (9)	**2.6** (6)	**1.1** (4)	**0.8** (4)	**1.7** (9)	**0.8** (8)	**1.1** (12)	**0.6** (3)	86
PrepP	-	**2.3** (4)	**0.5** (3)	-	**0.3** (1)	-	-	**0.1** (1)	-	-	7
AdjP	-	**1.1** (2)	**0.5** (4)	-	**0.3** (1)	-	**0.2** (1)	-	**0.1** (1)	-	9
Embedded Clause	**11.3** (6)	**28.4** (50)	**3.3** (19)	**2.2** (5)	**1.6** (6)	**0.2** (1)	**0.4** (2)	**0.8** (8)	**0.7** (8)	**0.4** (2)	107
Relative Clause	-	-	**0.2** (1)	-	**0.3** (1)	-	-	-	-	-	2
Whole Clause	-	**4** (7)	**1.4** (8)	**1.3** (3)	-	-	**0.6** (3)	**0.2** (2)	**0.2** (2)	-	25
Ambiguous	**1.9** (1)	**2.8** (5)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6

Table 5.11 Evolution of scope of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.19 Evolution of scope of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

If we take a closer look at the different variants of the tag and at the behaviour concerning the scope types with which they tend to occur, the data reveal some interesting differences between variants. As we can see in Figure 5.20 below, the variant *and the like* occurs with all kinds of scope types illustrated above, and shows the lowest rate of nominal scopes, although this is also the most common one by far (67%). On the other hand, *and such like* occurs with nominal scopes in 81.3% of the examples and shows much less

variability. Finally, for the variant *and (poss.) like* nominal scope applies in all occurrences.[103]



Figure 5.20 Distribution of scope type for variants of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

[103] I have not included here the detailed evolution of the different variants because it does not show anything different from what we saw in Table 5.11 and Figure 5.19 above.

In what follows, I discuss the nature of nominal scopes, as done above for *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.4). As we can gather from Figure 5.21 below, more than three quarters of the total of nominal scopes of the tag are inanimate noun phrases (77.8%) in contrast to 22.2% of animate scopes, mostly human (20.3%) and only 1.9% of non-human types. This distribution clearly differs from the one attested for *or something*, for which 95.5% of the cases corresponded to inanimate nominal elements as scope of the tag.



Figure 5.21 Distribution of types of nominal scope of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

The observable difference in proportion of human scopes between the extender tag *and the like* and *or something* (20.3% vs. 2.9%; cf. Section 4.2.4) lies in the fact that the majority of human scopes with *or something* were interpreted as having a metonymic reading and thus considered inanimate. Therefore, when mention was made to a profession, political or social status, kinship, origin, etc., the extender was understood as referring to such status and not to the persons themselves. This was illustrated by means of (4.63), repeated here for convenience as (5.46). Although less common, examples similar to (5.46) are also attested for the extender tag *and the like*, as (5.47), where reference is made to the profession of the people mentioned, stating

that they are *retired housekeepers* and *tradesfolk* in this case. By contrast, the vast majority of scopes of this kind are considered as human in the case of *and the like,* as it is interpreted that what is being referred to is the person who has a particular status or plays a particular role. (5.48) is a very illustrative example. Here the speaker overtly states *we of the thimble*, clearly pointing out that reference is being made to the people of the thimble and to those who are clayfakers, rather than to the professions, as was the case with the metonymic reading of (5.46) and (5.47).

(5.46) = (4.63) *"Isn't Mr FitzHoward nephew to the Duchess of St. Bungay?" "Nephew, or cousin,* ***or something****."* (Trollope, Anthony. 1864. *The Small House at Allington:* 255 (Vol. 2))

(5.47) *Many persons who let lodgings in Brighton have been servants themselves – are retired housekeepers, tradesfolk,* ***and the like****.* (Thackeray, William Makepeace. 1854. *The Newcomes:* 88 (Vol. 1))

(5.48) *"Bonnet is cant," said the man; "we of the thimble, as well as all clyfakers* ***and the like****, understand cant, as, of course, must every bonnet; so, if you are employed by me, you had better learn it as soon as you can, that we may discourse together without being understood by every one."* (Borrow, George Henry. 1851. *Lavengro:* 225 (Vol. 2))

The data also yielded examples similar to those which were classified as human in the case of *or something*, with direct reference to people in the scope of the tag, as we can see in (5.49).

(5.49) *In this way, therefore, he had got into a habit of looking at the hounds, and keeping up his acquaintance in the country, meeting Lord Dumbello, Mr. Green Walker, Harold Smith,* ***and other such like sinners****.* (Trollope, Anthony. 1861. *Framley Parsonage:* 245-246 (Vol. 1))

In addition to human scopes, the other type of animate scope comprises non-human referents, mostly animals, as in (5.50) below. These amount to only 1.9% of the total of occurrences, almost insignificant if compared to the extremely high proportion (77.6%) of inanimate scopes, as the one illustrated in (5.51), featuring the noun phrase *firewood.*

(5.50) *I also became much taken up with the manners and appearance of the anemones, and star-fish, and crabs, and sea-urchins,* ***and such like creatures****.* (Ballantyne, Robert Michael. 1858. *The Coral Island:* 83)

(5.51) *The garret, built to be a depository for firewood* ***and the like****, was dime and dark.* (Dickens, Charles. 1859. *A Tale of Two Cities:* 25)

As regards the animacy feature for the different variants of the tag, *and (poss.) like* occurs exclusively with human scopes. In turn, *and the like* and *and such like* show similar rates of non-human scopes but differ in the fact that the second variant occurs more commonly with human scopes (21.7% vs. 16.8%), while *and the like* occurs more frequently with inanimate nouns (81.3% vs. 76.4%), as seen in Figure 5.22 below.



Figure 5.22 Distribution of types of nominal scope for the variants of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

Regarding the evolution of the feature of animacy across late Modern English, if we obviate the high rates of inanimate nouns in the first two subperiods, due to Defoe's excessive use of this tag, we can observe in Table 5.12 and Figure 5.23 below that the predominance of inanimate scopes remains rather stable in the course of the 19th century. On the other hand, among animate scopes, non-human scopes are very rare all through the period analysed (12 examples in all) and human scopes show a slight growth in frequency towards the second part of the late Modern English period, a situation that mirrors that of *or something*, which also showed a slight growth in the incidence rate of human scopes (cf. Section 4.2.4 above).

		1700 -19	*1720 -39*	*1740 -59*	*1760 -79*	*1780 -99*	*1800 -19*	*1820 -39*	*1840 -59*	*1860 -79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Inanimate		**41.4** (22)	**53.3** (94)	**14.8** (85)	**8.6** (20)	**2.5** (9)	**1.3** (7)	**8.5** (44)	**9.7** (94)	**7.3** (80)	**9.2** (46)	502
Animate	Human	-	**3.4** (6)	**0.5** (3)	**0.9** (2)	**0.8** (3)	**0.4** (2)	**3.1** (16)	**4.9** (48)	**2.8** (31)	**4** (20)	131
	Non-Human	-	**1.1** (2)	-	**0.4** (1)	**0.3** (1)	**0.2** (1)	-	**0.4** (4)	**0.1** (1)	**0.4** (2)	12

Table 5.12 Evolution of animacy of scope of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.23 Evolution of animacy of scope of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

The evolution of the different variants of *and the like* in what concerns animacy of the scope shows very similar results to the ones just presented. For both variants *and the like* and *and such like* we witness a slight increase in their co-occurrence with human scopes over time, just as the overall development shown in Table 5.12 and Figure 5.23 above.[104] The only difference between the two variants lies in the rates of inanimate scopes (81.3% vs. 76.4%), which, nevertheless, outnumber animate ones in all subperiods.

It was mentioned at the beginning of this section that all types of noun phrases show a relation of grammatical agreement with the extender tag *and the like*, which means that, unlike *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.4), we have no cases of strict lack of agreement. In addition to these cases of agreement with nominal scopes, instances are found where the concept of agreement is not applicable. Such cases (i.e. scope types other than noun phrases), as I explained for *or something*, were considered to be in a relation of grammatical mismatch, because despite not being strict cases of grammatical disagreement, such instances are clearly not cases of agreement either. Moreover, earlier work on the topic considers any case that is not under a relation of strict grammatical agreement as a case of mismatch between the extender tag and its scope. The situation reflected in Figure 5.24 for the extender tag *and the like* is very similar to the one corresponding to *or something* (cf. Figure 4.14), with almost identical rates of scope types that are not noun phrases and of cases of agreement, which amount to 72.6% of the total of occurrences.

[104] We have to bear in mind that the variant *and (poss.) like* occurs only with human scopes.



Figure 5.24 Distribution of agreement of the extender tag *and the like* with its scope (percentages)

The distribution of agreement with the individual variants of the tag does not differ much from that already seen in Figure 5.20: the higher the rate of nominal scopes, the higher the rate of agreement as well. This means that, as we can gather from Figure 5.25, *and such like* shows higher proportion of agreement than *and the like* (82% vs. 67%). In the case of *and (poss.) like*, since the only type of scope that I have found in the data is the nominal one, agreement applies invariably.



Figure 5.25 Distribution of agreement between variants of the extender tag *and the like* and their scope (percentages)

The development of agreement throughout late Modern English, as shown in Figure 5.26 and Table 5.13 below, depicts a situation where the rates of agreement are closer to those of mismatch in the 18th century than in the 19th century. Even though agreement is more common than lack of agreement all through, in the 18th century instances that do not meet agreement requirements show values that represent almost half the values of cases of agreement, and the two patterns even feature the same normalized frequencies in the subperiod 1780-99. During the 19th century, on the other hand, cases of mismatch are very infrequent, amounting at most to one fourth of the cases of agreement. The situation just described differs completely from that depicted for *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.4), where we witnessed a growth in the rates of instances where agreement was not the case towards the second half of the period. Therefore, the two tags under analysis in this dissertation go in opposite directions: scope types that are not in strict grammatical agreement grow in the case of *or something* but decrease in the case of *and the like*.



Figure 5.26 Evolution of agreement between the extender tag *and the like* and its scope (normalized frequencies)

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Agreement	**41.4** (22)	**57.9** (102)	**15.5** (89)	**9.9** (23)	**3.5** (13)	**1.9** (10)	**11.6** (60)	**15** (146)	**10.3** (112)	**13.6** (68)	645
Not Applicable	**22.6** (12)	**53.3** (94)	**7.5** (43)	**6.1** (14)	**3.5** (13)	**0.9** (5)	**2.9** (15)	**1.9** (19)	**2.1** (23)	**1** (5)	243

Table 5.13 Evolution of agreement between the extender tag *and the like* and its scope (normalized frequencies and raw figures)

5.2.5 CO-OCCURRENCE WITH PRAGMATIC MARKERS

The last section included in the analysis of the formal features of the extender tag *and the like* focuses on the identification of the different pragmatic markers that accompany the tag, which have been claimed to reinforce its function and meaning,[105] as has already been explained in Section 4.2.5 above for the extender tag *or something*. The co-occurrence of extender tags and pragmatic markers has helped researchers such as Cheshire (2007), Tagliamonte & Denis (2010) and Palacios Martínez (2011) to seize the extent of the grammaticalization of the extender tags in their respective analyses, as they claim that those tags which are less established in terms of pragmatic change (i.e. those that had yet not consolidated the new meanings or uses they are representing) are in need of more reinforcing material. In other words, the more established those meanings are, the less extenders are predicted to collocate with pragmatic markers and are, therefore, more advanced in terms of grammaticalization. However, the aforementioned works only make reference to discourse markers of the type *you know*, which signal intersubjectivy. The term pragmatic marker is preferred here, as it includes other types of collocates apart from discourse markers, conveying "both textual and interpersonal functions" (Brinton 1996: 40).

In my late Modern English data, the extender tag *and the like* collocates with pragmatic markers on 92 occasions, which amounts to 10.4% of the total number of examples, a little less than was the case of *or something*

[105] Cf., among others, Overstreet & Yule (1997b: 254-256); Overstreet (1999: 74-76); Aijmer (2004: 185).

(11.2%) (cf. Section 4.2.5). These can be classified into three different categories. The first type, and the most recurrent one, corresponds to exemplifying markers. These markers have been defined as compulsory linking words/phrases used to "indicate partial coreferentiallity within [the] two units" that form a prototypical exemplifying construction (i.e. the *general element* and the *exemplifying element*) (Rodríguez-Abruñeiras 2017: 87). Exemplifying markers are used in my data to introduce the scope(s) of the tag, and the attested forms include, among others, *such as, viz., to wit, like,* or *as*, illustrated in (5.52) below.

(5.52) *They are in Companies all of a Name, and therefore call one another only by their Christian Names, as Jemy, Jockey, that is John; and Sawny, that is, Alexander,* ***and the like****.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1720. *Memoirs of a Cavalier:* 156)

Intersubjectivity markers are also present in combination with *and the like*, in the form of comment clauses such as *you know, you see* or *you remember it well,* as presented in (5.53) below.

(5.53) *You talked to Mrs. Jewkes of having begun wrong with me, in trying to subdue me with Terror, and of Frost,* ***and such like****; – you remember it well: – and that you would, for the future, change your Conduct, and try to melt me, that was your Word, by Kindness.* (Richardson, Samuel. 1741. *Pamela:* 290 (Vol. 1))

Finally, occasional instances also occur of pragmatic markers that denote doubt collocating with *and the like*. One such example is *if I remember right* in (5.54).

(5.54) *After some farther conversation, the subjects being, if I remember right, college education, priggism, church authority, tomfoolery,* ***and the like****, I rose and said to my host, "I must now leave you."* (Borrow, George Henry. 1851. *Lavengro:* 364 (Vol. 2))

As we can see from Figure 5.27 below, pragmatic markers that appear in combination with the extender tag *and the like* are mainly of the exemplifying type (84.7%), followed by intersubjectivity markers (12%) and a few occasional examples of pragmatic markers denoting doubt. If we compare these results with the ones obtained for *or something* and provided in Section

4.2.5 above, we can see that *and the like* collocates with fewer types of pragmatic markers and, furthermore, a single type represents the vast majority of collocations (namely exemplifying makers), while the other types are far less common.

As has been claimed above, extender tags tend to co-occur with pragmatic markers that have a similar meaning or function. Therefore, the fact that the extender tag *and the like* is preceded in the majority of instances by an exemplifying marker is only logical, as both constructions are used in order to present a list of items that does not exhaust the whole array of possibilities. In other words, they both convey that the elements that they feature are just an illustration and that more items could be added to the list.



Figure 5.27 Distribution of pragmatic marker types that collocate with the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

Of the 92 tokens of the extender tag *and the like* which collocate with some type of pragmatic marker, 80.4% feature the variant *and the like*, while *and such like* is only attested in 19.6% of the total of occurrences. The form *and (poss.) like*, in turn, does not co-occur with any discourse maker in my late Modern English data. Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 5.28 below, the behaviour of each variant differs significantly: while with *and the like* 94.6% of the cases correspond to the exemplifying type, half of the collocations of the variant *and such like* are markers of intersubjectivity (50%), which are more

frequent than exemplifying markers. In fact, even though *and such like* only co-occurs with a discourse marker in 19.6% of the total of such collocations with the whole paradigm of the extender tag *and the like*, the great majority of cases of intersubjectivity markers (9 out of 11) occur in combination with this variant. Therefore, we can say that the variant *and such like* is preferred to convey stance, while *and the like* is used almost exclusively in exemplifying constructions.



Figure 5.28 Distribution of pragmatic marker types that collocate with the variants of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

As shown in Table 5.14 and Figure 5.29 below, the highest frequencies of pragmatic marker occurrence with the extender tag *and the like* concentrate in the two earliest subperiods, as is the case of many other features discussed in this chapter, due to Defoe's productivity in the use of this extender tag and, as shown in Table 5.14, his preference for exemplifying markers as collocates of the extender. If we take a closer look at the subsequent subperiods, exemplifying makers are the most common pragmatic marker all through the 18th and 19th centuries. There are a couple of isolated examples of intersubjective markers in the 1740-59 subperiod, but this type seems to be consolidated and shows a slight growth in frequency in the second half of the period analysed. This was also the case with the extender tag *or something* (cf. Section 4.2.5), which began to co-occur with intersubjective markers in the 19th century. Pragmatic markers denoting doubt, while being

the most common type of collocate for *or something* (58.3% of the total), are very rare in combination with *and the like*, featuring only 3 examples scattered over the late Modern English period.[106]

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Exemplifying	**17** (9)	**11.9** (21)	**1.7** (10)	**2.2** (5)	**0.3** (1)	-	**0.8** (4)	**1.1** (11)	**1.1** (12)	**1** (5)	73
Intersubjectivity	-	-	**0.3** (2)	-	-	-	**0.2** (1)	**0.2** (2)	**0.3** (3)	**0.6** (3)	11
Doubt	-	**0.6** (1)	-	-	-	-	-	**0.1** (1)	**0.1** (1)	-	3

Table 5.14 Evolution of pragmatic marker types that collocate with the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.29 Evolution of pragmatic marker types that collocate with the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

It has been explained above that some researchers use the co-occurrence of extender tags and pragmatic markers as an indicator to measure the degree of grammaticalization of the tag. Given the very low frequencies of co-occurrence attested for both *and the like* (10.4%) and *or something* (11.2%) in my 18th and 19th centuries data, both extender tags can be argued to be at an advanced stage in the grammaticalization process,

[106] Given the low-frequency of pragmatic markers in combination with *and the like*, I do not include here the figures for the evolution of its different variants.

provided that the less frequently the tags co-occur with these elements, the more established their meanings are. Therefore, this parameter does not seem reliable to seize the grammaticalization of these two extenders, which is discussed in further detail in Chapter 6.

5.3 TEXTUAL FEATURES OF THE EXTENDER TAG *AND THE LIKE*

This section is devoted to the analysis of the context where the extender tag *and the like* occurs, more specifically whether it is part of a conversation, a narration or is included in a letter, which can be considered as a kind of conversation that is directed to the addressee. I have already argued in Section 4.3 above that extender tags have been typically described as features of conversation, much more commonly found in speech interactions than in writing. When working with novels, the best approximation to differentiate between both media is to divide occurrences of the tag according to whether they are part of a conversation or of a narration. Letters, in turn, are considered to be closer to those cases of conversation, despite their not representing true dialogic contexts, as the kind of language that is found in letters more speech-like than that found in narration (cf. Section 4.3).

The hypothesis of extender tags being more common in speech that in writing, which has been confirmed for *or something* (cf. Section 4.3), is nevertheless not verified for *and the like*, as we can gather from Figure 5.30 below, where tokens occurring in non-conversation settings (64.8%) far outnumber those that could be considered as representing speech in some way or another (35.2% in all).

Figure 5.31 shows the distribution of the three variants of the tag in different textual contexts. As seen here, the variant *and the like* occurs in non-conversation in three quarters of its occurrences (75.4%), while the variant *and such like* shows a preference for conversational settings; conversations and letters add up to something more than half of the occurrences (53.4%). The variant *and (poss.) like*, in turn, also shows a tendency to occur within narration (58.3%).



Figure 5.30 Distribution of textual occurrence of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)



Figure 5.31 Distribution of textual occurrence of the variants of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

Taking a closer look at the evolution of the tag, as reflected in Table 5.15 and Figure 5.32 below, we can see that the high rates of occurrence in letters correspond to one single subperiod, namely 1740-59, which may be due to the concentration of epistolary novels in this subperiod and the tendency of their writers to use *and the like*. Secondly, as was already the case with other features discussed in this chapter, the very high normalized frequencies of the two earliest subperiods (64 and 107.8, respectively) are due to Defoe's exclusive use of this tag. All in all, although some fluctuation is observed in the central part of the period under analysis, we witness an overall prevalence of occurrences of *and the like* in non-conversational settings. On the other hand, we can also see that the frequency of *and the like* in conversation grows over the time span at issue here, although not as much as to overcome its occurrence in narrative contexts, as was the case with *or something* (cf. Section 4.3).

The different variants of the tag evolve in a very similar way to the extender in general, as portrayed in Table 5.15 and Figure 5.32 below. However, it is important to mention that *and such like* becomes more frequent in conversation than in narration at the end of the late Modern period, thus being the only variant of the extender tag *and the like* which behaves similarly to *or something*.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Conversation	-	**3.4** (6)	**3** (17)	**6.1** (14)	**5.2** (19)	**2.5** (13)	**8.9** (46)	**5.6** (55)	**3.5** (38)	**7.2** (36)	244
Letter	-	-	**10.4** (60)	-	**0.5** (2)	**0.2** (1)	**0.4** (2)	**0.3** (3)	-	-	68
Non-Conversation	**64** (34)	**107.8** (190)	**9.6** (55)	**9.9** (23)	**1.4** (5)	**0.2** (1)	**5.2** (27)	**11** (107)	**8.9** (97)	**7.4** (37)	576

Table 5.15 Evolution of textual occurrence of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.32 Evolution of textual occurrence of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

Summing up, the evidence provided in the preceding paragraphs prove that the behaviour of the extender tag *and the like* concerning its occurrence in different textual contexts in the late Modern English period differs from the present-day tested fact of extenders being more common features of conversation than of writing. It may well be the case that this extender has not developed yet and reached this point at the stage which is the focus of the present dissertation, or that this particular extender tag is favoured in written texts over speech.

5.4 FUNCTIONS OF THE EXTENDER TAG *AND THE LIKE*

The last section in this chapter focuses on the functions of the extender tag *and the like* in late Modern English. As was already done in the case of *or something* (cf. Section 4.4), these are divided between referential functions, i.e. those that refer to the speaker's experience of the outer world in an objective way, and expressive functions, i.e. those that are tied to the expression of the speaker's subjectivity and his/her relations with others.

In the introduction of Section 4.4, when presenting the functions of *or something*, I pointed out that those functions that have been alleged to be

common to the use of all extender tags (cf. Section 2.3.1) are not included in the discussion. This is the case, to recall again briefly, of the assumption of shared knowledge and of vagueness, both traits common to all extender tags. Vagueness refers to the intrinsic unspecificity of these forms, while the assumption of shared knowledge applies to the indispensable means whereby the interlocutor is able to decipher the meaning behind the use of these constructions. The speaker assumes that his/her interlocutor(s) share(s) a co-conception of the world under which they will be able to satisfactorily decode the message intended.

5.4.1 REFERENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE EXTENDER TAG *AND THE LIKE*

As explained in Section 4.4.1 above, referential functions can also be labelled ideational (cf. Overstreet 1999: 17) and are those that are tied to the way the speaker experiences the outer world that surrounds him/her. Such functions tend not to be related to the subjectivity of the speaker, but are based on truth-conditional and observable data. Within the referential functions of *and the like,* categorization (cf. Section 5.4.1.1) and list completion (cf. Section 5.4.1.2) are discussed in this section.

5.4.1.1 CATEGORIZATION

This function has been suggested to be the most recurrent and iconic one in relation to extender tag use. It has been broadly explained in Section 2.3.2.1 and summarized again when applied to the extender tag *or something* (cf. Section 4.4.1.1). This function refers to the fact that the extender tag indicates that the element(s) in its scope are representative of a category where other items could also have been stated, but there is no such need, as the interlocutor is assumed to be able to infer any unstated information on the basis of shared knowledge between both. (5.55) offers an illustration of this function for the extender tag *and the like*. Here, *wash and scour*, *and brew and bake* are all members of the category 'house chores', where other items, such as making the beds, ironing, shopping for groceries, cooking, etc. could

have been added. However, this list is shortened by means of the extender tag, which indicates that although other items that also belong into this category could have been included in the listing, the interlocutor has enough information with the actions provided in the scope of the tag to be able to infer the category intended and successfully decode the message.

(5.55) *Besure I had better, as Things stand, have learn'd to wash and scour, and brew and bake,* ***and such-like****.* (Richardson, Samuel. 1741. *Pamela:* 93 (Vol. 1))

We have also seen in relation to *or something* (cf. Section 4.4.1.1) that the categories that are evoked by the exemplar(s) before the tag can be of two types: common or lexicalized, i.e. those that can be labelled under one single lexical item and easily retrievable, and ad hoc or non-lexicalized categories, i.e. those created ad hoc in order to associate under the same group a series of items that need to be categorized together. Illustrative examples of each of the two categorization types are (5.56) and (5.57) below, respectively.

(5.56) *"Why, Sir, you must know there was a great scholar, though he was but a youth then, living in this town some years ago, and he was very curious in plants and flowers* ***and such like****."* (Lytton, Edward Bulwer-Lytton. 1832. *Eugene Aram:* 39 (Vol. 3))

(5.57) *Beginning with the private houses so occupied, they broke open the doors and windows; and while they destroyed the furniture and left but the bare walls, made a sharp search for tools and engines of destruction, such as hammers, pokers, axes, saws,* ***and such like instruments.*** (Dickens, Charles. 1840. *Barnaby Rudge:* 239 (Vol. 3))

In (5.56) the category referred to by the exemplars *plants* and *flowers* is 'flora'. Any reader which receives this information will easily be able to produce more tokens that also belong to this category, such as trees, weeds or even vegetables. On the other hand, the category in (5.57) could be labelled as 'handheld tools that can cause destruction'. In order to be able to retrieve any other significant items from this category, we have to acknowledge the context in which (5.57) was produced, which is 19th-century England. Therefore we cannot include modern artefacts, such as a drill or a power saw, in this list. This can also be applied to (5.55) above, where the historical

context rules out many house chores that we would consider normal today, such as vacuuming or cooking in a microwave. When using extender tags in this way, thus, the speaker relies on shared knowledge and assumes that his/her interlocutor(s) will be able to decode the message as they have intended it, taking into consideration both the category implied and the context of occurrence (linguistic, geographical and historical).

The behaviour of the extender tag *and the like* is very similar to the one of *or something* (cf. Section 4.4.1.1): more than three quarters of the total of occurrences of this extender perform the function of categorization in late Modern English, and the categories being implied are almost exclusively ad hoc ones, with just 1.3% of tokens evoking a common category, as we can see from Figure 5.33 below.



Figure 5.33 Distribution of the categorization function of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

If we consider the different variants of the extender on their own, as reflected in Figure 5.34 below, small differences between them can be observed. First of all, the variant *and (poss.) like*, which is not included in the figure, is used for categorization in 100% of the cases and invariably evokes

an ad hoc category. For the variant *and such like*, categorization applies in 84.2% of the cases. Finally, the variant *and the like* shows a higher amount of tokens which do not perform this function, up to 26.1% of the total of its occurrences. The presence of common categories is, in all the cases, very scarce, so the tendency is for the tag to evoke ad hoc categories.



Figure 5.34 Distribution of the categorization function of the variants of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

As seen in Figures 5.33 and 5.34, in about one quarter of the tokens of the extender tag *and the like* the categorization function does not play a role. This is illustrated by (5.58) below, where the tag has as scope a series of quotes that are stated before it. Obviously enough, there is not such category as 'things that men shout while running'. What the presence of the tag implies in this particular example is that other things could be said, but there is no need to make the message longer, as the unstated information may not be of interest for the interlocutor or even not remembered by the speaker. In tokens like this the tag performs the function of adhering to the maxim of quantity (which is described in more detail in Section 5.4.2.1 below), and differs from categorization in that the interlocutor will not be able to produce any other items by considering those already stated, as they do not belong into any particular category.

(5.58) *The men were running to the spot, and shouting as they did so–*

"Never mind; hold on a bit; here we are; all right," ***and the like****.* (Le Fanu, Joseph Sheridan. 1864. *Uncle Silas:* 244 (Vol. 1))

As the data from Table 5.16 and Figure 5.35 below demonstrate, the categorization function clearly prevails over tokens where the tag does not perform this function all through the period under analysis. In spite of the fact that numbers are much higher in the first subperiods due to Defoe's persistent use of this tag, the difference between categorization and no categorization, despite being less pronounced in the central subperiods (from 1780 to 1819), points to stability throughout late Modern English. There is no observable growth or decline of any of the two patterns. Conversely, *or something*, despite displaying more often the function of categorization all through the period as well, showed a rise in frequency of use of this function in the course of the 19th century (cf. Section 4.4.1.1).

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Categorization	**45.1** (24)	**70.3** (124)	**17.2** (99)	**13.4** (31)	**4.4** (16)	**2.5** (13)	**12.2** (63)	**14.7** (143)	**10.3** (112)	**13.4** (67)	692
No Categorization	**18.8** (10)	**40.8** (72)	**5.7** (33)	**2.6** (6)	**2.7** (10)	**0.4** (2)	**2.3** (12)	**2.3** (22)	**2.1** (23)	**1.2** (6)	196

Table 5.16 Evolution of the categorization function of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.35 Evolution of the categorization function of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

A closer look at the different variants of *and the like* confirms the overall situation just described: an easily observable prevalence of cases of categorization all through the time span examined here (cf. Table 5.17 below).

AND THE LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Categorization	**37.6** (20)	**61.3** (108)	**6.4** (37)	**10.4** (24)	**1.4** (5)	**1.5** (8)	**7.2** (37)	**8** (78)	**6** (65)	**6.4** (32)	414
No Categorization	**18.8** (10)	**40.3** (71)	**2.1** (12)	**2.6** (6)	**1.6** (6)	**0.2** (1)	**1.2** (6)	**1.5** (15)	**1.4** (15)	**0.8** (4)	146

AND SUCH LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Categorization	**7.5** (4)	**9.1** (16)	**10.8** (62)	**3** (7)	**3** (11)	**0.9** (5)	**5** (26)	**6.3** (61)	**4.1** (45)	**5.8** (29)	266
No Categorization	-	**0.6** (1)	**3.6** (21)	-	**1.1** (4)	**0.2** (1)	**1.2** (6)	**0.7** (7)	**0.7** (8)	**0.4** (2)	50

AND (POSS.) LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Categorization	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0.4** (4)	**0.2** (2)	**1.2** (6)	12
No Categorization	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 5.17 Evolution of the categorization function of the variants of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)

The behaviour of the variant *and the like* is very similar to the one described for the extender in general, with the frequency of tokens conveying categorization being higher than those that do not, although the difference between both patterns is less remarkable in the central part of the period. *And such like*, on the other hand, shows a strong prevalence of this function constantly all through late Modern English. In turn, the variant *and (poss.) like* occurs only in 12 instances, and in all of them it performs the function of categorization. All in all, as was already the case with the extender *or something* (cf. Section 4.4.1.1), the function of categorization is indisputably more commonly found at work in the use of the extender tag than not in the period under analysis.

In what follows, I focus on those tokens that perform the function of categorization during late Modern English. First of all, the evolution of the tag concerning the type of category it evokes is dealt with, as reflected in Table 5.18 and Figure 5.36 below.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Common	**3.8** (2)	-	-	**0.9** (2)	-	-	**0.4** (2)	**0.5** (5)	**0.1** (1)	-	12
Ad hoc	**41.4** (22)	**70.3** (124)	**17.2** (99)	**12.5** (29)	**4.4** (16)	**2.5** (13)	**11.8** (61)	**14.2** (138)	**10.2** (111)	**13.4** (67)	680

Table 5.18 Evolution of type of category of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.36 Evolution of type of category of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

It was already obvious from Figure 5.33 above that common categories represent a very marginal phenomenon in connection to the extender tag *and the like* in the period under discussion. This is also what can be gathered from the evolution of the types of category that the categorization function evokes. Instances of common categories, as that exemplified in our earlier instance (5.56), are scarce and scattered through the late Modern English period,

where ad hoc categories prevail by far. I do not provide here the data for the different variants of the tag, as their evolution is very similar to that presented in Table 5.18 and Figure 5.36 above, with almost no cases of common categories (and none at all in the case of *and (poss.) like*). The situation just described is identical to the one analysed for the extender tag *or something* (cf. Section 4.4.1.1). Therefore, both extender tags are used mainly to elicit ad hoc categories when used as categorization devices in late Modern English.

As I have already mentioned for *or something* (cf. Section 4.4.1.1), at times the speaker makes an explicit mention of the category intended in his/her statement. This is, for instance, the case of (5.59) below, where the category *Silver Things*, to which the exemplars *Spoons, Porringers* and *Cups* belong, introduces the list of tokens, which the extender tag implies could have continued. In the rest of cases, the category is not overtly presented in the token, but only implied, as is the case of (5.60), where the exemplars *phials* and *powders* point towards the category 'package with substances that can disrupt someone's health'.

(5.59) *They proceeded then to search the House; The Goods all remain'd; but the Money, and divers Silver Things, as Spoons, Porringers, Cups,* ***and the like****, were gone.* (Barker, Jane. 1723. *A Patch-Work Screen:* Prologue)

(5.60) *Then they have a notion, from that false Betty I believe, that you intend to take something to make yourself sick; and so they will search for phials and powders,* ***and such-like.*** (Richardson, Samuel. 1751. *Clarissa:* 305 (Vol.2))

As described in Chapter 4 for the extender tag *or something* (cf. Section 4.4.1.1), the overt expression of the category within the exemplar decreased as the period progressed. Unlike *or something*, Table 5.19 and Figure 5.37 below indicate an overall prevalence of non-explicitness of category mention all through the late Modern English period for the extender *and the like.* Furthermore, the difference between explicit and non-explicit appearance of the category in the token is less pronounced in the case of *and the like* (disregarding, of course, the second subperiod, which reflects Defoe's

preference for non-overt category reference) than the one we observed in *or something* in the second half of the period under analysis, where non-explicitness gained strength (cf. Table 4.15 and Figure 4.23 above).

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Explicit	**22.6** (12)	**18.1** (32)	**5.9** (34)	**5.6** (13)	**1.4** (5)	**0.4** (2)	**3.3** (17)	**4.3** (42)	**2.7** (29)	**5.6** (28)	214
Non Explicit	**22.6** (12)	**52.2** (92)	**11.3** (65)	**7.8** (18)	**3** (11)	**2.1** (11)	**8.9** (46)	**10.4** (101)	**7.6** (83)	**7.8** (39)	478

Table 5.19 Evolution of category explicitness of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.37 Evolution of category explicitness of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

The situation for the individual variants of the tag is quite similar to the one just described, as we can see from Table 5.20 below: non-explicit mention of the category within the token is the rule for the three variants, with the only exception of *and such like* showing a prevalence of explicit category mention in the first subperiod.

AND THE LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Explicit	**16.9** (9)	**15.9** (28)	**1.7** (10)	**4.8** (11)	**0.5** (2)	-	**1.5** (8)	**2** (20)	**1.3** (14)	**3.4** (17)	119
Non Explicit	**20.7** (11)	**45.4** (80)	**4.7** (27)	**5.6** (13)	**0.8** (3)	**1.5** (8)	**5.6** (29)	**6** (58)	**4.7** (51)	**3** (15)	295

AND SUCH LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Explicit	**5.6** (3)	**2.3** (4)	**4.2** (24)	**0.9** (2)	**0.8** (3)	**0.4** (2)	**1.7** (9)	**2.3** (22)	**1.3** (14)	**2** (10)	93
Non Explicit	**1.9** (1)	**6.8** (12)	**6.6** (38)	**2.2** (5)	**2.2** (8)	**0.6** (3)	**3.3** (17)	**4** (39)	**2.8** (31)	**3.8** (19)	173

AND (POSS.) LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Explicit	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0.1** (1)	**0.2** (1)	2
Non Explicit	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0.4** (4)	**0.1** (1)	**1** (5)	10

Table 5.20 Evolution of category explicitness of variants of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)

It was discussed in relation to *or something* (cf. Section 4.4.1.1) that the growth in frequency of non-explicit mention of the category in the token could be related to the conventionalization of the categorizing function for the tag: the more frequently the tag is used to imply categorization, the less need there is for the category in question to be overtly included within the token. The case of the extender tag *and the like* is different, as there is no observable pattern of evolution towards greater or lesser explicit mention of the category and there is no evidence of a growing connection of the tag with the function of categorization either. As regards both features, *and the like* remains rather stable all through late Modern English, as shown by the data analysed in this section. It may well be the case that the tag acquired the function of categorization at an earlier stage of the language and therefore its use is already conventionalized in the period at issue here. However, the progression of the extender tag *and the like* displays regarding the function of categorization seems to have stopped at a less advanced stage than that of

or something at the end of the time span that concerns us in this dissertation. In other words, it seems that the extender tag *or something* in late Modern English is becoming more frequently used for categorization and the more it is used as a categorization device, the less the category is explicitly mentioned within the token. In the case of *and the like*, on the other hand, the situation remains stable all through the period: it is used mainly for categorization and cases where the category is not overt are also more common than those with explicit category mention within the token, but the difference between both patterns is milder than in the case of *or something* (cf. Section 4.4.1.1).

5.4.1.2 LIST COMPLETION

One of the functions that extender tags have been claimed to perform is list completion, which means that the tag is used in order to indicate that the process of listing is complete, the list being closed by means of the tag. At the same time, paradoxically, by closing the list with an extender tag, the speaker implies that the list is not complete, as one of the most common functions of extenders is to convey that other items could have been added to the list in question,[107] but the speaker decides that this is not necessary, as the interlocutor is deemed capable of supplying whatever unstated information on the grounds of shared knowledge.

As I have already pointed out in the discussion of *or something* (cf. Section 4.4.1.2), the minimum number that researchers agree is necessary for a list to be considered as such is three, which means that we need at least two items in the scope of the tag to regard that such token contains a list. Therefore, examples of the type exemplar plus tag, as (5.61) below, would not be considered as illustrating listing.

(5.61) *"[F]or you know, my dear, when I and my good man die, what in the world would come of my poor Edith, if so be she had no one to manage for her! for, Lord love you! she knows no more of managing a family,*

[107] This makes reference to categorization as explained in Section 5.4.1.1 above.

***and such-like**, than a new-born babe."* (Opie, Amelia Alderson. 1805. *Adeline Mowbray:* 18 (Vol. 1))

With *and the like* in late Modern English, it is more common to find tokens with multiple items as scope than was the case with *or something*, for which the most usual pattern featured just one exemplar accompanying the tag. In my data it is very usual for *and the like* to appear in third position regarding its scopes, as in (5.62), where two books are listed before the tag *Letters* and *Grace Abounding*. Not infrequent either are cases where the tag appears in fourth position, as illustrated in (5.63), where the extender occurs after the exemplars *Musquet Balls, old Nails* and *Stubbs*. *And the like* is also common in fifth or sixth position, with four or five items in its scope, such as the ones exemplified in (5.64) and (5.65), respectively. The rest of tokens are lumped together; occasional instances with up to 21 items in the scope of the tag have been found, as illustrated in (5.66) below.

(5.62) *She tried to engage his mind upon her favourite books, Rutherford's Letters, Scougal's Grace Abounding,* ***and the like***. (Stevenson, Robert Louis. 1896. *Weir of Hermiston:* 16)

(5.63) *Also he ordered, that all the Guns of the great Ship, on the Side which lay next the Shore, should be loaded with Musquet Balls, old Nails, Stubbs,* ***and such like Pieces of old Iron, Lead, and any thing that came to Hand***. (Defoe, Daniel. 1720. *Captain Singleton:* 276)

(5.64) *The aristocracy of Barchester consisted chiefly of clerical dignitaries, bishops, deans, prebendaries,* ***and such like****; on them and theirs it was not probable that anything said by Sir Roger would have much effect.* (Trollope, Anthony. 1858. *Doctor Thorne:* 48 (Vol. 2))

(5.65) *From the melancholy mass of papers, faded photographs, seals, diaries, withered flowers,* ***and such like****, Jocelyn dew a little portrait, one taken on glass in the primitive days of photography, and framed with tinsel in the commonest way.* (Hardy, Thomas. 1897. *The Well-Beloved:* 112)

(5.66) *Hence it follows of Necessity, that vast Numbers of our People are compelled to seek their livelihood by Begging, Robbing, Stealing, Cheating, Pimping, Forswearing, Flattering, Suborning, Forging, Gaming, Lying, Fawning, Hectoring, Voting, Scribling, Stargazing,*

> *Poysoning, Whoring, Canting, Libelling, Free-thinking,* ***and the like Occupations****: Every one of which Terms, I was at much Pains to make him understand.* (Swift, Jonathan. 1726. *Gulliver's Travels:* 83-84 (Vol. 2))

It seems, then, that the scopes that have been found preceding *and the like* tend to be longer than those which accompanied *or something* in the same period, for which scopes of more than three items were rare. Such a difference between *and the like* and *or something* may be related to the fact that *and the like* is an adjunctive extender. It has been discussed in connection to the tag *or something* (cf. Section 4.4.1.2) that such long lists in the scope of the tag are iconic. In other words, listing a long collection of items implies that there are many elements to be mentioned, an idea which is reinforced by the addition of the tag, which means that further elements could have been included. Iconicity is obvious from example (5.66) above, where many of the terms included in the list are very similar, synonyms to one another (robbing and stealing, or forswearing and lying, for example), but they are all included anyway, because the speaker's intention is to make a long list to iconically demonstrate how many occupations there were.

Figure 5.38 shows in percentages the various positions for the extender tag *and the like* in the ECF and NCF data. As shown here, the distribution is the complete opposite of the one attested for *or something* (cf. Figure 4.24 above), where almost 68% of the tokens were of the type exemplar plus tag (i.e. second position). The amount of tokens that have two or more items in the scope with *and the like* is as high as the pattern exemplar plus tag with *or something*. Here, the extender is in second position in only 29.3% of the total of occurrences, the remainder 70.7% being cases where *and the like* performs the function of list completer (as mentioned above, three or more item enumerations can be considered lists). Cases where the extender appears in third position are the most common in the period under analysis (33.2%). The frequency of tokens decreases as the number of elements in the scope of the tag increases; thus, tokens where the extender appears in fourth

position are less common that those where it appears in third position, fifth-position tags are less frequent that fourth-position tags, and so on.



Figure 5.38 Position of the extender tag *and the like* in lists (percentages)

A closer look at the different variants of *and the like* in Figure 5.39 reveals the existence of two different scenarios: on the one hand, *and the like* and *and such like* behave in a very similar way to the tag as a whole; on the other, *and (poss.) like* shows a very strong prevalence of cases of no list completion, where the tag has just one item in its scope. Figure 5.39 also shows that the variant *and the like* is the most prone to have longer scopes, with about three quarters of cases where the tag is used for list completion. *And such like*, in turn, shows a higher rate of exemplar plus tag cases (33.2%).





Figure 5.39 Position of variants of the extender tag *and the like* in lists (percentages)

Concerning the evolution of the function of the tag as list completer in late Modern English, we can see from Table 5.21 and Figure 5.40 below that the extender tag *and the like* performs this function more frequently than not throughout the period under analysis, except for the two central subperiods (1780-99 and 1800-19), where it is more frequent to find the extender in second position. However, it seems that the extender functions a list completer more often in the 18th century, while in the 19th century the difference between cases of list completion and cases where the extender is in second position is not so pronounced. The high values of this function in the first two subperiods may be due, once more, to Defoe's inclination to use this extender as list completer. Nevertheless, the cases where the tag realizes this function clearly outnumber those in which it does not for the most part of late Modern English.

The situation described here for *and the like* differs from the one obtained for *or something* in Section 4.4.1.2, which consistently did not act as list completer during late Modern English, this tendency becoming more pronounced as the period advanced. Therefore, the extender tag *and the like*, contrary to *or something*, goes against the present-day English attested

tendency for extender tags to occur after just one exemplar, rather than as list completers.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Yes	**54.5** (29)	**81.1** (143)	**17.5** (102)	**13.8** (32)	**3.3** (12)	**1.3** (7)	**10.8** (56)	**12** (117)	**8.1** (88)	**8.4** (42)	628
No	**9.4** (5)	**30.1** (53)	**5.2** (30)	**2.2** (5)	**3.8** (14)	**1.5** (8)	**3.7** (19)	**4.9** (48)	**4.3** (47)	**6.2** (31)	260

Table 5.21 Evolution of the list completion function of *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.40 Evolution of the list completion function of *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

5.4.2 EXPRESSIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXTENDER TAG *AND THE LIKE*

The last group of functions of the extender tag *and the like* concerns the expressive domain, as was also the case in the analysis of *or something* (cf. Section 4.4.2). Although the most representative of the expressive functions of extender tags is intersubjectivity, we have already seen that this is more an inherent trait of extenders than a proper function. As has already been explained several times in the course of this dissertation, while referential functions tie the message to a world of reference, expressive ones are related

to the speaker, his/her attitude towards the message or towards his/her interlocutor(s). The former subtype of expressive functions, i.e. those that reflect the speaker's commitment to the appropriateness of the proposition, are labelled subjective functions and are analysed in Section 5.4.2.1 below. By fulfilling a subjective function, the speaker gives prominence to his/her attitude to what is being communicated. In turn, the second subtype, i.e. those which encapsulate the relationship and stance towards the interlocutor(s), are the so-called intersubjective functions, which are addressed in Section 5.4.2.2.

5.4.2.1 SUBJECTIVE FUNCTION: THE EXTENDER TAG *AND THE LIKE* AS A QUANTITY HEDGE

As was the case with *or something* (cf. Section 4.4.2.1), for *and the like* only one subjective function has been found in my late Modern English data, namely the extender's compliance with Grice's Cooperative Principle. The relation between Grice's Cooperative Principle and extender tags has already been introduced in Chapter 2 (cf. Section 2.3.3.1.2), and it was analysed in detail concerning *or something* and its function as a hedge on the maxim of quality (cf. Section 4.4.2.1). We will see in what follows that *and the like* is also used as a hedge in accordance with one of the maxims of the Cooperative Principle, namely the maxim of quantity:

> 1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
> 2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
>
> (Grice 1975: 45)

The two submaxims that form this maxim mark the limits of informativeness: the speaker should try to include all the pertinent information in his/her contribution, but, at the same time, try not to make it longer than necessary. Adjunctive extender tags are especially well suited for this purpose, given their intrinsic meaning of "there is more". Therefore, and given that the interlocutor is supposed, on the grounds of shared knowledge,

to be able to decipher any unstated information, the speaker can decide not to give more data than is strictly necessary, shortening his/her contribution by means of the extender tag, which implies that "more could be said, but there is no need to state it as you already know what I mean", thus adhering to the maxim of quantity. This very close relation of adjunctive extender tags and the maxim of quantity makes them an ideal tool to be used as hedges, and is, at the same time, the reason behind the overwhelming number of cases of *and the like* that show this function in my data, as Figure 5.41 below reflects. As seen here, 98.6% of the total of occurrences of the extender perform the function of hedges on the maxim of quantity. The remaining 1.4% of the cases correspond to instances where grammaticalization is more advanced and where the tag is rather used exclusively for an intersubjective function (cf. Section 5.4.2.2 below). The situation is very similar for every variant of the extender. *And such like* shows a higher proportion of cases of non-quantity hedge use, but only amounting to 1.9% of the total of its occurrences, which for the variant *and the like* barely reach 1.1%. In turn, all tokens of *and (poss.) like* function as hedges on the maxim of quantity.



Figure 5.41 The extender tag *and the like* as a quantity hedge (percentages)

In order to illustrate those cases where the extender tag is used as a quantity hedge, let us take (5.67) below. Here, the enumeration of things that are typical of a fair could be longer, but with the illustrations provided (*wild-beast shows, caravans* and *gingerbread stalls*) there is enough information for the interlocutor to be able to infer any unstated elements, so the maxim of quantity is not flouted thanks to the extender tag. The exception are cases like (5.68), where the speaker does not try to imply that there are unstated options apart from *a good supper*, as was the case with (5.67), but rather wants to soften the impact of his/her contribution, as a politeness device, so that it may not be received as if (s)he were showing off (cf. Section 5.4.2.2).

(5.67) *[T]he streets were swarming with people, and I concluded, from the number of wild-beast shows, caravans, gingerbread stalls,* ***and the like****, that a fair was being held.* (Borrow, George Henry. 1851. *Lavengro:* 216 (Vol. 2))

(5.68) *'Why does Mrs. Yeobright give parties of this sort?' Eustacia asked, a little surprised to hear merriment so pronounced.*
'It is not one of her bettermost parlour parties. She's asked the plain neighbours and workpeople without drawing any lines, just to give 'em a good supper ***and such like****. Her son and she wait upon the folks.'*
'I see,' said Eustacia.
(Hardy, Thomas. 1878. *The Return of the Native:* 296 (Vol. 1))

Both Table 5.22 and Figure 5.42 reflect a situation where the extender tag *and the like* performs the function of a hedge on the Gricean maxim of quantity in the vast majority of cases all through late Modern English, with very scarce cases of non-quantity hedging scattered throughout the period in question. I have found it unnecessary to include here the tables and figures corresponding to the different variants of the tag concerning their evolution with respect to this function, as the frequencies are almost identical to those presented below for the tag as a whole.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Yes	**63.9** (34)	**110.6** (195)	**22.8** (131)	**16** (37)	**6** (22)	**2.7** (14)	**14.3** (74)	**16.8** (164)	**12.2** (133)	**14.4** (72)	876
No	-	**0.6** (1)	**0.2** (1)	-	**1.1** (4)	**0.2** (1)	**0.2** (1)	**0.1** (1)	**0.2** (2)	**0.2** (1)	12

Table 5.22 Evolution of the extender tag *and the like* as a quantity hedge (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.42 Evolution of extender tag *and the like* as a quantity hedge (normalized frequencies)

When analysing the function of the extender tag *or something* as a quality hedge, some special types of quality hedges were identified, i.e. different approximators (cf. Section 4.4.2.1). Conversely, the extender tag *and the like* functioning as a quantity hedge does not display any variation of this kind. However, distinctions have been made concerning some special contexts where the extender has been attested to function as a quantity hedge: when they are used for (i) downgrading, (ii) to summarize reported speech and (iii) to shorten known facts or formulae. Such contextual variation has been differentiated from the extender conventional use as a plain quantity hedge, which is illustrated in (5.69) below. Here the extender *and such like gentry* is used in order not to lengthen the list of evil figures, given that the interlocutor

is supposed to have gotten the gist with the examples provided (*ghosts* and *witches*), and therefore to adhere to the maxim of quantity.

(5.69) *"This is a rare night for ghosts and witches,* ***and such like gentry****. I'll warrant all the old women in the parish are at this moment telling frightful stories round their fire-sides, about goblins, and fairies, and murders."* (Robinson, Mary. 1797. *Walsingham:* 205 (Vol. 3))

On some occasions the speaker may decide not to include further information because (s)he finds it unnecessary or unimportant and, furthermore, downgrades it by adding some pejorative word to the extender, as is the case of *and suchlike nonsense* in (5.70) below. Here, the speaker downgrades all that is related to romance, deciding not to add any more items to the list, which may not be exhaustive, but is considered informative enough at the point of abandoning it.

(5.70) *Who ever hears of darts, flames, Cupids, Venus's, Adonis's,* ***and suchlike nonsense****, in matrimony?* (Richardson, Samuel. 1754. *Sir Charles Grandison:* 43 (Vol. 6))

Another context where the extender *or something* acted as a hedge is reported speech. Similar examples are also attested for *and the like*. However, whereas in the case of *or something* hedging was used to imply that the quote may not be exactly reproduced word-by word, *and the like* is used in order to indicate that the citation is not reproduced in full, that there was more, but the reported part is enough for the interlocutor to understand what the speaker wants to convey. This is the case of (5.71), where the speaker adds the extender after the list of quotes to imply that other things were said as well, but reproducing them is not necessary for the informativeness of his/her statement, and (s)he complies in this way with the maxim of quantity.

(5.71) *Then there was a great hubbub,– cries of "Order," "Gresham," "Spoke," "Hear, hear,"* ***and the like****, – during which Sir Orlando Drought and Mr. Gresham both stood on their legs.* (Trollope, Anthony. 1874. *Phineas Redux:* 294 (Vol. 1))

The last special environment where we can find the extender *and the like* functioning as a quantity hedge is accompanying known facts or formulae. This category was suggested by Carroll (2007: 49), who observed

that commonly acknowledged set phrases were sometimes shortened by means of the tag, and she presented (5.72) as an example of this. In my late Modern English data from the ECF and NCF, *and the like* is used to hedge some known facts on a number of occasions, such as (5.73) and (5.74) below. In (5.73) the speaker presupposes his/her interlocutors to be familiarized with catholic religion and the stories about monks and nuns' religious experiences as they have been traditionally transmitted in Christian faith. Therefore, only a few illustrative examples are presented, relying on the interlocutor's capability to supply the unstated information and, at the same time, complying with quantity expectations. In turn, example (5.74) is somewhat different from (5.73). The speaker here does not rely on common knowledge to be able to understand the meaning behind the use of the tag, but rather on the fact that the unstated information has already been mentioned previously, which explains why (s)he does not find it imperative for the sake of informativeness to relate it again.

(5.72) = (2.90) *'A charme for to stawnchym blood… 'In nomine patris* ***et cetera****… I conjure the, blood…*
'A charme for stanching blood … In nomine patris **et cetera**… I conjure thee, blood…'

(Carroll 2008: 31)

(5.73) *"I jest upon monks and nuns, because I believe the vast majority of the tales told about them to be silly trash. Do you think I believe all those old women's fables about dungeons, and living sepulchres, and iron rods, and clanking chains,* ***and the like****?"* (Sala, George Augustus. 1862. *The Seven Sons of Mammon:* 274-275 (Vol. 2))

(5.74) *[W]e told him yes, and gave him a large Account of ourselves, and how we came to the Woman's House to enquire for some Master of a Collier to get a Passage to London, and that this Man engag'd to carry us to London in his own ship,* ***and the like****, as is related above.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1723. *Colonel Jack:* 142)

The situation that Figure 5.43 below depicts is almost identical to the one we have seen for the extender tag *or something* (cf. Figure 4.28 in Section 4.4.2.1): an absolute prevalence of the function as a plain hedge on quantity

is observed, with almost three quarters of the total of cases (72.7%). The next most common type is the function as a hedge on quantity occurring after reported speech, which amounts to 21.1% of the cases, with the other two contexts (downgrading and shortening known fact or formulae) lagging behind, which correspond to about 6% of the total of occurrences of the tag.



Figure 5.43 Distribution of quantity hedge uses of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

On the other hand, if we take a closer look at the different variants of the extender tag *and the like*, some differences are identified in what concerns the distribution of quantity hedging patterns. The variant *and (poss.) like* is not included in Figure 5.44 below because in its 12 tokens it functions as a simple hedge on quantity. Of the other two variants, *and the like* is the one that shows a smaller proportion of plain quantity hedge use (70.2%), with almost one quarter of occurrences hedging reported speech (24.7%). *And such like*, in turn, has a slightly higher rate of uses as a simple hedge on quantity (76.1%) and considerably less cases accompanying reported speech (just 15.5% of the total of occurrences), but it also shows the highest frequency of use of the downgrading function (4.8%). Although the most noticeable use of every variant of *and the like* is as a plain hedge on quantity, on the basis of the evidence presented here, it seems reasonable to assume that speakers

tend to resort to the variant *and the like* more frequently when hedging reported speech, while *and such like* is the preferred variant for downgrading.



Figure 5.44 Distribution of quantity hedge uses of the variants of the extender tag *and the like* (percentages)

As regards the diachronic development of the various quantity hedge uses identified in the data, the first part of the late Modern English period shows greater variability of use, as Table 5.23 and Figure 5.45 below reflect. This is presumably so because the earliest subperiods contain a larger amount of tokens of the tag, which makes it more prone to show a wider array of types of uses. Therefore, we observe in the first half of the 18th century an important presence of quantity hedges occurring after reported speech and, to a lesser degree, after known facts or formulae. Since then onwards, the use of the tag after reported speech becomes rather sporadic, while its use after known facts or formulae comes to be almost inexistent at the end of the period under analysis. The numbers for those quantity hedges used in a downgrading environment remain very low all through late Modern English, with very scarce tokens scattered throughout the period. It is, therefore, the plain hedge on quantity the function that outnumbers all the others and is the most frequent type of hedge on quantity over the time span considered in this dissertation, showing fluctuations in frequency that match the fluctuations that have been observed for the overall occurrence of the tag in the 18th and 19th centuries (cf. Figure 5.1 above).

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Hedge on quantity	**47** (25)	**66.4** (117)	**13.6** (78)	**10.4** (24)	**4.1** (15)	**2.3** (12)	**11.8** (61)	**13.6** (132)	**10.1** (110)	**13** (65)	639
Downgrading	-	-	**0.7** (4)	**0.4** (1)	-	-	**0.4** (2)	**0.9** (9)	**0.1** (1)	**0.4** (2)	19
Reported speech	**7.5** (4)	**37.4** (66)	**8.3** (48)	**4.3** (10)	**1.9** (7)	**0.4** (2)	**1.7** (9)	**1.6** (16)	**1.7** (19)	**0.8** (4)	185
Known fact or formula	**9.4** (5)	**6.8** (12)	**0.2** (1)	**0.9** (2)	-	-	**0.4** (2)	**0.7** (7)	**0.3** (3)	**0.2** (1)	33

Table 5.23 Evolution of quantity hedge uses of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.45 Evolution of quantity hedge uses of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

To sum up, the extender tag *and the like* is used as a hedge on the maxim of quantity in almost all its occurrences in my late Modern English data, much more frequently than *or something* as a quality hedge (cf. Section 4.4.2.1). This suggests a higher level of entrenchment of this function on the part of *and the like*, with which it is almost as common as those that were described as inherent traits of the tag, namely the assumption of shared knowledge and vagueness.

5.4.2.2 INTERSUBJECTIVE FUNCTION: THE EXTENDER TAG *AND THE LIKE* AS A POSITIVE POLITENESS DEVICE

The so-called intersubjective functions are those that relate the speaker with his/her interlocutor(s), i.e. those that show the stance and attitude that the speaker reflects in his/her speech towards the other participants in the speech act. As was the case with the extender tag *or something* (cf. Section 4.4.2.2), the only intersubjective function that has been found in relation with *and the like* is its performance as a politeness device, this time as a positive politeness strategy. As has already been pointed out (cf. Sections 2.3.3.2; 4.4.2.2), politeness devices are mechanisms used in order to deal with face concerns. This implies that all speakers are determined to avoid any face-threatening act with which they may be confronted in everyday interaction, by using strategies that are designed for such purpose. As we have already seen, extender tags serve as politeness devices, negative politeness devices in the case of disjunctive forms, as *or something*, while adjunctives, such as *and the like*, function as positive politeness strategies.

Positive politeness is related to the establishment of a connection between the speaker and his/her interlocutor(s), including them as members of an in-group whose needs and wants are desirable to the other members. One way to achieve this is by asserting common ground between the participants in the discourse, a function that, as we have already seen, is inherent to extender tags, both adjunctive and disjunctive ones. As the assumption of shared knowledge is related to both types of extender tags, we can say that any extender tag will be performing a positive politeness strategy in some way. By implying that "I do not have to say more because you already know what I mean", extender tags entail an appeal for the interlocutor's intersubjectivity, including both the speaker and the interlocutor as members of the same group, able to acknowledge what the other wants to imply in his/her appeal to common ground between both.

Therefore, given the intrinsic connection of extender tags with positive politeness, in this section I discuss only special cases where the extender

works exclusively as a positive politeness device, i.e. instances where *and the like* is devoid of any other meaning or function and where its use does not imply any additional items, being used exclusively as an appeal for solidarity. This function is, consequently, linked to forms that are supposed to be at a more advanced stage of grammaticalization (cf. Section 2.6.2). This is the case of (5.75) below:

(5.75) *She desired Mrs. Watkins, therefore, to let the gentleman know that she was not well, and could not see any body. "Why, Lord, Miss!" exclaimed the officious landlady, "what can you mean now by that? What, go for to refuse seeing such an handsome young man, who is a Lord,* ***and the like of that****? I am sure it is so foolish, that I shan't carry no such message."* (Smith, Charlotte Turner. 1788. *Emmeline:* 155 (Vol.1))

It can be seen from (5.75) above that the extender tag *and the like of that* does not imply that there are unmentioned additional items to be included (*who is a Lord* and what else? We cannot presume that he will have any other nobility title) or that the speaker wants to comply with the maxim of quantity by making her contribution shorter, as only one item precedes the tag and there is no evidence that any more could be added. The sole aim of the extender in this token is to try to bring both interlocutors closer; it is meant as an appeal for solidarity and understanding. By being used as a positive politeness strategy, the tag implies that the speaker wants to convey to her interlocutor that they both belong into the same group, that they can communicate and understand each other's needs and wants. Mrs. Watkins means her reprimand as an advise because she knows the situation being discussed and the parts involved and, therefore, presents her counsel, which she needs her interlocutor to understand as such; hence, the appeal for solidarity that the tag suggests. The use of the extender tag in this case does not imply any function other than being a hedge on positive politeness. Another such example is illustrated in (5.76) below.

(5.76) *"What! is that a dress for a sober girl, who ought to be a help to her mother, and to take care of her father in his old age?"*

> *"She does, Ma'am, do both, I'll assure you," answered Robin, terribly stung by this reproof, "and is a very good and dutiful child. And as to her fineries, Ma'am,* ***and such like****, you are sensible that I'm not myself no judge of them there things."* (Smith, Charlotte Turner. 1793. *The Old Mannor House:* 130 (Vol. 1))

Example (5.76) is very similar to (5.75) above. Here, the speaker, Robin, does not imply any additional items when he hedges the scope *fineries* with the extender tag *and such like*. He only wants to refer to the way the girl dresses (which is what is being discussed), and the presence of the extender is an appeal to the interlocutor's solidarity and understanding. At the same time, the extender is also used in order to hedge the fact that Robin disagrees with his interlocutor. This way, the speaker attempts to distance himself from the statement, playing down the information that is being presented, but trying at the same time to gain the interlocutor's comprehension by adding a solidarity appeal.

As explained above, each and every use of the extender tag has an implicit appeal to solidarity, since it is used as a way of signalling shared knowledge because of its intrinsic meaning of "I do not need to tell you more because you know what I mean". The number of cases that are used in my data solely for solidarity purposes is very low, as Figure 5.46 below evinces. The ECF and NCF yield only 12 tokens of the tag that can be categorized as positive politeness strategies, amounting to just 1.4% of the total of the occurrences of *and the like*.[108] Of these 12 tokens, six correspond to the variant *and the like* and the remaining six to the variant *and such like*. The variant *and (poss.) like* is not attested in the corpus as a positive politeness device.

[108] Note that these are the 12 tokens that did not function as hedges on the Gricean maxim of quantity (cf. Section 5.4.2.1 above).



Figure 5.46 Distribution of the extender tag *and the like* as a positive politeness device (percentages)

Regarding the evolution of the function of the extender tag *and the like* as a positive politeness device throughout the period under analysis, we can gather from Table 5.24 and Figure 5.47 below that the very few cases where *and the like* performs this function are scattered all through the late Modern English period. The data obtained from the ECF and NCF only attest to the existence of cases where the tag functions as a politeness device. However, there is no discernible diachronic development concerning this function.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Yes	-	**0.6** (1)	**0.2** (1)	-	**1.1** (4)	**0.2** (1)	**0.2** (1)	**0.1** (1)	**0.2** (2)	**0.2** (1)	12
No	**63.9** (34)	**110.6** (195)	**22.8** (131)	**16** (37)	**6** (22)	**2.7** (14)	**14.3** (74)	**16.8** (164)	**12.2** (133)	**14.4** (72)	876

Table 5.24 Evolution of the extender tag *and the like* as a positive politeness device (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 5.47 Evolution of the extender tag *and the like* as a positive politeness device (normalized frequencies)

The situation that I have just described for the use of the extender tag *and the like* as a politeness device is different from the one depicted for *or something* in Section 4.4.2.2 above. The latter tag showed a clear growth in use as a negative politeness mechanism as late Modern English advanced, evolving from no cases at the beginning of the period to a modest amount of occurrences in the latter part of the 19th century. For *and the like* there is evidence of its use solely as a positive politeness device, but such examples are very scarce over the period under analysis, although they are attested all through the 18th and 19th centuries.

6. GRAMMATICALIZATION OF EXTENDER TAGS IN LATE MODERN ENGLISH

The last chapter of the analysis of the extender tags *and the like* and *or something* in late Modern English is devoted to the evolution of these two tags throughout the period from the perspective of grammaticalization.

As seen in Section 2.6.2, research on the grammaticalization of extender tags is not extensive and, moreover, has focused on present-day synchronic data solely. Even those analyses which have been conducted using the apparent time method (with subjects belonging to different age groups) have not obtained clear results on the grammaticalization path for extender tags. Although the research presented in this dissertation gives only a partial picture of the evolution of each of the two forms under analysis, as I focus only on late Modern English, the period investigated comprises two centuries, a time span of sufficient length to allow the identification of changes in the diachronic development of these extenders through the 18th and 19th centuries. In addition, the results obtained here can be complemented by those for the same extenders in present-day English. It is also important to note that although the earliest attestations of *and the like* are previous to those of *or something*, the latter seems to have first appeared in the language in the period analysed here. The extender tag use of *or something* in previous stages of the language has not been documented (cf. Section 4.1.1). Therefore, the whole diachronic evolution of this extender tag can be traced with the combination of the data provided in this dissertation and that for present-day English.

When approaching grammaticalization, it is important to take into account that it is in the most frequently occurring forms that this process normally takes place. Both *or something* and *and the like* show relatively high rates of occurrence in the late Modern English period, as this was precisely one of the reasons that led to their choice for analysis in the first place (cf.

Section 3.2). On the other hand, we know that *or something* remains a high-frequency tag in present-day English, while *and the like* is much less common, so that a different path of evolution may be expected for each of them.

In this chapter I follow the approach presented for the analysis of the grammaticalization of extender tags in Section 2.6.2. I consider the various changes which have been explored in previous research as indicators of the grammaticalization of extender tags[109] to verify whether *and the like* and *or something* have undergone (or are undergoing) a process of grammaticalization in the late Modern English period. These indicators are phonetic reduction (cf. Section 6.1), decategorialization (cf. Section 6.2) and semantic-pragmatic change (cf. Section 6.3). The data used for the discussion in this section correspond to those already presented in Chapters 4 and 5, reconsidering characteristics of the tags that have already been examined. The aim here is to portray the grammatical evolution of the extender tags *or something* and *and the like* in late Modern English by analysing their formal and functional development as regards the aforementioned parameters over the period under examination.

6.1 PHONETIC REDUCTION

Phonetic reduction typically implies the loss of phonetic weight during the process of grammaticalization, which entails that the grammaticalized form is normally shorter and lighter than the one from which it evolves. In the case of extender tags, phonetic reduction has been understood as the gradual preference and replacement of the long forms of the extenders by their short counterparts, which, in a way, although it involves the loss of whole morphemes, also brings about a loss in phonetic weight. In Section 2.6.2 above, we saw that, despite the fact that some researchers acknowledge that this way of approaching phonetic reduction deviates from the standard norm,

[109] Cf. Cheshire (2007); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010); Overstreet (2011); Palacios Martínez (2011); Pichler & Levey (2011); Secova (2014); and Denis (2015).

this has been the one that has been adopted by all of them, admitting therefore that it is among the shorter and phonetically lighter forms that grammaticalization usually takes place. In other words, the less lexical information the extender contains, the easier it is for it to lose its original nuance and functions and adopt a new grammaticalized status.

In view of this, we expect that, in a normal grammaticalization scenario, we will be able to witness an increase over time in the use of short forms to the detriment of their longer variants. We have already explored the dichotomy between bare and extended forms of *or something* and *and the like* (cf. Sections 4.2.1.1 and 5.2.1.2, respectively). In what follows, I reproduce the data presented there to examine the evolution of both forms throughout the late Modern English period.

Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 below show the development of bare vs. extended forms of *or something*, while Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2 provide the same data for the extender tag *and the like*.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Bare	-	**1.1** (2)	-	**0.4** (1)	**0.8** (3)	**0.8** (4)	**1.2** (6)	**2.8** (27)	**3.9** (42)	**5.4** (27)	112
Extended	**7.5** (4)	**5.7** (10)	**2.6** (15)	**4.8** (11)	**4.1** (15)	**6.3** (33)	**6** (31)	**8.8** (86)	**6.7** (73)	**7.4** (37)	315

Table 6.1(= Table 4.2) Evolution of bare vs. extended forms of *or something* (normalized figures and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 6.1 (= Figure 4.3) Evolution of bare vs extended forms of *or something* (normalized frequencies)

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Bare	**52.7** (28)	**92.5** (163)	**13.9** (80)	**12.1** (28)	**4.4** (16)	**2.1** (11)	**8.9** (46)	**12.4** (121)	**10.3** (112)	**11** (55)	660
Extended	**11.3** (6)	**18.7** (33)	**9** (52)	**3.9** (9)	**2.7** (10)	**0.8** (4)	**5.6** (29)	**4.5** (44)	**2.1** (23)	**3.6** (18)	228

Table 6.2 (= Table 5.3) Evolution of bare vs. extended form of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 6.2 (= Figure 5.4) Evolution of bare vs. extended form of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 show that, in the case of *or something*, there are indeed signs of ongoing change in the period under analysis. It is not until the second half of the period that the tag begins to appear in its bare form consistently, and its frequency of occurrence increases steadily until the end of 19th century, even though extended forms are still more common than bare ones at this time. Therefore, forms like *or something like that* or *or something that affected his spirits* are still more frequent than the bare *or something* in late Modern English. However, bare forms are clearly on the rise, to the point that the rates of the two patterns come closer in the last subperiod. From this we could expect that, following this trend, bare forms will outnumber

extended ones in the years to come, which is, in fact, confirmed by present-day data.[110]

And the like, on the other hand, differs substantially from *or something* regarding phonetic reduction. Here, bare forms are more frequent than extended ones right from the beginning of the period, as Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2 evince. Apart from the idiosyncratic behaviour of the first two subperiods, product of Defoe's excessive use of this form and the considerable proportion of his works in the ECF material, we witness no other change in progress for this extender; there is no visible increase in the frequency of the bare *and the like* nor a decrease of occurrences like *and such like things* or *and the like of that*, for example. The behaviour of the extender tag *and the like* concerning phonetic reduction seems to be rather stable in late Modern English. It may be the case that this change took place sometime before this period or that this extender occurred preferentially in its bare form since its inception, a characteristic shown by other extender tags.[111]

If we take a closer look at the variants of the extender tag *and the like*, some differences can be observed between them, as reflected in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3 below. Disregarding the variant *and (poss.) like*, which is very infrequent and whose appearance is linked solely to bare instances of the tag, the variants *and the like* and *and such like* show some discrepancies. While *and the like* shows a preference for the bare form consistently all through the period, *and such like* displays clear signs of change: from a predominance of the extended forms during the first half of the 18th century to a prevalence of bare forms from the second half of the 19th century onwards. It seems, therefore, that the evolution of both variants has not taken place at the same pace, with *and the like* being already more frequent in its bare form all

[110] Cf. for example, Aijmer (1985; 2002); Overstreet (1999); Cheshire (2007); Terraschke (2009); Tagliamonte & Denis (2010); and Pichler & Levey (2011).

[111] See, for example, the evolution of *and stuff* in Ontario English, which showed signs of an advanced grammaticalization status from its earliest occurrences. This has been interpreted as a case of lexical replacement rather than as the result of grammaticalization by Denis (2015: 166).

through late Modern English, showing no signs of ongoing change, and *and such like* showing some progress in terms of phonetic reduction. Nevertheless, none of the variants of the tag *and the like* is very frequent in present-day English, as they are not often mentioned among the most frequently occurring tags.

AND THE LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Bare	**50.8** (27)	**89.1** (157)	**7.5** (43)	**11.2** (26)	**1.6** (6)	**1.5** (8)	**6.2** (32)	**8.2** (80)	**5.8** (63)	**5.2** (26)	468
Extended	**5.6** (3)	**12.5** (22)	**1** (6)	**1.7** (4)	**1.4** (5)	**0.2** (1)	**2.1** (11)	**1.3** (13)	**1.6** (17)	**2** (10)	92

AND SUCHLIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Bare	**1,9** (1)	**3,4** (6)	**6,4** (37)	**0,9** (2)	**2,7** (10)	**0,8** (3)	**2,7** (14)	**3,8** (37)	**4,3** (47)	**4,6** (23)	180
Extended	**5,6** (3)	**6,2** (11)	**8** (46)	**2,2** (5)	**1,4** (5)	**0,8** (3)	**3,5** (18)	**3,2** (31)	**0,5** (6)	**1,6** (8)	136

AND (POSS.) LIKE	*1700-19*	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Bare	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0,4** (4)	**0,2** (2)	**1,2** (6)	12
Extended	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 6.3 (= Table 5.4) Evolution of bare vs. extended form of the different variants of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)





Figure 6.3 (= Figure 5.6) Evolution of bare vs. extended form of the different variants of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

To sum up, concerning phonetic reduction, some traces of ongoing change are observed in the development of the extender tag *or something*, with bare forms becoming more frequent over time. On the other hand, *and the like* seems to remain rather stable over the 18th and 19th centuries, even though this tag seems to be further advanced in the path of grammaticalization concerning this feature, as bare forms are already more frequent than extended ones all through late Modern English.

6.2 DECATEGORIALIZATION

The process of decategorialization, when linked to extender tags, implies the development of a grammatical mismatch between the proform of the tag and its scope. The rationale here is that extender tags, when they first appear, are attached to scopes that share syntactic and semantic properties with their proform, being therefore in grammatical agreement with them. Over time, however, and as a consequence of their repeated use and increase in frequency of occurrence, extenders begin to appear in other types of contexts and linked to other parts of speech, even though this implies that scope and tag show grammatical mismatch. The more common the use of a tag is, the

more it is expected to occur in any type of context and stop being compelled by strict grammatical agreement requirements. The abandonment of this link between tag and scope leads the tag to become more independent of its scope in the process of grammaticalization. On some occasions, the tag can end up not necessarily being attached to any scope at all, as Overstreet & Yule (1997b: 256) prove for *and stuff* in present-day English.

The types of scope with which the two tags under analysis combine during the late Modern English period have been examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 (cf. Sections 4.2.4 and 5.2.4, respectively), along with the evolution of agreement trends between scopes and tags. In what follows I only address the latter issue, i.e. how grammatical agreement and grammatical mismatch between the tags and their scopes evolve through late Modern English, in order to check whether there are signs of ongoing decategorialization.

In the case of *or something,* the proform of the extender, the pronoun *something*, shows grammatical agreement with inanimate noun phrases, represented by the blue line in Figure 6.4, which, as we can also see from the data in Table 6.4, is the most common pattern of co-occurrence all through the late Modern English period. On the other hand, *or something* is in a situation of grammatical mismatch with animate noun phrases (the orange line in the figure), be it human or non-human. Nevertheless, we also come across a third scenario in the data, i.e. those cases where the tag combines with other parts of speech that are not noun phrases, including verb phrases, adjective phrases or even whole clauses, among others. This third option (the grey line in Figure 6.4), even though not showing strict grammatical disagreement with the tag, does not show agreement either, and it represents another way in which extender tags begin to appear in environments which are not the expected ones for them. Despite the fact that the combination of the extender tag *or something* with animate noun phrases is not very frequent in the late Modern English period, it is noticeable that some such instances begin to appear, specially from the second half of the period onwards. Cases where the extender occurs with non-nominal scopes, in turn, show a

significant rise in frequency throughout the period under analysis. All in all, it can safely be maintained that some signs of ongoing decategorialization of the extender tag *or something* can be found in late Modern English, as suggested by the visible growth of instances where the tag does not accompany its grammatically expected type of scope. However, cases where agreement applies are still the most frequent option. Nevertheless, if the trend identified here continued after the period covered in the NCF collection, it is predictable that the extender tag *or something* will appear with inanimate noun phrases as much as with any other type of scope in successive decades.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Agreement	**7.5** (4)	**3.4** (6)	**2.3** (13)	**3.9** (9)	**3.5** (13)	**4.4** (23)	**4.3** (22)	**8.6** (84)	**7.3** (79)	**8.8** (44)	297
Non-Agreement	-	**0.6** (1)	-	-	-	**0.4** (2)	**0.6** (3)	**0.5** (5)	**0.2** (2)	**0.2** (1)	14
Not Applicable	-	**2.8** (5)	**0.3** (2)	**1.3** (3)	**1.4** (5)	**2.3** (12)	**2.3** (12)	**2.5** (24)	**3.1** (34)	**3.8** (19)	116

Table 6.4 (= Table 4.10) Evolution of agreement between *or something* and its scope (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 6.4 (= Figure 4.15) Evolution of agreement between *or something* and its scope (normalized frequencies)

As for *and the like*, the proform is in grammatical agreement with any nominal element, so there are no cases of strict non-agreement. In other words, in contrast to what we have seen for *or something*, *and the like* can only either show concord with its scope, when co-occurring with noun phrases, or have as its scope other parts of speech and be therefore indeterminate as regards agreement. As was already mentioned above, the occurrence of the extender tag with a scope that is not the one that would be expected following grammatical agreement requirements can be considered as evidence of decategorialization taking place. However, as we can see from Table 6.5 and Figure 6.5 below, the evolution of the co-occurrence of *and the like* with expected or with non-expected scopes in the late Modern English period reflects a tendency that is the opposite of the one we witnessed for *or something*, inasmuch as it shows no signs of ongoing decategorialization. In fact, disregarding the highly idiosyncratic earliest subperiods, the co-occurrence of this extender with noun phrases, which are, therefore, in grammatical agreement with it, shows an increase, while cases of unexpected scopes become less frequent as the period progresses.

All in all, concerning the process of decategorialization of the extender tags *or something* and *and the like* in late Modern English, it can be affirmed that *or something* exhibits clear signs of decategorialization beginning to take place. On the contrary, the extender tag *and the like* does not show any indication of such process and, although during the first half of the period both patterns are almost on a par, agreement increases over the 19th century, a behaviour that does not comply with a decategorializing scenario.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Agreement	**41.4** (22)	**57.9** (102)	**15.5** (89)	**9.9** (23)	**3.5** (13)	**1.9** (10)	**11.6** (60)	**15** (146)	**10.3** (112)	**13.6** (68)	645
Not Applicable	**22.6** (12)	**53.3** (94)	**7.5** (43)	**6.1** (14)	**3.5** (13)	**0.9** (5)	**2.9** (15)	**1.9** (19)	**2.1** (23)	**1** (5)	243

Table 6.5 (= Table 5.13) Evolution of agreement between the extender tag *and the like* and its scope (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 6.5 (= Figure 5.26) Evolution of agreement between the extender tag *and the like* and its scope (normalized frequencies)

6.3 SEMANTIC-PRAGMATIC CHANGE

When approaching grammaticalization, semantic change and pragmatic shift are usually addressed as two separate processes. On the one hand, bleaching of meaning applies to the loss of the main nuance associated to the form being grammaticalized. In the case of extender tags, this main meaning is categorization, which is considered the core function that such forms tend to perform (cf. Section 2.3.2.1). On the other hand, at the same time that this primary semantic nuance is lost, pragmatic functions appear and extenders thus shift from expressing propositional meaning to acquiring interpersonal functions (cf. Section 2.6.2). In the case of the extender tags *or something* and *and the like* these are mainly the hedging function on the Gricean maxims and the politeness function.[112] However, although semantic bleaching and pragmatic change are interrelated, Pichler & Levey (2011) claim that is it not the case that pragmatic meanings automatically replace propositional ones,

[112] The different functions of the extender tags *or something* and *and the like* have been discussed in detail in Section 4.4 and Section 5.4, respectively.

but rather that "the set-marking meaning of [extender tags] gradually recedes while their intersubjective and other pragmatic/procedural meanings increasingly come to the fore" (2011: 450). Therefore, there is a stage when extender tags present both propositional and pragmatic meanings at the same time. Consequently, in what follows I operationalize semantic-pragmatic change in different stages, following Pichler & Levey (2011: 450): a first stage where only categorization is at work,[113] a second stage where the tag performs both categorization and interpersonal functions and a third and last stage where the tag retains only interpersonal nuances.

Let us consider first semantic-pragmatic change in connection with *or something*. Some occurrences of this tag belong to the first stage, in which only categorization is at work, as (6.1) instantiates. Moreover, instances are also found which correspond to stage 2, portraying a combination of the categorization function and an interpersonal function; thus, for example, in (6.2) the extender *or something of that kind* fulfils the Gricean maxim of quality apart from categorization. Finally, we also come across cases where categorization is no longer at work, and the extender is used with interpersonal functions only. An example is the use of *or something more* in (6.3), where it serves as an approximator with an amount.

(6.1) *"It's well these women must be blabbing – if they haven't a friend to talk to, they must whisper their secrets to the fishes, or write them on the sand* ***or something****."* (Brontë, Anne. 1848. *The Tenant of Wildfell Hall:* 65 (Vol. 3))

(6.2) *It was the night of a little party at the Doctor's, which was given on the occasion of Mr. Jack Maldon's departure for India, whither he was going as a cadet,* ***or something of that kind****.* (Dickens, Charles. 1850. *The Personal History of David Copperfield:* 170)

[113] We must bear in mind that, as mentioned in Section 2.3.1.1, intersubjectivity is always at work in the use of extender tags because of their intrinsic conveyance of shared knowledge, which explains why I do not take this interpersonal function into account when operationalizing semantic-pragmatic change in this section.

(6.3) *"Passing the cross and the little shire, go forward for a mile* ***or something more****, till you come to a small cabaret on the road side, …"* (Lever, Charles. 1844. *Tom Burke:* 220 (Vol. 1))

A further complication here is that when used as a politeness device, an implication of categorization is present in every use of *or something*. As has already been discussed in Section 4.4.2.2 above, when the extender tag is used in requests, offers and so forth, in an attempt to avoid imposing on the interlocutor, *or something* brings about an implicit suggestion of the existence of other options, as (6.4) demonstrates.

(6.4) *"'Well, if that's the case," replied Charles, "I think I should like a little sherry-and-water,* ***or something****," lifting up the half-emptied decanter, "if you could get me some hot water and sugar, or never mind the sugar, if Mrs. Thompson's got the keys."* (Surtees, Robert Smith. 1854. *Handley Cross:* 200)

The speaker in (6.4) asks his/her interlocutor to give him sherry-and-water to drink, and uses the extender tag as a negative politeness device, for the request to sound less imposing. However, at the same time, the use of *or something* here implies that other beverages would be acceptable as well, apart from that presented in the scope of the tag (i.e. *sherry-and-water*). Although categorization seems to be at work in this example, what the speaker is asking for is sherry-and-water and not some other alternative. In fact, he subsequently asks his interlocutor to fetch him hot water and sugar (in order to make sherry-and-water). Therefore, I have decided not to operationalize the function of categorization for the semantic-pragmatic change of *or something* in examples such as (6.4) above, despite the inherent implication in such cases that other options are possible. Moreover, in accordance with Traugott's (2010b) intersubjectification theory (which poses the following evolution: non-/less subjective > subjective > intersubjective), extenders should first acquire subjective functions, i.e. those that reflect the speaker's attitude towards the message (the Gricean maxim of quality in the case of *or something*) and, later on, they may come to realize intersubjective functions, i.e. those that encode the relation with the addressee (negative politeness in this case). Given that the expression of politeness is the most

advanced function of the extender tag in terms of (inter)subjectification, the one that should appear at a later phase, it is included here within the interpersonal stage, disregarding the inherent notion of categorization that *or something* implies when used as a negative politeness device.

Considering Table 6.6 and Figure 6.6 below, we can see clear traces of semantic-pragmatic change in the evolution of *or something*. First of all, those cases in the first stage (i.e. categorization) are the least frequent type all through late Modern English. In turn, the second stage (i.e. categorization + interpersonal function) is the most recurrent pattern over the period at issue here and it shows the same increase in frequency as was reflected in Figure 4.1 above for the overall use of the tag. Finally, we witness an important increase in the occurrence of *or something* serving an interpersonal function, in such a way that by the end of the 19th century the frequency of the interpersonal function is almost on a par with that of the tag functioning as a categorization + interpersonal device. It becomes evident from the data provided here that the extender tag *or something* is undergoing semantic-pragmatic change in the late Modern English period, acquiring pragmatic meaning over time. However, the extender seems to be at an intermediate stage as regards this change during the period at issue here, as its most widespread use (i.e. as a categorization and an interpersonal device) still shows its referential function at work.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Categorizing	**1.9** (1)	**0.6** (1)	**0.5** (3)	**0.4** (1)	**0.8** (3)	**0.8** (4)	**0.6** (3)	**2** (20)	**1.5** (16)	**2** (10)	62
Categorizing + Interpersonal	**3.8** (2)	**4** (7)	**1.6** (9)	**3.9** (9)	**3** (11)	**3.4** (18)	**3.9** (20)	**6** (58)	**6.1** (67)	**5.8** (29)	230
Interpersonal	**1.9** (1)	**2.3** (4)	**0.5** (3)	**0.9** (2)	**1.1** (4)	**2.9** (15)	**2.7** (14)	**3.6** (35)	**2.9** (32)	**5** (25)	135

Table 6.6 Evolution of semantic-pragmatic change of *or something* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 6.6 Evolution of semantic-pragmatic change of *or something* (normalized frequencies)

Let us now move on to the discussion of the semantic-pragmatic changes undergone by the extender tag *and the like*. The analysis of this extender presented an important shortcoming, which is that there are no cases corresponding to the first stage. The maxim of quantity, i.e. fulfilling the premise "do not make your statement longer than necessary" is present in all the occurrences of the tag, except in those cases where it functions as a positive politeness device (cf. Section 5.4.2.1). As the analyst, I find no systematic way of discriminating cases of categorization from those where the tag is used as a hedge on quantity. In (6.5) below, for example, the extender tag *and such like* is used as a categorization device, but the notion of stopping the listing at that point in order to comply with the Gricean maxim of quantity is present as well.

(6.5) *Seeing that my lady took an interest in the out-of-door work, and the farms,* ***and such like****, I took an interest in them too – with all the more reason that I was a small farmer's seventh son myself* . (Collins, Wilkie. 1868. *The Moonstone:* 18 (Vol. 1))

That way, we have only two stages at work in the case of *and the like:* stage 2, showing a combination of categorization and an interpersonal function, and stage 3, in which the extender functions exclusively within the expressive sphere. The functions that are therefore included within the expressive ones for the extender tag *and the like* are hedging in accordance with the Gricean maxim of quantity, as shown in (6.6) below, where *and the like* is a hedge on reported speech, and positive politeness, illustrated in (6.7).

(6.6) *I was overwhelm'd with the Sense of my Condition, being try'd for my Life, and being sure to be Executed, and on this Account, I cry'd out all Night, Lord! what will become of me? Lord! what shall I do? Lord have mercy upon me,* ***and the like****.* (Defoe, Daniel. 1722. *Moll Flanders:* 300)

(6.7) *"Ay, sir – we – eh – know, and are aware – that – poof – you do not like to hear some folk's names; and that – eh – you understand me – there are things, and sounds, and matters, conversation about names,* ***and such like****, which put you off the hooks – which I have no humour to witness."* (Scott, Sir Walter. 1832. *Redgauntlet:* 333 (Vol. 1))

As we can see in Table 6.7 and Figure 6.7 below, in what concerns semantic-pragmatic change, the extender tag *and the like* exhibits a very different evolution from that of *or something*. Unlike the latter, *and the like* does not show any signs of semantic-pragmatic change. The only time when the extender presents a high normalized frequency for the interpersonal functions only are those subperiods where the rate of occurrence of the extender itself is higher, i.e. those where Defoe's use of the tag is very conspicuous. However, even in these subperiods, the incidence of the extender is higher in the second stage (i.e. categorization + interpersonal function). In the ensuing decades, the frequencies of both patterns remain stable, with those cases in which the tag functions both as a categorization and an interpersonal device representing the most common pattern all through the period. In turn, the frequency of occurrence of the extender tag *and he like* with only interpersonal functions seems to decrease over time, which does not conform to the expected path of evolution for grammaticalizing extender tags.

	1700-19	*1720-39*	*1740-59*	*1760-79*	*1780-99*	*1800-19*	*1820-39*	*1840-59*	*1860-79*	*1880-1903*	*Total*
Categorizing + Interpersonal	**45.1** (24)	**70.3** (124)	**17.2** (99)	**13.4** (31)	**4.4** (16)	**2.5** (13)	**12.2** (63)	**14.7** (143)	**10.3** (112)	**13.4** (67)	692
Interpersonal	**18.8** (10)	**40.8** (72)	**5.7** (33)	**2.6** (6)	**2.7** (10)	**0.4** (2)	**2.3** (12)	**2.3** (22)	**2.1** (23)	**1.2** (6)	196

Table 6.7 Evolution of semantic-pragmatic change of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies and raw figures in brackets)



Figure 6.7 Evolution of semantic-pragmatic change of the extender tag *and the like* (normalized frequencies)

By way of summary, we have seen in this section that, concerning semantic-pragmatic change, the extender tag *or something* shows signs of ongoing change taking place in the late Modern English period, while the evolution observed for *and the like* points to stability. In other words, there is no observable evolution in the functions of *and the like* from the propositional to the interpersonal sphere, as is the case with *or something*.

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7. CONCLUSIONS

The goal of the present dissertation was to approach the analysis of extender tags from a historical perspective. Extender tags have been extensively examined over the past decades, but with a focus on present-day data almost exclusively, with the exception of the works by Carroll (2007; 2008) and Ortega Barrera (2012) on Middle and early Modern English. In this context, the main objective of this piece of research was to contribute to our knowledge of these forms from a historical perspective. The present investigation focused on the late Modern English period (1700-1900), a stage which, to my knowledge, is completely unexplored as regards extender tags.

For my purposes, two extender tags were selected for analysis, namely the forms *or something* and *and the like*. These extenders are representative of the two main categories into which these expressions are normally classified: disjunctive and adjunctive extender tags, respectively (cf. Section 2.2.3). In addition, these forms were chosen amongst the most frequently occurring extenders in the late Modern English period. However, the evolution they were hypothesized to have followed differs, inasmuch as *or something* remains the more frequent disjunctive extender tag to this day, while the adjunctive form *and the like* does not enjoy high-frequency status in present-day English (cf. Section 3.2). In order to observe their diachronic development in the 18th and 19th centuries, a detailed examination of the extender tags *and the like* and *or something* was conducted, paying attention to their formal features, as well as the functions they perform during the late Modern English period. In what follows, I offer a summary of the main findings obtained from the analysis, including first some remarks on their general features, and focusing then on an overview of the evolution of the two selected extenders from the perspective of grammaticalization.

As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, extender tags have been described as "pervasive features of conversation" (Aijmer 1985: 366), much more

commonly found in spoken language than in writing. In view of the impossibility to access speech from earlier stages of the language, two collections of literature containing novels, namely the ECF and the NCF, were selected as source of data for the present piece of research (cf. Section 3.1). Such choice was motivated, on the one hand, by the fact that novels contain fictional dialogue and show, therefore, a high degree of speech-likeness and, on the other, by the size of these collections (about 52 million words in all), which makes the ECF and the NCF a particularly suitable source of evidence for analysis, given that extender tags are a low-frequency phenomenon. Furthermore, the possibility to divide extender tag occurrences into those that appear in dialogues and those that occur in the narrative part of the novels offered the opportunity of seeing how each extender behaved as regards the claim that they are prototypical features of speech. The results obtained for the extender tags *or something* and *and the like* concerning their context of occurrence differ substantially. The former tag is attested to shift from occurring more frequently in the narrations to being more consistently found in the dialogues from the beginning of the 19th century onwards (cf. Section 4.3). The extender tag *and the like*, in turn, despite some fluctuation in the central part of the period under analysis here, shows a preference for non-conversational settings instead (cf. Section 5.3). Therefore, as concerns this textual feature, the only extender tag that seems to comply with the present-day assumption that extenders are more frequent features of speech is *or something*.

As regards the overall frequencies of the two extender tags under analysis over the late Modern English period, the ECF and the NCF yielded more than the double of tokens of the extender tag *and the like* (888 examples) than of *or something* (427 instances). This may be related to the fact that for the analysis of the extender tag *and the like*, three different variants were considered, i.e. *and the like*, *and such like* and *and (poss.) like* (cf. Section 5.1.2). Furthermore, it was noted in Section 3.2 that the search for *and the like* in the ECF and the NCF yielded a similar amount of items in both datasets, which is remarkable, as the former collection contains about 12

million words, while the size of the latter is approximately 40 million words. This unusual behaviour on the part of *and the like* is, in fact, the result of a highly idiosyncratic use of this extender on the part of one single writer, Daniel Defoe, whose body of work represents almost half of the production of the two earliest subperiods in the ECF analysed in this dissertation (from 1700 to 1739). Disregarding, therefore, the abnormally high figures attested in those subperiods, there are no noticeable changes in the frequency of occurrence of the extender tag *and the like* through late Modern English (cf. Section 5.1.2). *Or something*, by contrast, displays a steady increase in frequency of use over the period at issue here, especially from the early 19th century onwards (cf. Section 4.1.2).

Another generally acknowledged feature of extender tags in present-day English is that they "typically occur in clause-final position" (Overstreet 1999: 3), as discussed in Section 2.2.3. However, it is not always at the end of the clause that extenders were found to appear in my data but, rather, at the end of the phrase of which they are a part. This phrase can, in turn, occur in clause-final position or not. On some rare occasions, the extender can be attested in phrase-medial position, but this pattern has proved to be very unusual in my data for both *and the like* and *or something* (cf. Sections 5.2.3 and 4.2.3, respectively). The results obtained here, once more, offer substantial differences between both tags under analysis. On the one hand, *or something* occurs almost indistinctively in clause-final and non-final positions during the 18th century. However, a shift in tendency is observed in the 19th century, when the extender begins to occur in clause-final position more often. This positioning option for *or something* shows, furthermore, a steady increase in frequency from the beginning of the 19th century onwards (cf. Section 4.2.3). On the other hand, the extender tag *and the like* consistently occurs more frequently in clause-final position all over the period under analysis. There is, in addition, no observable pattern of evolution, as the situation regarding positioning preferences of *and the like* is quite stable.

The rest of the formal and functional features that have been explored in this dissertation are discussed in what follows in connection to the

evolution of the extender tags at issue from the perspective of grammaticalization. In order to explore the extent to which the extender tags *or something* and *and the like* progressed along the path of grammaticalization in the late Modern English period, three different changes have been addressed as main indicators of grammaticalization, namely phonetic reduction, decategorialization and semantic-pragmatic change (cf. Chapter 6).

As regards the extender *or something,* we have seen that this tag shows all the aforementioned indicators of grammaticalization. First of all, it exhibits clear traces of ongoing phonetic reduction, as there is a steady increase in the occurrence of the bare form of the tag at the expense of the expanded form as the period progresses (cf. Section 6.1). Secondly, the tag also begins to occur more consistently with unexpected scopes on the basis of grammatical agreement requirements, which means that the process of decategorialization is also advancing (cf. Section 6.2). Finally, there is also proof of semantic-pragmatic change at work in the period under analysis, as we witness a rise in the frequency of occurrence of the tag functioning with an expressive role, devoid of its original categorizing function (cf. Section 6.3). It must be noted, however, that the grammaticalization of *or something* in the late Modern English period is still at an intermediate stage, because the most common patterns in the ECF and NCF data are still the original ones: extended forms are more frequent than their bare counterparts, scopes that are in grammatical agreement with the tag are also the preferred option, as is the combination of categorization and an interpersonal function from the semantic-pragmatic point of view. Nevertheless, the fact that all the aforementioned indicators begin to appear and that their frequencies become higher over the 18th and 19th centuries is a clear sign that change is taking place at this time and that *or something* is undergoing the process of grammaticalization in the late Modern English period.

And the like, on the other hand, follows a very different path from that of *or something*. Unlike the latter, *and the like* does not show signs of ongoing change concerning the indicators of grammaticalization mentioned above.

The only area where the extender seems to have made some progress is that of phonetic reduction, as the bare form of the tag is more frequent than its extended counterpart all through the period under examination. However, if this situation is considered the result of phonetic reduction, the process must have taken place at an earlier stage in the history of the language (cf. Section 6.1). In what concerns decategorialization, the ECF and the NCF do not show much variation: the extender co-occurs with its expected scope in the majority of cases, whereas unexpected scopes, on the other hand, seem to decrease as time goes by (cf. Section 6.2). This rather unanticipated evolution is also attested in the case of semantic-pragmatic change, as the most advanced pattern, that in which the extender is devoid of its categorization function, seems to decrease in frequency along the period, which is not what would be expected for a grammaticalizing extender tag (cf. Section 6.3).

In view of these results, can we ascribe the changes undergone by the extender tags *or something* and *and the like* in the late Modern English period to the process of grammaticalization? Evidence suggests an affirmative answer in the case of *or something*, which shows signs of ongoing change for every indicator of grammaticalization analysed. It can safely be maintained that the tag is already at an intermediate stage in the path towards grammaticalization, as we see layering of the more conservative and the new patterns, the latter showing a steady increase in frequency over time. *And the like*, on the other hand, is a more dubious case. At first sight, it can be said that it has progressed further along the path of grammaticalization than *or something*, as it is more advanced in terms of phonetic reduction. Furthermore, as regards the other two indicators, *and the like* does not differ much from *or something*: the more conservative patterns are more frequent than the further grammaticalized ones. However, contrary to *or something*, *and the like* does not show any signs of ongoing change taking place in 18th and 19th century English. There are two possible explanations for this. The first one is that the results obtained here for the analysis of the different parameters of grammaticalization indicate that such processes took place at an earlier stage of the language. That way, the extender tag *and the like* must

have undergone the changes explored here sometime before the late Modern English period. Evidence that supports this claim is found in the dissimilar behaviour displayed by the different variants of the extender tag *and the like* concerning phonetic reduction. Whereas the variant *and the like* shows a preference to occur in its bare form consistently all through the period at issue here, *and such like* is more common in its extended form in the first part of the 18th century and eventually occurs more frequently in its bare form at the end of the late Modern English period. It may well be the case that *and such like* has lagged behind and has undergone phonetic reduction later than the variant *and the like*. Therefore, we can assume that the latter underwent at an earlier stage the same change concerning phonetic reduction that is observed at work here for the variant *and such like*. The second explanation, in turn, is that the extender tag *and the like* has, from the very beginning, been more frequent in its bare form, that it can accompany on occasion scope types that are not the expected ones under strict grammatical agreement requirements and that it can serve interpersonal as well as referential functions. In other words, it may be the case that the behaviour of *and the like* in my 18th and 19th century data is not the result of grammaticalization, but inherent to the extender tag from its earliest attestations. Unfortunately, there is no way of ascertaining which of the two explanations, if any, is the correct one without further research on stages of the language prior to late Modern English.

All in all, the evidence discussed here seems to point to *or something* being more advanced in the process of grammaticalization than *and the like*, for which this process (if it applies) seems to have already stopped in the period at issue. The fact that *and the like* has not progressed further along the path of grammaticalization may go a long way towards explaining its scarce presence in present-day data. Such loss of frequency may have led the tag to shift from being one of the most frequent extender tags in late Modern English to being a more occasional extender nowadays. Conversely, the evolution that *or something* shows concerning every parameter analysed in Chapter 6 may be the reason behind its present-day status as the most

frequent disjunctive extender tag and the one that is most advanced in terms of grammaticalization (cf. Section 3.2).

Additional evidence that points to *or something* being further advanced than *and the like* in terms of grammaticalization during the late Modern English period is found in the type of pragmatic markers that typically co-occur with these extenders. Pragmatic markers have been attested to appear in combination with other expressions which convey similar propositional or pragmatic content (cf. Section 2.6.2). Although the co-occurrence of pragmatic markers is rare with both *and the like* and *or something* in my data (around 10% of the occurrences in both cases), it is noticeable that those that were found to collocate more often with *or something* are mostly stance markers (especially those denoting doubt), with an observable rise in frequency of intersubjective markers in the course of the 19th century (cf. Section 4.2.5). These pragmatic markers point to more (inter)subjectified meanings of the extender tag *or something* over time. On the other hand, the extender tag *and the like* is consistently found to co-occur with exemplifying markers more frequently, its co-occurrence with intersubjectivity markers of the type *you know* being very rare and mostly restricted to the variant *and such like* (cf. Section 5.2.5). The fact that *and the like* collocates with exemplifying makers in the majority of cases in which some pragmatic marker is found can be taken as an indication that the tag is functioning mainly on the referential domain (as a categorization device).

It seems, therefore, that the starting hypothesis that the evolution of the extender tags *or something* and *and the like* was deemed to be different over the late Modern English period has been confirmed by the results of the present investigation. This way, the extender tag *or something*, whose earliest occurrences have been attested in the ECF data (cf. Section 4.1.1), is seen to rise in frequency over the period that concerns us here and, furthermore, to progressively show more present-day-like characteristics concerning every feature analysed in this dissertation. By contrast, despite the fact that the extender tag *and the like* seems to have evolved to a point in which the features it shows are comparable to those attested for *or something*,

this evolution must have taken place at an earlier stage of the language, as the situation depicted in late Modern English shows no discernible traces of ongoing change.

Still pending for future research, a varied array of topics have surfaced in the present dissertation. The first of these is the complete evolution of both *and the like* and *or something*, from their earliest occurrences to their current status. Another compelling research option would be to search for other extender tags within the ECF and NCF collections of literature, in order to complete the inventory of forms available in the late Modern English period and trace their historical evolution. All the aforementioned suggestions for future research are rooted in a formal and functional approach to extender tags, as the one followed in the present dissertation. Nevertheless, the historical analysis of these forms from alternative perspectives would also be an engaging topic for further investigation.

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RESUMO EN GALEGO

INTRODUCIÓN

Os denominados elementos de final de serie enumerativa (Cortés Rodríguez 2006a, 2006b), coñecidos en inglés como "general extenders", termo acuñado por Maryann Overstreet na súa obra *Whales, candlelight and stuff like that. General extenders in English discourse* (1999), constitúen o obxectivo principal da presente tese doutoral. Estes elementos poden definirse como expresións xenéricas do tipo de *ou algo*, *e así*, *e tal*, *etc*. que aparecen ó final dunha frase, ás veces en posición final de cláusula, e que teñen como función principal a de ampliar enunciados xa por si mesmos completos. Os seguintes exemplos en lingua castelá no caso de (1) e (2), e en inglés no caso de (3), serven como ilustración do uso de ditos elementos:

(1) *[T]ienes que meterte a trabajar echando horas* ***o lo que sea*** *o de aprendiz en un taller* ***o algo de eso.*** (Cortés Rodríguez 2006a: 89)

(2) *[A]unque la gente insulte, amenace,* ***y tal*** *no va a pasar nada pero hay que estar pendiente de esas cosas.* (Cortés Rodríguez 2006a: 96)

(3) *One Christmas I was tired of Santa Claus pictures* ***and all that stuff.*** (Denis 2015: 121)

Como se pode observar no título da tese, se ben decidín adoptar o enfoque de corte multifuncional proposto por Overstreet (1999), non foi así co termo acuñado por ela, senón que me decantei polo proposto por Ruth Carroll (2007), "extender tags", por resultares máis neutro ó non referirse singularmente a aqueles elementos que mostran unha especificidade xeral en contraposición a aquelas formas máis específicas, dado que na miña análise inclúo ambos tipos. Overstreet afronta esta diferenciación por medio da dicotomía entre "general extenders", que son aqueles que, como no caso de (4), o elemento de final de serie aparece só; e "specific extenders", que inclúen

información sobre o tipo de elementos que se poden engadir á lista, no caso de (5), por exemplo, Maya especifica "cousas dese tipo que non resultan moi atractivas" (*things like that that aren't real attractive*), para precisar o tipo de cousas ás que se desexa facer alusión.

(4) *Homer: It's, like, they're all stupid* ***and stuff.*** (*Simpsons Comics* 1994: 2, cita de Overstreet 1999: 22)

(5) *Maya: My nose runs and my eyeballs ooze* ***an' things like that that aren't real attractive.*** (Overstreet 1999: 52)

A terminoloxía utilizada para referirse a este tipo de formas en inglés é variada, como por exemplo "set-marking tags", "extension particles", "vague category identifiers", "generalized list completers", entre outras etiquetas que, por norma xeral, fan alusión á que cada un dos investigadores responsables da cuñaxe das mesmas considera que é a función principal destes elementos. Na actualidade, no ámbito da lingüística inglesa, "general extenders" é o termo máis estendido para referirse a eles, por resultares máis neutro que os mencionados con anterioridade, tendo en conta, asemade, que é difícil adxudicar unha soa función principal ós mesmos. De todos os xeitos, hai autores que aínda hoxe se decantan por outros termos para se referir a estas formas, polo que non é raro atopar artigos nos que se utilizan diferentes denominacións para elas.

As investigacións levadas a cabo co obxecto de analizar os elementos de final de serie enumerativa son cuantiosas e adoptan moi diversos enfoques, dende enfoques formais, funcionais, pragmáticos, sociolingüísticos ou comparativos entre diferentes linguas, ata enfoques multidisciplinares que inclúen diversos aspectos. Unhas perspectivas teñen recibido máis atención que outras e foron estudiadas de xeito máis exhaustivo pero, en liñas xerais, a información da que se dispón en relación a estes elementos é abundante e prolixa. Unha das áreas que, sen dúbida, ten quedado máis desatendida para a lingua inglesa é a de corte histórico e a concerninte á evolución diacrónica destas formas, xa que só un par de investigadoras achegan breves artigos sobre o estado destes elementos no inglés medio e moderno temperán: Ruth Carroll (2007, 2008) e Ivalla Ortega Barrera (2012). Este é, xustamente, o

motivo polo que decidín situar a miña investigación no inglés moderno tardío, unha etapa até o momento deserta de estudos relativos ós elementos de final de serie e que se atopa no medio dos dous períodos para os que si contamos con análises, o inmediatamente previo e o inglés actual.

Posiblemente, o motivo máis importante polo que as investigacións sobre os elementos de final de serie se teñen centrado case de xeito exclusivo no período actual estea relacionado co feito de que ditas formas son descritas como compoñentes característicos do discurso oral, que aparecen con maior frecuencia neste medio que no escrito. Isto foi comprobado por Palacios Martínez (2011), que contrastou as partes orais e escritas dos corpus do inglés británico ICE-GB e BNC, atopando neles claras evidencias de que, en efecto, os elementos de final de serie enumerativa son máis comúns na lingua oral que en textos escritos. A falla de corpus que conteñan discurso de etapas anteriores da lingua condicionou á case totalidade dos investigadores que teñen traballado neste tema a utilizar datos actuais. A mellor solución que se propón para superar este obstáculo é utilizar aqueles textos que mostran unha maior semellanza coa lingua oral; no seu caso, Carroll (2007, 2008) recorreu a un corpus de correspondencia persoal mentres que eu decidín acudir á novela. As novelas, ademais de conter multitude de diálogos que reflicten a forma de falar da época en cuestión, tamén son un claro reflexo da sociedade do seu tempo, no que se inclúe a forma de expresarse da xente que formaba parte dela. Asemade, os séculos XVIII e XIX son unha época moi prolífica de produción narrativa, o que ofrece unha cantidade moi importante de material do que extraer datos, o que resulta bastante favorable se temos en conta que os elementos de final de serie enumerativa son un fenómeno de baixa frecuencia. Para a miña análise utilicei dúas colección s da *Chadwyck-Healey Collection of Literature*, o *Eighteenth Century Fiction* (ECF) e máis o *Nineteenth Century Fiction* (NCF), que comprenden material dende o ano 1700 até 1903, é dicir o inglés moderno tardío, e engloban un total de 52 millóns de palabras entre os dous.

Os elementos de final de serie enumerativa divídense en dous tipos dependendo da conxunción que os introduza: son aditivos cando van

precedidos de *e* (*y* en castelán e *and* en inglés), como se ilustrou anteriormente en (2), ou disxuntivos se ocorren despois de *ou* (*o* en castelán e *or* en inglés), exemplificado por partida dobre por *o lo que sea* e *o algo de eso* en (1). Téñense documentado, inda que escasos, exemplos nos que non aparece explicitamente unha conxunción introdutoria dos elementos de final de serie enumerativa, pero pódese entender, polo contexto, se se trata dun elemento aditivo ou disxuntivo. Atendendo a esta diferenciación, e por falta de espazo para analizar de xeito pormenorizado e detallado todos os elementos de final de serie que se poden atopar no período que nos concirne, decidín escoller para a miña análise unha forma representativa de cada un destes dous tipos. A forma *or something* é a forma disxuntiva máis frecuente, non só no inglés moderno tardío, senón tamén na época actual, mentres que a forma *and the like*, pese a ser unha das máis habituais nas coleccións que serven de referencia, non goza do mesmo status no inglés contemporáneo. Coa análise destes elementos o meu obxectivo é describir as particularidades formais e funcionais de cada un deles, ó tempo que se observa a evolución que sufriron durante o período que nos compete e que os levou ó estado no que se encontran na actualidade, evolución previsiblemente diferente en cada un dos dous casos.

ANÁLISE DOS ELEMENTOS DE FINAL DE SERIE ENUMERATIVA *AND THE LIKE* E *OR SOMETHING* NO INGLÉS MODERNO TARDÍO

A forma aditiva *and the like* é moito máis frecuente que *or something* no inglés moderno tardío, cun total de máis do dobre de exemplos, 888 casos atopados fronte ós 426 da forma disxuntiva. Isto pode deberse a que *and the like* levaba en uso máis tempo, xa que o OED (*Oxford English Dictionary*) data en 1425 as primeiras aparicións desta forma, mentres que non aporta exemplos de *or something* até 1814. Así e todo, nos meus datos aparecen exemplos deste elemento xa no ano 1720; pero dado que nin Carroll (2007, 2008) nin Ortega Barrera (2012) inclúen *or something* no repertorio de formas que atopan nas súas investigacións, queda pendente precisar se esta é a data

da súa primeira aparición ou hai algunha anterior. Con todo, podemos asegurar que a forma aditiva precede á disxuntiva. Outra razón que pode explicar que *and the like* presente o dobre de casos que *or something* é que, na miña análise, decidín incluír tres manifestacións distintas deste elemento: *and the like*, *and such like* e *and his/her/their/your like*, xa que o OED as considera como variantes da mesma forma. Asemade, por norma xeral, as formas aditivas teñen sido documentadas como máis frecuentes que as disxuntivas. No que compete á evolución na incidencia das formas analizadas nesta tese, no ECF e NCF, a situación que se observa durante o período inglés moderno tardío é un claro incremento no uso de *or something*, que contrasta coa estabilidade que presenta *and the like*.

ASPECTOS FORMAIS

No que se refire ós aspectos formais, inclúo na miña análise a forma dos elementos, a súa especificidade, a posición que ocupan dentro da cláusula na que se atopan, o ámbito de referencia dos mesmos e a súa aparición na compaña ou non de marcadores pragmáticos.

Canonicamente, distínguese entre os elementos de final de serie enumerativa que ocorren na súa forma base daqueles que van acompañados de material léxico, as formas curtas das longas. As formas curtas ou base serían *or something* e *and the like* ou *and such like*, e as súas correspondentes formas estendidas poderían ser, por exemplo *or something like that*, *or something of that sort*, *or something that affected his spirits* no caso do elemento disxuntivo, e *and the like of that* ou *and such like discourses* como exemplos estendidos do aditivo. As formas obxecto de estudo distínguense entre si no xeito en que son estendidas, no que se refire á sintaxe. *Or something* adopta, no período que estamos a analizar, diferentes tipos de extensións que teñen como particularidade que son post-modificadores do pronome *something*, poden ser extensións que expresan similitude, como *or something like that*, frases adxectivas, como *or something better*, ou cláusulas de relativo, como *or something that affected his spirits*, entre outros tipos.

Tamén se rexistran casos que conteñen a combinación de dous tipos de extensións, estando así dobremente estendidos. No caso de *and the like*, doutra parte, as formas *the like* e *such like* tamén aparecen, aínda que en poucos casos, acompañados dunha frase preposicional semellante ás extensións de similitude que vimos con *or something*, como por exemplo *and the like of that*. Non obstante, na inmensa maioría dos casos estendidos, estas formas son adxectivos que aparecen en combinación cunha forma nominal coa que se atopan en relación atributiva, como, por exemplo, *and such like ordinary matters*. Nestes casos, *such like* non é o núcleo do elemento de final de serie, senón que cede o posto á frase nominal *ordinary matters* e pasa a ser un atributo que indica que "as cousas ordinarias" ás que se fai referencia son "deste tipo". Esta clase de extensión é moi pouco común entre os elementos de final de serie enumerativa e non se trata dunha extensión propiamente dita, xa que a forma base deixa de ser o núcleo da frase para pasar a ser o complemento do material que, en teoría, é a súa extensión. Unha posible explicación para este fenómeno é que a forma base ou curta evolucionase a partir deste tipo de construción até se converter nun pronome que asume o significado e función de elemento de final de serie por si mesmo. Esta é, asemade, unha das teorías máis estendidas no concerninte ó aspecto formal que estamos a analizar: que os elementos de final de serie enumerativa evolucionaron a partir das formas longas e que a tendencia é que, á medida que estes avanzan no seu proceso de gramaticalización, progresen cara o uso das formas curtas de forma exclusiva. No caso de *or something*, aínda que as formas estendidas do elemento son máis frecuentes durante todo o período inglés moderno tardío, obsérvase un incremento no uso das formas curtas cara o final do mesmo en detrimento das anteriores. Parece que este cambio comeza a tomar forma a partir do século XIX, e seguirá até o momento presente, no que as formas curtas son moito máis frecuentes que as longas. *And the like*, por outra parte, aparece de xeito máis común na súa forma curta que na súa forma estendida no período que nos concirne. Semella que esta evolución cara un uso máis habitual da forma base puido ter sucedido con anterioridade, e a situación que se observa no inglés moderno tardío é estable

respecto da forma deste elemento, sen grandes variacións. Compre salientar, porén, que se comparamos a situación das diferentes variantes deste elemento, vemos que *and the like* ocorre na súa forma curta de xeito máis frecuente durante todo este período, mentres que para *and such like* o cambio ten lugar a mediados do século XIX; até ese momento as formas estendidas son lixeiramente máis frecuentes que as curtas, pero estas últimas pasan a ser máis comúns a partir dese momento. Os poucos exemplos de *and his/her/their/your like* documentados no ECF e NCF (apenas 12 en total) tan só ocorren na súa forma base, pero non se atopan exemplos desta variante até a segunda metade do inglés moderno tardío.

Moi ligado á forma dos elementos de final de serie enumerativa está a especificidade dos mesmos, xa que esta depende unicamente do material léxico que acompaña á forma base. Aínda que a especificidade destes elementos non é unha dicotomía perfecta entre formas xerais e específicas, senón que esta diferenciación é máis ben gradual, os investigadores que traballaron neste tema simplifícano dividindo os elementos entre xerais e específicos, como tamén fago eu na presente análise. Todas as formas curtas ou base dos elementos teñen unha especificidade xeral, pero non todas as formas estendidas se consideran específicas, senón que depende do contido léxico do material que as conforma: aquelas que aparecen cun complemento de semellanza do tipo *like that* ou *of that kind* non achegan información precisa sobre as cousas ás que se está a facer referencia, así como as que conteñen nominais do tipo de *things* ou *stuff*, que tampouco resultan moi informativas, e que por isto se consideran de carácter xeral; aquelas formas que aparecen con material con maior contido léxico considéranse específicas. No período que estamos a analizar, tanto *or something* como *and the like* aparecen de xeito máis frecuente con especificidade xeral, pero no caso de *or something* os elementos específicos mantéñense estables, se ben hai un incremento importante no uso de formas xerais que comeza xa a mediados do século XVIII, mentres que no caso de *and the like* a situación é estable. Con todo, a variante *and such like* parece levar unha evolución máis tardía que *and the like*, xa que, até case a metade do século XIX, as formas xerais non

pasan a ser máis frecuentes que as específicas, as cales, no comezo do período, son máis comúns que as xerais. Esta evolución é un reflexo da descrita para a dicotomía entre as formas curtas e estendidas dos elementos e semella, ademais, que, atendendo á mesma, *or something* acabará por perder especificidade mentres que *and the like* pode que non sufra este cambio.

Nas primeiras investigacións sobre os elementos de final de serie, apuntábase a que estes aparecían canonicamente en posición final de cláusula. Co tempo acabouse por concluír que non era ó final da cláusula onde ocorrían, senón ó final da frase da que formaban parte, e esta, á súa vez, podía ou non estar en posición final de cláusula. É moi infrecuente que estas formas aparezan en posición media dentro da frase, pero existen exemplos nos que a enumeración continúa despois do elemento de final de serie. O certo é que, no inglés actual, o habitual é que estas formas aparezan ó final da cláusula, pero no período moderno tardío observamos comportamentos diferentes para *or something* e *and the like*: a forma aditiva mostra unha leve preferencia cara a apareceres ó final de cláusula, pero as frecuencias deste modelo e o de final de frase que non se atopa ó final da cláusula van moi parellas durante estes dous séculos, sen que se aprecie ningunha evolución a favor de ningún dos dous patróns; *or something*, pola contra, intercala ambas posicións até case mediados do século XIX, cando se observa un claro incremento de formas situadas ó final da cláusula, unha evolución que concorda coa situación que se observa na actualidade.

Os elementos de final de serie enumerativa aluden a un referente que os precede, ó que estenden coa implicación de que outros elementos similares tamén se poderían engadir a aquel ou aqueles mencionados no mesmo. Se valoramos o exemplo (2) ó respecto disto, "*aunque la gente insulte, amenace, **y tal***", os verbos *insultar* e *ameazar* son as referencias ás que alude o elemento de final de serie; outros conceptos que poderían estar a ser implicados polo mesmo son *faltar ó respecto*, *menosprezar* ou mesmo *zoscar*, por exemplo. Por norma xeral, observouse que os elementos de final de serie non teñen por que manter unha relación de gramaticalidade estrita cos membros do seu ámbito de referencia, como é o caso do exemplo que se acaba de analizar, onde dúas

formas verbais forman o referente dun pronome. O núcleo do elemento *or something* é o pronome *something* que significa 'algo', isto supón que para que se dea unha relación de gramaticalidade estrita, os referentes do mesmo deberían ser elementos nominais de carácter inanimado; calquera outro tipo de nome estaría incumprindo esta regra, así como tamén outro tipo de referente que non sexa nominal, aínda que este último non se podería considerar nunha relación de gramaticalidade ou agramaticalidade ó non se tratar dun nominal. De todos os xeitos, tendo en conta que tampouco sería estritamente gramatical, achegaríase máis ó segundo grupo. No caso de *and the like*, dado que o elemento nominal *like* abarca todo tipo de nomes, calquera estrutura nominal estaría automaticamente nunha situación de gramaticalidade estrita con este elemento, o que significa que non existen casos puros de agramaticalidade con *and the like*, senón que todo o que non sexan frases nominais pertencerían a ese terceiro grupo do que se falou con anterioridade. No ECF e NCF, *or something* acompaña a unha gran diversidade de referentes ademais de frases nominais: frases verbais, frases preposicionais, frases adxectivas, frases adverbiais, cláusulas subordinadas completivas e cláusulas independentes. *And the like* tamén ten variedade de referentes neste período; ademais dos mencionados para *or something*, aparecen algúns casos illados nos que unha cláusula subordinada de relativo é o ámbito de referencia do elemento. Así e todo, pese á gran diversidade de referentes que preceden a estes elementos no período que estamos a analizar, boa parte dos tipos mencionados anteriormente son bastante infrecuentes, e o máis habitual é que os elementos de final de serie enumerativa aparezan acompañando a unha forma nominal. *And the like* aparece consistentemente con elementos que se atopan en relación de gramaticalidade estrita, é dicir, con frases nominais. Os casos nos que aparece con formas non nominais son menos frecuentes durante todo o período; obsérvase, en todo caso, un leve incremento nos casos de gramaticalidade xa entrado o século XIX. No caso de *or something*, a pesar de que o máis habitual, con bastante diferencia, é que apareza con nomes inanimados cos que se atopa en relación de gramaticalidade estrita, si se aprecia un incremento constante dende

mediados do século XVIII dos casos nos que aparece tras formas que non son nominais. Os exemplos de nomes animados precedendo a este elemento e, polo tanto, agramaticais, son moi pouco frecuentes. Podemos concluír, logo, que *or something* e *and the like* teñen evolucións contrarias durante o inglés moderno tardío; aínda que ambos comparten a tendencia de aparecer con formas coas que manteñen unha relación de gramaticalidade estrita na maioría dos casos, esta parece aumentar no caso de *and the like* mentres que os casos contrarios se van facendo máis habituais con *or something*. Este último elemento parece que evoluciona cara unha situación de maior independencia sobre as normas de gramaticalidade, mentres que con *and the like* aumentan os casos que se adhiren ás mesmas.

Por último, no que se refire ós aspectos formais destes elementos, obsérvase que poden aparecer acompañados de marcadores pragmáticos, como por exemplo *xa sabes*, *como*, *sen dúbida*, *quizais* etc. Este tipo de expresións funcionan como reforzo do que os elementos queren expresar; por exemplo, se os elementos de final de serie funcionan como indicadores de intersubxectividade, poderán aparecer con expresións do tipo *xa sabes*, *xa me entendes* etc.; ou se expresan dúbida, estarán acompañados de *non sei*, *quizais*, *pode ser* e similares. Algúns estudos (Cheshire 2007) suxiren que, dado que estas expresións reforzan certos significados e funcións dos elementos, a medida que os mesmos deixen de requirir a súa presenza, significará que estes significados xa están máis afianzados nos propios elementos de final de serie, o que implica que o seu proceso de gramaticalización estará máis avanzado. Outras análises (Tagliamonte e Denis 2010) atoparon que a combinación que forman os elementos e este tipo de expresións non é moi habitual, ademais de que a frecuencia coa que os mesmos aparecen xuntos aumentaba en vez de diminuír co paso do tempo. No caso de *or something* e *and the like* no período que nos compete, a porcentaxe de casos que aparecen na compaña dalgunha expresión deste tipo é de arredor do 10% en ambos casos, o que significa que tal combinación é moi infrecuente. A escaseza de expresións deste tipo non se pode atribuír a un maior grado de gramaticalización destes elementos.

ASPECTOS TEXTUAIS

Tal e como se comentou na introdución, nalgúns estudos comprobouse que os elementos de final de serie aparecen máis habitualmente na lingua oral que en textos escritos. Para corroborar se esta tendencia se manifesta xa no inglés moderno tardío, clasifiquei os elementos analizados segundo aparecesen dentro dunha conversación ou na parte narrativa das novelas do ECF e do NCF. No caso de *or something* obsérvase un cambio de tendencia: ó comezo do período é máis común atopalos na parte narrativa, pero á metade do mesmo, ó comezo do século XIX, comeza a ser máis habitual que aparezan nos extractos dedicados a conversas entre os personaxes. Este incremento de formas usadas nas partes discursivas é constante durante o resto do período, mentres que a frecuencia destes elementos na narrativa vai en diminución. No caso de *and the like*, pola contra, a situación é bastante diferente; este elemento flutúa entre aparecer en conversacións e partes narrativas durante todo o período, pero é lixeiramente máis habitual na narración. Esta situación é totalmente contraria á que se observa no período actual e que é, ó mesmo tempo, a tendencia que apunta tamén *or something*.

FUNCIÓNS DOS ELEMENTOS DE FINAL DE SERIE

As funcións que se lle teñen atribuído ós elementos de final de serie enumerativa son moi abundantes e variadas. Nun primeiro momento argumentouse que funcionaban unicamente como elementos de extensión que sinalaban que a lista que os precedía estaba incompleta e que outros elementos similares se poderían engadir á mesma; co tempo pasouse a soster que tamén desempeñaban certas funcións expresivas ou emotivas, defendendo ademais o seu carácter multifuncional. Tendo en conta que unhas funcións tenden a solaparse con outras, é moi pouco habitual que tan só presenten unha única función. Este é, precisamente, o enfoque que adopto para a miña análise, na que intento comprobar como se comportan estes

elementos con respecto a todas aquelas funcións propostas na bibliografía especializada sobre o tema. Considero que dúas das funcións que se lles teñen atribuído, a de sinalar coñecemento compartido e a de elementos de vaguidade para seres máis precisos, máis que funcións que poden ter ou non, son trazos característicos dos elementos, presentes en todos e cada un dos seus usos, polo que non os inclúo entre as funcións analizadas. Na miña opinión, ambos os dous significados, tanto o de vaguidade como a implicación de que existe un coñecemento común co interlocutor, forman parte intrínseca do significado de calquera elemento de final de serie enumerativa. Dado que o seu uso principal é suxerir que outros elementos poderían ser engadidos ós xa presentes no ámbito de referencia dos mesmos sen os explicitar, suponse un coñecemento compartido co interlocutor, dado que este debe poder identificar a información implícita. Por outra parte, o feito de que esta información non se expoña de forma manifesta leva consigo un nivel de vaguidade intencional por parte do falante.

En canto ás funcións que desempeñan estes elementos no inglés moderno tardío, estas divídense en dous tipos: referenciais e expresivas ou emotivas. A función referencial por antonomasia, que se lles atribuíu historicamente a estes elementos como función principal durante moitos anos, é a de categorizadores, que supón que os elementos que forman o ámbito de referencia destas formas pertencen a unha categoría e que o elemento de final de serie enumerativa implica que outros membros da mesma poderían ser tamén engadidos á enumeración. En (6), por exemplo *light carts, or chaises* ('carros lixeiros' e 'carruaxes'), forman unha categoría de tipos de vehículos dos que podía dispoñer a xente do campo no século XIX en Inglaterra. Ó pechar a enumeración co elemento de final de serie *or something of that sort*, o falante implica que outros elementos pertencentes a esta categoría se poderían ter engadido á mesma, pero non se considera preciso facelos explícitos, dado que o interlocutor comparte co falante o coñecemento dos mesmos.

(6) *"There are farmers about here; and farmers have light carts, or chaises, **or something of that sort.**"* (Collins, Wilkie. 1870. *Man and Wife:* 64 (Vol. 2))

Durante o período que estamos a analizar, tanto *or something* como *and the like* funcionan na gran maioría dos casos como elementos de categorización; son escasas as ocasións nas que esta función non está presente. Canto á referencia explícita da categoría no texto, *or something* pasa de ter categorización explícita de forma máis habitual a que a mesma non apareza no texto na segunda parte do período. Pola contra, *and the like* non parece precisar de que a categoría apareza de forma explícita, xa que o máis habitual é que a mesma non se manifeste no texto durante todo o inglés moderno tardío. En teoría, podería considerarse que a función de categorización está máis asentada cando a mención da categoría non aparece explicitamente no texto, polo que semella que esta función está máis asentada no caso de *and the like* que no de *or something*, no que apreciamos como esta evolución comeza a tomar forma no período que se está a analizar.

A outra función referencial que se lles ten atribuído a estas formas é a de sinalar o final dunha lista enumerativa, o que significa que a mesma se dá por completada e, ó mesmo tempo, ironicamente, que esta está incompleta (dado que o elemento implica que se poderían engadir máis membros á mesma). O número mínimo de elementos para que se considere que se está facendo unha lista son tres, polo que a combinación de dous ou máis exemplos co elemento consideraríase unha lista, debido a que o elemento xa se considera como un exemplo máis. Doutra parte, aqueles casos nos que un só exemplar preceda ó elemento non se poderían considerar unha lista, xa que ambos sumarían un total de tan só dous elementos. No caso de *or something*, o máis habitual é que este apareza en combinación cun único exemplar, polo que non estaría a realizar a función de completar unha lista. Ademais, co paso do tempo, este patrón vaise afianzando e facendo aínda máis frecuente. Pola contra, no caso de *and the like* si aparece esta función de forma máis común, sendo os casos nos que non se realiza máis escasos durante todo o período inglés moderno tardío. Compre destacar que a función de pechar unha lista

foi descrita como máis frecuente nos elementos aditivos que nos disxuntivos no inglés actual. Non obstante, a pesar deste dato, é posible que a situación que se reflicte neste período indique unha evolución diferente para os dous elementos obxecto de estudo, sendo *or something* máis independente desta función que *and the like*.

As funcións expresivas ou emotivas son aquelas que se centran no falante e a súa individualidade e divídense, á súa vez, en dous tipos: subxectivas, que son aquelas que expresan a actitude do falante con respecto á mensaxe que está a producir, e intersubxectivas, que reflicten a súa relación co interlocutor. A única función que atopei dentro das funcións subxectivas é a de mitigadores das máximas de calidade e cantidade de Grice (1975), para o elemento disxuntivo e aditivo, respectivamente. A máxima de cantidade estipula que a mensaxe debe ser o suficientemente informativa segundo requira a situación e, ó mesmo tempo, esta non debe ser máis informativa do estritamente necesario. Tanto os elementos de final de serie enumerativa aditivos como os disxuntivos son especialmente adecuados para limitar a informatividade da mensaxe, pero esta función ten sido aplicada de xeito especial coas formas aditivas debido ó seu significado de 'hai máis elementos que se poderían engadir á lista', pero que, co obxectivo de non ser máis informativo do necesario, estes non se inclúen, senón que se sinala esta particularidade por medio do elemento de final de serie. Mediante o uso do mesmo, evítase incluír no ámbito de referencia todos os membros ós que se quere facer referencia, acurtando a enumeración e adecuándose así á máxima de cantidade de Grice. En vista dos exemplos analizados, considerase que, salvo en moi contadas excepcións de exemplos que se atopan nun estado de gramaticalización máis avanzado, esta función aparece en todos os usos de *and the like*. Por tanto, no período inglés moderno tardío, esta forma funciona como mitigador da máxima de cantidade de Grice en case todas as súas aparicións. A máxima de calidade, para a que se ten considerado que as formas disxuntivas fan de mitigadores, convén que non se debe dicir aquelo que cremos falso ou de cuxa veracidade non se dispón de probas. *Or something* utilízase en moitos casos para sinalar que a mensaxe que se está a producir

é imprecisa ou pode non ser correcta. O falante achega a información da que dispón, inda que non está seguro de si esta é ou non correcta, pero marca esta dúbida co elemento de final de serie nun intento por respectar á máxima de calidade. En (7) vemos que o falante intúe, pola forma de vestir da persoa da que está a falar, que esta é metodista ou cuáquera, pero non ten probas da veracidade disto. Polo tanto, sinala co elemento de final de serie *or something of that sort* que poida que non estea no correcto e sexa outra a opción a atinada (opción que non se menciona, pero que o mesmo elemento implica).

(7) *"I saw she was a Methodist, or Quaker,* ***or something of that sort****, by her dress, but I didn't know she was a preacher".* (Eliot, George. 1859. *Adam Bede:* 101 (Vol. 1))

No período obxecto de estudo, o elemento de final de serie disxuntivo funciona como mitigador da máxima de calidade de Grice en tres cuartas partes das ocasións nas que aparece nos textos do ECF e NCF, un pouco menos do sinalado para a forma aditiva con respecto á máxima de cantidade. Asemade, o seu uso como mitigador de calidade non se ve alterado ao longo do período, senón que esta función permanece estable. Compre destacar que co aumento no uso deste elemento cara mediados do século XIX, tamén se observa un aumento de casos nos que non funciona como mitigador da máxima de calidade, aínda que acompañado tamén dun aumento de casos nos que si presenta esta función, polo que o resultado final é estabilidade no que se refire a este uso do elemento.

Por último, a única función intersubxectiva que se observou nos datos para *or something* e *and the like* foi a de marcadores de cortesía. De igual xeito que no caso anterior, diferénciase entre a función da forma aditiva como mitigador de cortesía positiva e da forma disxuntiva como mitigador de cortesía negativa. No caso deste último, funciona en ocasións para evitar a potencial ameaza á imaxe do interlocutor, en situacións como propostas, ofertas, invitacións ou peticións, onde existe o risco de que poida parecer que se está a impor unha opción sobre o interlocutor. *Or something* ten entón a función de suxerir que outras opcións son tamén posibles, entre as que o interlocutor pode elixir. Vexamos como exemplo o caso de (8), onde o falante

lle pide ó seu interlocutor saír fora e propón un par de opcións, *to the stairs or the garden* ('ás escaleiras ou ó xardín'), pero engade o elemento de final de serie a continuación, primeiramente para evitar que a proposta sexa entendida como unha imposición e, por outra parte, para dar a entender que outra opción diferente ás mencionadas tamén sería aceptable.

(8) *"[C]an't we get out to the stairs or the garden* ***or something****?"* (Somerville, Edith Oenone & Martin Ross. 1984. *The Real Charlote:* 146 (Vol. 2))

No caso de *and the like*, cando funciona como mitigador de cortesía positiva, o que se busca é establecer unha conexión entre o falante e o interlocutor, presentándose como membros dun mesmo grupo, polo que se supón un entendemento mutuo das súas necesidades e desexos. Para conseguires este entendemento, unha forma moi estendida é establecer que ambos comparten un coñecemento común como parte da mesma sociedade. Esta presuposición de que o interlocutor poderá interpretar a mensaxe satisfactoriamente é un trazo característico dos elementos de final de serie, como xa se comentou con anterioridade. Podemos observar no caso de (9) que o elemento de final de serie enumerativa non ten outra función que intentar achegar o falante ó seu interlocutor; *and the like of that* non pode implicar que, aparte de *Lord*, a persoa á que se están a referir teña outros títulos nobiliarios e, ó mesmo tempo, inda que se poida pensar que se usa para adherirse á máxima de cantidade, tendo tan só un elemento no ámbito de referencia, esta opción non é tampouco a máis probable.

(9) *"Why, Lord, Miss!" exclaimed the officious landlady, "what can you mean now by that? What, go for to refuse seeing such an handsome young man, who is a Lord,* ***and the like of that****? I am sure it is so foolish, that I shan't carry no such message."* (Smith, Charlotte Turner. 1788. *Emmeline:* 155 (Vol. 1))

Exemplos deste tipo, onde só se observa a función de estratexia de cortesía positiva son moi pouco frecuentes no inglés moderno tardío, e os poucos casos que se atopan están espallados de xeito aleatorio por este período. No caso de *or something*, o seu uso como mitigador de cortesía negativa é un pouco máis común, inda que só se observa nun 10% dos casos analizados. Pese a isto, cabe destacar que este uso aparece na segunda

metade do período e que se observa un leve incremento na súa frecuencia cara mediados e finais do século XIX, o que apunta a que esta función é nova para *or something* e que aparentemente se irá consolidando pouco a pouco.

GRAMATICALIZACIÓN

Por último, incluíuse na presente tese unha breve sección na que, por medio dos datos recompilados e analizados anteriormente, se observa a evolución de cada unha das formas analizadas no que se refire ó seu estado de gramaticalización no período inglés moderno tardío. Como indicadores de gramaticalización tomáronse os seguintes: a redución fonética dos elementos de final de serie, a descategorización, e mais o cambio semántico-pragmático.

A redución fonética correspóndese coa perda de carga fonética. Canonicamente, esta tería lugar dentro dunha mesma palabra, pero en relación cos elementos de final de serie, a redución fonética enténdese como o paso de usar as formas estendidas ao uso habitual das formas curtas. Unha evolución coherente cun escenario de gramaticalización apuntaría cara o uso exclusivo das formas base destes elementos en detrimento das formas estendidas dos mesmos.

No que se refire á descategorización dos elementos de final de serie enumerativa, esta implica un aumento progresivo da súa independencia con respecto á situación de gramaticalidade estrita entre os mesmos e o seu ámbito de referencia. Xa se comentou ó falar dos aspectos formais dos elementos que estes non tiñan por que acompañar estruturas coas que se atopasen nunha relación de gramaticalidade estrita, senón que era común que aparecesen con calquera tipo de frase ou cláusula. Nunha situación de gramaticalización en curso, observaríase un aumento de casos nos que o elemento e o seu ámbito de referencia non se atopan nun estado de gramaticalidade estrita. Esta medra de independencia do elemento pode desembocar nun illamento total do mesmo até aparecer só, sen estar ligado a ningún ámbito de referencia que o preceda, como se observou no caso de *and stuff* no inglés actual (Overstreet e Yule 1997b: 256).

Nos estudos de gramaticalización, os cambios semánticos e pragmáticos obsérvanse normalmente por separado, pero debido a que, no caso dos elementos de final de serie enumerativa, o cambio semántico, que é a perda do significado principal do elemento (neste caso, o significado de categorización), leva normalmente asociado a aparición ou aumento doutras funcións pragmáticas, algúns autores propoñen a análise conxunta de ambos aspectos (Pichler e Levey 2011: 450). Xa se comentou que o significado e función principal que se lles ten atribuído a estes elementos é o de categorización. De estar estes inmersos nun proceso de gramaticalización, deberíase observar unha diminución no seu uso como categorizadores ó mesmo tempo que se advertiría un aumento doutras funcións de tipo expresivo ou emotivas.

Os datos analizados para o período inglés moderno tardío no que compete a gramaticalización dos elementos de final de serie enumerativa *and the like* e *or something* reflicten unha situación bastante conservadora, na que se aprecian certos cambios que comezan a tomar forma, pero que aínda non se atopan nunha fase avanzada. Dita circunstancia, ó mesmo tempo, é moi diferente no caso de cada un dos elementos que se están a analizar. *Or something* presenta claros signos de evolución para cada un dos indicadores de gramaticalización explicados previamente: obsérvase un incremento importante cara finais do período no uso das formas curtas do elemento; tamén se aprecia un aumento de casos nos que acompaña ámbitos de referencia cos que non se atopa en situación de gramaticalidade estrita; tamén é notable o acrecentamento das funcións de tipo emotivo que presenta a partir de comezos do século XIX. Así e todo, o máis habitual é que o elemento presente os patróns máis conservadores en cada un dos indicadores que acabamos de mencionar: as formas longas son máis frecuentes que as curtas, aparece de forma máis recurrente na compaña de elementos nominais inanimados e a súa función máis común é a de categorización durante todo o período. Non obstante, o feito de que se observen os valores arriba comentados supón que o proceso de gramaticalización do elemento *or something* parece empezar a tomar forma dentro deste período. *And the like*, pola contra, pese

a estar máis avanzado en canto á súa redución fonética, xa que aparece de xeito máis habitual na súa forma curta, e presentar un estado similar a *or something* para o resto dos indicadores (con maiores frecuencias dos patróns máis conservadores), non mostra ningún tipo de evolución en ningún dos indicadores estudados: non se aprecia un incremento no uso de formas curtas, nin signos de descategorización ou de cambio semántico-pragmático, xa que a situación con respecto a todos estes parámetros é estable durante o período obxecto de estudo. Non podemos precisar se a situación que se observa pode ser debida a un cambio que puido ter lugar nunha etapa anterior e quedar fosilizado, non avanzando máis no proceso de gramaticalización, ou se este elemento non entrou nunca neste proceso. Non obstante, o feito de que se observe dentro da variante *and such like* o cambio de redución fonética durante o inglés moderno tardío (pasando de ser máis frecuentes as formas longas a un uso maioritario das curtas) pode indicar que a evolución do mesmo foi máis tardía que a da variante *and the like* e que, en efecto, os cambios observados tiveron lugar nun estadio anterior da lingua.

Como xa se apuntaba na introdución como hipótese, a evolución dos dous elementos analizados nesta tese de doutoramento non parece apuntar cara a mesma dirección. Semella que *or something* está a entrar nun proceso de gramaticalización no período inglés moderno tardío que se intúe que continuará no futuro, o que se corresponde coa situación descrita para o mesmo na actualidade. Por outra banda, *and the like* presenta unha situación de estabilidade, que implica que o proceso de gramaticalización se interrompeu e que o seu uso quedou fosilizado, o que puido ter provocado que se deixase de usar este elemento. Isto explicaría que *and the like* xa non se atope entre os elementos de final de serie enumerativa máis frecuentes no inglés actual, pese a selo no período moderno tardío.